Carlton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

WENDY RENEÉ CARLTON CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 26-156

ALPHABET INC., et al. SECTION M (2)

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Alphabet Inc. (“Alphabet”)

pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) (lack of standing as a component of subject-matter jurisdiction) and

12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The motion is

substantially similar to the one filed by defendant Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”).2

Alphabet, like Microsoft, argues that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing is

warranted because plaintiff’s rambling, incoherent complaint does not state any facts showing that

she suffered an actual, concrete, and particularized injury in fact that is traceable to any specific

act of Alphabet or that Alphabet, a private entity, took any particular action that violated her Fourth

or Fourteenth Amendment rights.3 Additionally, Alphabet, like Microsoft, advocates for dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, arguing first that plaintiff, in her complaint, does

not plead any facts whatsoever as to Alphabet.4 Alphabet also contends that dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6) is appropriate because, as a private entity, it cannot be held liable for constitutional

violations.5

1 R. Doc. 35.

2 R. Doc. 14.

3 R. Doc. 35-1 at 4-5.

4 Id. at 6.

5 Id. at 6-7.

Plaintiff Wendy Reneé Carlton, who is proceeding pro se, responds in opposition.6 Similar

to her opposition to Microsoft’s motion to dismiss, Carlton contends here that she has standing

and has stated a claim against Alphabet because she alleges that she has observed patterns in

Alphabet’s operating systems that violate her rights.7 She also conclusorily states (or, alternatively

framed, asserts her suspicion) that Alphabet jointly participated with the government so as to be

liable for the violation of her constitutional rights.8

In reply, Alphabet argues that the Court should dismiss Carlton’s claims against Alphabet

for the same reasons it dismissed her claims against Microsoft – namely, lack of standing and

failure to state a claim.9 Alphabet also contends that Carlton’s opposition did not address her

pleading deficiencies and that discovery would amount to a fishing expedition.10 Moreover,

Alphabet points out that Carlton cannot establish by speculation that it is a state actor.11

Having considered the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court

finds that Alphabet’s motion to dismiss should be granted for the same reasons as was Microsoft’s

motion to dismiss, namely, the Court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over Carlton’s claims

against Alphabet for want of standing, and the complaint’s failure to state any viable claims against

Alphabet.12

6 R. Doc. 37. A court liberally construes a pro se party’s filings and those filings are held “to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” United States v. Davis, 629 F. App’x 613, 618 (5th Cir. 2015)

(quotation omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff is still claiming the benefit of the courts and must adhere to its

procedures and the substantive law. See Thorn v. McGary, 684 F. App’x 430, 433 (5th Cir. 2017) (observing that a

pro se plaintiff is not “exempt ... from compliance with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law” (quotation

omitted)). “A court will squint at pro se filings to discern what may be there – but it will not see things that are not

there.” Brown v. Brown, 2025 WL 1811326, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2025) (citing Smith v. Barrett Daffin Frappier

Turner & Engel, L.L.P., 735 F. App’x 848, 851 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[T]here are limits on how far we will go to assist pro

se plaintiffs.”)).

7 R. Doc. 37 at 1-7.

8 Id. at 5.

9 R. Doc. 39 at 1-2.

10 Id. at 2-3.

11 Id. at 3-4.

12 See R. Doc. 33. Carlton’s mantra that she “observed recurring communications, system-generated outputs,

and system behavior that deviated from expected account activity within Defendant-operated systems,” R. Doc. 37 at

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Alphabet’s motion to dismiss (R. Docs. 35) is GRANTED, and

Carlton’s claims against it are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 30th day of April, 2026.

________________________________

BARRY W. ASHE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2; see also id. at 3-5, 7, merely describes, at the most general of levels, her own perceptions; it does not delineate “a

standard of care for liability,” as Alphabet aptly notes. R. Doc. 39 at 3.