Harrell

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CLAYTON DEAN HARRELL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-CV-210-JFH-JAR

RODNEY DERRYBERRY, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Clayton Dean Harrell (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner appearing pro se and

proceeding in forma pauperis, has filed a complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt.

No. 1. This matter is before the Court for screening of the complaint under the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the following

reasons, the Court finds that the complaint is subject to dismissal.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested for neglect or abuse of his mother, a vulnerable adult,

and that Deputy Sheriff Timbo DeWitt promised Plaintiff’s mother he would “let [Plaintiff] out of

jail” if she gave him pills. Dkt. No. 1 at 20. Plaintiff alleges that DeWitt received pills from his

mother on a continuing basis until her death and that Defendant Deputy Sheriffs Monks and Wess

promised Plaintiff that they would get the charges for neglect or abuse dropped if he provided

evidence of DeWitt’s wrongdoing. Id. at 19. Plaintiff claims that after providing the evidence,

DeWitt was fired but Defendants Monks and Wess failed to follow through on their promise.

Plaintiff then asserts that, on September 17, 2024, Defendant Kyle Drummond “broke 7

bones in [his] face with a bat that was loaded with lead.” Id. at 10. He claims he called the Sheriffs

about the incident but that the Sheriff’s Office failed to take any action against Drummond.

Plaintiff alleges he was then arrested for domestic assault and battery on September 24, 2024, and

that the LeFlore County Jail failed to give him his antibiotics or pain medications in relation to his

injuries. Id. Plaintiff additionally asserts the LeFlore County Jail is not handling his grievances

“in a fair manner,” that the Assistant District Attorneys sought “vengeance” against him for his

role in getting DeWitt fired, and that his lawyer’s advocacy was deficient. Id. at 11, 18.

Plaintiff names twenty defendants in this action and raises twenty claims for relief.

Plaintiff requests monetary relief and that each defendant be “reprimanded” and “relieved from

duty.” Id. at 22. He additionally appears to seek “acquittal” from the “current charge” against

him.1 Id. Though Plaintiff does not specify whether he sues defendants in their individual or

official capacities, the Court assumes for purposes of this Order that he sues each defendant in

both capacities. See Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1161 n.5 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Section 1983

plaintiffs may sue individual-capacity defendants only for money damages and official-capacity

defendants only for injunctive relief.”).

LEGAL STANDARD

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner who “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity,” the Court must screen his complaint to “identify cognizable

claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Further, an action

brought by a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis may be dismissed “at any time” under these

same standards. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the

1 “[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration

of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release . . . .” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477, 481 (1994). Accordingly, this request for relief is improper under § 1983.

Court must “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly

support a legal claim for relief.” Alvarado v. KOB TV, LLC, 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 n.2 (10th Cir.

2007). The Court “must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and . . . construe those

allegations, and any reasonable inferences that might be drawn from them, in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir.

1999). While the Court must liberally construe a complaint drafted by a self-represented plaintiff,

the rule of liberal construction “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient

facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110

(10th Cir. 1991).

DISCUSSION

“Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged

constitutional violation.” Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir. 1997). Thus, in the

context of § 1983 cases, it is “particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who

is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of

the claims against him or her.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)

(emphases in original); see Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 435 (10th Cir.

2014) (explaining that supervisory liability requires “an ‘affirmative link’ between the supervisor

and the constitutional violation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff named multiple

Deputy Sheriffs and jail staff and two Assistant District Attorneys in his pleading. Yet, in several

claims, Plaintiff broadly refers to “the jail,” “the Sheriffs,” “the Sherriff’s Office,” and/or “the

Assistant District Attorneys” without naming specific individuals or differentiating their conduct.

Plaintiff’s lack of specificity and differentiation as to the conduct of Defendants renders his

allegations insufficient to state plausible claims for relief against them.

Further, Plaintiff’s claims against “the Sheriffs” and the “police chief” primarily are

predicated on their failure to “press charges” against Defendant Drummond for his alleged assault

on Plaintiff. “[A] private citizen,” however, “lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the

prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748,

767 n.13 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.

614, 619 (1973)). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim for relief under § 1983

based on the decision not to pursue charges against Defendant Drummond.

Plaintiff’s claims against the “Assistant District Attorneys” likewise fail. Plaintiff broadly

asserts that the Assistant District Attorneys demonstrated bias, prejudice, and selective

enforcement against Plaintiff in relation to his criminal proceedings and suppressed evidence at

his preliminary hearing. Dkt. No. 1 at 17-18. These alleged actions, however, relate to the

Assistant District Attorneys’ performance of functions “intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). As such, the

Assistant District Attorneys are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See id. at 431 (“[I]n

initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, [a] prosecutor is immune from a civil

suit for damages under § 1983.”); Esquibel v. Williamson, 421 F. App’x 813, 816 (10th Cir. 2010)

(“Absolute prosecutorial immunity applies to . . . claims that a prosecutor willfully suppressed

evidence.”).2

As for Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Drummond for the alleged assault and against

Plaintiff’s defense attorney for alleged deficiencies in advocacy, Plaintiff has failed to show that

either individual acted under color of state law, as required for § 1983 liability. See Bruner v.

2 The Court cites unpublished decisions herein as persuasive authority. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a);

10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

Baker, 506 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (10th Cir. 2007) (“In order to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must

allege the violation of a [constitutional right], and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Plaintiff provides no allegations suggesting Defendant Drummond is a governmental officer or

employee or was acting pursuant to municipal or state authority. See Dkt. No. 1, at 8; Am. Mfrs.

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (explaining that “the under-color-of-state-law

element of § 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory

or wrongful’”). Similarly, “it is well established that neither private attorneys nor public defenders

act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when performing their traditional functions as

counsel to a criminal defendant.” Dunn v. Harper Cnty., 520 F. App’x 723, 725-26 (10th Cir.

2013) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not

stated a plausible claim for relief under § 1983 against Defendant Drummond or Plaintiff’s defense

attorney.

What remains are Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Monks and Wess for their alleged

failure to assist Plaintiff in exchange for evidence against Deputy Sheriff DeWitt. Plaintiff alleges:

“Deputy Jeff Monks and his side kick Deputy Wess promised me if I give them the evidence to

get Timbo [DeWitt] fired that they would redress my situation and get [the domestic assault and

battery] charge off of me. . . . [Monks] and Wess said they would make it clear to the DA and other

officials that I was outside of my character the day I was arrested.” Dkt. No. 1 at 19. Plaintiff

cites the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments in relation to his allegations against Defendants

Monks and Wess, but he fails to specifically assert what constitutional right he believes they

violated. Id. Without more, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to meet the plausibility standard. Further,

it is not apparent that the alleged actions of Defendants Monks and Wess could be construed as

actions under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. See Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375,

1379-80 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding Sheriff did not act under color of state law when “provid[ing]

the facts upon which the Information was ultimately based” because such action was “similar to

that of any other citizen” and did not implicate the power granted to him by the state).

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities, dismissal

likewise is appropriate. “[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated

as a suit against the entity” of which the officer is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

165-66 (1985). As to the municipal officials, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged: “(1) the existence

of a municipal policy or custom; and (2) a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the

injury alleged,” as required to establish municipal liability. Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3d 1215,

1218 (10th Cir. 2006). As to the two Assistant District Attorneys named as defendants in this

action, official-capacity claims for damages are precluded due to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

See Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1153 (2001) (explaining that

“under Oklahoma law, a district attorney is an arm of the state”). And while the Ex parte Young

exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity permits “suit[s] against individual state officers

acting in their official capacities if the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and

the plaintiff seeks prospective relief,” Plaintiff has not alleged an ongoing constitutional violation

against the Assistant District Attorneys. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1166

(10th Cir. 2012). Nor can Plaintiff’s request that Defendants be “reprimanded” and “relieved from

duty” be properly characterized as prospective, as the request pertains to alleged “past harms.”

Buchheit v. Green, 705 F.3d 1157, 1159 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Because [the plaintiff] is merely

seeking to address alleged past harms rather than prevent prospective violations of federal law, we

can only reasonably categorize such relief as retrospective.”).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court determines Plaintiffs Complaint is subject to dismissal under

28 U'S.C. § 1915A(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). However, because Plaintiff appears without

counsel and it is not plainly apparent that amendment would be futile as to all claims, the Court

grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to cure the noted deficiencies. See Hall, 935

F.2d at 1110. Plaintiff is advised that, if he files an amended complaint, he must identify all

defendants he intends to sue and the capacities in which he intends to sue them, and he must clearly

identify the constitutional violations for which he seeks redress and support his claims with

sufficient facts to demonstrate each defendant’s personal participation. Plaintiff is further advised

that the amended complaint must be on the Court’s approved Pro Se Prisoner Civil Rights

Complaint form.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint [Dkt. No. 1] is dismissed

without prejudice. Plaintiff may file within fourteen (14) days of this Order an amended complaint

on the Court’s approved Pro Se Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint form. Failure to do so will result

in the dismissal of this action without prejudice and without further notice.

Dated this 6th day of May, 2026.

C )etd tL2wW

JOHN F. HEIV, Ill

CHIEF UNHED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE