HUGHES

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANJIE HUGHES, : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff, :

: NO. 22-3712

v. :

:

MUHLENBERG TOWNSHIP :

POLICE OFFICER MALACHI :

SCHMIDT, et al., :

Defendants. :

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J. FEBRUARY 23, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Anjie Hughes, (“Plaintiff”), individually and as the Administratrix for the Estate

of her father Stephen Hughes, (“Hughes”), filed this wrongful death and survival action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (“Section 1983”), and 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8301-8302, against Defendants

Muhlenberg Township Police Officers Malachi Schmidt, (“Officer Schmidt”), and Michael Travis,

(“Officer Travis”), (collectively, “Defendants”).1 In her complaint, Plaintiff avers that Defendants

entered Hughes’ home without consent, warrant, exigent circumstances, or other legal justification,

and that, once inside the residence, Defendants broke into Hughes’ bedroom and tased and fatally

shot him.

1 Section 1983 provides that an individual may bring a civil action for the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, while Sections 8301 and 8302 to Title 42

of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes provide that all causes of action survive an individual’s death

and for a cause of action for the recovery of damages when death is caused by a wrongful act or negligence.

See Williams v. Rutala, No. CV 24-2132, 2025 WL 3008816, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2025) (first citing

Cappel v. Aston Twp. Fire Dep’t, 693 F. Supp. 3d 467, 496 (E.D. Pa. 2023); and then citing Donahue v.

Borough of Collingdale, 714 F. Supp. 3d 504, 508 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2024)) (finding that Sections 8301 and

8302 are “vehicles through which” Section 1983 claims may be brought).

Plaintiff asserts the following claims against Defendants: a Pennsylvania state-law battery

claim, (Count I); a Section 1983 claim for unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, (Count II); and a Section 1983 claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, (Count III).2 Discovery ensued and was completed.

Presently, before the Court are Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (see ECF 29),

filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, (“Rule”), 56, and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for

partial summary judgment with respect to Count II of the complaint, (see ECF 30). In their motion,

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on all claims based on their defense

of qualified immunity and Pennsylvania state law immunity. Plaintiff contests Defendants’

entitlement to any immunity and, as to Count II, argues that she is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law due to the lack of a genuine factual dispute pertinent to her unlawful entry claim. The issues

in the motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.3 For the reasons set forth herein,

Plaintiff’s motion is denied, Defendants’ motion is granted, and this matter is dismissed.

BACKGROUND

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must consider the evidence in the

light most favorable to the non-movant; in this case, Plaintiff. See Qin v. Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th

458, 469 (3d Cir. 2024). With respect to Plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgement, the

2 While Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is labeled as “Count II” in her complaint, (see ECF 1), it is

referred to by the parties as “Count III” in summary judgment briefing. Thus, the Court refers to Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim as Count III.

3 The Court has also considered each parties’ respective opposition briefs, (see ECF 33, 34).

court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the Defendants.

The facts relevant to Plaintiff’s claims and Defendants’ motion are as follows:4

At the time of the events, Hughes resided at 706 Wagon Wheel Lane,

Muhlenberg Township, Pennsylvania, (hereinafter, the “Residence”), with his

elderly mother, Geraldine Hughes, (“Ms. Hughes”).5 He was 62 years old.6

Plaintiff is Hughes’ daughter and Ms. Hughes’ granddaughter. Plaintiff had not

been present during the tragic events of March 14-15, 2021.

On March 14, 2021, at Ms. Hughes’ request, Kristy Killian, (“Killian”),

visited with Hughes at the Residence to discuss Hughes’ need for medical mental

health assistance.7 Killian is Ms. Hughes’ granddaughter and Hughes’ niece. Ms.

Hughes had reached out to Killian because Killian shared a close bond with

Hughes.8

On that day, Killian spoke with Hughes for approximately an hour.9 Killian

heard him say he was “ready for God,” which Killian understood to mean that he

was ready to die. During their conversation, Hughes held a knife near Killian’s

face and said, “I could kill you right now if I wanted to.”10 Ms. Hughes felt that

Killian failed to make any headway convincing Hughes that he needed help.11

Seeking advice and additional guidance, Killian contacted Mr. Albert, a certified

recovery specialist and intervention professional, to discuss alternative treatment.12

4 These facts are gleaned from the parties’ briefs, exhibits, and statements of facts. To the extent that

any fact is disputed, such dispute will be noted and, if material and supported by record evidence, may be

construed in Plaintiff’s favor.

5 (Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, (“SOUMF”), ECF 31 at p. 1 ¶ 2) (citing

Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF 1 at ¶ 10).

6 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 6 ¶¶ 45, 54).

7 (Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at p. 14).

8 (Dep. of Ms. Hughes, ECF 31-7 at p. 33, 35).

9 (Id. at p. 35).

10 (Plaintiff’s Opposition Brief, (“Pltf’s Brief”), ECF 34 at p. 4); (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 6 ¶ 51) (citing

Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at p. 16); (ECF 31 at p. 8 ¶ 72) (citing Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at pp.

34-35, 41).

11 (Dep. of Ms. Hughes, ECF 31-7 at p. 35, 54-55).

12 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 11 ¶¶ 109-10) (citing Dep. of Albert, ECF 31-5 at pp. 10-11); (Dep. of

Killian, ECF 31-2 at p. 101).

Although Ms. Hughes denies being then aware that Hughes had threatened

Killian with a knife, the parties appear to agree that Ms. Hughes told Plaintiff about

the incident the evening of March 14, 2021, and that Plaintiff considered Hughes’

behavior to be threatening.13 Ms. Hughes told Plaintiff that Killian had the situation

under control and was going to call Mr. Albert.14 That same evening, Ms. Hughes,

frightened because Hughes was yelling and screaming, hid inside a closet and again

called Killian for help addressing Hughes’ behavior.15 Ms. Hughes insisted they

reconvene in the morning.16

The following day, on March 15, 2021, Plaintiff called her grandmother to

ask if “everything was okay because her ‘dad had been like kind of all over the

place.’”17 Ms. Hughes told Plaintiff that Killian was going to handle matters with

Hughes, so Plaintiff did not go to the Residence that day.18

Separately, Mr. Albert called Ms. Hughes and believed her to be upset,

concerned, and in fear.19 Ms. Hughes told Mr. Albert that Hughes had hit her, was

bipolar, not taking his medication, had cancer, and was drinking that day.20 The

call was disconnected and, when Mr. Albert called back, Hughes answered the

phone, called Mr. Albert a profanity, and hung up.21 Ms. Hughes called Killian to

let her know that the call with Mr. Albert did not go well and asked her to come

and try and talk to Hughes again, telling her to “do what you have to do.”22

Concerned for Ms. Hughes’ safety, Mr. Albert called Killian to encourage her to

get to Ms. Hughes right away and to call 911 en route.23

13 (Id. at p. 5 ¶¶ 36-37) (citing Dep. of Plaintiff, ECF 31-1 at pp. 39-41); (Dep. of Plaintiff, ECF 31-

1 at p. 39-42).

14 (Dep. of Plaintiff, ECF 31-1 at p. 42-43).

15 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 13 ¶¶ 127, 131) (citing Dep. of Ms. Hughes, ECF 31-7 at pp. 30-32, 72-

73); (Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at pp. 21-22).

16 (Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at pp. 21-22).

17 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at pp. 4-5 ¶¶ 35, 38) (citing Dep. of Plaintiff, ECF 31-1 at pp. 35-36).

18 (Id.) (citing Dep. of Plaintiff, ECF 31-1 at p. 48).

19 (Id. at p. 12 ¶ 111) (citing Dep. of Albert, ECF 31-5 at p. 16).

20 (Id. at ¶ 113) (citing Dep. of Albert, ECF 31-5 at p. 18).

21 (Id. at ¶ 114) (citing Dep. of Albert, ECF 31-5 at pp. 19, 23).

22 (Dep. of Ms. Hughes, ECF 31-7 at pp. 45, 73-74, 96, 98); (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 13 ¶ 131).

23 (Id. at p. 5 ¶¶ 40-41, ¶ 115) (first citing Dep. of Albert, ECF 31-5 at p. 19; and then citing Dep. of

Killian, ECF 31-2 at p. 23-24).

Killian, believing she had the authority to remove Hughes from the house,

went to the Residence.24 In the interim, Ms. Hughes left the Residence — as she

felt that leaving was necessary.25 Upon arriving, Killian saw Hughes in the kitchen

making coffee and told him that she was calling for help and that he needed to pack

his bags.26 At approximately 2:15 p.m., she stepped outside to call the Muhlenberg

Township non-emergency line to request that police officers be dispatched to the

Residence.27 The call was rolled to 911.28

Killian told the 911 operator that Hughes was “being very threatening” and

requested an officer as soon as possible.29 She also advised that she needed

assistance getting Hughes to the hospital.30 The dispatcher notified Officer

Schmidt of the call and described the substance of the call; Officer Schmidt decided

to respond to the Residence.31 After hanging up, Killian went back into the

Residence to tell Hughes that the police were on their way.32 In response, Hughes

stood at the top of the Residence’s stairwell with a knife and said, “I will be ready

for them.”33

Hughes’ threatening response prompted Killian to call 911 a second time to

again request officer presence and advise that Hughes was aware officers were

coming and that he had a knife with a six-to-eight inch blade, would fight, and was

unlikely to cooperate.34 Killian told the dispatcher: “[the officers] have to come.”35

Killian also told the dispatcher that Hughes had threatened her with a knife the day

24 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at pp. 5, 7 ¶¶ 42, 56) (citing Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at pp. 11, 112).

25 (Dep. of Ms. Hughes, ECF 31-7 at pp. 73-74); (ECF 31 at p. 13 ¶ 131).

26 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 5 ¶ 42) (citing Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at p. 11).

27 (Pltf’s Brief, ECF 34 at p. 3).

28 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at pp. 5-6 ¶ 44) (first citing Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at pp. 11, 28-32; then

citing Incident Report Form, ECF 31-2 at pp. 164-68).

29 (Incident Report Form, ECF 31-2 at p. 164).

30 (Id.).

31 (Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at pp. 24-27).

32 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 6 ¶ 46) (citing Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at p. 13).

33 (Id. at p. 6 ¶ 47) (citing Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at p. 13).

34 (Incident Report Form, ECF 31-2 at pp. 164-65).

35 (Id.).

before.36 She also gave the dispatcher Hughes’ physical attributes and advised that

he lived with his mother-her grandmother, was an alcoholic, had brain cancer, and

was “not normal.”37 Killian confirmed to the dispatcher that, at that time: Hughes

was upstairs in his bedroom; she was outside; Ms. Hughes had left the Residence;

and no one else was inside the Residence.38 Killian also requested that the officers

refrain from using lights and sirens on arrival.39 Killian ended the call by telling

the dispatcher that she would “call back if I need you or if [the officers] don’t get

here in time.”40

While en route to the Residence, Officer Schmidt spoke with dispatch on a

recorded line.41 The following is a transcription of the conversation:

Dispatch to [Officer Schmidt], 706 Wagon Wheel Lane a female

caller stated her uncle is on location threatening. She gave the

address phone number and stated she had to go, disconnected.

Dispatch to [Officer Schmidt], additional, received phone call

back stating acting male is 62, [Hughes], he does have a 6" knife, he

threatened the complainant yesterday, white male approximately

110 [pounds], with stage four cancer, currently upstairs in a

bedroom, acting male is aware complainant called and s[t]ated he

will be at the top of the stairs waiting for you with the knife.

Dispatch to [Officer Schmidt], requesting no lights and sirens,

[Hughes] will not cooperate when he is sitting at the top of the steps

for you with the knife, almost sounds more like a threat than if he is

going to drop i[t].

[Officer Schmidt] to Dispatch, is he actually threatening the

complainant or just making threats.

Dispatch to [Officer Schmidt], sounds like she is being threatened

with the knife, but we can’t be sure because we were disconnected

again.

36 (Id.).

37 (Id. at p. 164).

38 (Id. at p. 165).

39 (Id.).

40 (Id.).

41 (Pltf’s Brief, ECF 34 at p. 3).

Upon arriving at the Residence, Officer Schmidt spoke with Killian outside

the Residence.42 Killian reiterated what had transpired and that Ms. Hughes had

contacted her “concerning some fear about [Hughes’] behavior,” and that Hughes

had threatened Killian with a knife the day prior.43 Killian told Officer Schmidt

that she needed to get Hughes help, but he was not going to go willingly.44 Killian

also told Officer Schmidt that she had previously hid the knives at the Residence;

that Hughes suffered from stage four cancer, bipolar disorder, and alcoholism; had

recently stopped taking his medication; had expressed being tired with living; had

a knife on his person; and was waiting for the officers threateningly.45

As Killian expressed that Hughes needed medical help, she agreed when

Officer Schmidt asked if she would be willing to involuntarily commit Hughes for

treatment. 46 Based on what Killian told him, Officer Schmidt believed Killian’s

grandmother, Ms. Hughes, lived at the Residence, but knew she was not present at

that time.47 Officer Schmidt was aware that, although Killian was sent to the

Residence by Ms. Hughes, Killian did not own the Residence nor reside there.48

Officer Schmidt considered the incident a “domestic with mental health issue

involved.”49

In the meantime, additional officers arrived at the Residence, including

Officer Travis.50 Officer Travis responded to the Residence after hearing the

dispatcher’s conversation with Officer Schmidt.51 Officer Travis overheard the

following details between Officer Schmidt and Killian; to wit: Hughes had a knife

42 (Id. at pp. 3-4); (Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at p. 34).

43 (Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at p. 34); (ECF 31 at p. 8 ¶ 72) (citing Dep. of Schmidt, ECF

31-1 at pp. 34-35, 41).

44 (Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at p. 37).

45 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 8 ¶¶ 72, 75) (citing Dep. of Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at pp. 34-35, 37-38, 41).

46 (Id. at pp. 6, 8, ¶¶ 55, 73-74) (first citing Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at p.37; then citing Dep. of

Officer Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at p. 35); (Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 31-1 at p. 35).

47 (Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at p. 34).

48 (Id. at p. 34-35, 37; see also Pltf’s Brief, ECF 34 at pp. 3-4, 20).

49 (SOUMF, ECF 31, p. 6, 8, ¶¶ 55, 73-74) (first citing Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at p.37; then citing

Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at p. 35).

50 (Pltf’s Brief, ECF 34 at p. 3) (citing Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 34-1 at 45:24-46:1); (see also

ECF 31 at p. 10 ¶ 94).

51 (Dep. of Officer Travis, ECF 31-4 at pp. 18:10-19:10, p. 19:24-20:9, 20:24-21:1).

and was waiting inside the house; Hughes was intoxicated and had mental health

issues; Hughes had, the day prior, held a knife to Killian’s face and threatened her;

and Officer Schmidt and Killian were discussing the possibility of a mental health

commitment.52

Officer Schmidt informed Officer Travis of the conversation he had with

Killian, and both agreed they needed to enter the Residence.53 They did not plan

to arrest Hughes and, because Hughes was armed with a knife and acting

irrationally, elected to proceed without a warrant.54 According to Officer Travis,

the purpose of entering the Residence was to strike up a conversation with Hughes,

determine if he was still armed and, if so, make the scene safe and then secure

medical treatment for Hughes.55

Killian entered the Residence with both officers through the front door.56

She allowed them to enter because she “needed their help.”57 Killian told them

where Hughes’ bedroom was located.58 Upon entering the Residence, Killian

called up to Hughes to let him know they were all there; she heard Hughes say “f—

ck you, a—hole.”59 Officer Schmidt drew his firearm and Officer Travis drew his

taser.60 Prior to attempting to communicate with Hughes, Defendants walked

through the first floor. 61 They proceeded to the second floor, where Hughes had

locked himself in his bedroom, and Officer Schmidt introduced himself as they

walked up the steps.62 Officer Schmidt knocked on Hughes’ door and, attempting

52 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 10 ¶¶ 94-97) (citing Dep. of Officer Travis, ECF 31-4 at pp. 21-23, 25).

53 (Pltf’s Brief, ECF 34 at pp. 3-4) (citing Dep. of Officer Schmidt ECF 34-1 at p. 46); (Dep. of Officer

Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at p. 47) (“He had made a vague threat about waiting for anyone that came to help”).

54 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 10 ¶ 100) (citing Dep. of Officer Travis, ECF 31-4 at p. 26); (Dep. of

Officer Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at p. 42).

55 (Id. at p. 10 ¶ 99) (citing Dep. of Officer Travis, ECF 31-4 at p. 27).

56 (Id. at p. 7 ¶¶ 57-58) (citing Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at pp. 38-40); (Dep. of Officer Schmidt,

ECF 31-3 at pp. 48-49).

57 (Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at pp. 39-40).

58 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 7 ¶¶ 57-58) (citing Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at pp. 38-40); (Dep. of Officer

Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at pp. 48-49).

59 (Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at p. 93).

60 (Dep. of Officer Travis, ECF 31-4 at p. 28; see also ECF 31 at p. 2 ¶ 11; ECF 34 at p. 4).

61 (Pltf’s Brief, ECF 34 at p. 4) (citing ECF 3[1] at p. 2 ¶¶ 12, 13).

62 (Id. at p. 4) (citing ECF 3[1] at p. 2 ¶¶ 12, 13).

to engage Hughes in conversation, stated that he just wanted to help.63 In response,

Hughes was verbally aggressive, and told Defendants that he did not want to talk

and did not want their help.64

Despite Hughes’ protestations, Defendants persisted in their attempts to

engage with him, repeatedly telling him they wanted to help.65 When Officer

Schmidt continued to try to build rapport with Hughes, Hughes responded by

talking about the Eiffel Tower.66 He answered affirmatively when Officer Schmidt

asked whether he was holding a knife, stating he had it to protect himself.67 After

a few minutes, Hughes told Officer Schmidt that he was done talking to him and

went silent for several minutes.68 At no point during the interaction did Hughes tell

the officers to leave the house.69

Concerned that Hughes may have harmed himself, or would do so,

Defendants felt that time was of the essence.70 In addition to being a threat to

himself, Defendants were concerned that Hughes, left to his own devices, would

come out and menace someone else.71 Defendants decided to open the bedroom

door using a key found by one of the officers at the scene.72

Once the door was unlocked, the officers remained in the hallway outside

of Hughes’ bedroom which, due to the bedroom’s size, put them in close quarters

63 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at pp. 3, 9 at ¶¶ 13-15, 77) (citing ECF 1 at ¶¶ 25-26; then citing Dep. of Officer

Schmit, ECF 31-3 at p. 55); (Dep. of Killian, ECF 31-2 at p. 91) (“The officer started up the steps

introducing himself. I could hear [Hughes] say f—ck you, a—hole.”).

64 (Id. at p. 4) (first citing Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 34-1 at p. 56:1-56:24; then citing ECF 3[1]

at p. 3 ¶ 15); (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 9 ¶¶ 78-80) (citing Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at pp. 56, 58).

65 (Pltf’s Brief, ECF 34 at pp. 4-5) (citing ECF 3[1] at p. 16 ¶¶ 16, 17).

66 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 9 ¶ 83) (citing Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at p. 61).

67 (Id. at p. 3 ¶¶ 19-20).

68 (Pltf’s Brief, ECF 34 at p. 5) (citing ECF 3[1] at ¶ 20); (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 9 ¶ 85) (citing Dep.

of Officer Schmidt, ECF 34-3 at pp. 62-63).

69 (Dep. of Officer Schmidt ECF 31-3 at pp. 55:23-25).

70 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 9 and 11 ¶¶ 86-87, 102) (first citing Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 34-3 at

pp. 64, 66; then citing Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 34-4 at p. 32); (Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 34-3 at

pp. 67:13-63:16).

71 (Id.).

72 (Id. at p. 9 ¶¶ 86-87) (citing Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 34-3 at pp. 64, 66); (See also Dep. of

Officer Schmidt, ECF 34-3 at pp. 67:13-63:16); (See also Dep. of Officer Travis, ECF 31-4 at p. 37).

of approximately six feet or less.73 Hughes immediately turned towards Officer

Schmidt with a knife in his right hand.74 Officer Schmidt told Hughes, repeatedly,

to drop the knife; Hughes responded by yelling, “f—ck you” and advancing towards

Officer Schmidt.75 When Hughes came within approximately four feet of the

officers, Officer Travis tased Hughes, causing him to momentarily dip his shoulder

but did not drop the knife from his right hand.76

Despite being tased, Hughes continued to advance towards Officer Schmidt,

ignoring his commands to drop the knife.77 From the first floor of the Residence,

another officer on scene heard Officer Schmidt yell: “drop the knife, drop the knife,

drop the knife.”78 As Hughes continued to advance, Officer Schmidt discharged

his firearm, shooting Hughes in the chest.79 Officers at the scene and ambulance

personnel administered life-saving care.80 Hughes was transported to a hospital,

where he was pronounced deceased.81

Hughes’ post-mortem toxicology report revealed that, at the time of being

shot, Hughes had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.268%—more than three times

the legal limit to operate a motor vehicle in Pennsylvania.82 On April 15, 2021, the

Berks County District Attorney, (the “DA”), published the results of its

investigation into Hughes’ death, finding that Officer Schmidt discharged his

firearm lawfully in defense of himself and in the defense of another.83 As such, no

73 (Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 31-3 at pp. 54-55); (Dep. of Officer Travis, ECF 31-4 at pp. 46-50);

(Photograph, ECF 31-10).

74 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 9 ¶ 88) (citing Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 34-3 at p. 71).

75 (Id. at pp. 9-10 ¶¶ 89-90) (citing Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 34-3 at pp. 71-72); (See also id. at

p. 11 at ¶ 104) (citing Dep. of Officer Travis, ECF 34-3 at p. 51).

76 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 10 ¶ 91) (citing Dep. of Officer Schmidt, ECF 34-3 at pp. 75-76); (See also

id. at p. 11 at ¶¶ 105-06) (citing Dep. of Officer Travis, ECF 34-3 at pp. 51-52); (See also DA Report, ECF

31-11 at p.2).

77 (Pltf’s Brief, ECF 32 at p. 11 at ¶ 107) (citing Dep. of Officer Travis, ECF 34-3 at p. 52); (See also

Dep. of Officer Travis, ECF 31-3 at pp. 71:76:20-77:1).

78 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 13 ¶ 124) (citing Dep. of Officer Schearer, ECF 31-5 at p. 59).

79 (Id.).

80 (DA Report, ECF 31-11 at p. 2).

81 (Id.).

82 (Id. at p. 3).

83 (Id. at p. 1).

criminal charges were filed against Defendants.84 The DA made the following

additional conclusions:85

[Officer Schmidt] was reasonable in his belief that he and [Officer

Travis] were in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury

due to Hughes’ actions of refusing to comply with all police

commands and by advancing towards the officers with a knife. It is

also reasonable to believe that Hughes had the intent and means to

inflict death or serious bodily injury to the officers and the officer’s

use of deadly force under these circumstances was reasonable and

therefore privileged under Pennsylvania law.

While it is unfortunate that a life was lost, the action taken by the

officer involved was for protecting himself and his fellow officer.

Plaintiff, who had not seen Hughes for approximately thirty-six hours

before his death, brings this lawsuit.86

LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 56 governs summary judgment motion practice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Specifically,

this Rule provides that summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Id. at 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence “might affect the outcome

of the suit under governing law[,]” and a dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When evaluating a motion pursuant to Rule 56, the court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Qin, 100 F.4th at 469

(“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if, construed in the light most favorable to the non-

84 (Id.).

85 (Id. at p. 3).

86 (SOUMF, ECF 31 at p. 4 ¶ 29) (citing Dep. of Plaintiff, ECF 31-1 at p. 69).

moving party, the record shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”) (internal citations omitted).

Consistent with Rule 56, the movant “bears the initial [burden] of informing the . . . court

of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions” of the record that the movant “believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). This burden can be met by showing that the nonmoving party has “fail[ed] to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case[.]”

Id. at 322. After the movant has met its initial burden, summary judgment is appropriate if the

nonmoving party fails to rebut the movant’s claim by “citing to particular parts of materials in the

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” that show a

genuine issue of material fact or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence

or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B).

The nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986). The nonmoving party may not rely on “bare assertions, conclusory allegations or

suspicions[,]” Fireman’s Ins. Co. of Newark v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982), or rest

on the allegations in the pleadings, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party must

“go beyond the pleadings” and, either by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or

admissions on file, “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

DISCUSSION

Section 1983 provides an avenue for private citizens to seek civil remedies when they have

been deprived of their rights by a state official in violation of the Constitution or federal law. See

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show “a violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and/or laws of the United States and that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d

Cir. 1996) (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)).

Pursuant to Section 1983, Plaintiff brings a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendants

for (a) unlawful entry into Hughes’ home without legal justification, and (b) excessive force, based

on their discharge of a taser and a firearm during their encounter with Hughes. As noted, in their

motion for summary judgment, Defendants offer the defense of qualified immunity.

Government officials, including police officers, are shielded from liability for civil

damages when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). This

doctrine, known as “qualified immunity,” provides not only a defense to liability, but “immunity

from suit.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). Qualified immunity protects from suit

“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the district court

engages in a two-prong inquiry: (1) whether the officer violated a constitutional right, and (2)

whether the right was clearly established, such that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d

177, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and modifications omitted) (quoting Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001)). “An answer in the negative to either prong entitles an officer

to qualified immunity.” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Reedy

v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2010)); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

While “[c]ourts may begin their inquiry with either prong[,]” id., the United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit, (“Third Circuit”), has held that the first prong should ordinarily

be addressed first, see Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014). “Should the court

choose to address the alleged constitutional violations, . . . analysis of the merits for purposes of

summary judgment merges with analysis of the deprivation of federal rights for purposes of

qualified immunity.” Crouse v. South Lebanon Twp., 668 F. Supp. 2d 664, 671 (M.D. Pa. 2009)

(citing Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2000)).

“At summary judgment, the burden is on the officer to establish an entitlement to qualified

immunity.” Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d at 165 (citing Halsey, 750 F.3d at 288). While courts

performing a qualified immunity analysis ordinarily analyze “the specific conduct of each

defendant separately,” the court may consider the officers’ actions together when the individuals

“acted in concert.” Cole v. Encapera, 758 F. App’x 252, 255 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Grant v. City

of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1996)); see also Minor v. Del. River and Bay Auth., 70

F.4th 168, 177 n.5 (3d Cir. 2023) (noting the relaxed standard for collective conduct).

Here, in their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that their conduct did not

violate the Fourth Amendment because their entry was justified pursuant to recognized exceptions

to the warrant requirement, and that the force they used was reasonable. Defendants further argue

that, if the Court reaches the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, it should conclude

that a reasonable officer standing in their shoes would have believed their actions to be

constitutionally compliant.

In response, Plaintiff argues that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to

Defendants’ justifications for their warrantless entry and the reasonableness of the force used.

Plaintiff also argues that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force

claim because their actions violated a clearly established right. Each argument is addressed in

turn.

A. Plaintiff’s Unlawful Entry Claim

Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that the

warrantless entry did not violate a constitutional right, as consent and exigent circumstances

obviated the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, and that it was objectively reasonable to

believe those exceptions validated the constitutionality of their entry. In response, Plaintiff argues

that no recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement was applicable in this

matter. As Defendants assert entitlement to qualified immunity on this claim, the Court must first

determine whether Defendants’ entry into the Residence violated a constitutional right. To do so,

the Court considers the applicability of the Fourth Amendment exceptions proffered by

Defendants.87

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits “unreasonable searches

and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also U.S. v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 230 (3d Cir. 2011).

“Warrantless searches and seizures inside someone’s home . . . are presumptively unreasonable

unless the occupants consent or probable cause and exigent circumstances exist to justify the

intrusion.” United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original) (internal

citations omitted); but see Case v. Montana, 607 U.S. ----, No. 24-624, 2026 WL 96690, at * 5

87 In addition to arguing the inapplicability of the exceptions Defendants rely on, Plaintiff argues that

the community caretaker exception cannot justify Defendants’ warrantless entry. (See ECF 30 at p. 8).

Defendants do not contest that said exception is inapposite. Accordingly, the Court does not address the

applicability, if any, of the community caretaker exception to this case.

(U.S Jan. 14, 2026) (holding that the constitutionality of a warrantless entry based on the exigent

circumstance of someone requiring emergency aid does not require probable cause).

Consent

As noted, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless entry of a person’s home

“does not apply . . . to situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained[.]” Illinois v.

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). Accordingly, “[l]aw enforcement officials may search a

home without a warrant when ‘voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the individual

whose property is searched, or from a third party who possesses common authority over the

premises.’” United States v. Livingston, 445 F. App’x 550, 555 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Rodriguez,

497 U.S. at 181). Because Defendants argue that Killian’s third-party consent justified their entry,

this dispute turns on the question of Killian’s authority to provide consent.88

“‘[T]he consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid

as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared,’” Stabile, 633

F.3d at 230-31 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974)). “‘Common

authority’ is defined as ‘mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or

control for most purposes.’” United States v. Murray, 821 F.3d 386, 391-92 (3d Cir. 2016) (first

quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7; and then quoting Stabile, 633 F.3d at 230-31). Thus, an

88 Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not have, or believe they had, consent to enter Hughes’ home

because neither Hughes nor Ms. Hughes—i.e., those with actual authority—provided consent. See ECF 34

at p. 10 (citing to a fragment of Officer Schmidt’s deposition transcript where he testified, after being asked

only whether Hughes or Ms. Hughes provided consent, that he did not believe he had their consent to enter).

This argument is unavailing as consent can also be provided by a third-party, not only a current resident.

The Court is persuaded that Defendants believed Killian consented to their entry because she requested

their assistance and invited them into the Residence. Further, Killian was invited to the residence by Ms.

Hughes to deal with the situation with Hughes. Moreover, as it appears undisputed that Killian’s consent

allowing Defendants to enter was voluntary, this Court considers only Killian’s legal authority to provide

consent.

entry pursuant to the consent of an individual with common authority does not violate the Fourth

Amendment.

Important here, the Supreme Court has expanded the common authority doctrine to validate

the constitutionality of a police officer’s warrantless entry when based upon the consent of an

individual with “apparent authority.” See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89. “A third party has

apparent authority to consent to an entry by police when the circumstances presented to the officer

cause the officer to reasonably believe that the third party has common authority over the premises,

even though the third party does not in fact have such authority.” Kirley v. Williams, 330 F. App’x

16, 20 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179). As such, “[w]hen an individual possesses

only apparent, rather than actual, common authority, the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the

police officer’s entry is ‘based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of

the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does

not do so.’” Murray, 821 F.3d at 391-92. (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179, 188-89).

Here, Defendants were summoned to the Residence by Killian, who twice sought their

assistance to obtain medical assistance for Hughes. They were aware that, despite not living at the

Residence, Killian had the authority to remove Hughes: both as his niece and pursuant to the

instruction of Ms. Hughes, who owned and lived in the Residence. Defendants also had reason to

believe that Killian had a regular presence at the Residence because she told them she had been

inside with Hughes before their arrival and on the day prior, and Hughes knew she had called for

them to come over. Moreover, Killian let Defendants in through the front door, directed them to

Hughes’ bedroom, and advised Hughes the officers were entering. Notably, Hughes did not at any

point communicate to Killian that she should not seek such police intervention or that she should

not allow police inside the Residence. In light of totality of these facts, Defendants reasonably

believed that Killian had access and control of who would be permitted to enter the Residence.

This Court is also guided by the Third Circuit’s decision in Murray, 821 F.3d at 391-392.

There, police officers sought entry to a motel room they knew was rented by the defendant. Id. at

389-90. The officers knocked on the door three separate times and, each time, were greeted by the

defendant’s employee. Id. Though the employee initially turned the officers away—first when

they declined her services and again when she stated she was busy—she invited them in when they

identified themselves as officers. Id. The officers understood that the employee was working in

the room. Id. While the officers were speaking with her, the defendant knocked and was admitted

by the employee. Id. The Third Circuit reasoned that the facts known to the officers at the time

of the entry warranted a reasonable belief that the employee had access and control over the room

for most purposes, which was reinforced by the fact that defendant himself knocked on the door

prior to entry. Id. at 391-92. The Court held that the fact that the officers knew the room was

registered to the defendant did not invalidate the employee’s consent to their entry because “she

had common authority—or at a minimum, apparent authority—over the room.” Id. at 392 (internal

citations omitted).

This case has similarities to Murray. Just as in Murray, Defendants here understood Killian

to have ongoing access to the Residence, having been present on consecutive days and apparently

entrusted with admitting visitors. Just as in Murray, Defendants knew Killian had access to the

Residence for an express purpose that involved allowing others to enter (i.e., obtaining assistance

for Hughes). Just as in Murray, Defendants were invited into the Residence by Killian through

the front door, without the need for a key, and oriented to the space. And just as in Murray,

Defendants’ beliefs about Killian’s authority were reinforced by Hughes’ lack of verbal

disagreement to Killian’s consent to their entry. Therefore, like in Murray, the facts known to

Defendants at the time of entry warranted a reasonable belief that Killian had common authority—

whether or not in fact true—over the Residence.89 Thus, Defendants’ warrantless entry pursuant

to Killian’s consent did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Exigent Circumstances

Another “well-recognized exception [to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement]

applies when ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling

that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v.

King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)). The Supreme Court “has identified several

exigencies that may justify a warrantless search of a home.” Id. (citing Brigham City, Utah v.

Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). “Brigham City identified one such exigency: ‘the need to assist

persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.’” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S.

45, 47 (2009) (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403).

“This ‘emergency aid exception’ applies if there is an objectively reasonable basis for

believing that a person within the house is in need of immediate aid.” Davido v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t

of Corr., No. 22-9000, 2025 WL 444410, at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2025) (cleaned up); see also Case,

2026 WL 96690, at *1 (noting that, pursuant to said exception, “police officers may enter a home

without a warrant if they have an ‘objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that someone inside

needs emergency assistance.”) (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400)). When applying that

89 Because the Court finds Killian’s consent was lawful pursuant to apparent authority, it need not

reach the parties’ arguments as to common authority.

standard, courts evaluate conduct “by looking at the ‘totality of the circumstances.’”90 Case, 2026

WL 96690, at *6 (internal citations omitted).

Here, the undisputed facts are that Defendants knew that Hughes was a cancer patient who

suffered from mental health and alcohol abuse problems, that he had expressed suicidal thoughts,

and that he possessed a knife.91 Defendants were also aware that Hughes’ behavior led Killian to

make two 911 calls requesting urgent assistance, that she felt compelled to wait outside for the

officers, rather than in the house with Hughes, and that Ms. Hughes was so fearful of Hughes’

conduct, she had removed herself from the Residence. When they arrived at the Residence,

Defendants learned more about Hughes’ volatile state—that Hughes made clear he would not go

for medical help willingly, was using profanity, possessed a knife, and had threatened anyone who

approached him and offered to facilitate the provision of medical assistance. Defendants were also

aware that, out of concern for a pattern of behavior, Killian had hidden the knives in the Residence,

but that Hughes was inside his room with a knife with a six-to-eight-inch blade.

The concerns of that situation were heightened by Hughes’ demeanor when the officers

knocked on his bedroom door, announced themselves as police officers, and informed Hughes that

they wanted to help him. During the short interaction, Hughes was intermittently verbally

aggressive and at times spoke in a rambling, delirious manner. Hughes eventually told the officers

90 In presenting their exigent circumstances argument, Defendants rely on several factors announced

in a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case considering whether exigent circumstances existed to “justify a

warrantless intrusion into a private dwelling to effectuate [an] arrest.” Com v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548, 557

(Pa. 1979). This standard is inapposite. Accordingly, the Court does not address those factors.

91 Citing her own testimony, Plaintiff contends that “Hughes had not expressed that he intended to

harm himself.” (Pltf’s Brief, ECF 34 at p. 11). This contention directly conflicts with the undisputed

material fact that the day prior, Hughes had expressed to Killian being tired of living and that he had stopped

taking his medications. The testimony of Plaintiff, who did not speak with Hughes for thirty-six hours

before the at-issue interaction, is insufficient to rebut these facts. See Irving v. Chester Water Auth., 439 F.

App’x 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a plaintiff’s “self-serving deposition testimony is insufficient

to raise a genuine issue of material fact.”).

he did not want help and went silent for over a minute. It was thus objectively reasonable for the

officers to believe that Hughes would, or had, hurt himself.92

Based on the totality of these circumstances, Defendants had, as Brigham City requires, an

“objectively reasonable basis for believing” that their intervention was needed to prevent serious

harm.93 Therefore, under the emergency aid exception, Defendants entered the Residence and

used a key to open the bedroom door. Their entry was reasonable. See City & Cty. of San

Franscisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 612 (2015) (holding that officers could enter the room

of a mentally ill person who had locked herself inside with a knife).

Because no constitutional right was violated by Defendants’ entry into the Residence,

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the issue of unlawful entry. See Saucier, 533

U.S. at 201 (“If no constitutional right would have been violated where the allegations established,

there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s unlawful entry claim is dismissed. 94

B. Plaintiff’s Excessive Force Claim

As to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity because their reasonable use of force did not violate a constitutional right and a

92 In her opposition brief, Plaintiff baldly asserts that Officer Travis could “[a]t no time prior to

opening the door . . . determine that Hughes was a harm to himself or others.” (ECF 34 at p. 5) (citing Dep.

of Officer Travis, ECF 34-2 at p. 36). Based on the record evidence, this Court disagrees. See United

States v. Wolfe, 452 F. App’x 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We should not be understood as holding that police

officers cannot address ambiguous and evolving circumstances as their well-informed professional

judgment dictates.”).

93 Plaintiff’s argument that “[t]here is simply no evidence that anyone was in imminent danger,” (ECF

30 at p.7), ignores the undisputed material facts that form the basis of this Court’s exigent circumstances

analysis. Thus, it fails.

94 The parties do not distinguish between the entry into the Residence and the entry to Hughes’

bedroom, though it is clear that the Officers did not enter into the bedroom. Nonetheless, the Court views

the two entries as part of a single, continuous search or seizure. Regardless, the facts support that Killian’s

consent extended to Hughes’ bedroom, and that her authority over the Residence extended her access to

reasonable officer would believe that tasing a man who is advancing towards an officer with a

knife and then discharging a firearm when the taser had no effect, was lawful. Plaintiff disagrees,

contending that material facts permit a reasonable inference that Hughes had not acted

threateningly before Defendants entered his room and he could not reasonably have been perceived

as threatening thereafter. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ use of force violated a clearly

established right. Applying the qualified immunity standard, the Court must first determine

whether Defendants’ use of force violated a constitutional right.

“The Fourth Amendment safeguards ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons

. . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.’” Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 2011)

(alteration and omissions in original). “To prevail on a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim,

a plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable under the circumstances.”

El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 336 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Lamont, 637 F.3d at 182-83). The parties do not dispute that Defendants’ use of force

constituted a seizure. Thus, only the reasonableness of the seizure is in dispute.

“A claim that a police officer used excessive force during a seizure is ‘properly analyzed

under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.’” Johnson v. City of

Philadelphia, 837 F.3d 343, 349 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388

(1989)). “The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is whether under the totality of

the circumstances, the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivations.”

Williams v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 967 F.3d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation modified).

Hughes’ bedroom. See, e.g., U.S. v. Anderson, 248 F. App’x 977, 979 (finding that a co-occupant of

defendant’s home, who was the only parental figure residing there, had common authority over the property

and free access to the defendant’s room).

“The ‘totality of the circumstances’ inquiry into a use of force has no time limit.” Barnes

v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80 (2025). While “the situation at the precise time of the shooting will often

be what matters most . . . earlier facts and circumstances may bear on how a reasonable officer

would have understood and responded to later ones.” Id.; see also Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279,

291-92 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that events prior to seizure must be considered in analyzing the

reasonableness of the seizure).

The Supreme Court has made clear that “reasonableness [is] the ultimate—and only—

inquiry.” Johnson, 837 F.3d at 349 (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007)). That is,

“[w]hether or not [an officer’s] actions constituted application of ‘deadly force,’ all that matters is

whether [the officer’s] actions were reasonable.” Id. (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 383) (citations

omitted) (alteration in original). To approach said inquiry, the Supreme Court has announced the

following, non-exhaustive list of factors for consideration: “‘the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether

he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Abraham, 183 F.3d at 289

(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

Several principles guide this Court’s analysis; to wit: “[a court must] analyze this question

‘from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight,’ making ‘allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount

of force that is necessary in a particular situation.’” Johnson, 837 F.3d at 350 (quoting Graham,

490 U.S. at 396-97). Courts must also be mindful that the Fourth Amendment “does not oblige an

officer to passively endure a life-threatening physical assault[.]” Id. at 353; see also Lamont, 637

F.3d at 183 (“Police officers do not enter into a suicide pact when they take an oath to uphold the

Constitution.”).

In cases where, as here, the victim of deadly force is unable to testify, the Third Circuit

cautions against simply accepting “what may be a self-serving account [of the events] by the

officer.” Abraham, 183 F.3d at 294 (quoting Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)).

However, in such cases, the summary judgment standard should not be “applied with extra rigor[.]”

Lamont, 637 F.3d at 182. Thus, to defeat summary judgment in such cases, the non-movant must

point to evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact without “simply [relying] on the

assertion that a reasonable jury could discredit the opponents’ account.” Id. (citation modified).

In sum, “although reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment should frequently remain a

question for the jury, defendants can still win on summary judgment if the district court concludes,

after resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, that the officer’s use of force was

objectively reasonable under the circumstances,” Est. of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 516 (3d

Cir. 2003) (citation modified). Given that this Court addresses the merits of Plaintiff’s

constitutional claim for qualified immunity purposes, this standard applies to its analysis. See

Crouse, 668 F. Supp. at 671.

Here, Plaintiff’s argument that Hughes’ behavior leading up to and at the moment of the

seizure was non-threatening is unpersuasive. It is undisputed that Hughes verbally threatened the

officers with a knife, see supra p. 5, when he learned they were responding to the Residence, that

Killian sought urgent police response because Hughes was “being very threatening,” and that both

a certified recovery specialist and Ms. Hughes felt unsafe around Hughes. Defendants were also

aware of Hughes’ conduct the day prior, which Plaintiff herself recognizes as threatening. (See

Dep. of Plaintiff, ECF 31-1 at p. 42:18-42:2) (“I would consider [Hughes holding a knife towards

Killian] to be threatening behavior”). While Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences being

drawn in her favor, the Court declines Plaintiff’s invitation to draw an unreasonable inference from

these facts to find—as Plaintiff urges—that Hughes had not done anything threatening prior to

Defendants’ standoff at the entrance of Hughes’ bedroom. See Mumtaz v. Etihad Airways and

Airlines, No. 12-cv-2051, 2014 WL 7405216, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2024) (“[T]he summary

judgment standard does not denote what a fact-finder may find upon delusion, but rather what a

reasonable fact-finder could conclude from the evidence presented.” (emphasis in original)).

Based on the totality of these facts, the Court finds that, Defendants had a reasonable belief that

Hughes was a threat to himself, see supra pp. 18-21, and a reasonable belief that Hughes posed a

threat to others leading up to the seizure.

Turning to the moment of the shooting, the following material facts are uncontested:

Defendants opened Hughes’ bedroom door using a key, and Hughes turned towards them, holding

a six-to-eight-inch blade knife; Defendants were in close proximity to Hughes, approximately six

feet or less; Officer Schmidt repeatedly instructed Hughes to drop the knife he held in his right

hand, and Hughes failed to comply; Defendants remained in the hallway while Hughes advanced

towards them, stating a profanity and ignoring Officer Schmidt’s repeated commands to drop the

knife; Officer Travis administered his taser when Hughes was approximately four feet away from

them; Hughes’ shoulder momentarily dropped from the taser’s electricity, yet he continued to

advance towards Defendants, knife in hand95; Officer Schmidt continued to instruct Hughes to

drop his knife; and when Hughes failed to comply and continued to advance toward them, Officer

95 While Plaintiff argues that Officer Schmidt “shot Hughes while [Officer Travis] was still tasing

him and [Hughes] did not have control of his body,” (ECF 34 at p. 13), she does not squarely contest

Defendants’ assertion that Hughes continued to advance toward the officers, knife in hand, after being tased.

Although it can be reasonably inferred that Hughes’ movement was in some way impaired by Officer Travis’

taser, the fact that Hughes continued to advance towards Defendants after being tased is undisputed.

Schmidt discharged his firearm, shooting Hughes in the chest, while the electricity from Officer

Travis’ taser continued to pulsate.

In light of these undisputed facts, Plaintiff urges this Court to infer that Hughes was not

wielding the knife in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as threatening when

considering also the undisputed facts that he weighed 110 pounds and was a stage four cancer

patient. Plaintiff’s proposed inferences cannot stand in view of the myriads of other facts that

support the contrary conclusion. Therefore, the Court declines Plaintiff’s invitation to speculate

that the manner in which Hughes was wielding a knife could not be interpreted as threatening

based on the totality of the circumstances and on no more than Plaintiff’s hindsight assessment.

What is important to remember is whether the Officers’ actions were reasonable under the totality

of the circumstances as they experienced them, and this Court finds they were.

Having identified all relevant material facts and drawing all inferences in the non-movant

Plaintiff’s favor, “the reasonableness of an officer’s actions ‘is a pure question of law.’” Johnson,

837 F.3d at 349 (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n. 8). Upon review of the evidence, this Court

finds that Defendants’ actions were reasonable as a matter of law. Hughes wielded a knife, refused

to comply with officer commands to drop the knife, advanced toward the officers while exclaiming

“f—ck you,” did not drop the knife after being tased, and the shooting took place while Hughes

was only a few feet from Officer Schmidt. Although Plaintiff insists that the taser prevented

Hughes from controlling his body, Hughes indisputably continued to hold the knife and advance

toward the officers, in cramped quarters, after being repeatedly instructed to drop the knife and

after being tased. Thus, even if the taser in some way affected Hughes’ ability to control his

movements, the officers reasonably believed they were still in danger. Therefore, at the moment

of the shooting, the “defensive use of deadly force, although unfortunate, did not violate the Fourth

Amendment.” Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of San Fran., 743 F.3d 1211, 1230 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d

in part, cert. dismissed in part sub nom. City & Cnty. of San Fran., Calif. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600

(2015).

The Supreme Court has held that officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they

used deadly force during an encounter similar to the one at issue here. In Sheehan, officers were

dispatched to a group home to help a mentally ill woman. 575 U.S. at 602. Upon arrival, a social

worker informed the officers that the woman had threatened him with a knife and that she needed

to be detained for a psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 603. The officers knocked on the door of the

woman’s room and offered their assistance. Id. at 604. When the woman did not answer, they

entered. Id. at 604-05. The woman reacted violently, grabbing a knife, and threatening to kill the

officers. Id. The officers retreated and called for backup. Id.

Concerned that the woman might continue to arm herself or flee, the officers chose to

reenter, weapons drawn, before backup arrived. Id. at 604-05. Upon reentry, the woman again

advanced toward them with the knife and, even after being pepper-sprayed, continued moving

toward them. Id. at 605-06. When she was within a few feet and refused to drop the knife, one

officer opened fire, ultimately shooting her multiple times. Id. The woman survived. Id. at 606.

The Supreme Court held that, at the point when the woman was in close proximity to an officer

and kept advancing despite the pepper spray, “the use of potentially deadly force was justified”

and “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment barred [the officers] from protecting themselves[.]” Id.

at 613 (first citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 384; then citing Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 777

(2014)). So too here.

The Court finds that Defendants’ use of force did not violate a constitutional right and,

therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. As

such, this Court need not reach the clearly established inquiry of its qualified immunity analysis.96

See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. As such, Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is dismissed.

II. State Law Battery Claim

Based on similar averments as her excessive force claim, Plaintiff asserts a state law battery

claim against Defendants. By way of the underlying motion, Defendants argue that they are also

entitled to immunity from Plaintiff’s battery claim pursuant to the Pennsylvania Political

Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8541–8564, (“PPSTCA”), on the grounds that

employees of local agencies are immune from state law tort claims and no exception to that

immunity exists here.97 In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are barred from that

immunity because a reasonable jury could find that their conduct constituted actual malice and/or

willful misconduct.98

“Generally, local agencies are immune from tort liability under Section 8541 of the Tort

Claims Act.” Gillingham v. Cnty. of Delaware, 154 A.3d 875, 877-78 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017)

96 While not dispositive, the Court notes that, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Sheehan

upholding the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force in analogous circumstances, Plaintiff’s argument

that Defendants’ use of force violated a clearly established right is unpersuasive. Moreover, the caselaw

Plaintiff relies on for her argument are distinguishable from this case. Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.

1, 11 (1985) (announcing principle that “[a] police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect

by shooting him dead”); Bennett v. Murphy, 120 F. App’x 914 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that any reasonable

officer would understand that clearly established law prohibited the use of fatal force by an officer standing

far away from an individual who had been surrounded by armed officers for about an hour, had a gun

pointed to his own head and was threatening suicide).

97 The parties do not dispute that Muhlenberg Township is a “local agency” for purposes of the

PPSTCA, and that Defendants are Muhlenberg Township employees. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8501

(defining “local agency” as a “government unit other than the Commonwealth government”).

98 Under Pennsylvania law, the term “actual malice” appears to be exclusively associated—in the

civil context—with the tort of defamation. See, e.g., DiPaolo v. Times Publ’g Co., 142 A.3d 837, 843 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 2016) (noting that a defamation claim requires, inter alia, a showing of actual malice, and

defining that term). Given the lack of guidance from Plaintiff as to the definition of actual malice in the

context of a battery, and as the applicable case law considers only willful misconduct, the Court does not

reach the issue of whether Defendants acted with actual malice for purposes of determining their entitlement

to PPSTCA immunity.

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Specifically, Section 8541 of the PPTSCA

provides that “no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person

or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof . . . .” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§ 8541. However, pursuant to Section 8550 of the PPTSCA, “[a]n employee’s immunity does not

extend to acts that are judicially determined to be crimes, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful

misconduct.” Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 292 (Pa. 1994) (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§ 8550).

“[T]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized [that] willful misconduct is a

demanding level of fault.” Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 315 (3d Cir. 2006). For purposes of

Section 8550 employee immunity, “willful misconduct occurs when the actor desired to bring

about the result that followed, or at least that he was aware that it was substantially certain to

ensue.” Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1023 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To establish willful misconduct in the context of

an intentional tort claim against a police officer, “it must be shown that the officer intended to

commit the intentional tort.” Pettit v. Namie, 931 A.2d 790, 801 (Pa. Commw. 2007) (internal

citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Renk, 537 Pa. at 283-94 (holding that a finding of tort

liability is insufficient to establish willful misconduct as it “is conceivable that a jury could find a

police officer liable for [assault and battery] under circumstances which demonstrate that the

officer did not intentionally use unnecessary and excessive force.”). Nonetheless, courts recognize

that “the willful misconduct exception is foreclosed if [officers] are entitled to qualified

immunity.” Salaam v. Wolfe, 2019 WL 3889745 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2019), aff’d 806 F. App’x 90

(3d Cir. 2020).

Here, because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claims, Plaintiff’s state law battery claim is barred by the PPSTCA. See Salaam, 806

F. App’x at 94-95 (“[B]ecause the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the federal

claims, [Plaintiff’s] state law claims are foreclosed.”) (citing Vargas v. City of Phila., 783 F.3d

962, 975 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8850)).

In any event, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants are not entitled to PPSTCA immunity is

unavailing. Nothing in the record suggests that Defendants intentionally used unnecessary and

excessive force, see supra pp. 21-27 (Defendants use of force was reasonable), nor that they

employed force against Hughes with the intent to commit a battery. Au contraire, the record fails

to show that Defendants acted with any other purpose than to help Hughes. Therefore, Defendants’

conduct did not rise to the level of willful misconduct such that Defendants would be precluded

from PPSTCA immunity. Since there is no evidence from which a jury could find that Defendants

intended to commit a battery or to bring about the harm Hughes’ suffered, even absent the Court’s

grant of qualified immunity, under the PPSTCA Defendants are immune from liability for battery.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s state-law battery claim is dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth, Plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment is denied,

and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted on the grounds that Defendants have

qualify immunity from Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed. A

corresponding Order will accompany this opinion.

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J.