Powers

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JENNIFER P.,1

Plaintiff,

v. 24-CV-91-LJV

DECISION & ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

On January 24, 2024, the plaintiff, Jennifer P. (“Jennifer”), brought this action

under the Social Security Act (“the Act”). Docket Item 1. She seeks review of the

determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) that she was

not disabled.2 Id. On April 23, 2024, Jennifer moved for judgment on the pleadings,

Docket Item 6; on July 24, 2024, the Commissioner responded and cross-moved for

judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 13; and on August 7, 2024, Jennifer replied,

Docket Item 14.

1 To protect the privacy interests of Social Security litigants while maintaining

public access to judicial records, this Court will identify any non-government party in

cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) only by first name and last initial. Standing Order,

Identification of Non-Government Parties in Social Security Opinions (W.D.N.Y. Nov.

18, 2020).

2 Jennifer applied for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), which is paid to a

person with a disability who also demonstrates financial need. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a).

For the reasons that follow, this Court denies Jennifer’s motion and grants the

Commissioner’s cross motion.3

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The scope of review of a disability determination . . . involves two levels of

inquiry.” Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987). The court “must first

decide whether [the Commissioner] applied the correct legal principles in making the

determination.” Id. This includes ensuring “that the claimant has had a full hearing

under the . . . regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the Social

Security Act.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation modified)

(quoting Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990)). Then, the court “decide[s]

whether the determination is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Johnson, 817 F.2d at

985 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).

“Substantial evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla. It means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison

Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “The substantial evidence standard means

once an ALJ finds facts, [the court] can reject those facts only if a reasonable fact finder

would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443,

448 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation modified) (emphasis in original); see McIntyre v. Colvin, 758

F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014) (“If evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

3 This Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history,

and the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and refers only to the facts

necessary to explain its decision.

interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld.”). But “[w]here there is a

reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application

of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an

unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability

determination made according to the correct legal principles.” Johnson, 817 F.2d at

986.

DISCUSSION

I. THE ALJ’S DECISION

On December 29, 2022, the ALJ found that Jennifer had not been under a

disability since November 5, 2019, the date her application was filed. See Docket Item

5 at 34. The ALJ’s decision was based on the five-step sequential evaluation process

under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). See id. at 23–24.

At step one, the ALJ found that Jennifer “ha[d] not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since . . . the application date.” Id. at 24. At step two, the ALJ found that

Jennifer suffered from four severe, medically determinable impairments: “bipolar

disorder, schizophrenia, anxiety disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

(ADHD).” Id. at 25.

At step three, the ALJ found that Jennifer’s severe, medically determinable

impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See id. at 26. More specifically, the ALJ found that

Jennifer’s impairments did not meet or medically equal listing 12.03 (schizophrenia

spectrum and other psychotic disorders), 12.04 (depressive, bipolar, and related

disorders), or 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders). Id. In assessing

Jennifer’s mental impairments, the ALJ found that Jennifer was moderately impaired in

all four domains: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2)

interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4)

adapting or managing herself. Id. at 26–27.

The ALJ then found that Jennifer had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)4 to

“perform work a full range of work at all exertional levels” except that:

[Jennifer cannot] work around hazards such [as] unprotected

heights[ or] moving mechanical parts[ and cannot climb] ladders[,]

ropes[, or] scaffolds; [she must] avoid concentrated exposure to

fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation, and other respiratory

irritants; [she c]an understand, remember[,] and carry out simple

instructions and tasks; [she] can maintain attention and

concentration and regular attendance at work for simple unskilled

work; [she can have] no supervisory duties, no independent

decision-making required, no strict production quotas as with

assembly line work, [and] minimal changes in work routine and

processes; and[ she can have] occasional interaction with

supervisors, coworkers[,] and the general public.

Id. at 28.

At step four, the ALJ found that Jennifer had no past relevant work. Id. at 32.

But given Jennifer’s age, education, and RFC, the ALJ found at step five that Jennifer

could perform substantial gainful activity as a packager, warehouse worker, or

groundskeeper. Id. at 32–33; see Dictionary of Occupational Titles 920.587-018, 1991

WL 687916 (Jan. 1, 2016); id. at 922.687-058, 1991 WL 688132 (Jan. 1, 2016); id. at

406.687-010, 1991 WL 673342 (Jan. 1, 2016). The ALJ therefore found that Jennifer

4 A claimant’s RFC is the most “an individual can still do despite his or her

limitations . . . in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis.” SSR 96-

8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (July 2, 1996). “A ‘regular and continuing basis’ means 8

hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” Id.; see Melville v.

Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999).

had not been under a disability since the date her application was filed. See Docket

Item 5 at 34.

II. ALLEGATIONS

Jennifer argues that the ALJ erred in two ways. See Docket Item 6-1 at 16–29.

First, she argues that the ALJ “cherry-picked the record, ignored [her] need for

supportive housing, and axiomatically failed to properly consider [her] mental

functioning.” Id. at 16–23. Second, she argues that the ALJ failed to account for

limitations in the opinions of D. Brown, Psy.D., and S. Bhutwala, Ph.D.—opinions that

the ALJ found “persuasive.” Id. at 23–29. For the reasons that follow, this Court

disagrees.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Limitations in Dr. Brown’s and Dr. Bhutwala’s Opinions

An ALJ must “weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is]

consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir.

2013); accord Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022). But that does not mean

that an RFC must “perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources

cited in [an ALJ’s] decision,” Matta, 508 F. App’x at 56, or even be based on opinion

evidence, see Rubin v. Martin O’Malley, Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 116 F.4th 145, 155 (2d

Cir. 2024). So long as an ALJ considers all the medical evidence and appropriately

analyzes any medical opinions, an RFC consistent with the record is not error. See 20

C.F.R. § 416.945; Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that

remand is not necessary “[w]here an ALJ’s analysis at Step Four regarding a claimant’s

functional limitations and restrictions affords an adequate basis for meaningful judicial

review, applies the proper legal standards, and is supported by substantial evidence”).

On June 6, 2021, Dr. Brown completed a mental RFC assessment of Jennifer.

See Docket Item 5 at 130–35. Dr. Brown opined that Jennifer had “[n]o evidence of

limitation in” understanding, remembering, and carrying out very short and simple

instructions and was “[n]ot significantly limited” in maintaining attention and

concentration for extended periods; performing activities within a schedule; maintaining

regular attendance; being punctual; sustaining an ordinary routine without special

supervision; working near others without being distracted; making simple work-related

decisions; interacting appropriately with others; accepting instructions and responding

appropriately to criticism from supervisors; maintaining socially appropriate behavior;

and being aware of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions. Id. at 131–34.

On the other hand, Dr. Brown found that Jennifer was “[m]oderately limited” in

understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions; completing a

normal workday and workweek without interruption; performing at a consistent pace;

responding appropriately to change; setting realistic goals; and making plans

independently. Id. Dr. Brown concluded that notwithstanding Jennifer’s mental

impairments, she “ha[d the] capacity for [the] basic mental demands of unskilled work.”

Id. at 135.

Just over a month later, on July 22, 2021, Dr. Bhutwala completed a similar

assessment, reviewed the record, and affirmed Dr. Brown’s findings. See id. at 150–54.

Like Dr. Brown, Dr. Bhutwala concluded that Jennifer had the “capacity for [the] basic

mental demands of unskilled work.” Id. at 154.

The ALJ found Dr. Brown’s and Dr. Bhutwala’s opinions to be “generally

persuasive” because they were “consistent with each other[]” and based on

“comprehensive record analys[e]s” that were “well[ ]explained with record citations.”

See id. at 32. Jennifer argues that in light of those “persuasive” opinions, the ALJ erred

by not including restrictions in the RFC addressing their moderate limitations—that is,

limitations in “completing a normal workday or workweek without interruptions from

psychologically based symptoms” and “perform[ing] at a consistent pace without an

unreasonable number and length of rest periods.” Docket Item 6-1 at 25–26. But that

argument is factually incorrect.

First, the RFC restricted Jennifer to “carry[ing] out simple instructions and tasks,”

performing only “simple unskilled work,” and doing work with “no strict production

quotas.” Docket Item 5 at 28. Courts in this Circuit repeatedly have found such

restrictions sufficient to account for moderate limitations like those about which Drs.

Brown and Bhutwala opined. See, e.g., Karl E. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL

3003714, at *5 n.5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2025) (“[T]he ALJ limited [the p]laintiff to ‘simple

tasks,’ which accounts for [the p]laintiff’s moderate difficulty in concentrating, persisting,

or maintaining pace.”); Arthur M. v. Saul, 2021 WL 2309884, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. June 7,

2021) (“[T]he restrictions imposed by the RFC, including that [the] plaintiff can perform

only simple and routine tasks . . . are sufficient to account for [the] plaintiff’s moderate

limitations with regard to completing a normal workday or workweek without interruption

as well as performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length

of rest periods.”); see also Denise Marie T.-W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL

4162490, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2024) (“Moderate limitations in some or all areas of

mental functioning may be accounted for in an RFC by limiting a plaintiff to simple,

routine work . . . .”). So the limitations incorporated in the RFC accounted for the

limitations in Dr. Brown’s and Dr. Bhutwala’s opinions. See Docket Item 3 at 28.

Jennifer specifically argues that the ALJ failed to address the opinions of Drs.

Brown and Bhutwala that she was moderately limited in completing a normal workday

and workweek without interruption and in performing at a consistent pace without

breaks. See Docket Item 6 at 24–29; Docket Item 14 at 5–7. But both doctors explicitly

found that Jennifer was not significantly limited in performing activities within a

schedule, maintaining regular attendance, being punctual, and sustaining an ordinary

routine without special supervision. See Docket Item 5 at 132, 151. And as noted

above, both doctors found that notwithstanding Jennifer’s moderate limitations, she

“ha[d the] capacity for [the] basic mental demands of unskilled work.” Id. at 135, 154.

In other words, both found that Jennifer was capable of working if the work she did was

unskilled. The RFC’s limitation to “simple unskilled work,” see id. at 28, therefore was

sufficient to account for what Drs. Brown and Bhutwala found were Jennifer’s mental

health issues, and Jennifer’s argument rings hollow, see, e.g., Matta, 508 F. App’x at

56; Young v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 156262, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2019) (finding that an

“RFC [that wa]s consistent with the record as a whole” was not error).

In sum, the ALJ crafted an RFC that was consistent with the medical evidence in

the record, including the opinions of Drs. Brown and Bhutwala. Indeed, the ALJ

explicitly addressed the limitations in those opinions and accounted for them in the

RFC. See Docket Item 3 at 28, 32. Jennifer’s argument that the RFC failed to

incorporate limitations in opinions that the ALJ found persuasive therefore lacks merit.

B. Consideration of Jennifer’s Supportive Housing

An ALJ must determine “the extent to which [a claimant’s] alleged functional

limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms can reasonably be accepted

as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings and other evidence to

decide how [a claimant’s] symptoms affect [his or her] ability to work.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(a). This is a two-step inquiry. See Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 179, 183

(2d Cir. 2010); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(d). First, the ALJ “consider[s] whether there is

an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment[] that could

reasonably be expected to produce an individual’s symptoms, such as pain.” SSR 16-

3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *2 (Mar. 16, 2016). “Second, once an underlying physical or

mental impairment[] that could reasonably be expected to produce an individual’s

symptoms is established, [the ALJ] evaluate[s] the intensity and persistence of those

symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit an individual’s ability to

perform work-related activities.” Id.

The ALJ correctly applied the two-step inquiry here. At step one, he found that

Jennifer’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause

the alleged symptoms.” Docket Item 5 at 29. At step two, however, he found that

Jennifer’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence[,] and limiting effects of

[her] symptoms [we]re not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other

evidence in the record.” Id. The ALJ then acknowledged that he was required to

consider other factors “in addition to the objective medical evidence when evaluating

[the] intensity, persistence, and limit[ing] effects of [Jennifer’s] symptoms, in recognition

of the fact that an individual’s symptoms can sometimes suggest a greater level of

severity of an impairment than can be shown by the objective medical evidence alone.”

Id. at 30. And he did exactly that, looking to the record to decide whether Jennifer was

disabled.

Jennifer argues that in doing so, the ALJ “fail[ed] to consider [her] supportive

housing” and that this failure “[wa]s a mischaracterization that infect[ed] the entire

decision, making it impossible to determine [whether] the ALJ considered the record

fully and fairly as he was required to do.” Docket Item 6-1 at 18. But the ALJ’s

consideration of Jennifer’s supportive housing is evident throughout his decision.

For example, at step three the ALJ noted that “[a]lthough [Jennifer] demonstrated

intact recent and remote memory skills[,] . . . other evidence of record disclosed [that

Jennifer] required extra support to adhere to her prescription medication regimen,

attend appointments, maintain a safe living space, and [maintain] adequate hygiene.”

Docket Item 5 at 26–27. Likewise, in explaining Jennifer’s RFC at step four, the ALJ

noted that Jennifer “obtained social services support for housing . . ., which included a

homeless shelter, a group home, and an individual apartment with increasingly reduced

case management.” Id. at 28. And in addressing the opinion of Susan Santarpia,

Ph.D., the ALJ explained that “Dr. Santarpia’s conclusion that [Jennifer’s] mental

impairments were non-severe [wa]s not at all persuasive because the record clearly

established that [Jennfer’s] mental symptoms impacted her daily activities, which

included her living arrangements.” Id. at 31–32 (emphasis added). So far from failing to

account for Jennifer’s supportive housing, the ALJ considered it and balanced it against

the other evidence throughout his decision.

But even if that were not so, the ALJ’s decision still would have been supported

by substantial evidence. For example, and as noted above, the ALJ considered the

opinions of Drs. Brown and Bhutwala, see Docket Item 5 at 32, who both found that

Jennifer could meet the “basic mental demands of unskilled work,” id. at 135, 154. And

the RFC restricted Jennifer to precisely that—“carry[ing] out simple instructions and

tasks” and performing only “simple unskilled work.” Id. at 28.

What is more, Dr. Santarpia found Jennifer to be less limited than even Drs.

Brown and Bhutwala found. Compare id. at 130–35, 150–54, with id. at 503–07. Dr.

Santarpia opined that Jennifer had no limitations in understanding, remembering, and

applying simple and complex instructions; using judgment to make work-related

decisions; interacting appropriately with others; sustaining concentration and performing

at a consistent pace; sustaining an ordinary routine and regular work attendance;

maintaining personal hygiene and dressing appropriately; and being aware of normal

hazards and taking appropriate precautions. Id. at 506. She also found that Jennifer

had only mild-to-moderate limitations in “regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and

maintaining well-being.” Id. And Dr. Santarpia concluded that Jennifer’s psychiatric

problems “d[id] not appear to be significant enough to interfere with [her] ability to

function on a daily basis.” Id. Nonetheless, the ALJ gave Jennifer the benefit of the

doubt, credited her need for supportive housing, and found her to be more limited than

Dr. Santarpia opined. See id. at 31–32. That was to Jennifer’s benefit and was not

error. See Ramsey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 830 F. App’x 37, 39 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding

an ALJ’s deviation “from consultative examiners’ recommendations to decrease [a

claimant’s] RFC abased on other evidence in the record” was not error (emphasis in

original)).

Jennfer repeatedly insists that the ALJ “cherry-picked the record to downplay”

her impairments. See Docket Item 6 at 16; see, e.g., id. at 17 (“An ALJ may not ‘cherry

pick’ evidence.”); id. at 20 (“the ALJ focused on cherry-picked . . . evidence”); id. at 23

(“The ALJ completely cherry-picked the record . . ..”). But other than incorrectly

asserting that the ALJ ignored her need for a supportive living arrangement—and citing

records that suggest mental health issues that Drs. Brown, Bhutwala, and Santarpia

addressed—Jennifer offers nothing in support of that repeated conclusion. She cites no

medical opinions that support her argument, nor does she cite any facts other than

those connected with her supportive living arrangements. See id. at 16–23 (section of

Jennifer’s memorandum arguing that the ALJ “cherry-picked the record”). Because the

ALJ indeed addressed Jennifer’s need for supportive living and because he relied on

opinion evidence explicitly finding that Jennifer had the capacity to work, Jennifer’s

argument is misplaced.

Finally, it is worth noting that “[a]n ALJ does not have to state on the record every

reason justifying a decision,” Valdez-Ocasio v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 3573761, at *1 (2d

Cir. May 22, 2023) (quoting Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d

Cir. 2012)); rather, so long as an ALJ’s decision provides “an adequate basis for

meaningful judicial review . . . and is supported by substantial evidence,” there is no

error, Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[R]emand is not required

where the evidence of record permits [the Court] to glean the rationale of an ALJ’s

decision.” (citation modified)). And that is precisely the case here.

In sum, the ALJ appropriately considered Jennifer’s impairments in light of her

supportive housing and other evidence in the record. And while Jennifer may disagree

with the weight the ALJ assigned to each piece of evidence, it is not the function of this

Court to re-weigh that evidence or to determine de novo whether Jennifer is disabled.

See Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998). Because the ALJ was “entitled

to weigh all of the evidence available to make a[] . . . finding that was consistent with the

record as a whole,” Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013), and because

the ALJ did just that, his decision was supported by substantial evidence. This Court

will not second-guess it. See Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010).

CONCLUSION

The ALJ’s decision was not contrary to the substantial evidence in the record, nor

did it result from any legal error. Therefore, and for the reasons stated above, Jennifer’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 6, is DENIED, and the

Commissioner’s cross motion for judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 13, is

GRANTED. The complaint is DISMISSED, and the Clerk of Court shall close the file.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 5, 2026

Buffalo, New York

/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo

LAWRENCE J. VILARDO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE