The opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CUTHBERT ANDERSON :
:
Appellant : No. 1358 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 9, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0005484-2023
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 5, 2026
Cuthbert Anderson appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in
the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas on August 9, 2024. On appeal,
Anderson challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, an evidentiary
ruling by the court, and the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
matter as follows:
On September 6, 2023, Officers Tyler Smith ([“]Officer Smith”)
and William Beck (“Officer Beck”) of the Bensalem Township Police
Department were dispatched to the Acme supermarket located at
1336 Bristol Pike in response to a report of a male individual
causing a disturbance. Upon arrival at the scene, Officer[] Smith
and Officer Beck (together the “Officers”) made contact with the
individual, later identified as Anderson.
Upon further investigation, the Officers ascertained that Anderson
was the subject of active warrants issued out of Philadelphia and
Bucks County. The Officers attempted to place Anderson under
arrest. Anderson did not comply with the Officers’ commands and
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actively resisted arrest. During the struggle, Officer Beck drew his
department-issued taser. Anderson proceeded to knock the taser
from Officer Beck’s possession and then took control of the taser.
Officer Beck was able to remove the taser from Anderson’s
possession by knocking it out of his hand onto the ground.
Anderson continued to resist arrest, striking Officer Beck in the
face and attempted to remove Officer Smith’s firearm from its
holster. Officer Beck regained possession of his taser and
successfully deployed it on Anderson, who was then subdued and
taken into custody without further incident.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/25, at 1-2.
Anderson was arrested and charged with Counts 1 and 2: aggravated
assault−attempts to cause or causes serious bodily injury to designated
individuals, Counts 3 and 4: aggravated assault−attempts to cause or causes
bodily injury to designated individuals, Counts 5 and 6: aggravated
assault−attempts to cause or causes bodily injury with a deadly weapon,
Counts 7 and 8: aggravated assault−fear of imminent serious bodily injury to
designated individuals, Counts 9 and 10: disarming a law enforcement officer,
Counts 11 and 12: simple assault, Counts 13 and 14: resisting arrest, and
Counts 15 and 16: simple assault.1
On June 6, 2024, following a trial, a jury found Anderson guilty of Counts
3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 16, and not guilty on Counts 1, 2, 5, and 9. Sentencing
was deferred for preparation of a presentence investigation report (“PSI”).
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(2), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2702(a)(3), 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§2702(a)(4), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2702(a)(6), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §5104.1(a), 18
Pa.C.S.A. §2701(a), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §5104, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2701(a)(3),
respectively.
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On August 9, 2024, the trial court sentenced Anderson to concurrent
terms of 5 to 10 years’ incarceration for Counts 3, 4, 7, and 8, to be followed
by 3 years’ probation for Count 10. No further penalty was imposed on the
remaining counts. The aggregate sentence was therefore 5 to 10 years’
incarceration, to be followed by three years’ probation, with credit for time
served. Anderson filed a timely post-sentence motion for reconsideration of
sentence, which the court denied. After his appellate rights were reinstated
nunc pro tunc, Anderson filed the instant timely appeal.
Anderson raises the following issues on appeal:
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing [Anderson]
above the Sentencing Guidelines, and in its failure to properly
consider, and give the appropriate weight to [Anderson]’s mental
illness and how his mental illness played a part in the crimes to
which [Anderson] was convicted?
II. Did the trial court err in permitting Officer William Beck to
testify as to the possible dangers from the deployment of a Taser
and to present what was essentially expert testimony being
elicited to establish the serious bodily injury element of the
Aggravated Assault offenses charged … ?
III. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to establish
any of the Aggravated Assault charges upon which [Anderson]
was convicted, as there was insufficient evidence of any injury to
the police, any legitimate concern or fear that injury would occur,
or any conduct on the part of [Anderson] that could reasonably be
interpreted by the jury as an attempt to do anything other than
flee from the police?
Appellant’s Brief, at vii (trial court’s responses omitted).
In his first issue, Anderson argues the trial court abused its discretion
by sentencing him above the sentencing guidelines and by failing to properly
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consider and give appropriate weight to his mental illness in sentencing.
Anderson concedes this claim raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects
of sentence. “A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be
considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a
claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must
invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
the Sentencing Code, 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
omitted; brackets in original).
Here, Anderson preserved his issue through a timely post-sentence
motion for reconsideration of sentence and filed a timely appeal. Further,
counsel has included the required Rule 2119(f) statement.
We therefore review the Rule 2119(f) statement to determine if
Anderson has raised a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Tirado,
870 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Our inquiry must focus on the reasons
for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal,
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which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. (citation
and emphasis omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).
Anderson “must show that there is a substantial question that the
sentence imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” McAfee,
849 A.2d at 274 (citation omitted). That is, “the sentence violates either a
specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code
or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.” Tirado,
870 A.2d at 365 (citation omitted). “Additionally, we cannot look beyond the
statement of questions presented and the prefatory 2119(f) statement to
determine whether a substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v.
Provenzano, 50 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
Anderson asserts the trial court erred by sentencing him to the statutory
maximum without considering mitigating evidence and without placing any
meaningful explanation on the record for the aggravated sentence. This claim
raises a substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Garcia-
Rivera, 983 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Preliminarily, we note the trial court reviewed a PSI prior to sentencing.
Where the trial court had the benefit of reviewing a PSI, we must
presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant
information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed
those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A
pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for itself.
In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of
engaging in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly that
sentencers are under no compulsion to employ checklists or any
extended or systematic definitions of their punishment procedure.
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Having been fully informed by the pre-sentence report, the
sentencing court’s discretion should not be disturbed. This is
particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where it can
be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of awareness of
the sentencing considerations, and there we will presume also that
the weighing process took place in a meaningful fashion. It would
be foolish, indeed, to take the position that if a court is in
possession of the facts, it will fail to apply them to the case at
hand.
Commonwealth v. Hallock, 603 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation
omitted).
Further, it is well-established that Pennsylvania has an indeterminate
guided sentencing scheme. See Commonwealth v. Yuhasz, 923 A.2d 1111,
1117 (Pa. 2007). The sentencing judge is required to consider the sentencing
guidelines that have been adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). It is recognized however that “the
Sentencing Guidelines are purely advisory in nature” and “are merely one
factor among many that the court must consider in imposing a sentence.”
Yuhasz, 923 A.2d at 1118 (citation omitted). “[A] trial court judge has wide
discretion in sentencing and can, on the appropriate record and for the
appropriate reasons, consider any legal factor in imposing a sentence in the
aggravated range.” Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (citation omitted).
It is impermissible for a court to consider factors already included
within the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing
or decreasing a sentence to the aggravated or mitigated range.
Trial courts are permitted to use prior conviction history and other
factors already included in the guidelines if, they are used to
supplement other extraneous sentencing information.
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Id. at 1275 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Here, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences for an aggregate
term of 5 to 10 years’ incarceration. It is undisputed that the aggregate
sentence is above the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines.
The court’s explanation for its sentence on the record was notably
extensive. First, the court noted its consideration of the facts of the case and
the offenses committed. See N.T., Sentencing Hearing, 8/9/24, at 30 (noting
it found the facts to be “extremely disturbing” especially considering the
Officers were just trying to do their job to protect all citizens). The court noted
its consideration of the danger Anderson put people in that night. See id. at
31 (noting Anderson not only put the Officers at risk, but also the people in
the store, the store manager, and shoppers in the parking lot). The court
acknowledged that Anderson had been trying to better himself, but noted that
he had only been doing so since being in prison. See id.
The court next stated its consideration of Anderson’s criminal record
from the PSI, which spanned numerous years. See id. at 31-32. The court
stated its consideration of the sentencing guidelines which it had summarized
earlier in the hearing. See id. at 32. The court also indicated its consideration
of the Officer’s impact statements. See id.
The court acknowledged Anderson’s need for rehabilitation and mental
health treatment, and indicated it was glad Anderson was getting that
treatment, including medications, while in prison. See id. at 33. However, the
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court emphasized that his current acceptance of treatment did not excuse the
underlying conduct. See id. The court then stated as follows:
Now, I’m also considering the recommendations from the PSI from
Probation, and I will say that I do think that that seems a little
lengthier than I think is necessary in your case. Because all of
these charges that you have can be stacked one on top of the
other, and that’s what they’re recommending here is that we do
run your sentences consecutive to one another, which would keep
you incarcerated longer than I think is necessary in this case, but
not much longer than I think is necessary.
Id. at 33-34. The court then imposed the sentence as stated above.
Anderson’s counsel acknowledged that the court “likely took a totality
into effect in imposing these concurrent sentences” but since the total
sentence did go above the aggravated range, counsel asked the court if it was
incorporating the reasons already given as the basis for an aggravated range
sentence. See id. at 36.
The court explained it was “going above the aggravated range because
all of these sentences could be consecutive to one another. But by doing them
concurrent, I’m going above the aggravated range so that we maintain the
sentence where I want it to be. I think it’s less than what's being
recommended by Probation, but I think it’s appropriate given all of the factors
here.” Id. at 36-37. The court further noted its consideration of misconducts
while in the correctional facility on these charges, the seriousness of the
convictions, and the threats and potential harm to not only the Officers, but
the public, as reasons for an aggravated sentence. See id. at 37.
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As we find the court relied on permissible factors in sentencing Anderson
in the aggravated range, we conclude the circumstances are sufficient to
justify the trial court’s aggravated sentence. We conclude the trial court did
not abuse its discretion, and therefore Anderson’s argument merits no relief.
In his second issue, Anderson challenges the admission of Officer Beck’s
testimony regarding the risks associated with deploying a taser. Specifically,
Anderson characterizes this testimony as improperly admitted expert
testimony used to establish the element of serious bodily injury for the
aggravated assault charges.
Our standard of review for the admission of evidence is well-settled:
The admission of evidence is solely within the discretion of the
trial court, and a trial court’s evidentiary rulings will be reversed
on appeal only upon an abuse of that discretion. An abuse of
discretion will not be found based on a mere error of judgment,
but rather occurs where the court has reached a conclusion that
overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised
is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill-will.
To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only
be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining
party. [A]n evidentiary error of the trial court will be deemed
harmless on appeal where the appellate court is convinced,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error could not have
contributed to the verdict.
Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 479-480 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702, which governs the admission of
expert testimony, provides:
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Rule 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson;
(b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue; and
(c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the relevant
field.
Pa.R.E. 702.
In contrast, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 701 governs opinion
testimony by lay witnesses:
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form
of an opinion is limited to one that is:
(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to
determining a fact in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
Pa.R.E. 701.
Here, Officer Beck testified about his ten years of law enforcement
experience and the type of trainings he had received, including ongoing
weapon proficiency. See N.T., 6/5/24, at 57. This training involved replicating
real-life encounters to determine when lethal force is necessary or not. See
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id. at 58. Officer Beck testified about his ongoing proficiency training on “less
lethal” forms of equipment, including mace and a taser. See id. at 60-61
(Officer Beck testifying that this training goes “hand in hand” with the firearms
training). Officer Beck expanded on his training specifically regarding a taser,
including practical uses and function checks. See id. at 61. Officer Beck
explained the operation and deployment of a taser, specifically explaining the
best practice as follows:
The first way, which is the best practice, typically would be to
deploy the prongs. They are two barbed prongs in the front of the
Taser. When the safety is taken off and the weapon becomes
activated, the prongs would fire from the front of the weapon, and
due to the barbs, they would stick in the subject at an angle. And,
obviously, the further the spread would be the best, because
electric travels at a current. It would go from one probe to the
other, and the wider spread the more effect it would have on the
person's muscular system.
Id. at 62. Officer Beck explained that they perform function checks on their
tasers because the taser is a “less-than-lethal option” so they do not have to
go for a firearm unless it’s a last resort. Id. at 64. While a taser is “less lethal”,
Officer Beck testified that deploying one is still dangerous because it “causes
very intense stress on the body or the subject that you are using it on
[depending] on their age, their health conditions, things of that nature.” Id.
Officer Beck explained that there are “preferred striking areas” to deploy a
taser on a subject’s body, such as the “upper chest to just below the belt line,”
as well as “areas that we would like to avoid altogether because you could
cause serious bodily injury.” Id. at 64-65. When asked why he would prefer
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to avoid deploying a taser above the chest area, the following pertinent
exchange occurred:
Q. Why not above the chest area?
[Officer Beck]: Actually, your head and face are a lot more
sensitive. If a subject was struck in the eyes with a Taser–
MR. DOWNS: Objection, Your Honor […] my objection is based
upon the fact that I think the Commonwealth is trying to start a
line of questioning that I don’t believe the officer is going to be
qualified to testify to. He’s about to give, basically, medical
testimony about the possible dangers of this Taser[…]he’s had
training on how to use it and deploy it, but he’s not a doctor. He’s
not a qualified party to be able to give what is, I believe, being
called for expert testimony in regards to the effects.
MR. GANNON: Your Honor, he’s being asked about that. He’s been
asked about the danger, which is a common sense argument
involving probes. There is a use of force that specifically states
that he is trained on to not aim at the head and to explain why. It
is also probative because it goes towards the charges of fear of
serious bodily injury, because when he is struck in the face with
the Taser it is active and he, I believe, would testify [] that if it
was utilized on his face he could suffer serious bodily injury.
[…] It's not an expert opinion. It is common sense and it goes
towards many of the charges in this instance.
THE COURT: I don’t think it’s expert testimony. I think it is based
on his experience, his training, and he is simply explaining to the
jury why you aim for certain parts of the body. So the objection is
going to be overruled.
Id. at 65-66. Officer Beck was subsequently asked to complete his answer, to
explain why you would not want to deploy a taser above the shoulders or
upper chest area. See id. at 68. Officer Beck explained that a taser’s “darts
deploy at a pretty rapid pace and they could cause vision loss. You could lose
an eye, you could lose a tooth, things of that nature[… The taser’s probes]
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have sharp tips with a barb, almost like the end of a fishing hook, which allows
the prong to stay inside the person’s skin or clothing.” Id. at 69. Officer Beck
testified that he has been trained to never aim above the shoulders. See id.
A review of the record shows that Anderson’s objection was based on
the assertion that Officer Beck was not qualified to testify about the possible
dangers and effects of being hit with a taser.
We cannot say that Officer Beck offered any scientific, technical, or
medical specialized knowledge. Officer Beck simply explained that it is
dangerous to deploy a taser at someone’s face because of the sharp prongs.
It is fairly common-sense that a sharp prong deployed at a face has the
potential to cause injury such as loss of vision or teeth. Officer Beck’s
testimony to this effect was rationally based on his own experience having
ongoing training regarding when and how to a taser should be used.
Accordingly, we find the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
permitting Officer Beck to testify regarding the risks associated with taser use.
In his final issue, Anderson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his aggravated assault charges. Specifically, Anderson argues
there was insufficient evidence of any injury to the police, any legitimate
concern or fear that injury would occur, or any conduct on Anderson’s part
that could reasonably be interpreted by the jury as an attempt to do anything
other than flee from the police.
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In reviewing sufficiency challenges, our standard of review is deferential
to the fact finder:
As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims
requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to
the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence
will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes
each material element of the crime charged and the commission
thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless,
the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical
certainty. Any doubt about the defendant's guilt is to be resolved
by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from
the combined circumstances.
The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the fact that the evidence
establishing a defendant's participation in a crime is circumstantial
does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the
presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute
our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the
evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a
defendant's crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant's
convictions will be upheld.
Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citation and brackets omitted).
In pertinent part, a person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(3) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily
injury to [a police officer] in the performance of duty;
(4) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily
injury to another with a deadly weapon;
…
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(6) attempts by physical menace to put [a police officer], while in
the performance of duty, in fear of imminent serious bodily injury;
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3), (4), and (6). Under any of these subsections,
actual injury is not required; rather an “attempt” to cause either bodily injury
or serious bodily injury is sufficient. See id. “Bodily injury” is defined as an
“[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” Id. § 2301. “Serious
bodily injury” is defined as “[b]odily injury which created a substantial risk of
death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement of the function of any
bodily member or organ.” Id. “An intent ordinarily must be proven through
circumstantial evidence and inferred from acts, conduct or attendant
circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Fortune, 68 A.3d 980, 984 (Pa. Super.
2013) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Anderson does not dispute that the pertinent subsections apply to the
Officers, or that neither of the Officers sustained actual bodily injury or serious
bodily injury. Anderson only asks us to “assess the adequacy of the
Commonwealth’s proof that [Anderson] attempted to cause such injury or to
place [the Officers] in fear thereof.” Appellant’s Brief, at 20.
Anderson argues that he was simply trying to resist arrest because he
did not want to be handcuffed. We find this argument to be baffling. It is
unlikely that anyone being arrested wants to be handcuffed. That does not
justify someone attempting to grab an officer’s gun or taser in order to avoid
handcuffs. This would lead to absurd and dangerous results.
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While Anderson may have been attempting to flee from the Officers, the
jury was free to believe that Anderson’s violent behavior demonstrated an
intent to cause bodily injury to the Officers in his attempt to flee. The evidence
established that Anderson, during a lawful encounter and arrest, resisted
apprehension by engaging in a violent struggle with the Officers, requiring
multiple officers to subdue him. Officer Beck and Officer Smith testified to
specific actions by Anderson which they reasonably interpreted as an
imminent threat of bodily injury. See N.T., 6/5/25, at 91-101, 174-187. As
stated above, the evidence showed that Anderson did not simply try to run
from the officers, but actively attempted to gain control of the taser and Officer
Smith’s firearm. The Officers both testified credibly that they feared for their
own lives and each other’s lives during the encounter with Anderson. See Trial
Court Opinion, 7/31/25, at 16 (finding the Officers testified credibly).
Accordingly, the jury was free to find that Anderson attempted by physical
menace to put the Officers in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, we find the evidence was sufficient to convict Anderson of
the aggravated assault offenses. As none of Anderson’s issues merit relief, we
affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Date: 5/5/2026
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