The opinion
[Cite as State v. Brown, 2026-Ohio-1622.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State of Ohio, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 24AP-699
v. : (C.P.C. No. 22CR-1758)
Charles E. Brown, : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
Defendant-Appellant. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on May 5, 2026
On brief: Shayla D. Favor, Prosecuting Attorney, and
Mark R. Wilson, for appellee.
On brief: Charles E. Brown, pro se.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Charles E. Brown, appeals pro se from a judgment of
conviction and sentence entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas pursuant
to a jury verdict finding him guilty of one count of having weapons while under disability
and a firearm specification. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On April 22, 2022, the Franklin County Grand Jury indicted Brown on one
count of having weapons while under disability, a third-degree felony in violation of
R.C. 2923.13, and a firearm specification. The indictment alleged that on or about April 14,
2022, Brown knowingly acquired, had, carried, or used a firearm or dangerous ordinance
having previously been convicted of a felony offense of violence, and the specification
alleged that Brown had a firearm on or about his person or under his control while
No. 24AP-699 2
committing the offense. A jury trial on the charge commenced on September 16, 2024. At
trial, the state presented evidence that Bexley police officers responded to a 911 call
reporting a possible drug overdose at Brown’s residence. Brown showed the officers drug
paraphernalia and suspected narcotics; he also showed the officers a knife and claimed that
the individual who overdosed had stabbed him. The officers requested permission to
search Brown’s residence and he agreed. During the search the officers found two firearms.
Brown testified on his own behalf, asserting that he inadvertently acquired a firearm in a
box of belongings retrieved from the home of his deceased mother. Brown admitted he
knew he was not permitted to have a firearm but claimed he did not know what to do with
it without getting into trouble. The parties stipulated that Brown had a prior conviction for
a felony offense of violence.
{¶ 3} The jury found Brown guilty of one count of having weapons while under
disability, as charged in the indictment, and the associated firearm specification. The trial
court found that a prison term was mandatory pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F). The court
imposed a sentence of 36 months of incarceration on the having weapons while under
disability conviction, to be served consecutively to 12 months of incarceration on the
firearm specification. The court found that Brown was entitled to 917 days of jail-time
credit.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 4} Brown appeals and assigns the following two assignments of error for our
review:
[I.] Plaintiff, nor the Trial Court rebuttal the jurisdiction
substantial defect of the April 14th, 2022 initial charging
Criminal Complaint under Case No.: 2022 CRA 5237 was not
incompliance pursuant to: Ohio Criminal Rule 3(A)
mandatory word “shall”;
[II.] The first presided Judge, Julie M. Lynch been
orchestrating tactics within the enforcement of hybrid-
representation upon him for a prolonged period, therein;
unconstitutionally denied this Defendant constitutional and
statutory right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, and Ohio
Revised Code Sections 2945.02, 2945.71(C)(2) and
No. 24AP-699 3
2945.73(B). By the court created structural error which
blatantly violated Defendant’s speedy trial rights,
(Sic passim.)
III. Discussion
A. Whether Brown’s conviction was invalid due to a deficiency in the
charging complaint
{¶ 5} In his first assignment of error, Brown appears to argue that the trial court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the charging document failed to comply with
Crim.R. 3(A). Brown claims that a complaint filed in Franklin County Municipal Court case
No. 2022 CRA 5237 was not made under oath and therefore was insufficient to invoke the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court.
{¶ 6} Crim.R. 3(A) provides that “[t]he complaint is a written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged.” It further provides that the complaint
“shall be made upon oath before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.”
Crim.R. 3(A).
{¶ 7} The complaint filed in Franklin County Municipal Court case No. 2022 CRA
5237 is not part of the record before this court. However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has
stated that an online municipal court docket may be appropriate for judicial notice. State
ex rel. Curtis v. Turner, 2024-Ohio-2682, ¶ 12. Accordingly, we note that Franklin County
Municipal Court case No. 2022 CRA 5237 was captioned State of Ohio versus Charles E.
Brown and a complaint charging Brown with having weapons while under disability was
filed in that case on April 14, 2022. See Jackson v. Conroy Rental, 2024-Ohio-4467, ¶ 2
(10th Dist.) (taking judicial notice of agreed judgment entry in Franklin County Municipal
Court case). Further, the online docket for that case indicates that the complaint was
dismissed on April 22, 2022, due to a direct indictment. Brown was indicted by the
Franklin County Grand Jury on April 22, 2022 in the present case.
{¶ 8} Brown was convicted and sentenced on the charges in the indictment in the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas case giving rise to this appeal, not on the
complaint in Franklin County Municipal Court case No. 2022 CRA 5237. Therefore, even
if Brown is correct that the complaint in Franklin County Municipal Court case No. 2022
CRA 5237 was deficient, such deficiency was irrelevant to the proceedings in the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas, which were based on the grand jury indictment. See State
No. 24AP-699 4
v. Rogers, 2018-Ohio-1073, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.) (“[E]ven if there were defects in the complaint
filed in the municipal court, such defects would be irrelevant and harmless because the
conviction is based on the grand jury indictment. Thus, the issuance of a grand jury
indictment renders any defect in the complaint or warrant moot.” (Citations omitted.));
State v. Monroe, 2009-Ohio-2343, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.) (“Whatever the complaint charged,
defendant was not convicted or sentenced on it; he was convicted and sentenced on the
indictment. Thus, any flaw in the complaint’s failing to mimic the indictment is
harmless.”); see also State v. McRae, 2022-Ohio-2918, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.) (“[I]n light of the
indictment, any alleged defects in the complaint would be irrelevant and harmless to
McRae’s conviction and would not divest the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.”);
State v. Phillips, 2014-Ohio-5309, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.) (holding that “a grand jury’s indictment
cures any defect in the failure to file a criminal complaint pursuant to Criminal Rule 3”);
State v. Turner, 2011-Ohio-4348, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.) (“Where the accused is initially charged
via a complaint, but is subsequently indicted by the grand jury, the accused is tried upon
the indictment not the complaint. Consequently, any alleged defects with the June 4, 2009
complaint are irrelevant and harmless to Turner’s convictions, as he was tried and
convicted on the indictment.” (Citations omitted.)).
{¶ 9} Accordingly, we overrule Brown’s first assignment of error.
B. Whether Brown’s right to a speedy trial was violated
{¶ 10} In his second assignment of error, Brown argues the trial court violated his
right to a speedy trial. Brown appears to argue that the trial court first erred by failing to
set an initial trial date within 30 days after he entered a not-guilty plea, as required by
R.C. 2945.02. Brown seems to assert that all subsequent continuances of his trial date were
invalid due to the alleged failure to comply with R.C. 2945.02. Brown ultimately argues
that his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated.
{¶ 11} Brown raised these arguments in pro se motions to dismiss filed in the trial
court. The trial court denied Brown’s motions in a decision issued on July 12, 2024. The
trial court concluded Brown had established a prima facie showing that his statutory right
to a speedy trial had been violated because 803 days had passed between his arrest and the
court’s hearing on the motions on June 25, 2024. The court then analyzed the continuances
that had been granted and other events that tolled the speedy-trial calculation and found
No. 24AP-699 5
that, at most, 142 days were not attributable to continuances or other tolling events.1
Therefore, the court concluded that Brown’s statutory right to a speedy trial had not been
violated. The trial court also applied the balancing test that governs constitutional speedy-
trial claims and concluded that Brown’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had not been
violated.
{¶ 12} The right to a speedy trial in a criminal case is guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio
Constitution. State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-1002, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). Ohio law also provides
a statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to statutes implemented to incorporate
constitutional protections. Id. A trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss based on a
speedy-trial violation presents a mixed question of law and fact. Id. at ¶ 12. On review, we
give deference to the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by competent,
credible evidence, but we independently review whether the trial court appropriately
applied the law to those facts.
1. Whether continuances of Brown’s trial date were invalid due to
failure to comply with initial scheduling requirement
{¶ 13} Brown appears to argue that the trial court failed to comply with R.C. 2945.02
by setting his trial within 30 days after he entered his not-guilty plea, and that the trial
court’s failure to do so rendered any subsequent continuances invalid.
{¶ 14} R.C. 2945.02 provides that the common pleas court “shall set all criminal
cases for trial for a day not later than thirty days after the date of entry of plea of the
defendant.” The statute further provides that “[n]o continuance of the trial shall be granted
except upon affirmative proof in open court, upon reasonable notice, that the ends of justice
require a continuance.” In this case, Brown entered his not-guilty plea on April 27, 2022.
The record indicates the first trial date was set for June 1, 2022. Although that was more
than 30 days after the plea was entered, the statute provides that failure to set a criminal
case for trial within 30 days “does not operate as an acquittal.” R.C. 2945.02. Rather, upon
notice of the failure to timely schedule the case for trial, the case “shall forthwith be set for
trial within a reasonable time, not exceeding thirty days thereafter.” R.C. 2945.02.
1 The trial court calculated that 30 days of speedy-trial time had passed; alternatively, the trial court asserted
that if Brown’s first motion to dismiss was not deemed a tolling event, an additional 112 days of speedy-trial
time would have passed, for a total of 142 days of speedy-trial time.
No. 24AP-699 6
Accordingly, any failure to set an initial trial date within 30 days of the not-guilty plea was
not a basis for dismissal.
2. Whether Brown’s statutory right to a speedy trial was violated
{¶ 15} Under R.C. 2945.71(C)(2), a person charged with a felony shall be brought to
trial within 270 days of being arrested, except as provided in R.C. 2945.73(C).2 A defendant
establishes a prima facie violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial by demonstrating
that more than 270 days elapsed without him being brought to trial.3 Williams, 2023-Ohio-
1002, at ¶ 14 (10th Dist.). Once a defendant establishes a prima facie case, the state bears
the burden of proving that the speedy-trial time was extended through waiver or tolling.
Id. at ¶ 14-16. If a defendant waives his speedy-trial rights, the days included in the waiver
period do not count toward the speedy-trial deadline. Id. at ¶ 16. The speedy-trial deadline
is tolled by operation of law under certain circumstances that are set forth in R.C. 2945.72.
As relevant to this appeal, the statute provides that the speedy-trial time may be extended
by “[a]ny period of delay necessitated by the accused’s lack of counsel, provided that such
delay is not occasioned by any lack of diligence in providing counsel to an indigent accused
upon the accused’s request as required by law.” R.C. 2945.72(C). Speedy-trial time may
also be extended by “[a]ny period of delay occasioned by the neglect or improper act of the
accused” or “[a]ny period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or abatement,
motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused.” R.C. 2945.72(D) and (E).
It may also be extended by “[t]he period of any continuance granted on the accused’s own
2 We note that amendments to R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73 became effective during the period between
Brown’s arrest and the beginning of his trial. 2021 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288; 2021 Sub.H.B. No. 343. The
substance of those legislative amendments is not directly relevant to our analysis of Brown’s speedy-trial
claim; therefore, we need not address the question of which version of the statutes applies to Brown’s claim.
3 When determining the 270-day period within which a defendant must be brought to trial on a felony charge,
“each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be counted as three
days.” R.C. 2945.71(E). In this case, the trial court issued a $5,000 reporting and recognizance bond and a
$3,500 surety or appearance bond, but Brown did not post bond and remained in jail until his trial began.
The triple-count provision under R.C. 2945.71(E) “is applicable only to those defendants held in jail in lieu of
bail solely on the pending charge.” (Emphasis added.) State v. MacDonald, 48 Ohio St.2d 66 (1976),
paragraph one of the syllabus. The trial court concluded Brown was not entitled to triple-counting pursuant
to R.C. 2945.71(E) because he was also being held on a parole matter. Brown does not appear to dispute the
trial court’s conclusion on appeal. Brown appeared to acknowledge the existence of a parole holder on him at
a hearing conducted on October 16, 2023. “The existence of a valid parole holder prevents application of the
triple-count provisions of R.C. 2945.71(E).” State v. Brown, 1992-Ohio-96, ¶ 12. See State v. Olverson, 2003-
Ohio-1274, ¶ 31 (10th Dist.) (“[T]he Ohio Supreme Court has held that the triple-count provision of
R.C. 2945.71(E) is applicable only to those defendants held in jail in lieu of bail solely on the pending charges,
and that the existence of a valid parole holder prevents application of that statutory provision.”).
No. 24AP-699 7
motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the
accused’s own motion.” R.C. 2945.72(H). “Presented with a statutory speedy trial
challenge, the appellate court is tasked with counting the number of days that have passed
while determining to which party the time is chargeable as directed in R.C. 2945.71 and
2945.72.” State v. Childs, 2024-Ohio-4699, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 16} Brown was arrested on April 14, 2022. For purposes of calculating speedy-
trial time, we do not include the date of arrest. See Williams at ¶ 18. Accordingly, our
calculation of Brown’s speedy-trial time begins on April 15, 2022; Brown’s trial commenced
886 days later, on September 16, 2024. Because more than 270 days passed, Brown has
demonstrated a prima facie violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. After finding a
prima facie violation, the trial court concluded that several tolling events and waivers
reduced the number of speedy-trial days to fewer than 270.
{¶ 17} From April 15 to May 13, 2022, 29 days passed that are attributable to
Brown’s speedy-trial time. On May 13, 2022, Brown moved for discovery from the state. A
defendant’s discovery request tolls speedy-trial time for a reasonable amount of time
necessary for the state to respond to the request. Id. at ¶ 19. In Williams, this court held
that 21 days was a reasonable amount of time for the state to respond to discovery and did
not include those days in the speedy-trial calculation. Id. It is unclear from the record in
this case when the state responded to Brown’s first discovery request, but on June 1, 2022,
only 20 days after the discovery request was filed, the trial court granted a continuance
from June 1 to June 29, 2022, at the request of both parties to complete discovery.
Therefore, we conclude that the 20 days following Brown’s discovery request and the time
covered by the first continuance request did not count toward Brown’s speedy-trial time.
{¶ 18} On June 29, 2022, the trial court granted another continuance at the request
of both parties, lasting until July 27, 2022, to complete discovery and for negotiation. The
trial court granted a continuance on July 27, 2022, lasting until August 31, 2022, at the
request of both parties for continued negotiations. During the period of that continuance,
Brown filed a pro se motion to dismiss his appointed counsel. On August 31, 2022, the trial
court continued the case until December 12, 2022, without noting a specific reason or
requesting party. Therefore, Brown’s speedy-trial calculation started again on August 31,
2022. However, Brown filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment on September 1,
No. 24AP-699 8
2022. As explained above, speedy-trial time is tolled for any period of delay necessitated
by a motion made by the defendant. R.C. 2945.72(E). Thus, 1 additional day was
attributable to Brown’s speedy-trial time, between the August 31, 2022 continuance and
the filing of his September 1, 2022 motion. That brought the accrued speedy-trial time to
30 days.
{¶ 19} On December 12, 2022, the trial court granted a continuance at Brown’s
request until April 17, 2023, for him to obtain new counsel. The trial court granted another
continuance on March 9, 2023, extending the scheduled trial date from April 17 to May 2,
2023, at the request of both parties for continued discovery and due to the unavailability of
the prosecutor. On March 21, 2023, Brown filed pro se motions to suppress and invoking
his right to self-representation. On April 11, 2023, the trial court issued a continuance on
its own motion, rescheduling the trial date from May 2 to May 10, 2023, because of the trial
court’s availability. Because the continuance was on the trial court’s motion, those 9 days
count toward Brown’s speedy-trial calculation, bringing the total to 39 days.
{¶ 20} On May 10, 2023, the trial court granted a continuance at Brown’s request,
extending the trial date to July 11, 2023, because his new counsel needed time to review the
case. The court granted a continuance at the request of both parties on July 11, 2023,
extending the trial date to August 3, 2023, for further negotiations. On August 3, 2023, the
court granted another continuance at the request of both parties, extending the trial date to
October 16, 2023. The trial court granted another continuance at the request of both parties
for further negotiations, extending the trial date to November 20, 2023. That entry
contained a notation indicating Brown refused to sign, but it was signed by his counsel. On
appeal, Brown appears to argue he did not consent to this and other continuances where he
refused to sign the entries, but it is well-established that a defendant’s counsel may validly
waive a defendant’s speedy-trial rights without his consent. State v. Stanford, 2024-Ohio-
1451, ¶ 41-42 (10th Dist.). See Williams, 2023-Ohio-1002, at ¶ 24 (10th Dist.) (“A defendant
is bound by his counsel’s actions in waiving speedy-trial rights by seeking or agreeing to a
continuance, even over the defendant’s objections.”). The trial court entered another
continuance at the request of both parties on November 20, 2023, extending the trial date
to January 30, 2024, with the entry indicating that Brown refused to be transported from
jail. Brown filed pro se motions to dismiss and invoking his right to self-representation on
No. 24AP-699 9
January 10, 2024. The trial court granted another continuance on motion of both parties
on January 30, 2024, extending the trial date to March 20, 2024, for appointment of new
counsel for Brown. Brown’s counsel filed an additional demand for discovery on
February 6, 2024. The trial court granted a continuance extending the trial date to
March 21, 2024, at the request of both parties for further negotiations. The trial court then
issued another continuance on March 21, 2024, at the request of both parties for rulings on
pending motions, extending the trial date to May 20, 2024. On May 20, 2024, the trial
court issued a continuance at Brown’s request for time to respond to the state’s filings,
extending the trial date to June 10, 2024. The trial court subsequently entered a
continuance at the request of both parties extending the trial date to July 29, 2024, because
the parties were awaiting decisions on pending motions. On July 18, 2024, the trial court
issued an entry striking the July 29, 2024 date and scheduling trial for September 16, 2024.
The entry explained it was the first date available for the court and all the parties.
{¶ 21} Thus, based on continuances granted at the request of both parties or by
Brown, none of the time between May 10, 2023 and July 18, 2024 counted toward Brown’s
speedy-trial calculation. Brown’s speedy-trial time resumed on July 18, 2024 and
continued running until September 16, 2024, with an additional 61 days accruing during
that period. When added to the 39 days that accrued between April 15, 2022 and May 10,
2023, a total of 100 days of speedy-trial time accrued between Brown’s arrest on April 14,
2022 and the first day of his trial on September 16, 2024. Therefore, because fewer than
270 days of speedy-trial time accrued, we reject Brown’s argument that his statutory right
to a speedy trial was violated.
3. Whether Brown’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated
{¶ 22} We also consider whether Brown’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was
violated because even when statutory deadlines are complied with, the constitutional right
to a speedy trial may be broader than statutory provisions in some circumstances. Williams
at ¶ 32. We apply a two-step inquiry when analyzing a constitutional speedy-trial claim.
First, we consider whether the defendant has demonstrated that the delay was
presumptively prejudicial. Id. Second, if there was a presumptively prejudicial delay, we
apply a four-factor balancing test that examines (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons
for the delay, (3) the defendant’s timely assertion of his speedy-trial right, and (4) the
No. 24AP-699 10
resulting prejudice to the defendant from the delay. Id. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
530 (1972) (setting forth the four-factor balancing test for deprivation of the constitutional
right to a speedy trial).
{¶ 23} “Generally, delay is presumptively prejudicial as it approaches one year.”
State v. Smith, 2021-Ohio-1936, ¶ 38 (10th Dist.). In this case, nearly two and a half years
passed between Brown’s arrest and the first day of his trial. This court and others have
found a two-year delay to be presumptively prejudicial. See, e.g., State v. Blacker, 2024-
Ohio-5611, ¶ 67 (10th Dist.); State v. Forrest, 2021-Ohio-122, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.); State v.
Dennison, 2013-Ohio-5535, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.); State v. Gatewood, 2012-Ohio-202, ¶ 27 (2d
Dist.). Accordingly, we will consider the balance of the four Barker factors in this case.
{¶ 24} With respect to the length of the delay in commencing trial, the United States
Supreme Court has noted that the particular circumstances of a case must be considered in
evaluating the length of a delay, asserting that “the delay that can be tolerated for an
ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.”
Barker at 531. This court has noted that, under certain circumstances, extended delays in
bringing a defendant to trial may not be unconstitutional. See Dennison at ¶ 35. In this
case, Brown was charged with having weapons while under disability and the facts
surrounding the charge were not particularly complex. Thus, the extended delay of more
than two years in bringing Brown to trial weighs in favor of finding a constitutional
violation.
{¶ 25} “The reason-for-delay factor ‘is concerned with whether the government or
the defendant is more to blame for the delay.’ ” Dennison at ¶ 36, quoting State v. Quinnie,
2013-Ohio-1208, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.). The Barker decision explained that different weight
should be assessed to different types of delay. For example, a deliberate attempt to delay a
trial to hamper the defense should weigh heavily against the state, while a neutral reason
such as overcrowded courts should weigh less heavily but still be considered the
responsibility of the state. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. As explained above, most of the
continuances granted by the trial court in this case were jointly requested by the parties, for
reasons such as negotiations, responding to motions, or fulfilling Brown’s requests for new
counsel. Brown now seems to argue that he did not consent to waiving his speedy-trial
rights through some of those continuances, but he was bound by the actions of his counsel.
No. 24AP-699 11
Additionally, Brown filed numerous pro se motions and sought changes in counsel that
necessitated delays in bringing him to trial. Much of the delay in commencing Brown’s trial
was attributable to his own conduct or that of his counsel. Therefore, the reason-for-delay
factor weighs strongly against finding a constitutional violation. See Dennison at ¶ 38;
Quinnie at ¶ 14. See also State v. Diallo, 2025-Ohio-5812, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.) (“[W]e find that
appellant shares responsibility for the delay and we do not find deliberate delay or
particular neglect attributable to the state here.”).
{¶ 26} The third factor involves Brown’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial.
Brown filed a pro se motion to dismiss his appointed counsel on August 22, 2022; in his
memorandum in support of that motion, Brown alleged that his right to a speedy trial was
being infringed. Brown also filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment on September 1,
2022, directly asserting that his right to a speedy trial was being infringed. Brown filed a
second pro se motion to dismiss on January 10, 2024, arguing that his constitutional and
statutory rights to a speedy trial had been infringed. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of
finding a constitutional violation, because Brown was diligent in asserting his right to a
speedy trial. See Dennison, 2013-Ohio-5535, at ¶ 39 (10th Dist.) (finding that third fact
weighed in defendant’s favor when he first formally raised the speedy-trial issue after he
had been in jail for approximately five months and then reasserted the right on numerous
occasions). Compare Quinnie at ¶ 15 (“Appellant filed a pro se motion to dismiss the
charges based on her speedy trial rights after the trial had concluded and the jury rendered
its verdict. Thus, while appellant did assert her right to a speedy trial, this factor is not a
persuasive factor in our consideration.”).
{¶ 27} The fourth factor is the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.
The Barker decision identified three interests of defendants that the speedy-trial right was
intended to protect: (1) prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) minimization of
anxiety and concerned of the accused, and (3) limitation of the possibility that the defense
will be impaired. Barker at 532. See Quinnie at ¶ 16 (“In assessing prejudice in this context,
we consider the specific interests the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect:
oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern of the accused, and the possibility
that the defendant’s defense will be impaired by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory
evidence.”). The possibility of impairing the defendant’s defense is the most serious issue,
No. 24AP-699 12
“because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of
the entire system.” Barker at 532. In this case, Brown’s pretrial incarceration was
substantial, but he was also subject to a parole holder at the same time. We have recognized
that facing criminal charges for an extended time necessarily entails some level of anxiety
and concern. Dennison at ¶ 41. However, Brown does not allege any particular anxiety or
concern caused by his pretrial incarceration. Finally, there is no indication that Brown’s
defense was impaired in any way by the delay in bringing him to trial. See Diallo at ¶ 24
(“There is no evidence that the preparation of appellant’s defense was impaired by the
delay.”); Dennison at ¶ 41 (“[A]ppellant does not argue that he was prejudiced by the delay
by being unable to call witnesses who were no longer available at the time of trial, or that
evidence had become unavailable during trial.”). Our consideration of the fourth factor
does not weigh in favor of finding a constitutional violation.
{¶ 28} Accordingly, in balancing the Barker factors, we find that the delay in
bringing Brown to trial did not violate his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Much of the
delay was due to Brown’s conduct, rather than dilatory actions by the state. Therefore, we
reject Brown’s argument that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.
{¶ 29} Because we conclude that neither Brown’s statutory right to a speedy trial nor
his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, we overrule Brown’s second
assignment of error.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 30} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Brown’s two assignments of error and
affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
MENTEL and LELAND, JJ., concur.