Zarrow

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

ROSALEE ZARROW, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 3:25-cv-01148

v. )

) Judge Trauger

ROBERTSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S ) Magistrate Judge Holmes

DEPARTMENT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Rosalee Zarrow, a resident of Ardmore, Pennsylvania, filed this pro se action1 against the

Robertson County Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Nate Miller, Public Information Officer Jessica

Draker, and Forensic Scientist Melissa Kingamen, alleging violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights.

(Doc. No. 1). The court must first resolve the matter of the filing fee.

I. FILING FEE

The court may authorize a person to file a civil suit without paying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Section 1915 is intended to insure that indigent persons have equal access to the judicial

system by allowing them to proceed without having to advance the fees and costs associated with

litigation. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &

Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948). Pauper status does not require absolute destitution. Adkins, 335

U.S. at 339; Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21 F. App’x 239, 240 (6th

Cir. 2001). Rather, the relevant question is “whether the court costs can be paid without undue

hardship.” Foster, 21 F. App’x at 240. Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right, and

1 Plaintiff remedied the signature deficiency of her complaint on March 24, 2026. (Doc. No. 8).

“[t]he decision whether to permit a litigant to proceed [in forma pauperis] is within the Court’s

discretion.” Id.

Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”)

demonstrates that Plaintiff cannot afford to pay the civil filing fee in this case without undue

hardship. (Doc. No. 9). Accordingly, her request for pauper status is GRANTED.

II. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT

The court must dismiss any action filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In doing so, the Court applies the

same standard as under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630

F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The court therefore accepts “all well-pleaded allegations in the

complaint as true, [and] ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they

plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)). An assumption of truth does not, however,

extend to allegations that consist of legal conclusions or “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

557 (2007)). A pro se pleading must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that in “April 2023” she was pulled over in Robertson County,

Tennessee and charged with driving under the influence on “more than one occasion.” (Doc. No.

1 at 4). She alleges that she was not under the influence on any of those occasions. When she was

pulled over, Defendant Miller pulled Plaintiff out of her car, causing her emotional distress and “a

physical injury by being scared of police officers touching and grabbing [her] from vehicles.” (Id.

at 6). She lost her employment with Uber as a result of what Plaintiff calls two false Driving Under

the Influence charges. She believes that Defendants Kingaman and Drake contributed to the “fake

charges” and loss of the Uber job.

Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “There are two elements to a [Section]

1983 claim. First, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acted under color of state law. Second, a

plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured under

federal law.” Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing

Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010)).

The statute of limitations for a Section 1983 action is the “state statute of limitations

applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the state in which the § 1983 claims arise.”

Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). The limitations

period for Section 1983 actions arising in Tennessee is the one-year limitations provisions found

in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a). Porter v. Brown, 289 Fed. Appx. 114, 116 (6th Cir.

2008). “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not

resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Claims accrue and

the statute of limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason “to know of

the injury which is the basis of his action.” Roberson v. Tenn., 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005).

This inquiry is objective, and courts look “to what event should have alerted the typical layperson

to protect his or her rights.” Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 548 (6th Cir. 2000). It is

the Court’s responsibility to “determine whether the alleged precipitating event or events occurred

more than a year before [the plaintiff] filed the complaint.” Standridge v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s

Servs., No. 3:08-CV-133, 2009 WL 348782, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 10, 2009).

Here, Plaintiff filed her complaint on October 7, 2025. (See Doc. No. 1). The claims set

forth in the complaint arise from incidents that occurred, by Plaintiff’s own admission, in April of

2023. (Id. at 4). There is nothing in the complaint suggesting that Plaintiff would not have known

or did not have reason to know of the claimed injuries which are the basis of her action well before

October 7, 2025. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the governing one-year statute of limitations

for Section 1983 claims in Tennessee.

Furthermore, this lawsuit appears to be a duplicate of an earlier lawsuit filed by Plaintiff in

this Court. See Rosalee Zarrow v. Robertson County Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al., Case No. 3:25-cv-

00361 (Campbell, C.J., presiding). In that case, Plaintiff made the same general allegations against

the same defendants as in this case (including the allegation that she lost her Uber job as a result

of the allegedly false DUI charges), but the earlier-filed complaint alleged the traffic stops occurred

on August 24, 2022 and August 26, 2022. By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on July

23, 2025, the court dismissed that case as Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims were filed outside the

governing statute of limitations period. (Id., Doc. No. 13). Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit a few

months later, alleging the traffic stops occurred on unspecified dates in April 2023. While it is

possible that the instant lawsuit concerns additional traffic stops by the exact same police officer

in the exact same county during a different month and year, in the opinion of this court, it appears

more likely that Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit and provided a different and purposefully vague

date in an attempt to obtain a different result than the one she obtained in her earlier-filed lawsuit.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims were filed outside of the governing one-year statute of

limitations and are therefore DISMISSED.

To the extent that the complaint alleges any state law claims (see Doc. No. 1 at 3), the court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims, having dismissed Plaintiff's

federal claims. Those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to be refiled in state

court, if appropriate. The court makes no representations as to the validity or timeliness of such

claims.

Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an

appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).

It is so ORDERED. Mth dag —

Aleta A. Trauger

United States District Judge