ASHBY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

PAMELA ASHBY, as Personal )

Representative of the Estate of )

TREVOR SAUNDERS, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00299-LEW

)

ANDROSCOGGIN COUNTY, et al., )

)

Defendants )

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Pamela Ashby, as personal representative of the estate of her son, Trevor

Saunders, has filed this lawsuit against Androscoggin County and seventeen individual

defendants alleging that the circumstances of her son’s death while he was incarcerated in

the Androscoggin County Jail violated the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25) of two individual

defendants, Bryan Litchfield and John Clevenger (for purposes of this Order,

“Defendants”). For the reasons below, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the Complaint (ECF No. 1). Trevor Saunders

reported to the Androscoggin County Jail (ACJ) on October 25, 2023, to serve a 45-day

sentence. Compl. ¶¶ 3-4, 57. On November 18, 2023, Mr. Saunders was found dead in his

cell. Compl. ¶ 5. The cause of his death was pneumonia, caused by untreated, infected

pressure ulcers. Compl. ¶¶ 6-7, 155. Defendants Litchfield and Clevenger were ACJ

correctional officers during Mr. Saunders’ incarceration. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 26.

Mr. Saunders had a history of spinal cord stroke, which he reported at booking, and

as a result had limited left-side mobility (which he managed with a walking cane), left hand

muscle retraction (which he addressed by sleeping in a brace), and urinary hesitancy and

incontinency (which he also managed independently). Compl. ¶¶ 58-60. Mr. Saunders

initially reported pressure ulcers on his lower back to the ACJ medical department on

November 1. Compl. ¶¶ 72-73. His condition continued to worsen over the next several

days, and by November 13, he reported feeling very ill and experiencing chest and upper

back pain. Compl. ¶¶ 78-82. He presented to the ACJ medical department on November

13 with tachycardia and diminished left-side breath sounds. Compl. ¶ 83.

From November 13 to 15, Mr. Saunders rarely left his cell in the minimum security

block. Compl. ¶ 89. He was in visible distress and had lost the ability to support his own

weight. Compl. ¶ 90. Mr. Saunders, his cellmate, and his blockmates all reported his

distress to ACJ staff, which ACJ staff ignored. Compl. ¶¶ 90-91. On November 14, Mr.

Saunders was brought to see a nurse in the ACJ medical department, who determined that

his condition was emergent. Compl. ¶¶ 92-93. The nurse and an on-call medical

department provider determined that Mr. Saunders needed to be seen by an outside

provider, but he was not. Compl. ¶¶ 94-96.

On November 15, Mr. Saunders was moved (by wheelchair, as he was unable to

walk) to a cell in ACJ’s observation block. Compl. ¶¶ 97-98. He was seen by a physician

assistant in that cell, who determined that Mr. Saunders could be suffering from

rhabdomyolysis or sepsis, both life-threatening conditions, but did not recommend

emergency medical care from an outside provider. Compl. ¶¶ 103-5. Later that day, Mr.

Saunders was moved again to ACJ’s maximum security block. Compl. ¶ 109. Throughout

the next day (November 16), Mr. Saunders was too sick to get up and move about and

instead remained lying on his back in his cell. Compl. ¶ 111. ACJ staff knew that it was

dangerous and painful for Mr. Saunders to remain lying on his back due to his pressure

ulcers and that he was too weak to sit up or reposition himself, but took no steps to help

move him or give him medical attention. Compl. ¶¶ 112-14.

At around 8:20 a.m. the morning of November 17, Mr. Saunders fell off his bed and

hit his head on a desk. Compl. ¶ 116. ACJ staff did not seek emergency medical care.

Compl. ¶ 117. Shortly after this fall, ACJ staff (including Defendant Litchfield), moved

Mr. Saunders back to the observation block by wheelchair. Compl. ¶ 118. He was weak

and nodding off in the chair. Compl. ¶ 119. Defendant Litchfield and others lifted Mr.

Saunders from the chair and placed him on his side on the bed. Compl. ¶ 121. Mr.

Saunders was unable to remain on his side, and was lying on his back again by the time

Defendant Litchfield and the other ACJ staff left the cell. Compl. ¶ 122. They did nothing

else to ensure that Mr. Saunders was properly positioned to remove pressure from his

wounds. Compl. ¶ 123.

Cells in the observation block are monitored continuously by video and audio

surveillance and with “living, breathing, flesh checks” conducted by ACJ staff at 15-minute

intervals. Defendant Litchfield and others conducting this monitoring observed Mr.

Saunder’s condition rapidly decline. Compl. ¶ 124. Mr. Saunders urinated himself

repeatedly while lying on his back. Compl. ¶ 125. At approximately 9:00 a.m., ACJ staff

accompanied a nurse into the cell for a medication pass, during which Mr. Saunders was

unable to sit up or hold a cup of water by himself. Compl. ¶¶ 127-28. Afterwards, Mr.

Saunders remained supine and continued urinating from that position to the point where

urine pooled visibly on the floor of his cell. Compl. ¶ 132.

ACJ staff continued to perform “living, breathing, flesh checks” every 15 minutes.

Compl. ¶ 131. When Defendant Litchfield and a nurse next entered Mr. Saunders’ cell,

Mr. Saunders told them he could not move, and Defendant Litchfield grabbed him by his

uniform and rolled him onto his side so that the nurse could change the dressings on his

wounds, which were dark, odorous, and obviously infected. Compl. ¶¶ 133-34. It was

obvious to both that Mr. Saunders’ health was declining rapidly and that he needed

emergency care, but neither took steps to provide it. Compl. ¶ 135. That evening,

Defendant Clevenger and other ACJ staff entered Mr. Saunders’ cell for a medication pass.

Compl. ¶ 136. They watched Mr. Saunders attempt to pour Gatorade into his mouth while

lying on his back, as he was unable to sit up. Id. He could not take his medication without

assistance. Id.

The morning of November 18, ACJ staff provided Mr. Saunders a tray of food,

which he was unable to eat. Compl. ¶ 137. ACJ staff returned with a nurse hours later to

distribute medication, and Mr. Saunders was again unable to sit up or hold a glass of water.

Compl. ¶ 138. When Mr. Saunders fell back onto his back, ACJ staff placed the medication

in his mouth and poured water into his mouth while he was lying supine. Compl. ¶¶ 138-

39. He remained in that position when ACJ staff left his cell. Compl. ¶ 139. That

afternoon, ACJ staff returned to Mr. Saunder’s cell to move him to the maximum security

block. Compl. ¶ 140. He told the staff that he was unable to sit up or stand on his own, so

they lifted him into a wheelchair, which they used to transport him to his new cell. Id.

They noticed the floor was covered in urine. Compl. ¶ 141. When they arrived at the new

cell, a corrections officer lifted Mr. Saunders under his arms and dragged him into the cell

because Mr. Saunders could not stand or walk. Compl. ¶ 143.

At around 5:00 p.m., corrections officers returned to Mr. Saunders’ cell to collect a

tray of food, which he had left uneaten, and observed the Mr. Saunders was “slow to move.”

Compl. ¶ 146. At 8:00 p.m., corrections officers escorted a nurse to Mr. Saunder’s cell for

a medical check and found him unresponsive. Compl. ¶¶ 149-50. At 8:40 p.m., Mr.

Saunders was pronounced dead. Compl. ¶ 151. An autopsy was conducted the next day,

which determined his cause of death to be lobar pneumonia and documented a stage 3

pressure ulcer with necrotic tissue present at Mr. Saunder’s sacrum and bilateral empyema

in Mr. Saunder’s lungs. Compl. ¶ 154.

DISCUSSION

To avoid dismissal, Plaintiff must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that [she] is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), that is, a complaint that

contains “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In applying this standard, I accept Plaintiff’s

well-pled factual allegations as true and consider whether the facts, along with reasonable

inferences that may arise from them, describe a plausible, as opposed to a merely

conceivable, claim. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011);

Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep’t of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010). I will not

credit conclusory statements that merely recite the elements of the claim. See Cheng v.

Neumann, 51 F.4th 438, 443 (1st Cir. 2022) (“We do not credit legal labels or conclusory

statements, but rather focus on the complaint’s non-conclusory, non-speculative factual

allegations and ask whether they plausibly narrate a claim for relief.”).

Defendants argue that the Complaint, which alleges violations of the Eighth

Amendment and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, fails to state a claim against them.

In the alternative, they argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The qualified

immunity inquiry has two components: “whether the facts alleged . . . make out a violation

of a constitutional right,” and “if so, whether the right was ‘clearly established’” at the time

of the alleged violation. Penate v. Hanchett, 944 F.3d 358, 366 (1st Cir. 2019) (internal

citation omitted). The first question before me, then, is whether the Complaint plausibly

alleges that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment.

“It is well established that ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of

prisoners [is] proscribed by the Eighth Amendment,’” and “actionable under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.” Abernathy v. Anderson, 984 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on such a claim, Plaintiff must show (1) that “as an

objective matter,” the inmate had a “serious medical need that received inadequate care,”

id. (cleaned up), and (2) that Defendants’ failure to provide such care was, as a subjective

matter, “purposeful” or in “wanton disregard to [the] prisoner’s needs,” id., see also Coscia

v. Town of Pembroke, Mass., 659 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2011) (requiring “a showing of

culpability greater than negligence but less than a purpose to do harm”). In other words,

“the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that

a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Leavitt v.

Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 645 F.3d 484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Defendants do not appear to dispute that Mr. Saunders’ serious

medical needs received inadequate treatment. Rather, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s

Complaint does not contain sufficient facts to show that they were, individually,

deliberately indifferent to those needs.

Defendants argue that because Mr. Saunders was receiving some medical care

before he died, Plaintiff must allege facts “that would allow the reasonable inference that

Clevenger or Litchfield were aware that the care being rendered was inadequate.” Mot. at

13. The Complaint alleges that both Defendants interacted with Mr. Saunders within the

48 hours preceding his death, during which period Mr. Saunders displayed clear,

unmistakable signs of severe illness.1 The infected wounds on his back were dark and

odorous. See Compl. ¶ 134. He was weak to the point of being unable to move, sit up, eat,

drink or take medication independently. See id. ¶¶ 118-22, 133, 136. He had urinated

himself repeatedly, to the extent that urine pooled visibly on the cell floor. See id. ¶¶ 125-

26, 132. Although medication was administered, it provided no apparent relief to Mr.

Saunders. I have little trouble inferring from these allegations that Mr. Saunders’ dire need

for emergent medical care in a hospital setting could have been apparent to a lay person.

1 Plaintiff and Defendants disagree about whether allegations against the “ACJ Defendants” collectively

can be held against Defendants Litchfield and Clevenger individually at this stage. Because I conclude that

the Complaint alleges sufficient facts about Defendants Litchfield and Clevenger individually to state a

deliberate indifference claim, I do not address the issue further.

And while jail staff without medical training are “generally justified in relying on the

expertise and care of prison medical providers,” Matthews v. Pa. Dept. of Corr., 613 F.

App’x 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2015), the facts that Plaintiff has alleged here cast sufficient doubt

on whether any such reliance was “reasoned” or “justifiable,” Snell v. Neville, 998 F.3d

474, 498 (1st Cir. 2021), to warrant discovery on the issue.2 See also Alsina-Ortiz v. Laboy,

400 F.3d 77, 83 (1st Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that “[r]easonable reliance on others and

lack of expertise may both be fair points,” but nonetheless rejecting the defendant’s

argument that because he was “not a healthcare provider,” he “should not be expected to

parse symptoms, especially of someone already under medical care”). Perhaps it will bear

out that Defendants Clevenger and Litchfield believed or assumed that Mr. Saunders was

receiving constitutionally adequate medical care—for now, I am satisfied that Plaintiff has

plausibly alleged that this was not the case.

Defendants next argue that the claims against them should be dismissed because

they are entitled to qualified immunity. As explained above, whether Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity depends upon “whether the right was ‘clearly established’”

at the time of the alleged violation. Penate, 944 F.3d at 366 (internal citation omitted).

Whether a right was “clearly established” in turn depends upon “the clarity of the law at

the time of the violation” and “the facts of the particular case”—specifically, “whether a

2 To my reading, the caselaw Defendants have mustered on this point provides that non-medical jail staff

do not violate the Eighth Amendment when they rely on medical staff to diagnose and treat inmates,

“[a]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or

not treating) a prisoner.” Matthews, 613 Fed. App’x at 170 (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236

(3d Cir. 2004)); see also McGee v. Parsano, 55 F.4th 563, 575 (7th Cir. 2022) (reaffirming that “corrections

officers are not constitutionally obligated to override the judgment of medical professionals unless they

have reason to know that an inmate is receiving inadequate treatment”).

reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct violated the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.” Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568

F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The relevant inquiry in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.”). “This demanding standard protects ‘all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby,

583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018).

Defendants argue that it would not have been “clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation” described in the Complaint, where the inmate was

receiving ongoing (though inadequate) care from medical staff. Maldonado, 568 F.3d at

269. Litigants often demonstrate that “the law is clearly established” through “earlier cases

involving ‘fundamentally similar’ facts” or “cases with ‘materially similar’ facts,” but

neither is “necessary to such a finding,” as “officials can still be on notice that their conduct

violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

730, 741 (2002); see also Irish v. Fowler, 979 F.3d 65, 76 (1st Cir. 2020). Plaintiff has not

identified any case where non-medical staff was found to be deliberately indifferent to the

serious medical needs of an inmate who was receiving ongoing medical care.3 In my view,

however, the mere fact that an inmate receives some form of medical care is not an antidote

that automatically absolves non-medical jail staff of all responsibility for that inmate’s

3 As Defendants observe, the cases Plaintiff has identified involve situations where the defendant was a

medical professional, see Dantone v. Bhaddi, 570 F. Supp. 2d 167, 173 (D. Mass. 2008), or someone

without medical training who failed to seek help for an inmate who was not actively under the care of

medical professionals, see Avery v. Wellpath, LLC, No. 2:20-cv-428, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97834, at *5

(D. Me. May 24, 2021), Alsina-Ortiz, 400 F.3d at 83.

health and safety. If an inmate is receiving medical care that is obviously inadequate to

address the inmate’s serious medical needs, and non-medical staff recognize this but do

nothing, they are deliberately indifferent to “an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also McGee v. Parsano, 55 F.4th 563, 573-75 (7th Cir. 2022)

(reasoning that “the key question” under “the qualified-immunity standard” was “whether

[the inmate’s] treatment was so obviously inadequate that every reasonable officer would

have known that he could not rely on [the nurse’s] medical judgment”). If the care Mr.

Saunders was receiving was so obviously inadequate that a person without medical training

would recognize the danger presented, then I do not see how a reasonable officer in that

position “could have believed that [he] was not violating [Mr. Saunders’] constitutional

rights” by failing to do more. Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 38 (1st Cir. 2011).

Although a defendant’s immunity from suit should be “resolved at the earliest

possible stage in litigation,” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2009), as

a practical matter, “[i]t is not always possible to determine before any discovery has

occurred whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity,” Giragosian v. Bettencourt,

614 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010). “[T]he plausibility standard creates tension at this stage

of litigation between developing the requisite facts for a well-informed qualified immunity

determination and preserving a government official’s right to avoid the burdens of pretrial

matters, including discovery.” Brown v. Cumberland Cty., 557 F. Supp. 3d 169, 177 (D.

Me. 2021) (quoting Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2018)). If the allegations

concerning the quality of the medical care provided, the inmate’s physical condition, and

the non-medical staff’s awareness of the same do not tend to absolve the non-medical staff

of liability, then the existence of deliberate indifference ought to be assessed with the

benefit of discovery. The question of whether Defendants’ conduct amounted to deliberate

indifference under the circumstances Plaintiff has alleged here will depend on facts that

have not yet been proven.

Nothing in this discussion forecloses Defendants from raising the qualified

immunity defense again once the relevant facts have been discovered. “[C]orrections

officers may rely on the judgment of jail health professionals, and the qualified-immunity

doctrine protects officers from reasonable mistakes when they do.” McGee, 55 F.4th at

575. These principles set a very high bar for Plaintiff to clear if she is to prevail at summary

judgment, but reading the Complaint in the light most favorable to her, and drawing all

reasonable inferences in her favor, I conclude that she has plausibly alleged a deprivation

of a clearly established right, such that a reasonable corrections officer would have

appreciated the deprivation despite—or potentially even because of—the ACJ medical

department’s approach to Mr. Saunder’s care.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated this 4th day of May, 2026.

/S/ Lance E. Walker

Chief U.S. District Judge