Carroll v. Illinois Department of Employment Security

2026 IL App (1st) 242206-U

FIRST DIVISION

May 4, 2026

No. 1-24-2206

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in

the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

____________________________________________________________________________

SHAUNCE CARROLL, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

) of Cook County.

Plaintiff-Appellant, )

)

v. ) No. 24 L 50503

)

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT )

SECURITY; DIRECTOR, ILLINOIS )

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT )

SECURITY; ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF )

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY BOARD OF )

REVIEW; and RELIABLE RELAMPING, INC., ) The Honorable

) Daniel P. Duffy,

Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the

court.

Justices Howse and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

HELD: Where employee knowingly violated employer’s attendance policy

multiple times, Board’s determination that his actions constituted misconduct and

rendered him ineligible for unemployment benefits was not clearly erroneous.

¶1 Plaintiff-appellant Shaunce Carroll (plaintiff) appeals, pro se, from a trial court order

affirming defendant-appellee Illinois Department of Employment Security Board of

No. 1-24-2206

Review’s (Board) final administrative decision finding him ineligible for unemployment

benefits under section 602(A) of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (Act) (820 ILCS

405/602(A) (West 2024)), following termination of his employment with defendant-appellee

Reliable Relamping, Inc. (Reliable) 1 due to misconduct. On appeal, plaintiff contends that

the Board’s determination was improper because his actions were “not deliberate” and did

not cause Reliable any harm. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Plaintiff began full-time employment with Reliable in early October 2023 as a light

installer. Reliable terminated his employment in mid-November 2023. When plaintiff filed

a claim for unemployment benefits with defendant-appellee the Illinois Department of

Employment Security (Department), Reliable, via its Human Resources Manager Heath

Hedden, filed a formal protest. Hedden outlined that plaintiff failed to appear for work and

failed to call his supervisor to notify him of his absence; that he did this on three separate

occasions; and that this violated Reliable’s attendance (no-call, no-show) policy of which

plaintiff was aware at the time of his hire. Hedden provided the Department with various

documents including Reliable’s employee handbook, which states in relevant part:

“A. Attendance

All employees are expected to arrive on time, ready to work, every day they

are scheduled to work. If unable to arrive at work on time, or if an employee

will be absent for an entire day, the employee must contact the supervisor as

soon as possible. ***

1

Reliable did not file a brief in this appeal.

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No. 1-24-2206

Excessive absenteeism or tardiness will result in discipline up to and including

termination. Failure to show up or call in for a scheduled shift without prior

approval may result in termination.”

Hedden also attached plaintiff’s signed acknowledgement and receipt of Reliable’s employee

handbook containing this policy, dated prior to his employment. In addition, Hedden

provided documents chronicling plaintiff’s infractions. These included:

• a Disciplinary Action Notice issued to plaintiff by a supervisor on October 11, 2023 for a

no-call, no-show violation having taken place the day before (October 10) and

documenting that plaintiff received a verbal warning; the Notice was accompanied by an

email also dated October 11, 1023 from a supervisor to Reliable’s human resources

department reporting that plaintiff did not call or show up for work;

• a second Disciplinary Action Notice issued to plaintiff by a supervisor on October 19,

2023 for another no-call, no-show violation having taken place that day and documenting

that plaintiff received a final warning and was advised that another instance “could lead

to suspension or termination;” the Notice was accompanied by an email dated October

20, 2023 from a supervisor to Reliable’s human resources department reporting that

plaintiff had now “missed 2 days no call no show;” and

• a third Disciplinary Action Notice issued to plaintiff by a supervisor on November 13,

2023 for a third no-call, no-show violation having taken place that day and documenting

that plaintiff received a “dismissal;” the Notice was accompanied by an email dated

November 15, 2023 from a supervisor to Reliable’s human resources department and to

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No. 1-24-2206

Hedden stating that plaintiff had now received “3 write ups for no call no show in 30

days.”

Finally, Hedden included a Separation Form issued to plaintiff from Reliable noting the

termination of his employment due to his violations of Reliable’s attendance policy and

stating that he would not be eligible for rehire.

¶4 A Department claims adjudicator was assigned to plaintiff’s claim. In the Department’s

requested “Misconduct Questionnaire,” as completed by plaintiff, he acknowledged in

writing that he had been “fired” for three instances of “tardiness” by his supervisors. He

further admitted that his conduct was in violation of Reliable’s company policy, he had

received prior warnings about his absenteeism, and he was aware he could be discharged for

his noncompliance and failure to remedy his actions.

¶5 After considering the questionnaire and the documents presented by Hedden, the

adjudicator found that the evidence demonstrated Reliable had terminated plaintiff’s

employment because he “no called[,] no showed 3 different times during his 42 days of

employment,” without ever providing an explanation, in violation of Reliable’s attendance

policy. Further reasoning that his discharge “was within [his] control to avoid,” the

adjudicator concluded plaintiff “was discharged for misconduct connected with the work”

and denied his claim, finding him ineligible for unemployment benefits.

¶6 Plaintiff filed a Request for Reconsideration, stating he “disagree[d] with [the] decision.”

He explained that the work project at issue was in Ohio, where he and the rest of the crew

were staying in a hotel. According to plaintiff, “the reason why [he] was late/no call no show

is because at the hotel the formeman would leave at the hotel the first day I didn’t worked

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No. 1-24-2206

cause they didn’t comunicate. *** They never knocke on my hotel door and say were

working today [sic].” He also stated that he “was sexually harrod by my forman on ONE

ocasioan [sic].” He concluded that his discharge was “Discrimitorion on thir behalf [sic].”

¶7 The matter proceeded before a Department referee/administrative law judge (ALJ), who

conducted an evidentiary hearing via telephone at which plaintiff and Hedden appeared.

Hedden testified that plaintiff was discharged because he neither appeared for work nor

called his supervisor to explain his absence on three different occasions (October 10 and 19,

and November 13, 2023), in violation of Reliable’s attendance policy. Hedden confirmed

that plaintiff had been provided with a written copy of that policy and had signed off on its

receipt before employment. He also confirmed that on the three days in question, Reliable

had work available for plaintiff but he never appeared, nor has he ever provided a reason or

excuse for any of his absences. 2 Finally, when asked if there was anything else Hedden

wanted to add, he responded that plaintiff’s failure to appear “was something where we have

to have people to work because we’re on a timeline for things.”

¶8 For his part, plaintiff admitted he was discharged following a verbal warning and

multiple “write-ups.” He testified that the “reason” for the discharge was that he “was late

three times” and that he “didn’t show” for work. He further acknowledged that he was aware

Reliable had an attendance policy for its workers, and he admitted he had received its

handbook containing that policy upon his employment. He testified that while he knew

2

The referee also asked Hedden if there were any “other issues” that led to plaintiff’s discharge.

Hedden noted that plaintiff’s manager “had some performance issues with him,” and a fourth Disciplinary

Action Notice dated in November 2023 provided to the referee (and included in the record here) detailed

performance concerns on the jobsite. However, and as Hedden made clear to the referee, plaintiff’s

discharge was based only on his failures to appear for work.

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No. 1-24-2206

about the policy, he did not believe it applied to him because he was working on a project

“out of town” in Ohio while staying at a hotel with the crew and managers, and “we weren’t

at our houses showing up to work at a place.”

¶9 Upon questioning by the ALJ, plaintiff testified about his three violations. As to the first,

he recounted that he arrived to the project site in Ohio and, as directed, joined the group text

to receive notifications as to when to appear for work. The next morning, he “waited” and

watched his roommate check his phone, get ready, leave their room, enter the work van, and

return eight hours later. When the ALJ asked plaintiff if he had a cell phone and if he tried to

contact anyone, he admitted he had a phone, stated it “had some type of bad reception,” and

recounted only that a superior later told him no one was going to “babysit nobody.” Plaintiff

told the ALJ he felt there “was like no team support.” With respect to his second violation,

plaintiff testified “[i]t was the same thing,” with his supervisors and fellow crewmembers

“leaving [him] at the hotel.” He repeated that “they would not knock on [his] door” in the

mornings, but admitted he did receive “messages in [his] phone.” He further averred that

“[t]his was a whole thing to get [him] fired,” with the crew and managers playing “the game”

and “want[ing] *** some evil stuff for [him].” As for the third instance, plaintiff testified,

without any other details, that he again missed work and the following morning was told to

stay at the hotel because he would be receiving a call from his supervisor. He received that

call, and his supervisor explained he had three “no call no shows,” which was against policy

and merited discharge. Plaintiff testified he believed his managers and coworkers “set me up

pretty much for me to lose.” At the end of his testimony, when asked by the ALJ if he had

anything else to add, plaintiff briefly commented he “had to, uh, file a sexual harassment, uh,

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No. 1-24-2206

complaint” with “OSHA” against Reliable because his supervisor had made “sexually, uh,

derogatory comments” towards him one day. He did not provide any details regarding the

alleged incident, other than that he filed the complaint several weeks after his discharge. In

rebuttal, Hedden testified he never received any notification or information from plaintiff or

any agency about a sexual harassment complaint.

¶ 10 Following the hearing’s conclusion, the ALJ issued a written decision denying plaintiff’s

claim for unemployment benefits. Noting that Reliable had a written attendance policy

plaintiff admitted he received and knew about, and Reliable repeatedly warned plaintiff about

his infractions and their potential consequence of discharge, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s

termination from employment was the result of “misconduct” as defined in section 602(A) of

the Act, as his conduct was a deliberate and willful violation of a reasonable rule and that his

violation harmed Reliable. The ALJ’s decision declared that plaintiff was “not eligible for

benefits,” and, accordingly, affirmed the adjudicator’s determination.

¶ 11 Plaintiff appealed to the Board, stating that he “strongl[y] disagree[d]” with the ALJ’s

decision because he “was racially profile[d]” in “a case of discrimination.” The Board

affirmed. In its written decision, the Board detailed the evidence presented, including the

circumstances of each of the three instances of plaintiff’s attendance violations, as well as

Reliable’s attendance policy and the provisions of section 602(A). Finding that Reliable’s

policy made clear that excessive absenteeism would result in termination, that he received the

policy when hired, and that he committed repeated violations of failing to appear for work

and failing to call his supervisor after being warned multiple times, the Board concluded

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No. 1-24-2206

plaintiff “was discharged for misconduct connected with work under the provisions of

section 602(A) and is disqualified from benefits.”

¶ 12 Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking review of the Board’s

decision. Following a hearing, 3 the court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding it “not to

have been clearly erroneous.” Plaintiff has appealed to our Court.

¶ 13 ANALYSIS

¶ 14 As a threshold matter, we note that compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule (Rule)

341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) is mandatory, and a party’s status as a pro se litigant does not

relieve him of noncompliance with appellate practice rules. See Voris v. Voris, 2011 IL App

(1st) 103814, ¶ 8 (compliance with rules governing briefs on appeal is compulsory regardless

of a party’s status); accord Ryan v. Katz, 234 Ill. App. 3d 536, 537 (1992); see also In re

Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 092636, ¶ 57 (our supreme court rules, including

Rule 341, are not merely advisory suggestions; rather, they are required to be followed). The

components of Rule 341(h) require that an appellant’s brief contain, in addition to a Points

and Authorities section and proper jurisdictional statement, a statement of “the facts

necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or

comment, and with appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R.

341(h)(1), (4), (6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Moreover, the necessary Argument section “shall

contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefore, with citation of the

authorities and the pages of the record relied on,” and “reference shall be made to the pages

3

While a transcript of this hearing is not included in the record, the trial court’s written order

states a hearing took place with both parties present.

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No. 1-24-2206

of the record on appeal where evidence may be found.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1,

2020). And, an Appendix is required (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(9) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)),

comprising “a complete table of contents, with page references, of the record on appeal”

stating the nature of each document therein, the date of filing, and the name of all witnesses

and the pages of their examinations (Ill. S. Ct. R. 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019)). Where an

appellant's brief contains numerous Rule 341 violations and, in particular, impedes our

review of the case at hand because of them, it is our right to strike that brief and dismiss the

appeal. See McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12; In re Marriage of Petrik,

2012 IL App (2d) 110495, ¶ 38 (citing Kic v. Bianucci, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622, ¶ 23

(failure to follow Rule 341 may result in forfeiture of consideration of issues on appeal)).

¶ 15 Here, plaintiff’s brief significantly fails to comply with Rule 341(h) in several important

respects. It does not contain a Points and Authorities section or a viable Statement of

Jurisdiction, there is not a single citation to the record on appeal anywhere, the Statement of

Facts can hardly be said to be accurately and fairly stated without argument or comment, and

there is no Appendix, as required. Moreover, save for one general citation each to the Act,

the Illinois Human Rights Act, section 2-615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, and

something he calls “Section 1900,” plaintiff’s brief provides no viable legal argument, let

alone any relevant citation to legal authority. Thus, it is within our prerogative to strike his

brief and dismiss this appeal based on his failure to comply with the applicable rules of

appellate procedure. See Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 80; accord

Petrik, 2012 IL App (2d) 110495, ¶ 38 (reviewing court has every right to strike brief and

dismiss appeal when Rule 341 violations impede review).

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No. 1-24-2206

¶ 16 Nevertheless, because plaintiff made an effort to present his appeal by use of the

approved form brief, because it is clear from his brief that he challenges the Board’s final

decision, and because we have the benefit of the Department’s cogent brief in response, we

choose not to dismiss this appeal. Rather, as the issues are evident and the merits can be

readily ascertained from the record, we proceed with our analysis. See Twardowski v.

Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 509, 511 (2011); accord Fryzel v.

Miller, 2014 IL App (1st) 120597, ¶ 26 (despite deficiencies in brief, we may consider merits

of appeal for purpose of settling issue in dispute).

¶ 17 On appeal, plaintiff contends that the Board’s decision finding him ineligible for

unemployment benefits was improper. Reiterating that he had a “cheap” cell phone, no car,

and that his coworkers would not alert him to get ready for work in the mornings, he asserts

his violations of Reliable’s attendance policy, which he admits he clearly knew at the time of

his employment, were “not deliberate” or harmful to Reliable and, thus, could not constitute

“misconduct” under section 602(A) because his actions constituted only a “good faith error

in jud[g]ment” and his failures to appear for work were “out [of his] control.” He further

asserts that his discharge was based on racial discrimination, sexual harassment, and he

makes a passing mention of suffering from mental illness.

¶ 18 Upon review of a decision denying unemployment insurance benefits, we review the

decision of the Board, and not the decision of the trial court. See Petrovic v. Department of

Employment Security, 2016 IL 118562, ¶ 22. The Board's findings and conclusion with

respect to the facts presented are considered to be prima facie true and correct. See

Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992);

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O'Boyle v. Personnel Board, 119 Ill. App. 3d 648, 653 (1983) (the agency is “charged with

the primary responsibility of adjudication in [its] specialized area”); see also Caliendo v.

Martin, 250 Ill. App. 3d 409, 416 (1993); Stein v. Department of Employment Security, 2017

IL App (3d) 160335, ¶ 17. Accordingly, we may not reweigh the evidence, make any

independent determinations of fact, substitute our judgment for that of the Board with respect

to the facts, reassess witness credibility, or resolve conflicting evidence; we may not reverse

any of the Board's factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the

evidence. See Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88; Caliendo, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 416; see also

Williams v. Department of Employment Security, 2016 IL App (1st) 142376, ¶ 53 (citing

Woods v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 2012 IL App (1st) 101639, ¶ 16).

¶ 19 More specifically, in the instant cause, because our review of the Board's decision

requires us to determine the legal effect of a particular fact scenario, namely, whether

plaintiff committed misconduct connected with his work by violating Reliable’s attendance

policy in that he failed to appear for work on three occasions without informing his

supervisors, this appeal involves a mixed question of law and fact. See Petrovic, 2016 IL

118562, ¶ 21 (“[o]ur review of the Board’s decision to deny unemployment insurance

benefits based on an employee’s discharge for misconduct involves a mixed question of law

and fact”); accord Williams, 2016 IL App (1st) 142376, ¶ 56 (whether employee was

properly terminated for misconduct in connection with work is a mixed question of law and

fact). Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. See

Petrovic, 2016 IL 118562, ¶ 21; accord Stein, 2017 IL App (3d) 160335, ¶ 17. Ultimately,

the Board's decision is considered to be clearly erroneous only when, based on the entire

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No. 1-24-2206

record, a reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed. See Petrovic, 2016 IL 118562, ¶ 21; accord Stein, 2017 IL App (3d) 160335,

¶17; Williams, 2016 IL App (1st) 142376, ¶ 56.

¶ 20 Here, the Board was required to review the evidence presented, to weigh the credibility of

the witnesses (namely, plaintiff and Hedden), and to resolve any conflicts before it. The

Board was then required to determine whether that evidence qualified as misconduct as

defined under section 602(A) of the Act. Therefore, we review the Board’s decision in this

case for clear error. We find none.

¶ 21 First, we examine the Board’s factual findings to determine if they were against the

manifest weight of the evidence. This occurs only if the opposite conclusion is clearly

evident. See Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d

200, 210 (2008) (citing City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d

191, 204 (1998)). Here, after reviewing the evidence presented, the Board determined that

plaintiff deliberately violated Reliable’s attendance, or no-call no-show, policy on three

occasions after having received multiple warnings that said violations could result in his

discharge. The record reflects that Reliable presented plaintiff with its attendance policy, as

contained in its employee handbook, at the time of his hire and that plaintiff signed an

acknowledgement of its receipt. The policy makes clear that all employees “are expected to

arrive on time, ready to work” and if they are unable to do so, they “must contact the

supervisor as soon as possible.” The policy also explicitly states that the “[f]ailure to show

up or call in for a scheduled shift without prior approval may result in termination.”

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No. 1-24-2206

¶ 22 The record further reflects that plaintiff violated the policy three times while employed

with Reliable. The first instance was on October 10, 2023, when he did not report to work

and did not call his supervisor. His supervisor issued a disciplinary action notice the next

day stating it was for a no-call, no-show violation and noting that plaintiff was given a verbal

warning; his supervisor also sent an accompanying email documenting the incident and the

warning to human resources. The second instance took place soon after, on October 19,

2023. Again, plaintiff did not call his supervisor and did not show up for work. His

supervisor issued a second disciplinary action notice that day, stating it was for a second no-

call, no-show violation and noting that plaintiff was this time given a final warning and was

advised that another violation “could lead to suspension or termination.” Just as before,

plaintiff’s supervisor sent an accompanying email documenting the incident to human

resources. Despite the warnings, a third instance followed on November 13, 2023, where

plaintiff again failed to appear for work and again failed to inform his supervisor of his

absence. His supervisor issued a third disciplinary action notice to plaintiff, this time

documenting that he was receiving a “dismissal” from his employment for a third violation of

the no-call, no-show policy. Again, the supervisor sent an email to human resources, and

manager Hedden specifically, documenting the third violation.

¶ 23 For his part, plaintiff has never contended, nor even suggested, that he did not violate

Reliable’s attendance policy. In fact, he has consistently, and outrightly, throughout every

step of this litigation, admitted he committed each of the documented violations. That is, he

stated in the Department’s Misconduct Questionnaire, which he filled out at the outset of his

challenge to his discharge, that he was “fired” for three instances of “tardiness” as

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No. 1-24-2206

documented by his supervisors. He further stated that he knew his conduct of failing to

appear for work and failing to inform his supervisors was in violation of Reliable’s

attendance policy, he confirmed he had received multiple prior warning from his supervisors

for no-call, no-show violations before the last incident, and he admitted he was aware at the

time that he could be discharged if he continued to violate the policy. Additionally, plaintiff

admitted all this again in his testimony before the ALJ. During that hearing, the ALJ asked

him to speak to each of the three instances at issue. Plaintiff recounted that, as to the first, he

“waited” on the morning of October 10, 2023, and watched as his roommate (a fellow

crewmember) checked his phone, got ready for work and left their room. He also watched

him enter the work van and not return for the next eight hours. Plaintiff admitted he did not

attempt to report to work, and although he had a cell phone, he did not bother to contact his

supervisor or anyone else that day. Likewise, he testified that “the same thing” happened

with respect to the second incident; he admitted he received a text message from his

supervisor that he was to report for work that morning, but he did not show up and did not

work that day. And, per his testimony, the third incident was a repeat of the first two.

Plaintiff further described that after the crew returned from work that day, he was told that he

would be receiving a call from his supervisor the following morning. He received that call

and was informed that his three “no call no shows” merited his discharge.

¶ 24 Although admitting his three violations, plaintiff repeatedly insisted they were

attributable to his managers and fellow crewmembers. For example, he lamented that the

managers “played a game” to “traumatize[]” him by telling him to be ready for work in the

morning and that he was needed at the jobsite, but then would leave him “just sitting there”

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No. 1-24-2206

in the hotel for the day. However, this characterization is not supported by the record, and is

directly contradicted by plaintiff’s own admissions; plaintiff has never once recounted an

incident where he was ready and reported for work but was then told he was not needed and

could remain at the hotel. Also, plaintiff’s insistence that he did not believe Reliable’s

attendance policy applied because he was on a crew working out-of-state, as well as his

blame-shifting to other crewmembers and insinuations of deviousness on the part of

managers, fall flat here. Nowhere does he cite to anything (a verbal instruction or part of the

employee handbook) that would indicate Reliable’s attendance policy was somehow not in

effect because the project plaintiff was assigned to was in Ohio as opposed to Illinois. And,

that his roommate did not wake him up, that no one knocked on his door in the mornings, and

that he felt like there was “no team support,” even if true, is irrelevant. Again, plaintiff

repeatedly admitted that he had a cell phone from which he received notifications sent by his

supervisors to show up for work, that he received these notifications, and that he did not obey

these notifications on three occasions even after he had received warnings that his no-call,

no-shows could result in the termination of his employment. Based upon our review of the

evidence, the Board’s factual findings that plaintiff violated Reliable’s attendance policy can

hardly be said to be against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 25 Concomitantly, the Board determined that plaintiff’s violations qualified as misconduct

as defined in section 602(A) of the Act. We must now consider whether that was correct,

which, as detailed earlier, we review for clear error. If an employee is discharged for

misconduct, he is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits under the Act. See Sudzus v.

Department of Employment Security, 393 Ill. App. 3d 814, 826 (2009). The Act defines

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“misconduct” as “the deliberate and willful violation of a reasonable rule or policy of the

employing unit, governing the individual's behavior in performance of his work, provided

such violation has harmed the employing unit or other employees or has been repeated by the

individual despite a warning or other explicit instruction from the employing unit.” 820

ILCS 405/602(A) (West 2024). Based on this statutory definition, our courts have made

clear that three main requirements must be met in order to establish misconduct on the part of

an employee within the context of the Act: there must be (1) a deliberate and willful violation

by the employee (2) of a reasonable rule or policy of the employer (3) that harms the

employer or other employees, or has been repeated by the former employee despite a

warning or the employer’s explicit instructions. See Williams, 2016 IL App (1st) 142376, ¶

55 (citing Woods, 2012 IL App (1st) 101639, ¶ 19); Baker v. Department of Employment

Security, 2014 IL App (1st) 123669, ¶ 15; accord Petrovic, 2016 IL 118562, ¶ 26. We find

no error in the Board’s conclusion that each of these elements was met in the instant cause.

¶ 26 First, on all fronts, the evidence shows plaintiff deliberately and willfully violated

Reliable’s attendance policy. Under the Act, conduct is deliberate and willful when it

comprises “ ‘a conscious act made in violation of company rules, when the employee knows

it is against the rules.’ ” Petrovic, 2016 IL 118562, ¶ 30 (quoting Wrobel v. Department of

Employment Security, 344 Ill. App. 3d 533, 538 (2003)). Succinctly, as detailed earlier,

Reliable provided plaintiff with a copy of its employee handbook before he began his

employment. In that handbook, Reliable made clear to its employees that they were required

to appear for work and if they could not, they were to inform their supervisors. Reliable also

warned therein that the failure to do so could result in discharge. In his testimony before the

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ALJ, plaintiff admitted he was well-aware of this policy from the moment he started working

for Reliable, and his signed receipt of the handbook was submitted into evidence. He also

admitted he was warned by his supervisors, following both his first and second infractions,

that his “no-call, no-shows” violated the policy and would merit discharge if repeated.

Again, documentary evidence of this was presented, via Reliable’s disciplinary action notices

and accompanying emails. Yet, plaintiff committed a third violation thereafter.

Furthermore, plaintiff never provided any explanation to Reliable for his absences, let alone

any that indicated they were for reasons other than his own doing. Upon his arrival in Ohio

to begin the project Reliable assigned him to, plaintiff’s supervisors told him to join the text

chain for notifications of when to appear in the morning for work. Upon the ALJ’s

questioning, plaintiff confirmed he had a cell phone and that he received notifications that he

was scheduled to appear for work. However, essentially claiming his supervisors and

coworkers, without more, were out to get him, he admitted both that he simply did not get out

of bed, get ready, and report to work and that he never called anyone at Reliable to report his

absences. His own testimony demonstrated that rather than doing so, he just watched his

crewmember-roommate get ready for work, leave, get into the work van and not return for

eight hours during the first instance; he stayed at the hotel because no one knocked on his

door in the morning of the second instance; and he provided no details regarding the third

instance other than his claim that he likewise was not alerted to the crew’s departure.

¶ 27 From all this, the Board was free to find that plaintiff's testimony was incredible, to the

extent that he claimed he did not deliberately and willfully violate Reliable’s attendance

policy. And, obviously, the Board did not find plaintiff's testimony, and his explanations

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attempting to blame-shift, to be credible as to this element of misconduct. The evidence

clearly shows he deliberately and willfully violated the policy, and even more clearly, he

unequivocally admitted to doing so while being aware of that policy.

¶ 28 Similarly, with respect to the second statutory element required for a finding of

misconduct, the Board could certainly conclude that Reliable's attendance policy was

reasonable within the meaning of the Act. An employer’s policy is reasonable if it “concerns

‘ “standards of behavior which an employer has a right to expect” ’ from an employee.” See

Sudzus, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 827 (quoting Livingston v. Department of Employment Security,

375 Ill. App. 3d 710, 716 (2007) (quoting Bandemer v. Department of Employment Security,

204 Ill. App. 3d 192, 195 (1990))). An employer’s policy against repeated absenteeism from

work without notification, such as Reliable’s “no call, no show” policy in the instant cause, is

more than reasonable. Needless to say, it concerns a standard of behavior Reliable has a

right to expect from its employees: showing up for work as scheduled and calling a

supervisor to report an absence. See Selch v. Columbia Management, 2012 IL App (1st)

111434, ¶ 43 (“[i]n Illinois, employers have a right to expect a certain standard of conduct

from employees in matters directly concerning their employment”). And, significantly, our

courts have consistently maintained the same. See Nichols v. Department of Employment

Security, 218 Ill App. 3d 803, 811 (1991) (employee “cannot validly argue that rules

prohibiting excessive absenteeism and tardiness are not reasonable under the Act”); see also

Wilson v. Department of Employment Security, 196 Ill. App. 3d 711, 714 (1990) (employee’s

failure to telephone employer to report his absence constituted misconduct under the Act, as

absenteeism policy was reasonable); Bochenek v. Illinois Department of Employment

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Security, 169 Ill. App. 3d 507, 509 (1988) (employee’s failure to improve absenteeism and

tardiness constituted misconduct under the Act in violation of employer’s reasonable policy).

¶ 29 Again, in the instant cause, Reliable presented evidence of its attendance policy and

expectations, as stated in its employee handbook, which plaintiff acknowledged he received

and testified he knew and understood. Reliable’s policy states that all employees “are

expected to arrive on time, ready to work” when scheduled, they “must contact the supervisor

as soon as possible” if they will be absent, and a failure to show up or call, along with

excessive absenteeism or tardiness, may result “in disciple up to and including termination.”

This policy provides the most fundamental tenants of employment and, thus, was reasonable.

¶ 30 Finally, the third statutory requirement of misconduct under the Act is that the violation

must have either harmed the employer, or been repeated by the employee despite previous

warnings. See Williams, 2016 IL App (1st) 142376, ¶ 55; Manning v. Department of

Employment Security, 365 Ill. App. 3d 553, 557 (2006). Although only one of these

standards must be met, in the instant cause, there was more than sufficient evidence for the

Board to conclude that plaintiff’s violations of Reliable’s attendance policy met both of them.

Initially, as to the standard regarding harm, we note that absences and tardiness always harm

an employer because they “cause disruption to the general operations of any business.” 56

Ill. Admin. Code 2840.25(b) (West 2026). Indeed, Hedden explicitly testified before the ALJ

that plaintiff’s failure to show up for work and failure to report he would be absent was a

problem because “we have to have people to work because we’re on a timeline for things.”

¶ 31 More significantly, and as the Board specifically found, plaintiff’s violation of Reliable’s

attendance policy was repeated despite previous warnings. We have already detailed the

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evidence presented demonstrating that plaintiff violated the policy three times: he “no-called,

no-showed” on October 10, 2023 and received a verbal warning the next day; he “no-called,

no-showed” again on October 19, 2023 and received a final warning the same day explaining

that another instance could lead to his discharge; and he “no-called, no-showed” a third time

on November 13, 2023, and received a “dismissal” resulting in his discharge. During his

testimony before the ALJ and at some points in his brief, plaintiff suggests Reliable gave him

each of the three warnings on the same day. However, other portions of his brief contradict

this and acknowledge he received the warnings separately (after each incident). Ultimately,

other than his bare and equivocal assertion, he cites no evidence that he was not warned after

each instance. To the contrary, the three warnings issued by plaintiff’s supervisors as

contained in the record before us, which were all accompanied by emails from those

supervisors to the human resources department, clearly show they were issued to plaintiff,

and reported to human resources, on the three operative, and different, dates on which

plaintiff committed the violations.

¶ 32 Before we conclude our decision, we feel we must address one last item here. The

overwhelming crux of plaintiff’s argument on appeal is that his termination was improper,

and he should receive unemployment benefits, because Reliable discharged him based on

racial discrimination and a report he made of sexual harassment. Briefly, both assertions are

irrelevant in a claim for unemployment benefits under the Act, as allegations of employment

discrimination are to be made under the Illinois Human Rights Act (see 775 ILCS 5/7A-101,

5/7A-102(A)-(D) (West 2024)). Moreover, plaintiff does not come close to even asserting

the requirements for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, as would be his

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burden. See, e.g., Young v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 2012 IL App (1st) 112204, and

Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, (1989). For example, he does

assert he is a member of a protected class or that he was treated differently from similarly

situated employees; we do not even know his race or the races of any other individuals

involved in this case, and there is no evidence anywhere in this record that plaintiff ever

made a claim of racial discrimination while employed at Reliable, or even before the ALJ,

for that matter. With respect to sexual harassment, he made a brief mention before the ALJ

that his “for[e]man” sexually harassed him on “ONE” occasion. However, he provided

absolutely no details of the incident, other than to say that he made a report to “OSHA.”

However, he admitted he did so only several weeks after he was discharged from Reliable, he

provided no proof of any report, and Hedden testified in direct contradistinction that, as

Reliable’s human resources manager, he never received any notification from any agency,

including OSHA, that such a report was made.

¶ 33 In sum, the evidence here, including his own admissions, clearly bears out that plaintiff

knew of Reliable’s attendance policy, one that was more than reasonable; that he chose to

violate that policy of his own accord; and that he repeated this violation multiple times

despite previous warnings. Accordingly, the Board's decision to deny plaintiff

unemployment benefits due to misconduct under section 602(A) of the Act was not clearly

erroneous.

¶ 34 CONCLUSION

¶ 35 For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Board.

¶ 36 Affirmed.

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