Barraza-Guzman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

JOSE DAVID BARRAZA GUZMAN CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-1058

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

HERIBERTO TELLEZ, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE AYO

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) (Record

Document 2) filed by Petitioner Jose David Barraza Guzman (“Petitioner”).

Petitioner is a native of El Salvador who is currently detained at Jackson Parish

Correctional Center. See Record Document 1 at 2. According to the pleadings, Petitioner

was previously released under an Order of Release on Recognizance over nine years

ago. See id. Petitioner further alleges that he was later granted deferred action and

employment authorization pursuant to a bona fide determination of his U-visa application,

and that such deferred action has not been formally revoked. See id. at 6. Petitioner was

re-arrested by immigration authorities in October 2025 and is presently detained. See id.

at 7.

On April 6, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Record

Document 1) along with the instant Motion. In his Habeas Petition, Petitioner challenges

the legality of his current detention and seeks immediate release from custody, or

alternatively, a constitutionally sufficient custody determination. See id. at 22. Likewise, in

the instant Motion, Petitioner seeks substantially identical relief—namely, immediate

release from custody and an order restraining Respondents from re-arresting,

transferring, or removing him pending adjudication of the habeas petition. See Record

Document 2 at 2.

An applicant for a Temporary Restraining Order must demonstrate each of the

following: (1) a substantial likelihood his cause will succeed on the merits, (2) a substantial

threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) the threatened injury

outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to the opposing party, and (4)

granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest. See Misquitta v. Warden Pine

Prairie ICE Processing Center, 353 F. Supp. 518, 521 (W.D. La. Nov. 16, 2018) (citing

Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1981)). The decision

of whether to grant or deny a TRO lies in the district court’s discretion. See Moore v.

Brown, 868 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2017). And courts should deny such motions more

often than not. See Albright v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.Supp.2d 523, 532 (E.D. La. 1999)

(explaining that temporary restraining orders are “extraordinary relief and rarely issued.”);

see also Suburban Propane, L.P. v. D & S GCTX LLC, 2025 WL 2429087, at *2 (W.D.

Tex. 2025) (holding that the extraordinary relief under Rule 65 must be “unequivocally

show[n].”); see also Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Only

under ‘extraordinary circumstances’ will this court reverse the denial of a preliminary

injunction.”).

In this case, the relief requested in the Motion substantially mirrors the ultimate

relief sought in the habeas petition (a determination that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful

and that he must be released). Seeking injunctive relief that mirrors the relief requested

in the habeas petition is nothing more than a motion to decide the habeas petition now.

See Garcia-Aleman v. Thompson, No. 5:25-CV-00886, ECF No. 20 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 30,

2025). Granting the requested relief at this stage would effectively resolve the central

legal dispute presented in the habeas proceeding without the benefit of full briefing or a

developed record. The Court declines to shortcut the habeas process through emergency

injunctive relief.

Moreover, to the extent Petitioner seeks to enjoin Respondents from removing him

from the United States, this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant such relief. Even if framed as

seeking to preserve the status quo, a request for stay of removal is a challenge to a

removal order. See Imran v. Harper, No. 25-30370, 2026 WL 93131, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan.

13, 2026), citing In re Asemani, 2025 WL 1823953, at *1 (4th Cir. July 2, 2025) (construing

habeas petitioner’s request for stay as seeking review of the final removal order). The

Fifth Circuit recently reiterated that “federal courts lack jurisdiction over claims connected

directly and immediately with a decision or action by the Attorney General to commence

proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” Id., citing Humphries v.

Various Fed. USINS Emps., 164 F.3d 936, 943 (5th Cir. 1999) and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)

(internal quotations omitted). Thus, this Court is without jurisdiction to grant Petitioner’s

request for stay of removal. See id., citing Fabuluje v. Immigration & Naturalization

Agency, 244 F.3d 133, 133 (5th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (holding that district court was

without jurisdiction to grant stay of removal under § 1252(g)); Idokogi v. Ashcroft, 66 F.

App’x 526, 526 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); see also Westley v. Harper, No. CV 25-229, 2025

WL 592788, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 2025).

Finally, Petitioner also seeks to prohibit his transfer or re-arrest. However, “[m]ere

speculation or conclusory allegations of an irreparable injury are insufficient to entitle a

movant to injunctive relief.” Lotter v. Lyons, 2025 WL 2946630, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 22,

2025). Petitioner has not demonstrated that such relief is necessary to preserve this

Court's ability to adjudicate the habeas petition. Further, the Court is reluctant to set a

precedent that would interfere with the government's need to transfer any immigration

detainee with a pending habeas petition.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Record

Document 2) is DENIED.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 7th day of April, 2026.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT