Lyons

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MARTIN LYONS, M19540, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

ANGELA CRAIN, )

PHILLIPA DEVENNEY, )

CONNIE DOLCE, ) Case No. 26-cv-91-DWD

TARA CHADDERTON, )

TARA McCOY, )

JILIAN CRANE, )

ANTHONY WILLS, )

JANE DOES 1-6, )

MICHAEL MOLDENHAUER, )

ANGELA KENNER, )

)

Defendants.1 )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Martin Lyons, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

currently detained at Menard Correctional Center (Menard), brings this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. (Docs.

1, 10). Plaintiff alleges that the defendants have violated his rights by failing to provide

treatment for multiple conditions. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint2 (Doc. 10) is now

before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section

1 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to ADD Angela Kenner as a Defendant in CM/ECF, because she was

properly added to the listing of defendants in the Amended Complaint (Doc. 10 at 2).

2 Plaintiff tendered his original complaint on January 27, 2026, and before the Court conducted an initial

review or served anyone, he submitted an Amended Complaint on March 3, 2026. A litigant is allowed to

amend their complaint once as a matter of right without Court permission, so the Court treats the Amended

Complaint as operative.

1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious

claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money

damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are

to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th

Cir. 2009).

The Amended Complaint

Plaintiff arrived at Menard on October 22, 2022, and was still at Menard as of the

filing of this suit. (Doc. 10 at 3). He alleges that in October and November of 2022

previous medications, prescriptions, and medical permits lapsed without review by any

medical professional. Plaintiff claims that Menard (including Wills, Crain, Dolce,

Chadderton, Devenney, McCoy, Moldenhauer, and Crane) has a policy, custom, or

practice of allowing medical treatment to lapse for three weeks or longer at a time, and

that this caused him significant harm. (Id. at 3). He further alleges that Defendants Wills,

Crain, Dolce, McCoy, Chadderton, Devenney, and Kenner have a policy, practice, or

custom of requiring inmates to submit kites on scraps of paper to be seen for medical

attention, and then the scraps are often lost or ignored. (Id. at 3-4).

Plaintiff alleges that on December 14, 2022, his Cymbalta prescription expired and

was not renewed until January of 2023. He suffered headaches, dizziness, and mood-

related impairments and he alleges kites and a grievance were not timely answered on

this issue. (Doc. 10 at 4). Additionally, he alleges that in January of 2023 his

gabapentin/Neurontin expired, causing vomiting, migraines, confusion and irritation.

Again, he alleges kites and grievances were not timely addressed, and he went two weeks

or more in withdrawal. (Id.). He attributes these issues to the policy described, and in

addition to the defendants previously named, he alleges Jane Doe 6 (LPN nurse)

participated in these issues. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that in May and June of 2023 he “constantly” missed

gabapentin/Neurontin doses due to an “emergency meds only” policy that limited

medication distribution to select inmates. (Doc. 10 at 4). He alleges that this violates the

Equal Protection clause under a class of one theory. He missed medication on May 1, 2,

June 4-6, June 30, and July 1-2, 2023. He attributes the missing doses to staffing shortages

and overcrowding and faults Defendants Jane Doe 6 (LPN), Crain, Dolce, Chadderton,

and McCoy. (Id. at 4). He specifically faults Chadderton for answering his cellmate’s

grievance about this issue but ignoring Plaintiff’s grievance. (Id.).

Plaintiff takes gabapentin/Neurontin for neuropathy and carpal tunnel, and

claims that without the medication he suffers extreme pain. (Doc. 10 at 5). He alleges he

grieved the issue to Wills, Crain, Dolce, McCoy, and Chadderton, but they turned a blind

eye or took more than two years to respond. (Id.). He alleges he missed additional doses

on: August 4-5, August 19-20, September 3-4, September 15-17, and October 3, 2023. (Id.).

Plaintiff also wrote an emergency grievance to Defendant Chadderton complaining about

a “crush and float” method being used to deliver his medication that he claimed had ill-

effects. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that his medication expired on December 17, 2023, and again he

was without it between January 25, 2024, and February 11, 2024. He had symptoms of

withdrawal including migraines, nausea, sweating, vomiting, and more. He alleges he

notified Defendant Kenner via kite but she turned a blind eye or did not help. (Doc. 10

at 5). Plaintiff alleges he also pursued an emergency grievance about these outages, but

Defendants Crain, Dolce, and McCoy did not respond or provide assistance. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that in February and March of 2024, he had outside appointments

cancelled without explanation, though he was eventually taken out in March without

knowing why. (Doc. 10 at 6). Plaintiff received a nerve test and was seen by Defendant

Jilian Crane on May 1, 2024. He alleges that he tried to explain all of his medical issues

to Crane, but she said she would not address all of his issues, and said he would need to

“man up a little bit[.” (Id.). He claims at this appointment he realized his medical records

were being fabricated. He alleges Crane gave a brief shower permit and a body scrub but

did not address any other prescriptions or permits. He further alleges that Defendants

Jane Doe 6 (LPN) or Kenner did not provide the things Crane ordered and ignored other

kites.

On July 31, 2024, Plaintiff saw Dearmond,3 whom he alleges also told him he was

asking for too much. Dearmond provided some referrals and medical permits, but she

did not order “lotions, Robaxin, Tramadol, egg crate mattress, waist chain, ice, or medical

showers,” that Plaintiff believed he should have received based on previous treatment.

3 Dearmond was not named as a defendant in the case caption, so the allegations about Dearmond were

not analyzed for legal sufficiency.

(Doc. 10 at 6). Plaintiff alleges he received permits for the things Dearmond ordered, but

that on November 7, 2024, upon release from segregation the items Dearmond authorized

were all gone from his property. (Id. at 6-7). He alleges he wrote kites and grievances

about this issue, but Defendants Crain, Dolce, and McCoy disregarded his issues and

responded to other inmates instead. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that on January 9, 2026, his gabapentin/Neurontin expired again,

and was not replaced until February 25, 2026. He faults Defendants Crain, Dolce, McCoy,

Devenney, Jane Doe 6 (LPN) and Kenner for allowing the expiration and ignoring related

kites. (Doc. 10 at 7). During this lapse in mediation Plaintiff says he told Jane Does 1-4

on numerous occasions, or gave them kites, indicating his medication had lapsed and he

was suffering physical withdrawal. He claims they turned a blind eye to his plight,

consistent with the Menard custom, policy, or practice. (Id. at 7-8). Plaintiff claims that

while his medication had lapsed, Defendants Devenney, Moldenhauer, Crain, Dolce,

McCoy, and Jane Doe 6 (LPN) were providing treatment to other inmates or answering

their grievances/kites. (Id. at 8).

He further alleges that on February 18, 2026, Defendant Moldenhauer only

authorized a renewal of a 600mg dose, compared to his previous 1800mg. (Doc. 10 at 7).

Moldenhauer refused medical permits and accommodations and allegedly said he did

not believe Plaintiff’s injuries or needs were genuine. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff alleges that on

March 2, 2026, Moldenhauer provided him with a permit for a wrist stint, but he still

lacks a knee brace, elbow brace, double cuff permit, low bunk permit, and shower permit.

(Id. at 9). Plaintiff claims that the reduced dose of gabapentin/Neurontin is not adequate

and has left him to suffer in pain. (Id.).

As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation, injunctive relief directing Wills,

Devenney, and Crain to resume adequate nerve medication, transfer to a prison that will

treat his needs, and the creation of an electronic inmate complaint system to lodge

medical requests. (Doc. 10 at 10).

In support of the complaint Plaintiff submitted an affidavit from a fellow inmate

attesting that in February of 2026 he witnessed Plaintiff experiencing withdrawal

symptoms due to the lack of his nerve medication. (Doc. 10 at 11). He also submitted

random excerpts of medical records, medical permits, and medication administration

charts, the majority of which are significantly dated (pertaining to events that pre-date

his time at Menard). (Doc. 10 at 12-41).

Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court will designate the

following claims:

Claim 1: Claim against Defendants Wills, Crain, and Devenney, for

maintaining a policy, custom or practice, of allowing

medical prescriptions to lapse for 3 weeks or longer at a time

without medical evaluation;

Claim 2: Claim against Defendants Wills, Crain, Wills, Crain, and

Devenney for maintaining a policy, custom, or practice

requiring inmates to submit kites to seek medical care, but

routinely not responding to kites;

Claim 3: Claim against Defendants Wills, Crain, and Devenney for

denying Plaintiff gabapentin/Neurontin due to the

“emergency meds only” policy, custom, or practice, on

numerous dates in May, June, July, August, September, and

October of 2023;

Claim 4: Eighth amendment deliberate indifference by Defendant

Chadderton for failing to respond to Plaintiff’s grievances

about the emergency meds only issues;

Claim 5: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference clam against

Defendant McCoy for turning a blind eye to Plaintiff’s

complaints about his medication being provided in an

“open and float” method;

Claim 6: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendants Crain, Devenney, Dolce, Chadderton, McCoy,

Kenner, Jane Does 1-4, and Jane Doe 6 (LPN) for their roles

in allowing Plaintiff’s gabapentin/Neurontin to lapse

between January 25-February 11, 2024; and January 9-

February 25, 2026;

Claim 7: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Moldenhauer for decreasing Plaintiff’s

gabapentin/Neurontin prescription from 1800mg to 600mg

in February of 2026.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

Preliminary Dismissals

Plaintiff named Jane Doe 5, a registered nurse, in his list of Defendants (Doc. 10 at

2), but he did not describe any actions by this individual in his factual narrative. Naming

a party without describing their role is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Accordingly, Jane Doe 5 is dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff also named Jilian Crane as a defendant. He alleges he saw Crane on May

1, 2024, and she provided some of the care he desired, but did not address his full panoply

of concerns. Plaintiff does not provide enough detail about the issues he raised to Crane,

the seriousness of his various conditions, or her response, for the Court to plausibly infer

that her conduct exhibited deliberate indifference at this single appointment. Other than

this single encounter, Plaintiff faults Crane in shotgun fashion for the alleged policies,

practices, or customs that have harmed him at Menard, but naming a defendant in

conclusory fashion is not sufficient for liability under § 1983.

Plaintiff discussed many desired accommodations or treatments in his complaint

beyond gabapentin/Neurontin. For example, he claims he needs knee, elbow, and wrist

braces, an egg-crate foam mattress, and double-cuff permits. He does not explain any of

the underlying medical conditions that necessitate these various accommodations. He

also seems to complain about shower and hygiene issues requiring various permits,

lotions, etc.. He faults the Defendants for maintaining policies, customs, or practices that

allowed various accommodations and permits related to his many conditions to lapse.

On the whole, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the vast majority of his medical issues or

desired treatments/permits are too vague to state a claim. The Eighth Amendment

requires an inmate to establish a serious medical condition, and care that demonstrates a

total disregard for his situation. By only explaining the treatment/accommodations he

sought, and not explaining the accompanying serious medical conditions, Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim for the majority of issues mentioned in his complaint. The Court

will not discuss any of Plaintiff’s allegations concerning accommodations or treatment

further beyond the gabapentin/Neurontin.

Finally, Plaintiff repeatedly alleges throughout the Complaint that he has an Equal

Protection claim under a “class of one” theory because other inmates got care at times

when he did not receive care. At screening, another court recently described the standard

for class-of-one claims as follows:

[A] “classic class-of-one claim is illustrated when a public official, ‘with no

conceivable basis for his action other than spite or some other improper

motive...comes down hard on a hapless [individual].’ ” Frederickson v.

Landeros, 943 F.3d 1054, 1060 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Swanson v. City of

Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2013)). “Class-of-one claimants carry a

heavy burden” and must, at the very least, show he was “intentionally

treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no

rational basis for the difference in treatment.” FKFJ, Inc. v. Vill. of Worth, 11

F.4th 574, 588 (7th Cir. 2021); see also Walker v. Samuels, 543 F. App'x 610, 611

(7th Cir. 2013) (“But even at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must anticipate

the burden of eliminating any reasonably conceivable state of facts that

could provide a rational basis for the government's actions [and] must

provide a sufficiently plausible basis to overcome the applicable

presumption of rationality.”)

[…]

To the extent Noojin is attempting to assert class-of-one equal protection

claims related to the denial or confiscation of his specific items—e.g., a

blanket, his cup and spork, personal items, and his religious

necklaces— such claims fail because he hasn't plausibly alleged any of the

named defendants intentionally denied him the items and did so without

any conceivable rational basis. See Lee v. Stanford, No. 24-2417, 2025 WL

1904114, at *2–3 (7th Cir. July 10, 2025) (affirming dismissal of equal

protection class-of-one claim because “[a]lthough [plaintiff] peppers

throughout the complaint that [defendant] acted ‘intentionally,’

‘arbitrarily,’ and with ‘no rational basis, these bare legal conclusions are

irrelevant to our assessment”); see also Bissessur, 581 F.3d at 602 (claim must

be plausible on its face and complaint must provide adequate factual

content).

Noojin v. English, 2026 WL 194114 at * 12-13 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2026).

In the present case, Plaintiff mentions the class-of-one theory throughout his

complaint, but he does not say anything that suggests the differential treatment was

intentional, nor does he suggest there was no rational basis for the differential treatment.

As such, he has failed to adequately plead a class-of-one claim and all such mentions in

the complaint are dismissed as insufficient.

Analysis

Claims 1-3 allege that numerous defendants were responsible for three policies,

customs, or practices that contributed to Plaintiff’s missed doses of

gabapentin/Neurontin. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that there was a policy, custom, or

practice of allowing prescriptions to lapse for three weeks or more at a time, second he

alleges sometimes an “emergency meds only” protocol was followed that allowed some

inmates to get their medications and not others, and, third he alleged that inmates are

required to submit kite slips for all medical issues but kites are often ignored or lost.

Though Plaintiff names Defendants Wills, Crain, Dolce, McCoy, Chadderton, Devenney,

Kenner, and Jane Doe 6 (LPN) in association with the alleged policies, he only seeks

injunctive relief from Wills, Crain, and Devenney.

Generally, when an inmate presents a claim about a harmful policy, custom, or

practice in the context of prison medical care, he is often pursuing a claim allowed under

Monell against the prison’s corporate medical contractor. Monell v. Department of Social

Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections,

746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014) (Wexford is a private corporation that cannot be held

liable under § 1983 unless the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional

policy or custom of the corporation itself). Monell liability is also often applied to

allegations about policies maintained by units of local government. See e.g., Thomas v.

Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A local governing body may

be liable for monetary damages under § 1983 if the unconstitutional act complained of is

caused by: (1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its officers; (2) a

governmental practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is widespread

and well settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.”).

It is much less common for an inmate to seek to pursue a claim for a harmful

policy, custom, or practice against the Illinois Department of Corrections, and such a

theory is strained. IDOC itself is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 liability. Thomas

v. Ill., 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

70 (1989)). In this case, Plaintiff does not name IDOC as a defendant. Instead, he has

named various prison employees, including the Warden (Wills), the healthcare

administrator (Crain), and the medical director (Devenney) in their official capacities for

injunctive relief. (Doc. 10 at 2). Though state employees sued in their official capacity

are not subject to monetary damages, Plaintiff’s desire for injunctive relief may warrant

a different outcome.

The Eleventh Amendment generally bars private suits in federal court against a

state for monetary damages. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); MCI

Telecomm. Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 336 (7th Cir. 2000). That immunity extends

to state agencies as well and, subject to the Ex Parte Young doctrine, to state employees

acting in their official capacities. MCI Telecomm., 222 F.3d at 336–37 (discussing Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). Under the exception outlined in Ex Parte Young, the Eleventh

Amendment does not bar a lawsuit against an individual state official in their official

capacity for an ongoing violation of federal law if the remedy sought is prospective

injunctive or declaratory relief. MCI Telecomm., 222 F.3d at 345 (“[A] private party may

sue individual state officials in federal court to obtain prospective relief for an ongoing

violation of federal law.”). However, merely seeking injunctive relief for an ongoing

issue against an official is not automatically enough to sustain a claim. An inmate must

also establish that there is an actual connection between the harmful policy, practice, or

custom that he has identified, and the actions of the official from whom he seeks

injunctive relief. See Eason v. Pritzker, 2020 WL 6781794 at * 8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2020)

(“Courts require a link between the ‘official’s duties and powers under state law” and the

alleged unconstitutional act to ensure that the official is not merely a representative of the

state.”). In Eason the court concluded that an inmate could not maintain a policy claim

against the Governor of Illinois because merely sitting atop the state executive branch

does not establish liability, and he did not demonstrate any meaningful connection

between the governor and the prison’s policies for hearing impaired inmates. Id. at * 8-9.

Here, Plaintiff faults Defendants Wills, Devenney, and Crain for the three policies

that he alleges caused him to miss his medications. He does not clearly describe the

individual roles that these three had with the three policies he describes, but he alleges

that he repeatedly notified them via kites, grievances, and emergency grievances about

the issues he was experiencing accessing his medications. At this juncture, the Court

cannot fairly assess if these three had a role in the policies, customs, or practices

described, or if policies, customs, or practices even existed at all. However, the pleadings

must be interpreted broadly in Plaintiff’s favor at this very early juncture, and viewing

things broadly, he has at least said each of these three was in a supervisory role, and each

of the three was notified of his explicit problems. As employees local to Plaintiff’s prison,

there is a reasonable likelihood they had control over the issues Plaintiff describes, if in

fact Plaintiff’s allegations about the policies and his own situation can ultimately be

substantiated.

Additionally, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief specific to the three issues he has

described in the form of stable access to his nerve medication. He also seeks the

implementation of an electronic medical services request form to fix problems he has

experienced with the written kite system. Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, and his narrow

demand for injunctive relief, he may proceed on Claims 1-3 against Defendants Wills,

Devenney, and Crain in their official capacity for purposes of injunctive relief.

Claims 4-7 complain about discrete issues with Plaintiff’s receipt of medication

and his attempts to grieve or complain about missed doses. Not every missed dose of

medication in prison is enough to state a constitutional claim. See e.g., Hamilton v. Gavin,

2023 WL 2161663, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2023) (collecting cases concerning missed doses

of medication, generally one dose is not enough to state a claim). But here Plaintiff

describes a rather lengthy pattern of missed doses, so the Court views his situation as

passing the threshold for a possible constitutional claim.

An Eighth Amendment claim arising from the denial of medical care consists of

an objective and a subjective component. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 439–40 (7th Cir.

2010). A plaintiff must show that he suffered from a serious medical condition (i.e., an

objective standard) and also show that each defendant responded with deliberate

indifference (i.e., a subjective standard). Id. To satisfy the subjective component, a

prisoner must demonstrate that an official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to

inmate health. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Neither medical

malpractice, nor mere disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment will amount to

deliberate indifference. Id. Additionally, an inmate is not entitled to demand specific

care, and a medical professional may choose from a range of acceptable courses of care.

Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019).

Plaintiff’s allegations straddle the line between demanding care versus receiving

allegedly inadequate or inappropriate care. At this preliminary juncture, the Court

construes his allegations broadly and accepts his assertion that the missed doses, reduced

dose, and “crush and float” method may have negatively impacted Plaintiff. He

describes numerous symptoms of withdrawal and also alleges that the “crush and float”

method caused side effects. He claims that without stable access to his medication, he

suffered pain, and withdrawal symptoms including vomiting and headaches. He also

alleges that some of the defendants named in Claims 4-7, such as Defendant Kenner,

received numerous detailed grievances about the problems he had with missed

medications, and yet they turned a blind eye and offered no assistance. Claims 4-7 may

proceed against the individual defendants for their alleged roles in Plaintiff’s medication

issues.

Disposition

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claims 1-3 of the Complaint (Doc. 1) survive

against Defendants Wills, Devenney, and Crain in their official capacities for injunctive

relief, and Claims 4-7 may proceed against Defendants Crain, Devenney, Dolce,

Chadderton, McCoy, Kenner, Jane Does 1-4, Jane Doe 6 (LPN), and Michael

Moldenhauer. By contrast, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Wills in

his individual capacity, against Defendant Jilian Crane, and against Jane Doe 5. The Clerk

of Court shall TERMINATE Defendants Jilian Crane and Jane Doe 5.

The Clerk of Court shall ADD Angela Kenner as a defendant consistent with

footnote 1.

The Clerk shall ADD the Warden of Menard in official capacity for injunctive relief

and to help identify Jane Does 1-4 and 6. Plaintiff shall have 21 days to file a notice with

descriptive information about Jane Does 1-4 and 6. He shall include physical

appearance, dates when he interacted with these defendants, nicknames, and any other

information he possesses. Failure to file a notice may result in the dismissal of Jane Does

1-4 and 6. Once Plaintiff has filed his Notice, the Court shall set a deadline for the Warden

to respond.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Angela Crain, Phillipa

Devenney, Connie Dolce, Tara Chadderton, Tara McCoy, Angela Kenner, Anthony Wills,

Michael Moldenhauer, and the Warden of Menard (official capacity): (1) Form 5 (Notice

of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of

Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the

Complaint (Doc. 10), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place of

employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver

of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were

sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the

Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent

authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this

Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a change of address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this

action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA Order in this case

because it will involve the exchange of medical records.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Status (Doc. 12) is GRANTED by the issuance of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 17, 2026

/s/ David W. Dugan

________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.