Hankins

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

TIMOTHY HANKINS, JR,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 22-CV-515-SEH-CDL

v.

DARIN EHRENRICH and

CITY OF TULSA,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

RAUL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge.

Pending before the Court are Darin Ehrenrich’s (“Ehrenrich”

or “Defendant Ehrenrich”) Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket

No. 76 and City of Tulsa’s (“Tulsa”) Motion for Summary Judgment

at Docket No. 77. After reviewing the parties’ submissions in

support and opposition, both Motions for Summary Judgment are

hereby GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 23, 2020, a felony warrant was issued for Mr.

Timothy Hankins Jr.’s (“Mr. Hankins” or “Plaintiff”) arrest and he

was charged with First Degree Rape under Oklahoma law. (Docket No.

2 ¶ 5). After a trial on the merits, a jury of his peers found Mr.

Hankins not guilty, and Plaintiff was acquitted. Id. ¶ 6.

On November 23, 2022, Mr. Hankins filed his Complaint against

Lieutenant Darin Ehrenrich and the City of Tulsa (collectively,

“Defendants”). (Docket No. 2). Therein, Plaintiff alleged wrongful

and unreasonable arrest and seizure and malicious prosecution,

both in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶¶ 108-130).

On November 20, 2024, Defendants filed individual Motions for

Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of the case in its entirety.

(Docket Nos. 76 and 77). In his Motion for Summary Judgment,

Defendant Ehrenrich asserted that he was entitled to qualified

immunity with regard to both of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims

(i.e., unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution). (Docket No.

76). Moreover, he argued that Plaintiff is estopped from

relitigating the existence of probable cause and, in any event,

probable cause existed. Id. On its part, the City of Tulsa

similarly contends that Plaintiff is estopped from relitigating

the determination of probable cause and that Mr. Hankins’ claims

fail on the merits. (Docket No. 77).

On February 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed separate Responses in

Opposition to each motion. (Docket No. 92 and 93). On March 12,

2025, Defendants filed individual Replies. (Docket Nos. 101 and

102). On May 12, 2025, Defendants also filed a joint Notice of

Supplemental Authority. (Docket No. 104).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute over a material

fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material”

if “under the substantive law it is essential to the proper

disposition of the claim.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144

F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242).

The movant “bears the initial burden of making a prima facie

demonstration of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact

and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 670-71

(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).

Next, the burden shifts to the non-movant “to go beyond the

pleadings” and provide “specific facts that would be admissible in

evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact

could find for the nonmovant.” Id. at 671 (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Specific facts can be shown “by reference

to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits

incorporated therein.” Id. (citing Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola

Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1992)).

A court must “view the evidence and draw any inferences in a

light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”

Thomas, 986 F.2d at 1024 (citations omitted). A court should review

the record in its entirety and refrain from making credibility

determinations or weighing the evidence. See Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)(3) (a court “need only consider cited materials” but can

“consider other materials in the record.”). A court should “give

credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant” as well as

“uncontradicted and unimpeached” evidence supporting the moving

party, “at least to the extent that that evidence comes from

disinterested witnesses.” Id. at 151 (citation omitted). Summary

judgment may be proper if the nonmovant’s case solely relies on

evidence that is “merely colorable or is not significantly

probative[.]” Whatley v. City of Bartlesville, Okla., 932 F.Supp.

1300, 1302 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (citation omitted). The “mere

existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will

not affect an otherwise properly supported motion for summary

judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quotation

omitted) (emphasis in original).

Summary judgment motions filed in the Northern District of

Oklahoma are also subject to the Local Civil Rules. Local Civil

Rule 56.1 requires that parties include a section in their filings

stating their proposed material facts in “concise, numbered

paragraphs” with accompanying citations. L. CV. R. 56.1(c), (e).

A party’s response brief to a motion for summary judgment must

include a section responding “to the facts that the movant contends

are not in dispute and shall state any fact that is disputed.” L.

CV. R. 56.1(c). “All material facts” in the movant’s statement of

material facts will be admitted for summary judgment purposes

“unless specifically controverted by the statement of material

facts of the opposing party, using the procedures set forth in

this rule.” Id. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Bell v. BOKF, NA,

No. 12-CV-28, 2013 WL 1309411, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 26, 2013)

(admitting the movant’s statement of undisputed material facts

when the non-movant did not comply with Local Civil Rule 56.1).

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

To make its findings of fact, the Court reviewed Defendants’

Motions for Summary Judgment, Hankins’ Responses, Defendants’

Replies, the exhibits accompanying these documents, and the

parties’ other filings in the case. (Docket Nos. 76, 77, 78, 79,

92, 93, 94, 101, and 102). The Court makes the following findings

of fact after crediting only material facts that are properly

supported by a record citation and uncontroverted.1

1. On or about September 2, 2020, Ashley Nix (“Nix”)and Hankins

were introduced to each other by a mutual acquaintance at

Oren’s Restaurant. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 1; 77 ¶ 1).

2. Ashley Nix is, and was at the time of the relevant events, an

Assistant District Attorney with the Tulsa County District

Attorney’s Office. At the time of the incident, she was one

of the prosecutors assigned to the team of prosecutors,

1 References to a specific Finding of Fact shall be cited in the following

manner: (Fact ¶ _).

referred to as the special victims’ unit, which prosecuted

sex crimes. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 9; 77 ¶ 9).

3. On the evening of September 5, 2020, Nix and Hankins arranged

to meet at Oren’s for drinks. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 2; 77 ¶ 2).

4. That same day she had also been trying to arrange a date with

Jeff Dickason (“Dickason”), but Dickason was working, whereas

Hankins was available. (Docket No. 92 ¶ 6).

5. Hankins arrived at Oren’s at approximately 9:45 p.m. Nix was

already there and sitting at the bar. Id.

6. Nix and Hankins were together at the bar having drinks for

approximately one hour and left the bar together in Hankins’

car. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 2; 76-2 at 7; 77 ¶ 2).

7. Video footage from inside Oren’s bar shows that they each had

approximately two drinks. (Docket Nos. 76-18; 93 ¶ 3).

8. At his deposition, Hankins testified that after they left

Oren’s, Nix kissed him on the mouth and suggested going to

his place. (Docket No. 92 ¶ 9).

9. Surveillance video from Hankins’ residence shows him and Nix

arriving in Hankins’ vehicle at his residence at 10:55:32

p.m. and proceeding to walk toward the residence. (Docket

Nos. 76 ¶ 3; 77 ¶ 3; 76-16).

10. Hankins testified that after arriving at his house, he and

Nix had sexual intercourse on the kitchen counter of his home

for approximately 20 minutes. (Docket Nos. 92 ¶ 10; 93 ¶ 5).

11. At approximately 11:14 p.m., Hankins and Nix returned to his

vehicle and left his residence briefly. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 3;

77 ¶ 3; 76-16).

12. Hankins testified that he drove Nix to the Oren’s parking lot

to get her car, but Nix then discovered she did not have her

keys. (Docket No. 92 ¶¶ 10-11; 93 ¶ 5).

13. Hankins and Nix returned to his residence at 11:21 p.m.

(Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 3; 77 ¶ 3; 76-16).

14. A patio camera at Hankins’ residence shows Nix and Hankins on

the patio from 11:21:40 p.m. until 11:36:20 p.m., at which

time Hankins carries Nix into the residence. Id.

15. While on the patio, at approximately 11:22:53 p.m., Nix is

seen losing her balance while standing on her own two feet,

falling backwards, and tumbling into hedges. Hankins helped

her up. Subsequently at 11:25:51 p.m. the footage shows Nix

straddling Hankins and them beginning to kiss. (Docket No.

76-16).

16. At 12:01:04 a.m., Hankins and Nix exited the residence, and

at 12:04:20 a.m., departed in Hankins’ vehicle. (Docket Nos.

76 ¶ 3; 77 ¶ 3; 76-16).

17. Hankins testified that he drove Nix to her residence to look

for a spare key. Moreover, he testified that Nix directed him

to her house along the way. (Docket No. 92 ¶¶ 14-15).

18. A RING surveillance video at Nix’s residence shows that,

shortly after midnight, Hankins and Nix approached her front

door; they appear to look for Nix’s keys in her purse but are

apparently unable to find them and immediately leave without

entering the residence. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 4; 77 ¶ 4).

19. Hankins then drove Nix to Doc’s Restaurant, which shares a

parking lot and valet with Oren’s, in the hope of finding

Nix’s keys. Nix entered the restaurant alone. Hankins left.

(Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 5; 77 ¶ 5).

20. The staff inside Doc’s helped Nix secure alternative

transportation home, since she was unable to drive herself

home. Id.

21. Spencer Snow, an employee at Doc’s, called Dickason, with

whom Nix had gone on one date before and who agreed to pick

up Nix from Doc’s. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 6; 76-9 at 60; 77 ¶ 6).

22. Dickason testified at trial that when he first saw Nix, she

was sitting at the bar and seemed really intoxicated, had

trouble staying on her bar stool, slurred her words, and had

difficulty walking. (Docket No. 76-10 at 240).

23. Dickason picked up Nix, drove to her home, helped her get

into her house through a window, and left her residence

shortly thereafter. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 6; 76-9 at 60; 77 ¶ 6).

24. RING video footage from Nix’s residence shows her and Dickason

on her back porch, playing with her dogs. (Docket No. 92 ¶

18; 76-16; 93 ¶ 12).

25. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on September 6, 2020, Nix went to

Hillcrest Medical Center in order to have a sexual assault

exam performed, and to report the assault. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶

7; 77 ¶ 7).

26. At 3:26 a.m., while waiting for the exam, Nix texted Hankins:

“Can you see if you have my keys?” (Docket No. 92 ¶ 24).

27. The sexual assault examination was performed by a sexual

assault nurse examiner (SANE), Ashlea Dollins, R.N.,

(“Dollins”) who documented her observations in her report.

(Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 7; 77 ¶ 7).

28. Per Dollins’ testimony at the Preliminary Hearing, Nix

appeared tearful and groggy at the time of the exam. She also

had lapses in memory and couldn’t remember what had happened.

However, Nix did not say she had been unconscious. (Docket

No. 76 ¶7; 76-9 at 155-56, 166).

29. Dollins did not notice any physical injuries but did notice

blood on the vaginal swabs that appeared bright, typically

indicative of active bleeding. (76-9 at 156-157).

30. Per the Sexual Assault Information Form (TUL 4760-1) prepared

by Dollins, Nix reported that the assault occurred on the

“kitchen countertop at a foreign house, completely dark

inside.” She further identified the assailant as a white male

acquaintance named Tim. The Form also states that Plaintiff

had one or two drinks at the beginning of the night and had

possibly been drugged at some point. (76-1 at 2-3).

31. Per Nix’s summary of the events recorded in the Sexual Assault

Information Form, Nix stated she had met Tim at Oren’s and

had ordered a drink. She had a drink before arriving but was

not remotely drunk. She remembers talking and having a drink

and then “everything goes black for a while.” Her next memory

is wandering around an unfamiliar house that was pitch black,

and then sitting on a countertop where she was having sex.

The next thing she remembers is walking into Doc’s without

knowing how she got there or where Tim went. She couldn’t

find her keys but found her underwear in her bag. A bartender

asked if she was ok and helped her call a friend to come pick

her up. (76-1 at 4).

32. Nix did not explicitly say that she was raped, sexually

assaulted, or that she did not want to have sex with Hankins.

(Docket No. 76-1 at 4; 76-9 at 170)

33. The Tulsa Police Department (“TPD”) was contacted regarding

the SANE exam, and Officer T.K. Talley (“Officer Talley”) was

dispatched to Hillcrest Medical Center. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 8;

77 ¶ 8).

34. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Talley noted that when he

first encountered Plaintiff, she appeared to be “somewhat out

of it” and had fragmented memories. After the SANE exam was

completed, she seemed more coherent and was able to piece

things together in chronological order. (Docket Nos. 76 at 8;

76-9 at 133).

35. In the Tulsa Police Department Incident Report prepared by

Officer Talley, Nix reported that she did not remember

finishing a drink before she began to black out and could

only remember pieces of the evening. She recalled being in an

empty house with no furniture or light. She recalled sitting

on what felt like a kitchen counter with Hankins in front of

her. She reported that she woke up to Hankins inside of her.

She also remembered searching for her keys, only to find her

underwear in her purse, and walking into Doc’s where an

employee helped her get a ride home. (Docket No. 76 ¶ 8; 76-

2 at 2-3).

36. At the time of the event, Defendant Ehrenrich, a lieutenant

with the TPD, had recently been reassigned as the lieutenant

supervisor over TPD’s special victims’ unit, the group of

detectives who investigate sex crimes. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 10;

77 ¶ 10).

37. On September 6, 2020, Nix contacted Ehrenrich and informed

him that she had filed a rape report because he was the

supervisor over the SVU, and she knew that the matter would

be reported to SVU detectives. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 11; 76-12 at

7; 77 ¶ 11).

38. Specifically, Nix texted Ehrenrich at 5:24 a.m. on September

6, 2020 and they spoke by phone at 7:35 a.m. that day. They

subsequently exchanged fourteen (14) text messages throughout

the day until past 7:30 p.m. that night. Nix was communicating

with Ehrenrich via both his personal and official cell phone.

(Docket No. 92 at 26).

39. Ehrenrich testified that he assigned the investigation of the

incident to himself because, as the newest member of the

special victims unit, he felt he had the least interactions

and familiarity with Nix. He also felt that because the

purported victim was an Assistant District Attorney, the

investigation should be handled by a supervisor. (Docket Nos.

76 ¶ 12; 76-12 at 8; 77 ¶ 12).

40. Because Nix was an employee of the Tulsa County District

Attorney’s Office, said office recused itself from any

involvement in the investigation or prosecution. Accordingly,

the Oklahoma Attorney General’s Office referred the matter to

the Payne County District Attorney’s Office. (Docket Nos. 76

¶ 13; 77 ¶ 13).

41. Ehrenrich’s investigation began on September 8, 2020, and was

completed on November 23, 2020. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 14; 77 ¶

14).

42. Ehrenrich’s investigation included interviews of the

following people, among others:

•

Nix, the alleged victim;

•

Jonathan Hood, a tattoo artist that Nix had an

appointment with earlier in the evening of September 5,

2020;

•

Nathan Wood, the bartender at Oren’s Restaurant;

•

Spencer Snow, the bartender at Doc’s Restaurant;

•

Jeffrey Dickason, the acquaintance who drove Nix home;

(Docket No. 76 ¶ 14; 76-3; 77 ¶ 14).

43. During her interview with Ehrenrich, Nix provided the

following version of the events of September 5, 2020:

•

Nix had two drinks at Oren’s earlier in the day, prior

to a tattoo appointment.

•

She later made plans with Hankins to go to Oren’s

together in the evening. She arrived a few minutes before

he did. They ordered a drink together. She did not

remember what they talked about.

•

Nix remembered walking out of Oren’s with Hankins, being

in a car, pulling into a driveway, and then only recalls

bits and pieces.

•

Nix remembered being in a dark, empty house. She could

not see anything but could feel she was on a counter.

She remembered that she could not hold her body up and

slipped off the counter, hitting the floor.

•

Nix then recalled being back at the patio of the house,

falling outside, and thinking that Hankins appeared to

be mad.

•

She felt she could not walk and did not feel well.

•

The next thing she remembered is being at Doc’s. She

recalled being upset and frantic and having bad motor

skills. One of the bartenders looked concerned and

helped her use her phone to call someone to assist her.

•

Nix remembers Dickason arriving, being really nice, and

taking her to her home.

•

She recalled laughing with Dickason as they tried to

figure out how to get into the house. They played with

her dogs once she was able to enter. She did not fall.

•

Nix recalled asking Dickason to stay but he declined. He

gave her a kiss and left.

•

Nix remembered taking her makeup off and removing her

contacts, things she does not usually do when drunk.

•

She later remembered going to her purse and noticing her

panties there. She averred that at that moment, the

memories of the night came back.

•

She did not know what had happened exactly but was really

upset.

•

She recalled going to Hillcrest to be evaluated by a

SANE nurse. She remembered the exam but did not remember

the specific questions asked.

•

The next day when she woke up, she recalled being in

pain and being covered in bruises. She had to go back to

the hospital and was provided a sling.

•

She remembered Hankins trying to have sex but her memory

was blurry and she did not remember having sex.

(Docket No. 92-7).

44. As part of the investigation, a search warrant was obtained

and executed at Hankins’ residence, where the following

evidence was seized:

•

Two iPhones;

•

Two iPads;

•

Two MacBook laptops;

•

Multiple unidentified yellow, round pills/tablets;

•

Multiple small bottles containing an unidentified clear

viscous liquid;

•

One digital video recording (DVR) unit;

•

A buccal swab of the inside of Hankins’ mouth for DNA

purposes.

(Docket No. 76 ¶ 14; 76-4; 76-7; 77 ¶ 14).

45. The investigation also included the:

•

Download and forensic analysis of Nix’s cellphone;

•

Receipt and review of the Sexual Assault Information

Report prepared by Ashley Dollins, R.N.;

•

Receipt and review of original Incident Report prepared

by TPD Officer T.K. Talley;

•

Download and analysis of Hankins’ cell phones and

computer;

•

Download and analysis of surveillance recordings from

Hankins’ residence, “driveway camera,” and “patio

camera”;

•

Download and analysis of “RING” video recording of Nix’s

residence, front porch camera, and back porch camera;

•

Forensic lab analysis of the blood/urine samples

obtained from Nix during SANE exam, which showed the

presence of amphetamines and a blood alcohol level of

0.180.

(Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 14; 76-3; 76-4; 76-7; 77 ¶ 14).

46. The investigation also included the Criminalistics

Examination Report outlining the results of the Forensic

Laboratory DNA of subjects Hankins and Nix. The evidence

evaluated was the Sexual Assault Evidence Collection Kit from

Nix (containing vaginal swabs, external genitalia swabs,

chest/neck swabs, buccal swabs, underwear, and sperm search

slide), a brown paper sack listed as containing clothing, and

buccal swabs from Hankins. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 14; 77 ¶ 14; 76-

5 at 1).

47. The analysis of the evidence resulted in the following

findings:

•

“A partial single source male DNA profile was obtained”

from the External Genitalia Swabs – Sperm Fraction.

“Hankins cannot be excluded as a potential donor” of

male DNA obtained from external genitalia swabs from

Nix. “The probability of selecting an unrelated

individual at random from the population having this

partial DNA profile is at least 1 in 1.81 sextillion.”

•

The vaginal swabs – sperm fraction DNA profile was a

mixture that could be separated into a major component

and minor component. “A complete single source male

profile was obtained from the major component. The DNA

profile from the major component matches the DNA profile

obtained from the known buccal swabs from HANKINS (4).

The probability of selecting an unrelated individual at

random from the population having this DNA profile is at

least 1 in 16.1 octillion.” Nix “cannot be excluded as

a potential contributor to the minor component.”

•

The Chest/Neck Swabs contained a DNA mixture of at least

three individuals. Nix cannot be excluded as a potential

contributor and due to the intimate nature of the sample,

is presumed to be a contributor. Hankins is excluded as

a potential contributor.

•

A “partial DNA profile with very limited genetic

information was obtained” from the Chest/Neck Swabs –

Sperm Fraction. “It is not suitable for interpretation

and no conclusions can be made at this time.”

•

A complete single source Y-STR DNA profile was obtained

from the Vaginal Swabs – Epithelial Fraction. The Y-STR

DNA profile matches the Y-STR DNA profile obtained from

the known buccal swabs from Hankins. Therefore, Hankins

(and all his paternal male relatives) are included as a

potential donor.

(Docket No. 76-5).

48. Ehrenrich prepared a Supplemental Offense Report setting

forth a summary of his investigation. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 15;

77 ¶ 15).

49. The Supplemental Offense Report summarizes the toxicology

report received, noting that both Nix’s blood and urine were

analyzed. Ethanol was detected in both her blood and urine.

Specifically, her blood alcohol content was 0.18. Amphetamine

was detected in her blood. (Docket No. 92-8 at 24-25).

50. The toxicology report also evaluated items found in Hankins’

residence. THC was detected in the tablets, and no controlled

substances were detected in the liquids. Id.

51. During his deposition, Ehrenrich testified that there were “a

bunch of unusual liquids that were packaged weirdly” at

Hankins’ residence but none of them were positively

identified as “date rape drugs.” (Docket No. 92-1 at 16-17).

52. Ehrenrich also noted that, in his experience, although there

are several common date rape drugs such as Rohypnol, ketamine,

and GHB, people can use any type of drug, such as

antidepressants, tranquilizers or sleeping aids to overpower

a victim and hinder their recollection. Not all these drugs

are tested for in toxicology examinations and no such drugs

were identified in the blood and urine samples provided by

Nix. (Docket Nos. 92-1 at 16-17; 102-1 at 53-56).

53. Based on the entirety of his investigation, Ehrenrich

concluded there was probable cause to believe Hankins had

committed the crimes of rape and/or sexual assault against

Nix. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 16; 77 ¶ 16).

54. Ehrenrich provided the Payne County District Attorney’s

Office with his investigation file and had communications

with the Payne County District Attorney’s Office regarding

the investigation. The investigation file included

surveillance video from Oren’s Restaurant, video from

Hankins’ residence, video from Nix’s residence, phone records

with text messages, the Hillcrest Medical Center SANE exam

documentation, the initial police report prepared by Officer

Talley, numerous witness interviews and statements, analysis

of evidence gathered from Hankins’ residence via execution of

search warrant, forensic laboratory reports regarding Nix’s

blood and urine analysis, DNA analysis from Nix’s SANE exam

and from Hankins, along with other materials and information.

(Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 17; 76-14 ¶ 6; 77 ¶ 17).

55. Only one of Ehrenreich’s text messages with Nix was provided

as part of the investigative file but, as noted above, Nix’s

phone records reflect that they exchanged more messages.

(Docket No. 92-16; 92-10).

56. Prior to making a charging decision, the Payne County District

Attorney’s Office spoke with Allen Smallwood, attorney for

Hankins. (Docket No. 77 ¶ 19).

57. Hankins never made a statement to either the police or the

prosecution, until he testified in his defense at the jury

trial. Id. ¶ 20.

58. The Payne County District Attorney’s Office also interviewed

Nix prior to making a charging decision. Id. ¶ 21.

59. After receiving and reviewing the investigation file, the

Payne County District Attorney’s Office decided to file

felony charges against Hankins for Rape in the First Degree

or in the alternative Sexual Battery and asked Ehrenrich to

prepare the Probable Cause Affidavit. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶¶ 18-

19; 77 ¶ 22).

60. Ehrenrich drafted the Probable Cause Affidavit and submitted

it to Assistant District Attorney Debra Vincent for her to

review. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 20; 77 ¶ 23).

61. The Probable Cause Affidavit provides the following summary

of Nix and Hankins’ interaction on September 5, 2020:

On 09-05-2020, victim, A.N. [i.e., Nix],

agreed to meet with suspect, Timothy Hankins

for drinks at Oren’s restaurant. Victim stated

that she remembers getting to the restaurant

and both her and Hankins ordered drinks.

Victim reported that after drinking with

Hankins that she began to black out and that

everything went from “so clear, to not so

clear”. AN reported that her next clear memory

was standing in another bar on Brookside,

‘Doc’s’, not knowing how she got there. The

bartender at Doc’s arranged for AN to get a

ride home. AN stated that she later located

her panties in her purse, did not know how

they got there when she should have been

wearing them, so she arranged transport to

Hillcrest Hospital for a SANE exam.

(Docket No. 76-8 at 1).

62. The Probable Cause Affidavit further specifies the

individuals interviewed by Ehrenrich that interacted with the

victim prior to and after the interaction with Hankins. The

Affidavit provides a brief summary of what each individual

stated. Specifically, the bartender at Oren’s, Nathan Wood,

noted that Nix seemed vibrant when she first arrived but

seemed tired, lethargic, and her speech had slowed when she

left with Hankins. Snow, the bartender at Doc’s, stated that

Nix appeared very disoriented and very intoxicated when she

arrived. Dickason stated that when he arrived at Doc’s to

help Nix, she was having difficulty maintaining balance, her

speech was slurred, and he had to help her walk to the car.

After taking her to her home, Nix asked Dickason to stay but

he didn’t feel comfortable based on how intoxicated she

appeared. Id. at 1.

63. The Probable Cause Affidavit also describes video

surveillance footage at Hankins’ residence depicting how Nix

had difficulty maintaining her balance and fell over. Id. at

1.

64. The Probable Cause Affidavit highlights that the SANE exam

detected seminal fluid on Nix’s vaginal swabs, external

genitalia swabs, and on her panties, and that the DNA testing

resulted in the following finding: “Timothy Hankins cannot be

excluded as a potential contributor of the haplotype

information obtained.” Id. at 2.

65. Lastly, the Probable Cause Affidavit notes that the blood and

urine testing from the SANE exam showed that Nix’s blood

alcohol level was 0.18 at the time of the SANE exam,

approximately 3 hours after her encounter with Hankins.

66. After submitting the Probable Cause Affidavit to the Payne

County District Attorney’s Office, Ehrenrich had no further

involvement in the decision to file charges against Hankins.

(Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 21; 77 ¶ 24).

67. On November 23, 2020, Payne County prosecutors presented the

Probable Cause Affidavit to Tulsa County Judge David Guten,

who reviewed the Probable Cause Affidavit and determined

there was probable cause to arrest Hankins on charges of

first-degree rape or in the alternative sexual battery.

Prosecutors filed the original Information on November 23,

2020. Judge Guten signed the warrant for Hankins’ arrest.

(Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 22; 77 ¶ 25).

68. The case was filed as Case No. CF-2020-5224, State of Oklahoma

v. Timothy Francis Hankins Jr (“Oklahoma v. Hankins”).

(Docket No. 77 ¶ 26).

69. On April 27, 2021, Payne County prosecutors amended the

charges to drop the sexual battery charge and added rape by

instrumentation. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 23; 77 ¶ 27).

70. On April 28, 2021 and May 19, 2021, Tulsa County District

Court Judge Tonya Wilson conducted a preliminary hearing in

the case Oklahoma v. Hankins, Case No. CF-2020-5224. At the

preliminary hearing, numerous witnesses testified, and

Hankins’ attorney cross-examined witnesses and presented

witnesses and evidence on Hankins’ behalf. All the

surveillance video of the interactions between Nix and

Hankins were admitted into evidence and reviewed by Judge

Wilson. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 24; 77 ¶ 28).

71. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing and after

reviewing all evidence presented, Judge Wilson found probable

cause that Hankins had committed the crime of rape in the

first degree as well as rape by instrumentation, and he was

bound over for trial. Id.

72. On July 6, 2021, through his attorney, Hankins filed a Motion

to Quash Evidence Adduced at Preliminary Hearing, seeking

dismissal of the case. The State filed a response on August

2, 2021. Judge Clifford Smith heard arguments on the motion

August 4, 2021 and ultimately overruled the same. (Docket

Nos. 76 ¶ 25; 77 ¶ 29).

73. A jury trial in Oklahoma v. Hankins, Case No. CF-2020-5224,

was held from April 26–29, 2022, before Tulsa County District

Judge Clifford Smith. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 26; 77 ¶ 30).

74. At the close of the State’s case, Hankins demurred to the

evidence and moved for directed verdict. Judge Smith denied

Hankins’ motion, finding there was sufficient evidence to

submit the case to the jury.

In my research on the issue, I can’t find a

lot, but it comes down to incapacitated, and

everything indicates that’s ultimately a job

for the finder of fact. So I’m going to

overrule the demurrer. I’m going to withhold

a ruling on Instrumentation until we get down

to the point that I have to determine what to

instruct the jury. But I’m overruling the

demurrer at this time.

(Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 26; 77 ¶ 30; 76-10 at 297).

75. Hankins then presented evidence in his own defense, including

his own testimony and two expert witnesses. At the close of

his case, Hankins moved for a directed verdict on the primary

and alternative charges. Based on Hankins’ testimony that he

had engaged in sexual intercourse with Nix, the alternative

charge of Rape by Instrumentation was withdrawn. The motion

for directed verdict was also denied by Judge Smith. (Docket

No. 77 ¶ 31; 77-18 at 438-439).

76. Ultimately, the jury acquitted Hankins. (Docket Nos. 76 ¶ 26;

77 ¶ 31).

77. The Tulsa Police Department has promulgated Policies and

Procedures, Rules and Regulations, Departmental Orders, and

Operations Manuals to ensure the efficient and lawful

administration of justice. In particular, TPD policies

provide instruction on Interviews and Interrogations, Arrest

Warrants, Search Warrants, and Major Crime Scenes/Sexual

Assaults. (Docket No. 77 ¶¶ 32-33).

78. Tulsa Police Rules and Regulations state that “[e]mployees

shall not make a false report nor knowingly enter into any

department record or report any inaccurate, false, or

improper information.” (Docket Nos. 77 ¶ 34; 77-20 at 30).

79. All Tulsa Police Department officers take an Oath of Office

swearing to “defend, enforce, and obey the Constitution and

laws of the United States, the State of Oklahoma, and the

Charter and Ordinances of the City of Tulsa” and “protect the

rights, lives, and property of all citizens.” (Docket No. 77

¶ 35).

80. It is the Tulsa Police Department Special Victims Unit’s

practice to “coordinate with the district attorney’s office

prior to submitting an affidavit so they can have an

understanding of the case.” Id. ¶ 36.

IV. APPLICABLE LAW

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides that a person

acting under color of state law who “subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42

U.S.C. § 1983. In Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court determined that local

governments and municipalities are “persons” under the Civil

Rights Act and can therefore be subject to a Section 1983 claim as

well.

Crucially, Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive

rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and

federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.

137, 145 n. 3 (1979); see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,

285 (2002) (“[S]ince § 1983 merely provides a mechanism for

enforcing individual rights ‘secured’ elsewhere, i.e., rights

independently ‘secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United

States”). “Section 1983 does not allow plaintiffs to create a

federal case out of “every violation of state common law.” Margheim

v. Buljko, 855 F.3d 1077, 1084 (10th Cir. 2017) (quotations

omitted). The first inquiry in any Section 1983 suit is therefore

“whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right ‘secured by

the Constitution and laws.’” Id. (quoting Baker, 443 U.S. at 140;

42 U.S.C. § 1983). Relevant to the case at bar, “[t]he Fourth

Amendment provides one source of rights enforceable in a § 1983

action.” Id.

B. Qualified Immunity

An “individual defendant named in a § 1983 action may raise

a defense of qualified immunity, which shields public officials

from damages actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light

of clearly established law.” Est. of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d

405, 411 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted) (cleaned up). Once

a defendant asserts qualified immunity, “the plaintiff carries a

two-part burden to show: (1) that the defendant’s actions violated

a federal constitutional or statutory right, and, if so, (2) that

the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s

unlawful conduct.” Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451,

460 (10th Cir. 2013).

Notably, when a defendant moves for summary judgment based on

qualified immunity, “courts must still view the facts in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual

disputes and reasonable inferences in its favor.” Gomez, 745 F.3d

at 411. However, unlike most affirmative defenses, plaintiff bears

“the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial to overcome qualified

immunity by showing a violation of clearly established federal

law.” Id. Thus, at the summary judgment stage, courts “must grant

qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can show (1) a reasonable

jury could find facts supporting a violation of a constitutional

right, which (2) was clearly established at the time of the

defendant’s conduct.” Id.; see also Riggins v. Goodman, 572 F.3d

1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that

qualified immunity is proper when the record plainly demonstrates

no constitutional right has been violated, or that the allegations

do not offend clearly established.”).

C. Collateral Estoppel

The collateral estoppel doctrine, also known as issue

preclusion, “is designed to prevent needless relitigation and

bring about some finality to litigation” by barring “a party from

relitigating an issue once it has suffered an adverse determination

on the issue, even if the issue arises when the party is pursuing

or defending against a different claim.” Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d

1155, 1161 (10th Cir. 2009). Specifically, collateral estoppel

will bar a claim if the four following elements are met:

(1) the issue previously decided is identical

with the one presented in the action in

question, (2) the prior action has been

finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the

party against whom the doctrine is invoked was

a party or in privity with a party to the prior

adjudication, and (4) the party against whom

the doctrine is raised had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior

action.

Id. (citing Frandsen v. Westinghouse Corp., 46 F.3d 975, 978 (10th

Cir. 1995).

The rules of collateral estoppel are applicable to Section

1983 actions. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980).

Moreover, in Allen, the Supreme Court held that federal courts

“considering a section 1983 action must give preclusive effect to

a state court judgment to the same extent a court in that state

would.” Hubbert v. City of Moore, Okl., 923 F.2d 769, 772 (10th

Cir. 1991) (citing Allen, 449 U.S. at 96). “Because the preclusive

effect of a prior state court judgment is defined by that state’s

law,” the Court must evaluate Oklahoma law to determine whether

the state court’s finding of probable cause against Hankins

collaterally estops the court from evaluating the existence of

probable cause in the current federal proceeding. Id. at 772-773.

Under Oklahoma law, collateral estoppel “may only be invoked

if the party against whom the earlier decision is interposed had

a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the critical issue in

the previous case” and has lost on that issue. Miller v. Miller,

956 P.2d 887, 897-898 (Okla. 1998). Accordingly, the defendant

invoking collateral estoppel “must show that the issue sought to

be precluded was actually litigated and determined in the prior

action between the parties or their privies, and that the

determination was essential to the decision in the prior action.”

Id. 956 P.2d at 897; see also Fent v. Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co., a

Div. of Oneok Inc., 898 P.2d 126, 133 (Okla. 1994).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Collateral Estoppel is Inapplicable

Defendants argue that because probable cause was found to

exist throughout the state criminal proceedings against Hankins,

collateral estoppel applies, and Plaintiff is precluded from

relitigating the existence of probable cause. This would be fatal

to Plaintiff’s claims given that probable cause is a crucial

element of both. If probable cause existed to arrest and prosecute

Hankins, his claims for unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution

fail and must be dismissed.

As discussed above, under Oklahoma law, a defendant invoking

collateral estoppel as a defense “must show that the issue sought

to be precluded was actually litigated and determined in the prior

action between the parties or their privies, and that the

determination was essential to the decision in the prior action.”

Miller, 956 P.2d at 897. In the case at bar, there is not exact

identity between the parties in the state and federal proceedings

and Defendants have not briefed the issue of privity. See Docket

Nos. 76 and 77.

Pursuant to binding Tenth Circuit precedent, officers that

are civilly sued in their individual capacity, and where their

personal interests were not at stake in the criminal proceeding,

are not considered in privity with the state of Oklahoma. See

Kinslow v. Ratzlaff, 158 F.3d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 1998);

McFarland v. Childers, 212 F.3d 1178, 1185 (10th Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, collateral estoppel does not apply to Plaintiff’s

claims against Ehrenrich.

The record reflects that although the investigation began in

Tulsa, the Tulsa County District Attorney’s office recused itself

from any involvement in the investigation and the matter was

referred to the Payne County District Attorney’s Office. (Fact ¶

40). In light of this fact and the fact that the parties did not

brief the matter, the Court is not in a position to find whether

the City of Tulsa is in privity with the State of Oklahoma. See

Kinslow, 158 F.3d at 1106, n.2 (quoting Hildebrand v. Gray, 866

P.2d 447, 450 (OK CIV APP 1993)) (noting that privity requires

that the party have “the same interest, character, or capacity as

the party against whom the prior judgment was rendered.”).

B. Ehrenrich is Entitled to Qualified Immunity as to Plaintiff’s

Unlawful Arrest Claim because Probable Cause Existed for

Hankins’ Arrest

Plaintiff claims he was wrongfully and unreasonably arrested

in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects

individuals against unreasonable seizures, including arrests, in

the absence of probable cause. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Probable

cause exists where the facts and circumstances known to the officer

at the time of arrest, and of which the officer had reasonably

trustworthy information, were sufficient to warrant a prudent

person in believing defendant had committed or was committing a

criminal offense.” United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 485

n.2 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).

Whether probable cause existed “does not require proof beyond

reasonable doubt” nor that “the suspect’s guilt...be ‘more likely

true than false.’” Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1188 (10th Cir.

2011) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)). “Instead,

the relevant question is whether a substantial probability existed

that the suspect committed the crime, requiring something more

than a bare suspicion.” Id. (internal quotations and citations

omitted).

Under the qualified immunity doctrine, “law enforcement

officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable

cause is present are entitled to immunity.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502

U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (quotations omitted); see also Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (“We have recognized that it

is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases

reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present,

and we have indicated that in such cases those officials—like other

officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful—

should not be held personally liable.”); Stonecipher v. Valles,

759 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted)

(“In the context of a qualified immunity defense on an unlawful

search or arrest claim, we ascertain whether a defendant violated

clearly established law by asking whether there was ‘arguable

probable cause’ for the challenged conduct. Arguable probable

cause is another way of saying that the officers' conclusions rest

on an objectively reasonable, even if mistaken, belief that

probable cause exists.”).

The fact that a neutral judge issued an arrest warrant “is

the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively

reasonable manner, or in objective good faith. Nonetheless, that

fact does not end the inquiry into objective reasonableness.”

Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012) (internal

quotations omitted). Qualified immunity cannot be granted (1)

“where the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia

of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence

entirely unreasonable” Id. (quotations omitted). “Nor will a

warrant protect officers who misrepresent or omit material facts

to the magistrate judge.” Stonecipher, 759 F.3d at 1142. Plaintiff

bears the burden of making “a substantial showing of deliberate

falsehood or reckless disregard for truth” by the officer seeking

the warrant.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

In the present case, Plaintiff contends that Ehrenrich both

included falsified inculpatory facts and knowingly or recklessly

omitted numerous facts. (Docket No. 92 at 28). The Tenth Circuit

has explained that:

Where false statements have been included in

an arrest warrant affidavit, the existence of

probable cause is determined by setting aside

the false information and reviewing the

remaining contents of the affidavit. In a case

involving information omitted from an

affidavit, the existence of probable cause is

determined by examining the affidavit as if

the omitted information had been included and

inquiring if the affidavit would still have

given rise to probable cause for the warrant.

Wolford v. Lasater, 78 F.3d 484, 489 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

But first, the Court “begin[s] with what was included in the

affidavit and isn't challenged.” Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1188 (emphasis

in original). Per the unchallenged portions of the Probable Cause

Affidavit, Nix met with Hankins at Oren’s, drank alcohol with him

at the bar, and her memory went from “so clear to not so clear.”

(Fact ¶ 61). Video surveillance footage from Hankins’ residence

shows them entering the residence and being on the patio; Nix then

has difficulty maintaining balance and falls into the bushes before

Nix and Hankins subsequently leave the residence. (Fact ¶ 63). Nix

subsequently arrived at Doc’s, where she was observed by Snow to

be acting disoriented and very intoxicated. (Fact ¶ 62). The SANE

exam detected seminal fluid on Nix’s vaginal swabs and external

genitalia. (Fact ¶ 64). The DNA testing resulted in Hankins not

being excluded as a potential contributor. Id. Nix’s blood alcohol

was 0.18 at the time of the SANE exam. (Fact ¶ 65).

Taken together, the Court finds that these facts are

sufficient to establish probable cause that Hankins committed Rape

in first degree under Oklahoma law, which can include “[r]ape

accomplished where the victim is at the time unconscious of the

nature of the act and this fact is known to the accused[.]” Okla.

Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1114(2) and (4); See Stonecipher, 759 F.3d

at 1141 (quotations omitted) (“Probable cause is not a precise

quantum of evidence—it does not, for example, ‘require the

suspect’s guilt to be ‘more likely true than false.’ Instead, the

relevant question is whether a ‘substantial probability’ existed

that the suspect committed the crime, requiring something ‘more

than a bare suspicion.’).

Plaintiff takes issue with the Probable Cause Affidavit

stating that Nix “blacked out” after drinking with Hankins and

that her next clear memory was standing in Doc’s. (Docket No. 92

at 28). He argues that this constitutes a falsified inculpatory

fact because when drafting the Affidavit, Ehrenrich knew that Nix

remembered several events between drinking with Hankins and being

at Doc’s. Id. Having evaluated the record, the Court finds that

this statement is not a false characterization that needs to be

stricken. During Ehrenrich’s interview of Nix, she stated that

after walking out of Oren’s with Hankins, she only remembered bits

and pieces: such as being in a dark house, falling and not being

able to hold up her body, and then being at Doc’s. (Fact ¶ 43).

Recently, the Tenth Circuit reiterated its position that

generally, a “victim’s own statement to police may independently

establish probable cause absent some reason to think the statement

not trustworthy, particularly when law enforcement officers

directly interview the victim.” Crothers v. Carr, No. 23-8014,

2025 WL 1122681, at *6 (10th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025) (internal

quotation omitted). Although the Probable Cause Affidavit

naturally does not reflect the totality of Nix’s statements, it is

a faithful representation of Nix’s description of the events, which

has consistently been that she only remembered portions of the

evening after leaving the bar with Hankins. See Fact ¶ 34 (the

Sexual Assault Information Form reflects that Nix stated that

“everything goes black for a while” after having drinks with

Hankins); Fact ¶ 38 (the Tulsa Police Department Incident Report

reflects that Nix described that she blacked out and only remembers

pieces of the evening).

Plaintiff further argues that Ehrenrich omitted a wide range

of “exculpatory facts” in the probable cause affidavit. The twenty-

one omissions identified by Plaintiff consist of his appreciation

of the events (e.g., that he and Nix were acting in a friendly

matter after the alleged rape), largely irrelevant details (such

as Nix not explicitly using the word rape when evaluated by the

SANE nurse), and importantly, a fact simply not supported by the

record. The most crucial of these omissions is Plaintiff’s

contention that the DNA analysis showed seminal fluid from two

males, neither of whom is Hankins, detected on the chest and neck

swabs taken from Ms. Nix’s body. This is not supported by the

Criminalistics Examination Report. (Fact ¶ 47). The Criminalistics

Examination Report states that the tests of the chest and neck

swabs revealed a DNA mixture of at least three individuals, that

Nix cannot be excluded as a potential contributor and that Hankins

is excluded as a potential contributor. Id. Furthermore, the sperm

fraction recovered from the chest/neck swabs contained “very

limited genetic information” and “is not suitable for

interpretation and no conclusions can be made.” Id. At the Jury

Trial, Ms. Samantha Campenni-Hunt, the criminalist that prepared

the toxicology report, explained that a person can collect DNA

from someone else on their exposed neck or chest by skin-to-skin

contact such as a hug, but that she cannot confirm how DNA got on

Nix for sure. (Docket No. 76-10 at 317-318). None of this indicates

that the chest and neck swabs revealed the conclusive presence of

seminal fluid from two males.

The remaining omissions can largely be grouped together in

nine (9) categories. The Court addresses each below. First,

Plaintiff maintains that Nix did not tell the SANE Nurse or any

investigator that she was raped or was unconscious during her

contact with Hankins, but rather she remembered having sex with

him. Plaintiff also notes that during the SANE test, Nix denied

pain or notable injuries, and the SANE nurse did not observe any

injuries. However, the Court finds that Nix’s failure to explicitly

state that she was raped during her SANE exam, and her choice in

turn to use other language, is not exculpatory, especially when

coupled with Nix’s contention that she had gaps in her memory.

Furthermore, during her interview with Ehrenrich, Nix stated that

she remembered Hankins trying to have sex but did not remember

having sex. (Fact ¶ 43). Likewise, the absence of visible injuries

is not dispositive.

Second, Plaintiff notes that video footage from inside Oren’s

and from Hankins’ patio shows Nix initiating physical contact with

Hankins, including rubbing his thighs, holding his hand, wrapping

her arms around his neck, and throwing her legs around his waist.

He further asserts that three to six minutes of contact between

Hankins and Nix on the patio were not recorded by the surveillance

camera. Even if included in the Affidavit, these facts are not

exculpatory and do not negate the possibility of subsequent

misconduct, as they are not indicative of consent or consciousness

at the time of intercourse. Moreover, the Court notes that this

video footage also shows Nix struggling to maintain balance and

falling. (Fact ¶ 15).

Third, Plaintiff contends that when he took Nix home to look

for her keys, she was conscious, and they were communicating on

friendly terms. However, this amounts to Plaintiff’s

characterization and the degree of Nix’s consciousness cannot be

fully devised from the video footage at Nix’s residence.

Fourth, Plaintiff argues that Nix’s allegation that she only

had “one or two” drinks on September 5th was a lie. The Probable

Cause Affidavit does not specify the number of drinks consumed but

it highlights that her blood alcohol level was .18, well over the

legal limit. See e.g., United States v. Kirby, 161 F.4th 1208,

1211 (10th Cir. 2025) (noting that 0.08 percent is the legal limit

under Oklahoma law). The number of drinks Nix remembered having is

ultimately irrelevant to how intoxicated or conscious Nix actually

became and how Hankins perceived her to be. Thus, this fact would

not negate the existence of probable cause.

Fifth, Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that the Probable

Cause Affidavit does not explicitly state that the toxicology

results showed that there were no drugs in Nix’s system on the

morning of September 6, aside from her prescription amphetamine,

and that no commonly used date rape drugs were recovered at

Hankins’ residence. Given that the Affidavit mentions the

toxicology report regarding alcohol but is silent as to drugs, the

Court finds that it could be inferred that no drugs were found in

Nix’s blood or urine. Even if explicitly added to the Probable

Cause Affidavit, these facts do not negate the existence of

Probable Cause. As noted in Ehrenrich’s deposition testimony, not

all drugs that can be used to overpower a victim and hinder their

recollection are tested for in toxicology examinations. (Fact ¶

52).

Sixth, Plaintiff claims that Ehrenrich manipulated the

investigation by telling Dickason that Ms. Nix had been drugged

and raped prior to interviewing him, altering his perspective.

(Docket Nos. 92 at 29 and 92-3 ¶ 23). To support this claim,

Plaintiff provided a signed declaration by Dickason. Defendant

argues that the declaration was signed under duress to avoid a

video deposition. (Docket Nos. 102 at 6 and 102-3). Even if this

were added to the Probable Cause Affidavit, or if Dickason’s

observations were stricken in their entirety, the Affidavit would

still have Nix’s version of events, Snow’s statement that Nix

appeared disoriented and intoxicated when she arrived at Doc’s,

and reference to the video footage at Hankins’ residence showing

Nix having difficulty maintaining balance and falling over. (Facts

¶¶ 61-63). Accordingly, this fact does not negate probable cause.

Moreover, Plaintiff does not provide any case law to establish

that Ehrenrich could not inform Dickason of the underlying alleged

crime being investigated prior to interviewing him.

Seventh, Plaintiff argues Ehrenrich should have disclosed

that he had a pre-existing professional relationship with Nix and

communicated in over 70 text messages and phone calls with Nix

between September 6-9, 2020. Plaintiff has similarly failed to

establish that these communications amount to wrongdoing. The

Court finds that this omission is largely irrelevant to the facts

of the case and thus, even if included in the Probable Cause

Affidavit, would not negate a finding of probable cause.

Eighth, Plaintiff asserts that Nix remembered numerous

details of the events before, during, and after her encounter with

Hankins, including having sex. The Court finds that even if a more

detailed summary of the events, such as those provided by Nix

during her interview with Ehrenreich, were included, the Affidavit

would still give rise to probable cause. The Probable Cause

Affidavit constitutes a succinct summary of Nix’s version of the

events, as told to Ehrenrich and is consistent with what she told

both Dollins (the SANE nurse) and Officer Talley. (Facts ¶ 30-31;

35; 43).

Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Nix was in the midst of an

emotional meltdown over the abrupt and dramatic end of an

inappropriate relationship with her married supervisor. The Court

finds that this is wholly irrelevant to a finding of probable

cause. “Probable cause is based on the totality of the

circumstances, and requires reasonably trustworthy information

that would lead a reasonable officer to believe that the person

about to be arrested has committed or is about to commit a crime.”

Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1116 (10th Cir. 2007). Having

evaluated the totality of the record and the Probable Cause

Affidavit vis-à-vis Hankins’ arguments, the Court concludes that

Ehrenrich’s finding that probable cause existed was objectively

reasonable. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991);

Stonecipher, 759 F.3d at 1141. Having reviewed Ehrenrich’s

interview of Nix, the Court finds that this on its own would be

sufficient to establish probable cause in this case. See Crothers,

No. 23-8014, 2025 WL 1122681, at *6. Moreover, none of Plaintiff’s

arguments outlined above amount to “obvious reasons to doubt the

veracity” of Nix’s allegations. Stonecipher, 759 F.3d at 1142.

Ultimately, Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of making “a

substantial showing of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard

for truth” by Ehrenrich. Id. Because probable cause existed,

Defendant Ehrenrich is entitled to qualified immunity with regard

to Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim. Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest

claim against Ehrenrich is DISMISSED.

C. Ehrenrich has Qualified Immunity as to Plaintiff’s Malicious

Prosecution Claim because Probable Cause Existed for Hankins’

Arrest and Prosecution

To establish a malicious prosecution claim pursuant to

Section 1983, Plaintiff must show: “(1) the defendant caused the

plaintiff’s continued confinement or prosecution; (2) the original

action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) no probable cause

supported the arrest, confinement, or prosecution; (4) the

defendant acted maliciously; and (5) the plaintiff sustained

damages.” Shrum v. Cooke, 60 F.4th 1304, 1310 (10th Cir. 2023)

(citation omitted). Once an individual defendant asserts qualified

immunity, the plaintiff must meet their burden of showing all five

elements of malicious prosecution to establish a Fourth Amendment

violation. See Margheim, 855 F.3d at 1087.

As discussed above at length, Plaintiff cannot establish the

element that “no probable cause supported the arrest.” Because

Hankins cannot meet this essential factor of his malicious

prosecution claim, the Court need not address the rest. Ehrenrich

is thus similarly entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s

malicious prosecution claim. Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution

claim against Ehrenrich is DISMISSED.

D. Plaintiff Cannot Establish Section 1983 Liability Against the

Municipality because Probable Cause Existed

To succeed in a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, “a

plaintiff must show two elements: ‘(1) a municipal employee

committed a constitutional violation, and (2) a municipal policy

or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional

deprivation.’” Campbell v. City of Spencer, 777 F.3d 1073, 1077

(10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183, 1193

(10th Cir. 2009)). Although “qualified immunity is not available

as a defense to municipal liability[,]” Pyle v. Woods, 874 F.3d

1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2017), the Court’s previous determination

regarding the existence of probable cause precludes municipal

liability in this case.

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims are both based on his

allegation that there was no probable cause for his arrest and

prosecution. However, as discussed at length above, the Court

explicitly holds that probable cause existed. Therefore, Ehrenrich

did not commit a constitutional violation. “A municipality may not

be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional

violation by any of its officers.” Hinton v. City of Elwood, Kan.,

997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing City of Los Angeles v.

Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)); see also Myers v. Oklahoma Cnty.

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1998). For

this reason, Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Tulsa are

DISMISSED.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Darin

Ehrenrich’s Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket No. 76 and

Defendant City of Tulsa’s Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket

No. 77. Judgment DISMISSING this action WITH PREJUDICE shall be

entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 1st day of May 2026.

S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH____

United States District Judge