HUNT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

STATE OF FLORIDA

v. Case No. 5:26-cv-93-AW-MJF

CORNELIO HUNT,

Defendant.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443 and 1455, Defendant Cornelio Hunt

attempts to consolidate and remove to the District Court two Florida

criminal prosecutions. Doc. 1. For the reasons set forth below, the District

Court should remand Hunt’s criminal cases to the Florida court from

which Hunt attempts to remove them.

BACKGROUND

The State of Florida charged Hunt in Holmes County Court Case No.

26000046CTAXMX with a second-degree misdemeanor: knowingly

operating a vehicle while driving with a suspended license. Doc. 2-1 at 4.

The State of Florida also charged Hunt in Holmes County Court Case No.

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26000052MMAXMX with a first-degree misdemeanor: resisting or

obstructing an officer without violence. Doc. 2-1 at 5.

Hunt attempts to remove both criminal actions to the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1443 and 1455. Hunt asserts that the relevant Florida court denied him

access to the courts and that it lacks jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

A. Hunt Cannot Remove His Cases Under 28 U.S.C. § 1443

In his notice of removal, Hunt first references 28 U.S.C. § 1443.

A party seeking removal of an action pursuant to § 1443 bears the

burden of establishing that removal is proper. Charter Sch. of Pine Grove,

Inc. v. St. Helena Par. Sch. Bd., 417 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 2005); Conrad

v. Robinson, 871 F.2d 612, 614 (6th Cir. 1989). Hunt does not make any

allegations that would suggest he is seeking removal pursuant to § 1443(2).

Thus, Hunt has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating the

applicability of subsection 2. That leaves only subsection 1.

Under § 1443(1), a defendant may remove a state criminal

prosecution to federal court when the defendant “is denied or cannot

enforce” in the relevant state court “a right under any law providing for the

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equal civil rights of citizens of the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).

Only rarely will a State criminal prosecution qualify for § 1443 removal.

See Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 828–29 (1966).

To demonstrate removability under § 1443(1), the removing party

fist must show that the right upon which he relies “arises under a federal

law ‘providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.’”

Alabama v. Conley, 245 F.3d 1292, 1295 (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384

U.S. 780, 792 (1966)). Second, the removing party “must show that he has

been denied or cannot enforce that right in the state courts.” Id.

1. Hunt Fails to Establish the First Requirement

Hunt’s allegations fail to satisfy the first requirement for removal:

that the right upon which he relies provided for specific civil rights stated

in terms of racial equality.

“The phrase ‘any law providing for . . . equal civil rights’ refers to

laws ‘providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality,’

and does not include rights of ‘general application available to all persons

or citizens.’” Id. (quoting Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792). A defendant’s reliance

on broad constitutional provisions does not support removal under § 1443

when those provisions are not phrased in “the specific language of racial

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equality that § 1443 demands.” Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792 (quotations

omitted). Thus, for example, allegations that a criminal defendant has

been or will be denied general rights—such as those protected by the Equal

Protection, Full Faith and Credit, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses,

and rights to a fair and speedy trial—are insufficient to qualify for removal

under § 1443(1). See Miller v. Lambeth, 443 F.3d 757, 761 (10th Cir. 2006)

(Equal Protection, Full Faith and Credit, and Privileges and Immunities

Clauses); Conley, 245 F.3d at 1295–96 (Equal Protection Clause); Colorado

v. Lopez, 919 F.2d 131, 132 (10th Cir. 1990) (rights to a speedy and fair

trial); New Mexico v. Torres, 461 F.2d 342, 343 (10th Cir. 1972) (per

curiam) (Equal Protection Clause).

Here, Hunt states that the removal is based on violations of his

“constitutional rights,” but he has failed to identify any “rights implicating

racial equality” relevant to his case. The rights Hunt mentions in

passing—access to courts and the “right to travel”—apply regardless of the

individual’s race, and Hunt also has not alleged that he was denied these

rights based on his race. Hunt, therefore, has failed to carry his burden of

establishing the first requirement for removal pursuant to § 1443(1). For

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this reason alone, section 1443 does not authorize Hunt to remove his

criminal cases to a federal court.

2. Hunt Also Fails to Establish the Second Requirement

Hunt also fails to establish the second mandatory prerequisite to

removal: that he has been denied—or likely will be denied—an equal civil

right under federal law “or cannot enforce that right in the state courts.”

See Conley, 245 F.3d at 1295. To warrant removal of a criminal action

pursuant to § 1443(1), a State’s denial of a party’s civil rights generally

must be “manifest in a formal expression of state law,” or the defendant

must show that he is immunized from prosecution and trial by federal civil

rights law. Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 221–22 (1975); Rachel,

384 U.S. at 804–05. A criminal defendant cannot remove a state criminal

prosecution merely by asserting that “the charges against the defendant

are false, or that the defendant is unable to obtain a fair trial in a particular

state court.” Greenwood, 384 U.S. at 827.

Hunt does not allege that any Florida law has prevented him, or

would prevent him, from asserting his constitutional rights in a Florida

court. Hunt also does not allege—much less demonstrate—that he is

immunized from prosecution and trial by a federal civil rights law.

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Accordingly, Hunt has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that §

1443(1) authorizes removal of his criminal cases.

B. Hunt Cannot Remove His Cases Under 28 U.S.C. § 1455

In his notice of removal, Hunt also references 28 U.S.C. § 1455.

Section 1455 bears the title: “Procedure for removal of criminal

prosecutions.” True to its label, § 1455 merely sets forth the procedures

and requirements for the removal of criminal prosecutions. Kansas v.

Gilbert, 2023 WL 2397025, at *1 (10th Cir. Mar. 8, 2023); Pennsylvania v.

Brown-Bey, 637 F. App’x 686, 688 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016); In re Ingris, 601 F.

App’x 71, 75 (3d Cir. 2015). This provision does not itself confer power on

defendants to remove actions, and it does not confer subject-matter

jurisdiction on federal courts. Pennsylvania v. Halloway, 2024 WL

5103009, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 13, 2024). Rather, a litigant seeking to remove

a case must articulate some other statutory basis for removal and

jurisdiction. See Colorado v. Murphy, 2024 WL 340793, at *2 (10th Cir.

Jan. 30, 2024). Accordingly, Hunt also has not demonstrated—and cannot

demonstrate—that § 1455 authorizes removal of his cases and empowers

the District Court to adjudicate Hunt’s criminal cases.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully

RECOMMENDS that the District Court:

1. REMAND Hunt’s criminal cases, Holmes County Court Case

Nos. 26000046CTAXMX and 26000052MMAXMX, to the State court from

which they originated.

2. DIRECT the clerk of court to take all steps necessary to

remand the cases noted above and close this case file.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 1st day of April 2026.

/s/ Michael J. Frank

Michael J. Frank

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

The District Court referred this case to a magistrate

judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive

matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C); Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b). Objections to these proposed findings and

recommendations must be filed within fourteen days of

the date of the report and recommendation. Any

different deadline that may appear on the electronic

docket is for the court’s internal use only. A party must

serve a copy of any objections on all other parties. A

party who fails to object to this report and

recommendation waives the right to challenge on appeal

the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual

and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.

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