ELLIS-MACLIN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ARMAGENE B. ELLIS-MACLIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:26-CV-3

)

MR. COOPER GROUP, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge.

The plaintiff, Armagene B. Ellis-Maclin, alleges she was displaced from her home.

She brings claims against the defendant,1 a mortgage servicer, for violations of state and

federal law. Because Ms. Ellis-Maclin does not allege sufficient facts to state a claim

against the defendant, and her proposed amended claims are futile, the defendant’s

motion to dismiss will be granted.

I. Background

According to her amended complaint, Ms. Ellis-Maclin is a resident of Durham,

North Carolina, with a home located on Lillington Drive. The defendant has serviced the

mortgage on that property for a number of years. Ms. Ellis-Maclin alleges that in 2020,

her abusive former spouse, Barrington A. Smith, ceased residing at the property.

1 The defendant asserts that Ms. Ellis-Maclin incorrectly named Mr. Cooper Group, Inc. as

the defendant, and that the correctly named defendant is Rocket Mortgage, LLC, as successor by

merger to Nationstar Mortgage LLC. For ease of reference, the court uses a shorthand “the

defendant” throughout this order.

In that same year, Ms. Ellis-Maclin began “exchanging personal documents” with

the defendant, such as her “marriage license, divorce paperwork, passport information,

re-marriage documents, proof of insurance documents, tax statements, check stubs, utility

bills,” and “information on abuse that [she] suffered” from Mr. Smith. Doc. 8 at 3. Ms.

Ellis-Maclin asserts she is a “named successor-in-interest to the mortgage that is on [her]

property.” Id.

The defendant allegedly “failed and refused to transfer the mortgage into the

Plaintiff’s name on the sole basis that the abuser, who was their client, Barrington A.

Smith, failed and refused to give his ‘consent’ and participate in any process that would

get the mortgage ‘out of his name’ and into Plaintiff’s name.” Id. According to the

amended complaint, the defendant “accepted payments from the Plaintiff for more than

18 months and it only improved the abuser[’]s credit.” Id.

Ms. Ellis-Maclin made a “full mortgage payment on January 15, 2026.” Id. at 4.

However, she states that she has “been displaced out of [her] home since 12/30/2025 and

[has] experienced extreme emotional distress being displaced and having [her] children

and grandchildren displaced.” Id. at 3.

Ms. Ellis-Maclin alleges the existence of an “Equitable Distribution (ED) Order,”

which “required for the Plaintiff to have the mortgage put into her name either by

refinancing or assuming the mortgage.” Id. at 4. She also alleges the property “was

taken from the plaintiff and given to the abuser on the sole basis that plaintiff failed to

refinance the property or otherwise get it out of the abuser’s name.” Id.

Ms. Ellis-Maclin asserts the defendant “did not honor an implied contract.” Id. at

3. She also asserts the defendant violated the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), the

Fair Housing Act (FHA), and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),2 by failing to

transfer the mortgage to Ms. Ellis-Maclin. Id.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). On a motion to dismiss, courts take the

allegations in the complaint as true, drawing all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007). But courts are not required to

“accept as true legal conclusions drawn from the facts or any other unwarranted

inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Just Puppies, Inc. v. Brown, 123

F.4th 652, 660 (4th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).

Pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (cleaned up); Nichols v. Bumgarner, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 1084251, at *2 (4th

Cir. 2026). In addition, it may be appropriate to “look beyond the face of the complaint

to allegations made in any additional materials filed by the plaintiff” to determine

whether their claims can withstand a motion to dismiss. Dawkins v. Staley, No. 22-CV-

2 The court construes Ms. Ellis-Maclin’s reference to “Equal Credit Protection Act,” Doc. 8

at 3, as an assertion of a claim under the ECOA.

299, 2023 WL 1069745, at *2 (M.D.N.C Jan. 27, 2023); Armstrong v. Rolm A. Siemans

Co., 129 F.3d 1258, 1997 WL 705376, at *1 (4th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished

table decision).

However, the liberal construction of a pro se plaintiff’s pleading does not require

district courts to ignore clear defects in pleading, Bustos v. Chamberlain, No. 09-CV-

1760, 2009 WL 2782238, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2009), or to “conjure up questions never

squarely presented to them.” Folkes v. Nelsen, 34 F.4th 258, 269 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned

up). Nor does it require that the court become an advocate for the unrepresented party.

Jackson v. Dameron, 171 F.4th 641, 650 (4th Cir. 2026); see Lindemann-Moses v.

Jackmon, 644 F. Supp. 3d. 163, 170 (M.D.N.C. 2022). It is not the role or responsibility

of the Court to undertake the legal research needed to support or rebut a perfunctory

argument. See Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978); see also King v.

Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 225 (4th. Cir. 2016).

B. Implied Contract

“[A] contract implied in fact arises where the intent of the parties is not expressed,

but an agreement in fact, creating an obligation, is implied or presumed from their acts.”

Creech v. Melnik, 347 N.C. 520, 526, 495 S.E.2d 907, 911 (1998). As with any contract,

“it is essential . . . that there be mutual assent of both parties to the terms of the agreement

so as to establish a meeting of the minds.” Id. at 527 (cleaned up).

Here, Ms. Ellis-Maclin’s claim for implied contract fails because she “never

identifies precisely what the defendant allegedly promised to do.” Putnam v. CIT Small

Bus. Lending Corp., 509 F. App'x 195, 196 (4th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). This is critical

because “[c]redit transactions do not lend themselves to the supplying of essential terms

by the courts by implication.” Id.

Ms. Ellis-Maclin contends an implied contract was formed because she is a

“named successor-in-interest to the mortgage.” Doc. 8 at 3. She states that defendant

“confirm[ed] that the Plaintiff is” a successor-in-interest. Doc. 18 at 2. But these

contentions do not help identify what the defendant allegedly “promised to do.” Putnam,

509 F. App’x at 196; see Normile v. Miller, 313 N.C. 98, 103, 326 S.E.2d 11, 15 (1985)

(holding a contract is not formed unless the parties “assent to the same thing in the same

sense.” (cleaned up)).

Ms. Ellis-Maclin suggests that the defendant implied it would “transfer the

mortgage” to her. Doc. 8 at 3. But she has not alleged any actions by the defendant that

plausibly support an inference of “an agreement in fact, creating an obligation,” to

transfer the mortgage. Creech, 347 N.C. at 526. She alleges she sent payments and

documents to the defendant, but that the defendant “refused to transfer the mortgage”

without the “sign-off” of Mr. Smith. Doc. 8 at 3–4. This is not enough to plausibly

establish “a meeting of the minds.” Creech, 347 N.C. at 527.3

Ms. Ellis-Maclin’s claim for implied contract fails as a matter of law. It will be

dismissed.

3 In view of this result, the Court need not address the defendant’s additional contention that

any alleged implied contract to transfer the mortgage “would be barred by North Carolina’s

statute of frauds.” Doc. 15 at 6; but see also Tuten v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 14-CV-99, 2015

WL 12850549, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 9, 2015) (“An unexecuted verbal agreement by a mortgagee

to modify a real estate mortgage does not come within the statute of frauds.”).

C. Statutory Claims

Ms. Ellis-Maclin’s statutory claims will also be dismissed. The facts as alleged do

not state plausible claims for relief.

i. Violence Against Women Act

The VAWA imposes liability on a person “who commits a crime of violence

motivated by gender.” 34 U.S.C. § 12361(c). But Ms. Ellis-Maclin does not allege the

defendant engaged in such a crime. While she suggests she was “the victim of domestic

violence and . . . economic abuse,” Doc. 18 at 3, she does not allege facts attributing such

conduct to the defendant. In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held that the

private right of action under the VAWA is unconstitutional. United States v. Morrison,

529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). Ms. Ellis-Maclin’s VAWA claim thus fails as a matter of law.

ii. Fair Housing Act

The FHA prohibits discrimination in “the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or

rental of a dwelling, . . . because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). To state a claim under this provision, a plaintiff must

allege either that “the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive,” or that the

defendant’s challenged practices “have a disproportionately adverse effect on protected

classes and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale.” Reyes v. Waples Mobile

Home Park Ltd. P’ship, 903 F.3d 415, 421 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

Ms. Ellis-Maclin asserts discrimination based upon “familial status.” Doc. 8 at 3.

That status is defined as “one or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18

years) being domiciled with” either “a parent or another person having legal custody of

such individual or individuals” or “the designee of such parent or other person having

such custody.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k). But Ms. Ellis-Maclin does not allege she is such a

parent or person having legal custody, and she does not allege that the defendant took any

action based on her having such a position. If anything, she suggests that the defendant

acted because of Mr. Smith’s conduct. Doc. 8 at 3.

In addition, Ms. Ellis-Maclin has not alleged “the defendant had a discriminatory

intent or motive,” Reyes, 903 F.3d at 421, either by direct evidence or by alleging that

“other similarly situated applicants who were not in the protected classes received loans

or were treated more favorably.” Adam v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09-CV-2387,

2010 WL 3001160, at *3 (D. Md. July 28, 2010). She also has not alleged a disparate

impact, absent facts showing a “causal connection between the defendant’s policy and [a]

statistical disparity” in impact on a protected class. Reyes, 903 F.3d at 426.

Ms. Ellis-Maclin has not stated a claim for relief under the FHA.

iii. Equal Credit Opportunity Act

Ms. Ellis-Maclin’s ECOA claim fails for similar reasons. The ECOA prohibits

discrimination against “any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction,”

based on “race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age.” 15 U.S.C. §

1691(a). Plaintiff does not state a claim for disparate treatment, absent allegations of

“more favorable treatment” by others outside a protected class. Grant v. Vilsack, No. 10-

CV-201, 2011 WL 308418, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2011). She does not allege a

disparate impact due to a discriminatory policy of the defendant. See id.

In addition, “[t]he animating principle of the ECOA and its state analogues is to

prevent discrimination against those applying for credit.” Capitol Indem. Corp. v.

Aulakh, 313 F.3d 200, 202 (4th Cir. 2002). Ms. Ellis-Maclin does not allege that she was

an “applicant” in any “credit transaction.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). She has not alleged

facts that state an ECOA claim.

D. Proposed Amendments

Ms. Ellis-Maclin raises additional factual allegations and legal theories in her

responses to the defendant’s motion and affidavit in support thereof. See Docs. 17–19.

These allegations and theories do not remedy the deficiencies in her existing claims. To

the extent Ms. Ellis-Maclin suggests amendments to her claims, “it is well-established

that parties cannot amend their complaints through briefing.” S. Walk at Broadlands

Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d. 175, 184 (4th Cir.

2013) (cleaned up).

Further, any amendment to add claims and allegations as Ms. Ellis-Maclin

suggests would be futile. Many of Ms. Ellis-Maclin’s contentions in response to the

defendant’s motion are perfunctory, and she does not address the elements of the causes

of action she asserts or the case law that shows that those claims cannot proceed. The

Court thus will not “explore exhaustively all potential claims,” but rather endeavor to

address the “essential grievance” in her contentions. Jackson, 171 F.4th at 650 (cleaned

up); see Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1152.

Ms. Ellis-Maclin proposes to assert claims as a “successor in interest,” under

mortgage servicing provisions of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA),

Truth in Lending Act (TILA), and related Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)

regulations. Doc. 18 at 2. It is true that CFPB regulations set forth procedures for

mortgage servicers to follow for “successors in interest,” including “where the spouse or

children of the borrower become an owner of the property.” 12 C.F.R. § 1024.31; see,

e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41 (setting forth requirements for loss mitigation). But Ms. Ellis-

Maclin does not point to any alleged facts showing how the defendant violated any of

these procedures. See Doc. 18 at 2–3.

In addition, “making payments on the loan related to the mortgaged property does

not make a person a ‘borrower’ for purposes of RESPA.” Kamara v. Selene Fin., LP, No.

25-CV-611, 2026 WL 767684, at *4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2026) (cleaned up). Absent

allegations that she is a “borrower, Congress has not granted the plaintiff a private right

of action under RESPA.” Id. (cleaned up). Likewise, Ms. Ellis-Maclin has not alleged

facts supporting a claim under TILA, which generally “requires lenders to make certain

disclosures to consumer borrowers.” Lavis v. Reverse Mortg. Sols., Inc., 40 F.4th 181,

183 (4th Cir. 2022).

Ms. Ellis-Maclin challenges a state court order “that held Plaintiff in contempt of

Court, . . . transferred ownership of the property to the ex-spouse, and ordered the

property sold.” Doc. 18 at 7. She asserts this improperly modified an earlier “Equitable

Distribution” order that “awarded the property” to her. Id.; see Doc. 19 at ¶ 26. This

Court, however, already has held that “absent rare exceptions not present here,” this

Court cannot “correct state court errors.” Doc. 5 at 3.

In addition, Ms. Ellis-Maclin maintains that the defendant is responsible for

allowing or causing the state court order to go forward, resulting in “Constitutional

violations.” Doc. 18 at 8; see Doc. 19 at 9] 14-27. But she has not alleged any facts

tending to show that the defendant is a state actor or that “the state has so dominated its

activity as to convert it into state action.” DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 507 (4th Cir.

1999) (cleaned up). She thus has not stated a claim for “Constitutional violations” arising

from the deprivation of her alleged property rights. Doc. 18 at 9.

In sum, Ms. Ellis-Maclan’s complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. The proposed amendments to her complaint that she suggests in response to

the defendant’s motion would be futile.

It is ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to dismiss, Doc. 14, is GRANTED.

Judgment will be entered separately as time permits.

This the 30th day of April, 2026.

Lk Lh

Cob ea

10