Donahue

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

BLEU BLAZE DONAHUE, Case. No. 6:26-cv-748-MC

Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER

v.

CATHY KRAMER,

Defendant.

_____________________________

MCSHANE, Judge:

Pro se plaintiff Bleu Blaze Donahue seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2.

This court has discretion in deciding whether to grant in forma pauperis status. See O'Loughlin v.

Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990). To qualify for in forma pauperis status, a civil litigant

must demonstrate both that the litigant is unable to pay court fees and that the claims the litigant

seeks to pursue are not frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); O'Loughlin, 920 F.2d

at 617.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cathy Kramer, a Courtroom Deputy in the Eugene division,

conspired to abuse her position and “obstruct my federal lawsuit Donahue v. Hoschouer.” Compl.

3; ECF No. 1. “Kramer took personal stewardship of the conspiracy to violate my rights via not

doing her lawful job as a courtroom deputy and choosing to not respect me as a legitimate party

before her court.” Id. Plaintiff generally alleges, in a broad and conclusory fashion, that Kramer

conspired to have Plaintiff’s earlier case, Donahue v. Oregon, No. 1:25-cv-01174-AA, dismissed

with prejudice. Plaintiff styles his claims as Bivens claims. There are several fatal errors barring

Plaintiff’s claims.

First, his claims are barred by judicial immunity. Judicial immunity is a common law

doctrine that protects “the finality of judgements” and “discourage[es] inappropriate collateral

attacks . . . by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants.”

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988)(citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871)).

“The common law’s rationale for these decisions—freeing the judicial process of harassment or

intimidation—has been thought to require absolute immunity even for advocates and witnesses.

Id. However, even with this immunity, “judicial mistakes or wrongs are open to correction through

ordinary mechanisms of review,” the appellate process. Id.

This immunity extends to court staff engaged in administrative duties. “‘Court clerks have

absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks

that are an integral part of the judicial process’ unless a clerk acts ‘in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction.’” Torres v. Voltz, 2019 WL 3345972 at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Mullis v. United

States Bankr. Ct., Dist. of Nev, 828 F.2d 1358, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987)). “Quasi-judicial immunity

extends ‘to court clerks and other non-judicial officers for purely administrative acts—acts which

taken out of context would appear ministerial, but when viewed in context are actually a part of

the judicial function.’” Id. (quoting In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 952 (9th Cir. 2002). Such quasi-

judicial immunity applies, say, when the clerk refuses to file court papers. Id. (citing Mullis, 828

F.2d at 1390). Such immunity applies also for failing to report allegations that multiple federal

judges have found to be frivolous.

Plaintiff’s claims here stem from his theory that because Kramer was aware of the

conspiracy Plaintiff outlined in case number 25-1174-AA, and because Kramer did not notify the

United States Attorney of the conspiracy, Kramer violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (by

forcing Plaintiff to face illegal state criminal charges). For context, Plaintiff’s claims in 25-1174-

AA asked the court to intervene in his pending state charges for Luring a Minor, Online Sexual

Corruption of a Child in the First and Second Degrees. Sept. 5, 2025, Op. & Order in 25-1174. In

September 2025, Judge Aiken entered Judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims in 25-1174-AA with

prejudice.

Because Kramer is clearly entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, Plaintiff fails to state a claim

and this action must be dismissed with prejudice. However, Plaintiff’s claims face multiple other

hurdles; hurdles that Plaintiff cannot clear.

For example, Plaintiff’s claims appear to be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Plaintiff lists his damages as “damages for loss of liberty resulting from the coerced guilty plea

and retaliatory arrest,” ostensibly from pleading guilty to the Luring a Minor and Online

Corruption of a Child chares in state court. To the extent Plaintiff’s complaint is an attempt at an

end run around state court proceedings, the claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts from hearing claims that collaterally

attack prior state court decisions. See Ignacio v. Judges of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit, 453 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2006); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462, 482 & n.16 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).

And to the extend Plaintiff’s state criminal proceedings are ongoing, this action is barred

by the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which prevents a

federal court from directly interfering with ongoing criminal proceedings in state court. “Younger

abstention is a common law equitable doctrine holding that a federal court should refrain from

interfering with a pending state court proceeding. Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654,

699 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Younger abstention applies when: (1) the state proceedings

are ongoing; (2) the claims implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings

provide an adequate forum to raise federal questions. Weiner v. County of San Diego, 23 F.3d 263,

266 (9th Cir. 1994). Absent here are any “extraordinary circumstances” that might uproot the

“strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings.”

Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Middlesex Co. Ethics Comm. v.

Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982)).

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims here implicate the validity of any state court criminal

conviction, they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim, Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED, with prejudice. The Court notes that Plaintiff

has filed 6 federal actions to date. The first three, 1:25-cv-01174-AA; 1:25-cv-01175-CL;

6:26-cv-00152-AP, were dismissed, with prejudice. This action is dismissed, with prejudice. Cases

6:26-cv-00501-MTK and 6:26-cv-00747-AP remain pending at the IFP screening phase. All six

cases appear to be based on Plaintiff’s state court criminal proceedings (and resulting guilty plea).

At some point, the Court will be forced to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant and en-join Plaintiff

from filing future actions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 20th day of April 2026.

_____/s/ Michael McShane ______

Michael McShane

United States District Judge