Opinion

Brown v. Mendes

Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Filed
Apr 30, 2026
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.4%

"Our general superintendence power cannot be invoked simply to get another bite of the apple"

How later courts described this case

  • "Our general superintendence power cannot be invoked simply to get another bite of the apple"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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SJC-13883

SHARYON BROWN vs. FREDERICK MENDES.

April 30, 2026.

Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.

The petitioner, Sharyon Brown, appeals from a judgment of a

single justice of this court denying her petition pursuant to

G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

Brown and the respondent, Frederick Mendes, are the parents

of four unemancipated children. In March 2024, a judge in the

Probate and Family Court granted Brown sole legal and physical

custody of three of the children. In October 2025, the judge

issued a temporary order, in response to both parties' motions

for contempt and modification, that, among other things, granted

Mendes parenting time with two of the children (temporary

order). Brown thereafter filed a petition with a single justice

of the Appeals Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first

par., seeking interlocutory relief from the temporary order

(§ 118 petition). She also filed a motion to stay the temporary

order pending interlocutory review. The Appeals Court single

justice denied both the motion to stay and the § 118 petition.

Brown subsequently filed a notice of appeal from that decision,

but because there is no right to appeal in that circumstance,

i.e., from the denial of a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 231,

§ 118, first par., the notice was struck. Brown then filed her

G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, in which she stated that she was

seeking relief from both the denial of the § 118 petition and

2

the underlying temporary order. The single justice denied the

petition.1

The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as

amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a showing that

"review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be

obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial

court or by other available means." S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2).

Brown has not made, and cannot make, such a showing. To the

extent that Brown seeks to use G. L. c. 211, § 3, to obtain

relief from the denial of her § 118 petition, she has no right

to do so. An order denying a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 231,

§ 118, first par., is a final, unappealable order. See

McMenimen v. Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 189-190 (2008), S.C.,

458 Mass. 1007 (2010) and 461 Mass. 279 (2012). To the extent

that she seeks relief not from the denial of her § 118 petition

but from the underlying temporary order, she is similarly not

entitled to relief. That she was unsuccessful in the Appeals

Court -- i.e., that she did not receive the relief that she

sought in that court -- does not render that avenue for

appellate relief inadequate or otherwise entitle her to relief

pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. See, e.g., Bishay v. Superior

Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 487 Mass. 1012, 1012-1013

(2021). See also Votta v. Commonwealth, 444 Mass. 1001, 1001

(2005) ("Our general superintendence power cannot be invoked

simply to get another bite of the apple").2

The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in

denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.3

1 The single justice also denied several other motions

including motions for expedited relief and to stay the trial

court proceedings pending appeal.

2 Moreover, the petitioner's requests for relief are now

moot. Following a hearing on January 28, 2026, the trial court

judge issued an order granting the father certain parenting

time. The judge subsequently issued findings of fact following

a trial on February 17, 2026.

3 Many of the citations in the petitioner's G. L. c. 211,

§ 3, petition and memorandum filed pursuant to rule 2:21 are

inaccurate –- the cases cited simply do not exist or the

included citations are for cases with different names and that

are not relevant here, i.e., the cases involve entirely

different subject matters. The petitioner is reminded that all

information included in her court filings must be accurate and

3

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by

a memorandum of law.

Sharyon Brown, pro se.

should be thoroughly reviewed prior to filing if she wishes to

avoid having them struck.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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