Hedges

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

HEIDI H.', Civ. No. 3:24-cv-02057-CL

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

MARK D. CLARKE, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Heidi H. seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration denying her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits and

Supplemental Security Income. Full consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction was entered on

December 13, 2024 (ECF No. 5). For the reasons provided below, the Commissioner’s decision is

REVERSED and REMANDED for the immediate calculation and payment of benefits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Bom in 1972, Plaintiff alleges disability beginning December 31, 2009, due to Attention-

Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) and injuries from a November 2017 motor vehicle

accident, including fractured vertebra and pelvis, and a vertebral artery occlusion. Tr. 140-50, 538-

49. Her claims were denied initially in November 2018, and upon reconsideration in February

2019. Tr. 254, 259, 270, 273. On March 30, 2021, and July 23, 2021, hearings were held before

' In the interest of privacy, this Opinion and Order uses only the first name and the initial of the

last name of the non-governmental party or parties in this case.

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an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), wherein Plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified,

as did a vocational expert (“VE”). Tr. 57-87, 88-106. The ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's

claims in September 2021. Tr. 222-41. The Appeals Council vacated this decision and remanded

Plaintiff's claims for further administrative proceedings. Tr. 248-51.

Plaintiff was again represented by an attorney and testified at a hearing on August 1, 2023,

along with a medical consultant, Plaintiff’s case worker, and a vocational consultant. Tr. 107-58.

The ALJ issued another decision, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled on November 29, 2023.

Tr. 19-44. After the Appeals Council denied her request for review, Plaintiff now requests the

United States District Court review the ALJ’s decision and alleges harmful legal error. Tr. 1-6; PI.

Br., ECF No. 9 at 3-20.

THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

At step one of the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. Tr. 25. At step two, the ALJ

determined the following impairments were medically determinable and severe: “cervical and

lumbar compression fractures and degenerative disc disease; pelvic fracture; sacral fracture status

post open reduction and internal fixation of the public symphysis and pubic ramus; right vertebral

artery occlusion; history of traumatic brain injury; ADHD; anxiety; depression; history of

methamphetamine abuse; possible opioid abuse (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).” Id. At

step three, the ALJ found Plaintiffs impairments, either singly or in combination, did not meet or

equal the requirements of a listed impairment. Tr. 28.

Because she did not establish a presumptive disability at step three, the ALJ continued to

evaluate how Plaintiff's impairments affected her ability to work. The ALJ resolved that Plaintiff

had the residual function capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work except:

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[She can] occasionally lift and carry up to 20 pounds; frequent lifting and carrying of up to

10 pounds; walking 2 hours at one time and 4 hours in an 8 hour workday; standing 3 hours

at a time and up to 7 hours in an 8 hour workday; no sitting restrictions, no work around

hazards (such as unprotected heights or operating motor machinery); no climbing of

ladders or scaffolds; occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; occasional stooping,

kneeling, and crouching, no crawling; frequent reaching, handling, and feeling bilaterally;

simple tasks; and few changes in a routine work setting (with well-established routines and

expectations and predictable schedule).

Tr. 30.

At step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has no past relevant work. Tr. 43. At step five,

the ALJ concluded, based on the VE’s testimony, that there were a significant number of jobs in

the national economy Plaintiff could perform despite her impairments. Jd.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff (1) argues the ALJ erred by finding the medical opinion of Ken Berger, M.D.,

J.D., persuasive, and the medical opinion of Molly Rodden, PMHNP, unpersuasive; and (2)

contends that the ALJ’s discounting of her subjective symptom testimony lacked clear and

convincing reasons. PI. Br. at 3-20.

(1) Ken Berger. Ken Berger, a physician and attorney, testified at the administrative hearing

as a medical expert and opined on Plaintiff's physical impairments only. Tr. 112-24. Dr. Berger

opined that none of Plaintiff's physical impairments would meet or equal a listing. Tr. 113. He felt

they would interfere with her ability to perform basic work activities and assessed her as

limited to lifting and carrying ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally; walking two

hours at a time, four hours in a workday; standing three hours at a time and seven hours ina

workday; no sitting restrictions; and frequently reaching and handling. Tr. 113-14. Dr. Berger

explained that further limitations were not warranted, as there was no evidence of a spinal cord

injury, a fracture in hardware, or a lack of healing. Tr. 115, 116.

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The ALJ found that Dr. Berger’s opinion was persuasive, stating that “[i]t is well supported

by explanation and a review of the complete record, and is consistent with the record.” Tr. 37. The

ALJ then lists several objective findings that, in his eyes, support Dr. Berger’s opinion on

Plaintiff's physical capabilities. See id. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s explanation is not

supported by or consistent with the record. Pl. Br. at 16-17; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (the

regulations require ALJs to evaluate the supportability and consistency of a medical opinion when

assessing its persuasiveness); Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (ALJs must

“articulate . . . how persuasive [they] find all of the medical opinions” and “explain how [they]

considered the supportability and consistency factors”) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2)).

Plaintiff also asserts that objective findings only provide a limited amount of insight into the pain

that an individual is experiencing from their impairments, and that Dr. Berger disregarded evidence

in the record that Plaintiff continued to experience significant pain, even after healing from her

corrective surgeries. Pl. Br. at 16-17, citing SSR 16-3p, Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (th

Cir. 2021). The Court agrees, particularly because the ALJ failed to weigh Dr. Berger’s medical

opinion against the other five in the record.

Here, the ALJ first erred because ALJs have an obligation to compare a medical opinion

with other evidence in the record and “providf{e] an explanation supported by substantial

evidence.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that in evaluating the

consistency factor, an ALJ must evaluate whether the “medical opinion is ‘consistent . . . with the

evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.’” Woods, 32 F.4th at

792 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)) (emphasis added). Because the ALJ stated only that

Dr. Berger’s opinion was “consistent with the record” and listed several treatment note

observations rather than comparing Dr. Berger’s opinion to other providers’ opinions, the Court

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declines to speculate as to what findings support the ALJ’s conclusion that the opinion of Dr.

Berger was “consistent” with those of other medical sources. Consequently, the Court is unable to

find the ALJ properly discussed the consistency factor. See Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (the factor

addresses “the extent to which a medical opinion is consistent with the evidence from other

medical and nonmedical sources”) (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added). Because

the ALJ provided no explanation for why Dr. Berger’s opinion was or was not “consistent . . . with

the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim,” it is apparent that

his analysis runs afoul of applicable law. J/d.

Furthermore, the ALJ’s discussion of the supportability factor also falls short of the

requirements under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. The ALJ cited particular

portions of the record that support Dr. Berger’s opinion, but does not explain how findings such

as “lumbar degenerative disc disease and fractures[,]” or “pain with crouching[,]” or “decreased

range of motion” support Dr. Berger’s opinion that Plaintiff could walk for four hours in an eight-

hour workday, or how she could stand “up to [seven] hours in an [eight]-hour workday.” Tr. 37,

citing Tr. 766, 883, 1307, 1311, 1913, 1920. Though the ALJ listed several objective findings that

highlight the severity of Plaintiff's physical impairments and “balanced [them] against” other

normal observations in the record, the ALJ still did not provide an explanation as to how those

specific findings from Plaintiff's musculoskeletal exams and x-rays supported Dr. Berger’s

opinion regarding Plaintiff's ability to regularly attend work with no sitting limitations, or that she

could stand for up to seven hours in a typical workday. Tr. 37. This was error, because an ALJ has

a duty to “set forth” his reasoning “in a way that allows for meaningful review[,]” Brown-Hunter

v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015), which requires building an “accurate and logical

bridge from the evidence to [the ALJ’s] conclusions.” Micheal D. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No.

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2:22-CV-464-DWC, 2022 WL 4377400, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 22, 2022) (quoting Blakes ex

rel. Wolfe v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2003)). No logical bridge was offered, and the

Court cannot meaningfully review the ALJ’s decision regarding Dr. Berger’s opinion. Thus, the

ALJ erred.

(2) | Molly Rodden. Molly Rodden, a psychiatric-mental health nurse practitioner, is one of

Plaintiff's psychiatric providers who opined twice on Plaintiff's impairments. Tr. 1551-57, 1783-

88. In her 2020 opinion, Rodden listed the three medications (Gabapentin, Oxycodone, Cymbalta)

she prescribed to Plaintiff and their respective side effects. Tr. 1552. Plaintiff's relevant side effects

include dizziness, fatigue, poor memory, reduced coordination, sedation, and brain gaps. Jd.

Rodden opined on Plaintiff's chronic pain, stating her pain is between a seven and nine daily due

to chronic headaches, pain in her cervical spine at the site of multiple previous fractures, chronic

pain from previously crushed pelvis, and complex nerve pain. Jd. Regarding Plaintiff's functional

capabilities, Rodden opined that Plaintiff could not maintain any position, whether it be sitting,

standing, or walking, for more than ten minutes and needed to reposition herself frequently. Tr.

1552, 1553. Rodden did not feel that Plaintiff should lift more than ten pounds. Tr. 1552. Due to

Plaintiff's brain injury and ADHD, her ability to stay on task, maintain regular attendance and

perform activities within a schedule, or perform simple and repetitive tasks was significantly

impaired. Tr. 1554-55. Rodden noted Plaintiff had high levels of impulsivity and distractibility, as

well as poor focus, which would interfere with her ability to work around others. Tr. 1556. Rodden

reiterated this statement in March 2021. Tr. 1783-88.

The ALJ found that Rodden’s opinion about Plaintiff's physical functioning was not

persuasive because she is a mental healthcare provider and, while she noted pain behaviors, she

also observed normal strength, gait and balance, normal coordination, and a healthy appearance.

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Tr. 40. Further, the ALJ found Dr. Berger’s opinion about Plaintiff's physical impairments more

persuasive than Rodden’s because “he was able to evaluate the complete medical record, is well

qualified to offer a physical opinion, and because his opinion is more consistent with [Plaintiff]’s

actual physical functioning on exam.” Jd. Regarding Rodden’s opinion on Plaintiff's mental health

limitations, the ALJ found that while this was within Rodden’s expertise, she “overestimated”

Plaintiff s “limitations in a manner inconsistent with [her] captured mental functioning on exam.”

Id. Plaintiff again contends that the ALJ’s explanation is not supported by or consistent with the

record. Pl. Br. at 17-19; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c; Woods, 32 F.4th at 792. The Court agrees.

The ALJ is correct that Rodden did not opine on some of Plaintiff's exertional capabilities

because she is a mental healthcare provider. Tr. 1570-71. However, the ALJ’s evaluation of the

consistency factor of Rodden’s opinion is largely similar to that of Dr. Berger’s. Aside from stating

Dr. Berger’s opinion on Plaintiff's physical limitations was more persuasive than Rodden’s, the

ALJ again largely relied only on objective findings to find Rodden’s opinion unpersuasive, both

for physical and mental limitations. And as previously determined, using this line of reasoning

prevents the Court from concluding that the ALJ properly discussed the consistency factor. See

Woods, 32 F.4th at 792.

Furthermore, the ALJ’s discussion of the supportability factor also falls short of the

requirements under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. The ALJ cited particular

portions of the record indicating an improvement in Plaintiff's mental health symptoms while

ignoring notes from the very same visits discussing the persistent severity of her symptoms. For

example, the ALJ cited treatment notes showing Plaintiff's normal memory, but those same

treatment notes also indicate a “severe deficit in delayed memory with visuospatial/constructional

ability” and that Plaintiff presented with “difficulties suggestive of brain injury” and “disorganized

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thinking and impulsivity during testing.” Tr. 769. The ALJ cited Plaintiff's appropriate mood,

affect, cooperation, and grooming, but those same treatment notes indicate that her “[s]peech is

slower and appropriate, [Plaintiff] continues to interrupt provider and will often lose her train of

thought while speaking” and was positive for “depression, anxiety, sleep disturbances, and

memory loss.” Tr. 1920; see also Tr. 2151, 2159, 2179, 2184-85, 2228, 2233, 2239. Throughout

the decision, the ALJ’s description of the objective medical evidence cherry picks the evidence

which supports his finding while ignoring other contradictory cadence. See Ghanim v. Colvin,

763 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding error when the ALJ’s decision did not account for

the record “as a whole,” but rather relied on “cherry picked” evidence); Williams v. Colvin, No.

ED CV 14-2146-PLA, 2015 WL 4507174, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2015) (cleaned up) (“An ALJ

may not cherry-pick evidence to support the conclusion that a claimant is not disabled, but must

consider the evidence as a whole in making a reasoned disability determination.”).

The ALJ’s reliance on normal mental status examination findings to the exclusion of all

other evidence of mental health impairments did not constitute a valid reason, supported by

substantial evidence, to find Rodden’s opinion not persuasive.

(3) Subjective Symptom Testimony. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give specific, clear

and convincing reasons for discounting her subjective symptom testimony. PI. Br. at 4-15; Brown-

Hunter, 806 F.3d at 488-89 (if a claimant provides objective medical evidence of an underlying

impairment and there is no affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide specific,

clear and convincing reasons for discounting the claimant’s testimony); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.

According to Plaintiff, the ALJ’s bases for discounting her symptom testimony—objective

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medical evidence and activities of daily living—were unsupported or failed to account for the

entire record. Pl. Br. at 4-15. The Court agrees.”

(a) Objective Medical Evidence. The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff's testimony and

responses in her function report regarding her chronic pain from two motor vehicle accidents that

ended in multiple fractures and head injuries, as well as her general complaint of ADHD. Tr. 31.

The ALJ then lists several objective medical findings in an attempt to undermine Plaintiff's

testimony about her mental and physical impairments. See Tr. 32-36. However, the ALJ solely

used the objective medical evidence to support his own RFC finding, which falls short of Ninth

Circuit requirements. An ALJ’s failure to “link [a claimant’s] testimony to the particular parts of

the record supporting her non-credibility determination [is] legal error.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d

at 494. The ALJ has failed to do so here.

Looking to the ALJ’s decision, he cites several objective findings but fails to connect those

findings to any of Plaintiff's testimony. The only analysis offered was that Plaintiffs “cervical and

lumbar compression fractures and degenerative disc disease; pelvic fracture; sacral fracture status

post open reduction and internal fixation of the public symphysis and pubic ramus; and right

vertebral artery occlusion support a limitation to light work[.]” Tr. 32. Regarding Plaintiff's mental

health limitations, the ALJ similarly cited several objective medical findings and stated, “history

? The ALJ mentions “possible opioid abuse” in his decision as a severe impairment. This finding

does not meet the legal standard required for a medically determinable impairment. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). To the extent the ALJ relies on Plaintiff's “possible opioid abuse” to

undermine her credibility, that finding is not supported by substantial evidence. This unsupported

and assumed fact leads to speculation that Plaintiff abuses opioids. ALJs are barred from

speculating on such issues. See SSR 86-8, 1986 WL 68636, at *8 (1986) (“presumptions,

speculations and suppositions should not be substituted for evidence”); see also Bayliss v.

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601

(9th Cir. 1998)). If the ALJ wanted to conduct a proper DAA analysis, he should have done so

when forming his decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b).

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of traumatic brain injury supports a limitation to light work with no exposure to hazards and no

climbing of ladders or scaffolds.” Tr. 34, 36. Neither of these explanations point to Plaintiffs

testimony regarding her continued pelvic or neck pain, her urinary incontinence, her lingering

anxiety, or memory gaps. And because the ALJ failed to “link [Plaintiff]’s testimony to the

particular parts of the record supporting [his] non-credibility determination[,]” the Court will not

do so for him. Brown-Hunter makes clear that courts err when they usurp the ALJ’s duty to try to

link particular testimony to specific evidence that the ALJ might have found to undermine it. 806

F.3d at 494 (ALJ’s “error could not be corrected by the district court’s statement of links between

claimant testimony and certain medical evidence.”) For the above reasons, the Court concludes

that the manner in which the ALJ used the objective medical evidence to undermine Plaintiff's

testimony is not a clear-and-convincing reason supported by substantial evidence.

(b) Activities of Daily Living. The last reason the ALJ cited to discount Plaintiff's

subjective symptom testimony was that her activities of daily living were not as “limited as she

alleged at the hearing and in her function report.” Tr. 36. The ALJ also stated that although Plaintiff

“reported that her impairments significantly limited her daily activities, this cannot be objectively

verified with any reasonable degree of certainty” and that “the evidence shows activities that are

somewhat less limited than would be expected given the allegations of disabling symptoms and

limitations.” Jd. The Court is unconvinced.

In her function report, Plaintiff stated that she takes Morphine to be able to get up to eat.

Tr. 571. She also claims that she is never well-rested and has continuous rigfitmares. Jd. Due to

past injuries from two motor vehicle accidents, she stated the damage to her pelvis causes urinary

accidents, so she wears a diaper. Tr. 572. She testified that she sleeps most of the day, and that due

to her urinary incontinence and pelvic pain, she has had to crawl on the floor before to get to the

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bathroom. Tr. 142. Although she can perform some household chores, her injuries have tripled the

time required. Tr. 573. Any grocery shopping is done intermittently, and she uses the motorized

cart to do so. Id.

The ALJ indicated that her ability to “prepare simple meals, do light housework, shop in

stores, use public transportation, shop in stores, and read,” suggests she can “perform simple

routine tasks and responding appropriately to some changes in setting and routine. Her ability to

do light housework also suggests, at least somewhat, that she can work at the above limited light

residual functional capacity assessment.” Tr. 36-37. But these are the exact activities the Ninth

Circuit has cautioned against using to discredit symptom testimony. See Cooper v. Bowen, 815

F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (“evidence that [claimant] could assist with some household chores

was not determinative of disability. ‘Disability does not mean that a claimant must vegetate in a

dark room excluded from all forms of human and social activity.’”) (quoting Smith v. Califano,

637 F.2d 968, 971 (3d Cir. 1981)); Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (“This

court has repeatedly asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities,

such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or limited walking for exercise, does not in any way detract

from her credibility as to her overall disability.”). Because Plaintiff's reported activities are akin

to those cited in Cooper v. Bowen, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s choice to use Plaintiff's

activities of daily living to undermine her testimony is not a clear-and-convincing reason supported

by substantial evidence. 815 F.2d at 561.

(4) Remedy. The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or for immediate

payment of benefits is within the discretion of the court. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 682

(9th Cir. 2017). The issue turns on the utility of further proceedings. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d

995, 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014). Under the “credit-as-true” doctrine, evidence should be credited

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and an immediate award of benefits directed if “(1) the record has been fully developed and further

administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally

sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3)

if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the

claimant disabled on remand.” Jd. at 1020 (citations omitted). Even when the credit-as-true

standard is met, the court retains the “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when the record

[evidence] as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within

the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021. The reviewing court should decline to credit

testimony when “outstanding issues” remain. Luna vy. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010).

The Court concludes the credit-as-true standard is satisfied here and that remand for the

payment of benefits is appropriate. The ALJ’s finding that Dr. Berger’s opinion was persuasive

was not legally sufficient and lacked proper explanation to allow this Court to meaningfully review

his decision. The ALJ also failed to provide legally sufficient reasons to reject Plaintiff's testimony

and NP Rodden’s medical opinion once again.? The record has been fully developed, including

treatment notes spanning the relevant time period, opinions from several medical sources, and

Plaintiff's testimony about the severity and effects of her impairments. Further proceedings would

serve no useful purpose,’ particularly because the ALJ has already twice failed to properly evaluate

Rodden’s medical opinion after being instructed to do so by the Appeals Council. Allowing the

Commissioner to decide the issue again would create the precise “unfair ‘heads we win; tails, let’s

play again’ system of disability benefits adjudication” that the Ninth Circuit is trying to prevent.

’The Appeals Council ordered that further evaluation of Rodden’s opinion was necessary

because the ALJ faulted Rodden for not evaluating Plaintiff in person and because the ALJ failed

to discuss any findings concerning Plaintiff's limited range of motion or tenderness. Tr. 250.

4The Commissioner did not argue or identify any useful purpose for further proceedings. See

generally Def. Br., ECF 11.

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See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004). To the extent Rodden’ opinions were

ambiguous, or the record was inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of such opinions, the ALJ

should have further developed the record and addressed such issue in his first decision. See

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (quoting Varney v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 859 F.2d 1396,

1399 (9th Cir. 1988)) (“[I]f grounds for [concluding that a claimant is not disabled] exist, it is both

reasonable and desirable to require the ALJ to articulate them in the original decision.”); Mayes v.

Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

If Plaintiff's symptom testimony and Rodden’s medical opinion are credited as true, the

record reflects Plaintiff would be unable to work. Tr. 140-43, 149-50, 1551-58, 1569-75. The VE

testified that “it is important a worker at an unskilled occupation must maintain no less than 85

percent [productivity] of the standard workday. If they are unable to do that, they are not going to

sustain unskilled competitive employment.” Tr. 153. When asked if an individual “who is absent

from work two or more days a month could do any of these jobs?” the VE answered “[t]hey are

not going to be available. They are not going to sustain that employment or any sustainable

occupations.” Tr. 156-57. As a result of the VE’s testimony, the ALJ would be required to find

plaintiff disabled on remand. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1022 n.28 (explaining “there is no need to

develop the record or convene further administrative proceedings” where “the VE answered a

question describing a hypothetical person with the RFC that the claimant would possess were the

relevant opinion or testimony taken as true”). Finally, the Court does not have any serious doubt

as to whether plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

For those reasons, the Court remands this case for the calculation and payment of benefits.

See, e.g., Leitz v. Kijakazi, No. 22-35356, 2023 WL 4342114, at *3 (9th Cir. July 5, 2023) (“The

Government argues that we should remand for further proceedings rather than remand for an award

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of benefits. However, remand would serve no legitimate purpose . . . and permitting the

Government to introduce additional evidence on remand would provide the Government with an

unfair second opportunity to present its case. .. . We therefore remand to the district court with

instructions to remand to the agency for an award of benefits.”) (citations omitted); Hoffschneider

v. Kijakazi, No. 18-15504, 2022 WL 3229989, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2022) (“Once the

improperly discredited evidence is credited as true, the vocational expert’s testimony forecloses a

determination that [the claimant] can work. Because no ‘serious doubt’ remains that [the claimant]

is disabled, there is nothing left to decide. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to

remand to the Commissioner for a calculation and award of benefits.”) (citations omitted); Varela

v. Saul, 827 F. App’x 713, 714-15 (9th Cir. 2020) (reversing district court opinion remanding for

further proceedings and instead remanding with instructions to “remand to the Commissioner of

Social Security for an award of benefits” where “crediting [the treating physician’s] opinion as

true, there is no doubt that [the claimant] was disabled.”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial

evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED, and this case is

REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for the immediate calculation and

payment of benefits.

DATED this W day of April 2026. 2 er

MARKD. CLARKE

Uniicd Sates Magictrate Indge

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