Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT March 31, 2026

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

MCALLEN DIVISION

MELISSA AGUERO RAMIREZ, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 7:24-CV-00505

§

PHARR SAN JUAN ALAMO §

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, §

ALEJANDRO ELIAS and CARLOS §

VILLEGAS, §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Melissa Aguero Ramirez is the former Chief of Human Resources at the

Pharr San Juan Alamo Independent School District (“PSJA ISD”). She was hired by then-

Superintendent Dr. Jorge Arredondo. In November 2022, a PSJA School Board election

resulted in a change of the Board composition, with a majority of the seats going to

members of a political faction that opposed the previous Board majority. Several

members of this new faction believed that Aguero Ramirez supported the opposing

political faction. After the new faction prevailed in the election, its leaders, including

Dr. Alejandro Elias and Carlos Villegas, began to target those within the PSJA ISD that

opposed them, including Arredondo and Aguero Ramirez. In December 2022, Aguero

Ramirez alleges that she was demoted from her position as Chief of HR by the PSJA

School Board (the “School Board”) and Dr. Elias—the new Board Superintendent—in

retaliation for her perceived political support of the former majority faction. Following

her demotion, Aguero Ramirez sued the PSJA ISD, Dr. Elias, and Villegas under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for First Amendment retaliation. (Dkt. No. 1).

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 5). For the

reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND1

Aguero Ramirez was hired as Chief of Human Resources for PSJA ISD on March

2, 2020. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2–3). Then-Superintendent Dr. Jorge L. Arredondo and Chief

Officer of Academics Dr. Rolando Trevino recruited her for the position based on her

prior experience in the field. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3). Her employment was also approved by

the School Board, led by then-President, Ricardo Pedraza. (Id.). The position paid a

yearly salary of $159,000. (Id.).

In July 2022, Superintendent Arredondo met with the principal of PSJA High

School, Dr. Alejandro Elias, to inform him that he was being reassigned to Director of

Strategy and Planning. (Id.). As Chief of HR, Aguero Ramirez had to sign off on the

written notice of reassignment provided to Dr. Elias. (Id. at 3–4). While Aguero Ramirez

did not agree with the reassignment and thought it was “wrong,” she was nevertheless

ordered by Arredondo to sign it. (Id. at 4). Dr. Elias, unhappy with this decision, filed a

political retaliation lawsuit in state court against the School Board to contest his

reassignment. (Id.).

1 The Court accepts all factual allegations in the Complaint, (Dkt. No. 1), as true and views

them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, see White v. U.S. Corrs., LLC, 996 F.3d 302, 306–

07 (5th Cir. 2021).

As part of this lawsuit, Dr. Elias alleged that he was targeted by Arredondo and

the School Board because of his support for an opposing political faction in the upcoming

November 2022 PSJA School Board election. (Id. at 4–5). This faction (the “anti-

Arredondo faction”), which included Dr. Elias, two current Board members, and Carlos

Villegas (a candidate in the upcoming election), aimed to replace President Pedraza,

Superintendent Arredondo, and their supporters (the “pro-Arredondo faction”). (Id.).

Dr. Elias eventually resigned his position with PSJA ISD and began publicly campaigning

for the anti-Arredondo faction, including for candidate Villegas. (Id. at 5). According to

Aguero Ramirez, Villegas and Dr. Elias began discussing their plans for a

“reorganization” of the School Board in the event their faction won the election. (Id.).

This “reorganization” included hiring Dr. Elias as the new Superintendent and demoting

Aguero Ramirez because of her perceived support for the pro-Arredondo faction.2

The November 2022 election resulted in the anti-Arredondo faction winning a

majority of the seats on the Board. (Id.). Villegas eventually became the new Board

President. (Id.). Later that month, Arredondo was removed from his position as

Superintendent through a negotiated settlement, and Dr. Elias was hired to take his place.

(Id.). Soon after, Aguero Ramirez received notice from Dr. Elias that her Chief of HR

position was being reclassified to Director of Professional Development. (Id. at 6). The

2 Aguero Ramirez does not state whether she actually supported the pro-Arredondo

faction. While she notes that she “had a close working relationship with Dr. Arredondo and

former Board Member and President Ricardo Pedraza,” (Dkt. No. 1 at 7), she also notes that she

opposed Arredondo’s decision to reassign Dr. Elias from his position as principal of PSJA High

School, (id. at 4).

reclassification notice stated that “[t]he Chief of Human Resources position will no longer

exist, nor will anyone replace [Aguero Ramirez] in that position.” (Id.). As a result of the

reclassification, Aguero Ramirez had her pay reduced to $92,205.74 and she also lost out

on a $750/month stipend. (Id.). Moreover, despite Dr. Elias’s statement that the Chief of

HR position would not be refilled, Aguero Ramirez alleges that Rebecca Garza, a member

of the anti-Arredondo faction whom Aguero Ramirez had replaced as Chief of HR in

2020, “replaced [Aguero Ramirez] and her job duties.” (Id. at 6–7).3

Aguero Ramirez also alleges that there was personal animosity between Dr. Elias

and Villegas, and Arredondo and herself. According to Arredondo, Villegas was not a

fan of either him or Aguero Ramirez. (Id. at 5). When Aguero Ramirez and Villegas were

first introduced, Villegas allegedly walked away in the middle of the conversation. (Id.

at 5–6). The Complaint also asserts that Dr. Elias, when speaking to Aguero Ramirez,

stated “I don’t need you, I have my own HR Department.” (Id. at 6). According to Aguero

Ramirez, the true reason for her demotion was this animosity that resulted from her

perceived support of Arredondo and the pro-Arredondo faction. (Id. at 8–9).

On December 2, 2024, Aguero Ramirez filed this suit against Dr. Elias, Villegas,

and PSJA ISD. (Dkt. No. 1). Defendants filed a joint Motion to Dismiss on February 3,

2025, (Dkt. No. 5), and Aguero Ramirez responded on March 7, 2025, (Dkt. No. 9).

3 Garza’s job title was not changed to Chief of HR after assuming Aguero Ramirez’s job

duties; she kept her title of Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 6–

7).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. RULE 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to move

to dismiss for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” When considering a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must “accept the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations

as true.” Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 496 (5th Cir. 2021). Dismissal for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction is appropriate when the plaintiff does not “plausibly allege all

jurisdictional elements.” Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 217, 141 S.Ct. 740, 749, 209 L.Ed.

2d 33 (2021); Ghedi v. Mayorkas, 16 F.4th 456, 463 (5th Cir. 2021). “For a 12(b)(1) motion,

the general burden is on the party asserting jurisdiction.” Dickson v. United States, 11 F.4th

308, 312 (5th Cir. 2021).

“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed with other Rule 12 motions, the court should

consider the Rule 12(b)(1) motion ‘before addressing any attack on the merits.’” D&G

Holdings, LLC v. Becerra, 22 F.4th 470, 474 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ramming v. United States,

281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)).

B. RULE 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to move

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than . . . ‘labels and conclusions . . . .’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). “The defendant, as

the moving party, bears the burden of proving that no legally cognizable claim for relief

exists.” Flores v. Morehead Dotts Rybak, Inc., No. 2:21-CV-00265, 2022 WL 4740076, at *2

(S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2022) (citing 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed.)).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept the plaintiff’s

factual allegations as true and view those allegations in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. White v. U.S. Corrs., LLC, 996 F.3d 302, 306–07 (5th Cir. 2021). The court must

evaluate whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). “A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). “Dismissal . . . is

appropriate where the plaintiff fails to allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face’ and thus does not ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’”

Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1974).

III. DISCUSSION

A. RULE 12(b)(1)

Defendants argue that Aguero Ramirez’s claims against Dr. Elias and Villegas

should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction for two reasons: (1) qualified immunity

protects them from suit in their individual capacities, and (2) the claims against them in

their official capacities are duplicative of her claims against PSJA ISD, and thus, should

be dismissed as redundant. (Dkt. No. 5 at 1, 5–7). Both arguments fail at this stage.

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion is an improper vehicle for asserting qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity is not a jurisdictional issue and is properly analyzed under a Rule

12(b)(6) standard. Espinoza v. Garza, No. 1:19-CV-00226, 2020 WL 2310022, at *6 (S.D. Tex.

Apr. 6, 2020), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Rico Espinoza v. Garza, No. 1:19-

CV-00226, 2020 WL 2309686 (S.D. Tex. May 8, 2020); Richard v. Capps, No. 3:07-CV-00138,

2007 WL 2428928, at *2 n.6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2007) (citing Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190,

197 (5th Cir. 1996)). As such, the Court declines to address Defendants’ arguments under

Rule 12(b)(1). The Court will construe those arguments as being made under Rule

12(b)(6) and will address them in that section. Likewise, Defendants’ argument that the

claims against Dr. Elias and Villegas in their official capacities are duplicative of the claim

against PSJA ISD is also improperly raised under Rule 12(b)(1). Whether these claims are

duplicative is not a jurisdictional issue, but an issue on the merits. See Castro Romero v.

Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming a district court’s dismissal of claims

against non-governmental defendants in their official capacity for duplicity concerns

under Rule 12(b)(6)). The Court will therefore also defer addressing this issue until the

Rule 12(b)(6) section. Because neither argument is proper, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(1) is denied.

B. RULE 12(b)(6)

Next, the Court turns to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). First,

the claims against the individual Defendants and then the claim against PSJA ISD.

1. Claims Against Individual Defendants

a. Official Capacity Claims

Now under the correct standard, the Court begins by addressing Defendants’

duplicity argument. “The Fifth Circuit recognizes that claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against a state actor in their official capacity are functionally duplicative with the claims

against the municipality.” Neri v. City of San Benito, No. 1:23-CV-00156, 2024 WL 4152699,

at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2024) (citing first Castro Romero, 256 F.3d at 355; and then citing

Flores v. Cameron Cnty., 92 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1996)). As a result, “it is proper to dismiss

allegations against municipal officers in their official capacities when the allegations

duplicate claims against the government entity itself.” Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293,

297 n.4 (5th Cir. 2009) (Clement, J., separate opinion); see also Castro Romero, 256 F.3d at

355. Here, Aguero Ramirez’s Complaint makes no attempt to distinguish between the

claims against Dr. Elias and Villegas in their official capacity and PSJA ISD and are thus

duplicative. The Court dismisses the claims against the individual Defendants in their

official capacity.

b. Individual Capacity Claims

Aguero Ramirez brings claims against the individual Defendants in their

individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First Amendment. She

alleges that Dr. Elias and Villegas retaliated against her based on their belief that she

supported an opposing political faction in the 2022 PSJA ISD election.4 Section 1983

creates a private right of action for the deprivation of certain rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To

state a cause of action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege that the defendants

violated “a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States,” and

(2) show “a person acting under color of state law” committed the violation. Perdomo v.

City of League City, 765 F.Supp.3d 613, 620 (S.D. Tex. 2025) (citing Peterson v. Johnson, 57

F.4th 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2023)).

As an initial matter, Aguero Ramirez has alleged that Dr. Elias and Villegas acted

under color of state law by using their powers as PSJA ISD officials to demote her for her

alleged protected political association. See Kallinen v. Newman, 616 F.Supp.3d 645, 650

(S.D. Tex. 2022) (“The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires

that a defendant . . . have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made

4 Aguero Ramirez’s Complaint somewhat confusingly lists “Freedom of Association” and

“First Amendment Retaliation” as separate headings under the Section 1983 cause of action. (Dkt.

No. 1 at 9–10). Because both headings allege that Defendants demoted Aguero Ramirez in

retaliation for her perceived support of the pro-Arredondo faction, the Court construes the

Complaint as alleging only a single First Amendment retaliation claim based on political

association.

possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” (quoting

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988)). Aguero

Ramirez alleges that Dr. Elias had “board delegated authority” to demote her and that

Villegas, as the newly elected Board President, approved of the demotion. (Dkt. No. 1 at

8).

Next, Aguero Ramirez must allege that Dr. Elias and Villegas violated her First

Amendment rights. Defendants assert that she has not met this burden because her

allegations are conclusory and do not overcome qualified immunity. (See generally Dkt.

No. 5). “To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim based upon political

association, [a plaintiff] must prove that: (1) he suffered an adverse employment action;

(2) he was engaged in politically protected activity; (3) his interest in engaging in the

protected activity outweighed the defendant’s interest in promoting workplace efficiency

[also called Connick-Pickering balancing]; and (4) that the protected activity was a

substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action.” Fuller v. Brownsville

Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:13-CV-00109, 2016 WL 3960563, at *8 (S.D. Tex. May 18, 2016)

(citing Burnside v. Kaelin, 773 F.3d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 2014)). At the motion-to-dismiss stage,

“there is a rebuttable presumption that no [Connick-Pickering] balancing is required to

state a claim.” Burnside, 773 F.3d at 629. As such, the Court does not address that element

at this stage.

First, “[a]dverse employment actions include ‘discharges, demotions, refusal to

hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands.’” Rivera v. Harris Cnty., No. 4:19-CV-04920,

2020 WL 3871457, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 9, 2020) (quoting Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d

150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000)). In her Complaint, Aguero Ramirez alleges that in December

2022 her Chief of Human Resources position was reclassified to Director of Professional

Development by Dr. Elias after Villegas promoted him to Interim Superintendent. (Dkt.

No. 1 at 6). She claims that while Dr. Elias initially told her that the reclassification would

not affect her base salary of $159,000 per year, her salary was later reduced to $92,205.74

per year in August 2023. (Id.). Aguero Ramirez also alleges that the reclassification

resulted in the loss of a $750 monthly stipend that had previously been provided to her.

(Id.). Further, despite being told by Dr. Elias that her former position would not be filled,

Aguero Ramirez alleges that Rebecca Garza—the current Assistant Superintendent for

Human Resources and political ally of the anti-Arredondo faction—replaced her and

took over her job duties. (Id. at 6–7). The Court is thus satisfied that Aguero Ramirez has

sufficiently pled an adverse employment action.

Second, Aguero Ramirez must prove that she engaged in (or was perceived to be

engaged in) protected political activity. The contours of what constitutes protected

political activity are unclear. See Fuller, 2016 WL 3960563, at *12. However, “[t]he Fifth

Circuit has found that membership—or lack thereof—in a political party or organization

is protected [as well as] [s]upporting or opposing a political candidate.” Id. (first citing

Steadman v. Tex. Rangers, 179 F.3d 360, 367 (5th Cir. 1999); and then citing Cox v. Kaelin,

577 F.App’x 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)). Here, Aguero Ramirez’s Complaint

alleges that Dr. Elias and Villegas retaliated against her because of her perceived support

of the pro-Arredondo faction in the 2022 election. (See generally Dkt. No. 1). The Court is

satisfied that this perceived electoral support is protected political activity. See Heffernan

v. City of Patterson, 578 U.S. 266, 136 S.Ct. 1412, 194 L.Ed.2d 508 (2016) (holding that a

public employer violates the First Amendment when it retaliates against an employee

under the mistaken belief that the employee was engaging in protected political activity).

Finally, Aguero Ramirez must allege that Dr. Elias and Villegas’s belief that she

was supporting the pro-Arredondo faction was a motivating factor in the decision to

demote her. The Complaint alleges that Dr. Elias and Villegas discussed the

“[r]eorganization” of the school district in the event that the anti-Arredondo faction won

the election. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5). As part of this reorganization, Aguero Ramirez asserts that

the two men discussed demoting her because of her perceived support for Arredondo.

(Id.). She points to several interactions with the two men where Villegas “walked away

from [her] while being introduced” and Dr. Elias told her “I don’t need you, I have my

own HR Department.” (Id. at 5–6). Dr. Elias allegedly made good on this statement by

replacing Aguero Ramirez as Chief of Human Resources with Rebecca Garza, a supporter

of the anti-Arredondo faction. (Id. at 6–7). The Complaint further states that Dr. Elias’s

decision to demote Aguero Ramirez was in part due to her role in effectuating Dr. Elias’s

July 2022 reassignment by order of Arredondo. (Id. at 3–4). Such actions indicate that

politics played a part in Aguero Ramirez’s demotion. Taking the Complaint as true, these

facts plausibly state a claim that Aguero Ramirez’s perceived political association with

Arredondo was a motivating factor in the decision to demote her.5 Aguero Ramirez has

thus successfully stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation under Section 1983.

Before her claim can proceed, however, the Court must also determine whether

the facts in the Complaint, taken as true, would overcome the defense of qualified

immunity. Perdomo, 765 F.Supp.3d at 620 (quoting Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th

Cir. 2012)). “Qualified immunity ‘shields [government officials] from civil liability so

long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Id. (quoting City of Tahlequah v. Bond,

595 U.S. 9, 12, 142 S.Ct. 9, 11, 211 L.Ed.2d 170 (2021)). Thus, to overcome qualified

immunity, Plaintiff must show (1) whether the facts alleged, taken as true, show a

constitutional violation; and (2) whether the right was clearly established in light of

existing precedent. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11–12, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255

(2015).

While Aguero Ramirez has successfully pled a constitutional violation, she must

also show that the violation contradicted clearly established law. To be clearly

established, a right must be “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have

understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 11, 136 S.Ct. at 308 (citing

Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012)) (internal

5 The Court is not convinced, however, that Aguero Ramirez’s references to a parade in

which she rode on a float with Arredondo and members of the pro-Arredondo faction

demonstrate that politics were a motivating factor in her demotion. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 7). Aguero

Ramirez does not allege that either Dr. Elias or Villegas were at the parade, that they saw her on

float, that they saw the photograph, or that they were even aware she was in the parade.

quotations omitted). Further, “the clearly established right must be defined with

specificity.” City of Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42, 139 S.Ct. 500, 503, 202 L.Ed.2d

455 (2019). While a plaintiff need not point to “a case directly on point for a right to be

clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5, 142 S.Ct. 4, 7–8, 211

L.Ed.2d 164 (2021) (per curiam). The inquiry “is judged against the backdrop of the law

at the time of the conduct.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152, 200

L.Ed.2d 449 (2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Simply put, qualified

immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Perdomo, 765 F.Supp.3d at 620 (quoting City of Tahlequah, 595 U.S. at 12, 595 S.Ct. at

11).

Aguero Ramirez cites several Supreme Court cases to assert that it is clearly

established “that a public employee may be neither discharged nor demoted in retaliation

for exercising his First Amendment Rights.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 10–11). Specifically, Aguero

Ramirez points to several cases where the Supreme Court held that government officials

violated the rights of public employees when the officials fired them for their political

affiliation. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52

(1990) (holding that “promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political

affiliation or support are an impermissible infringement on the First Amendment rights

of [non-policymaking] public employees”); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287,

63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980) (holding that a public employer violated the First Amendment

when it fired employees because they were Republicans); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 96

S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that a sheriff violated the

First Amendment when they replaced or fired non-civil-service employees that

supported a different political party). She asserts that such retaliatory employment

decisions are clearly established violations of the First Amendment, even when an

employer’s belief of its employee’s political affiliation is incorrect. (Dkt. No. 1 at 10–11

(citing Heffernan, 578 U.S. 266, 136 S.Ct. 1412)).

Defendants dispute the applicability of Heffernan, arguing that, unlike in that case,

Aguero Ramirez does not allege any intent on the part of Dr. Elias or Villegas to deprive

her of her rights. (Dkt. No. 5 at 6–7). This argument is unpersuasive. First, Defendants

do not seem to dispute that it is clearly established that a public employer may not fire or

demote a non-policymaking employee on the basis of their political affiliation. Instead,

Defendants merely assert that Aguero Ramirez has failed to plead that Dr. Elias and

Villegas reclassified her position because of her (perceived) affiliation with the anti-

Arredondo faction. This is incorrect. Aguero Ramirez’s Complaint consistently alleges

that Defendants retaliated against her because she was perceived as backing Arredondo

in the School Board election. (See generally Dkt. No. 1). In particular, the Complaint

alleges that Dr. Elias and Villegas discussed prior to the election that “[Aguero Ramirez]

would be demoted as it was Villegas and Dr. Elias’[s] belief that [she] was politically

supporting the pro-Arredondo faction of candidates.” This allegation, taken as true, is

an allegation that Defendants intended to retaliate against Aguero Ramirez for her

political associations. Because the Court agrees with Aguero Ramirez that her Complaint

alleges that Defendants violated clearly established Supreme Court precedent, the Court

holds that she has pled facts that overcomes qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss

stage.6

2. Claim Against PSJA ISD

The Court next addresses the claim against the municipality itself, PSJA ISD.

Defendants argue that Aguero Ramirez’s Monell claim fails because she does not allege a

PSJA ISD policy or custom that caused her harm, nor does she allege that Dr. Elias or

Villegas acted in a policymaking capacity. (Dkt. No. 5 at 8–9). The Court is unpersuaded.

“A person may sue a municipality that violates his or her constitutional rights ‘under

color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.’” Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty.,

994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021) (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and then citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). Monell

claims have three elements: a policymaker, an official policy, and a violation of

constitutional rights whose moving force is the policy or custom. Perdomo, 765 F.Supp.3d

at 625 (citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)). Monell liability

does not arise through vicarious liability: it must be directly attributable to official action.

6 The Court notes that it is unclear from Aguero Ramirez’s Complaint whether her

position as Chief of Human Resources was a policymaking position where “party affiliation is an

appropriate requirement” in employment. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64, 110 S.Ct. at 2731–32. While this

is an important consideration in the Connick-Pickering balancing test that may affect the validity

of her claims, see Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988, 994 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that

“policymaking or confidential employees’ First Amendment rights are more easily outweighed

in balancing interests”); but see Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 884 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that an

employee’s First Amendment interests are not automatically outweighed because they held a

policymaking position), that element of a First Amendment retaliation claim is not considered at

the motion-to-dismiss stage. Fuller, 2016 WL 3960563, at *12. Therefore, this omission does not

doom Aguero Ramirez’s Complaint.

Id. Importantly, no Monell claim can exist unless the plaintiff pleads a constitutional

violation. Id.

The Court first analyzes the official-policy prong. Claims under a theory of official

policy may take one of two forms. First, it may be “a formal policy statement, ordinance,

regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s

lawmakers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policymaking

authority.” Martinez v. Rojo, No. 1:17-CV-00102, 2020 WL 2542612, at *6 (N.D. Tex. May

19, 2020) (citing Burge v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2003)). Second, it

may be “’[a] persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees which,

although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and

well-settled as to constitute a custom that,’ in effect, ‘fairly represents municipal policy.’”

Id. (citing Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per

curiam)) (alteration in original). Under the former theory, “it is well established that a

municipality may be liable for ‘course[s] of action tailored to a specific situation and not

intended to control decisions in later situations,’ provided that ‘the decision to adopt the

particular course of action is properly made by that government’s authorized decision

makers.’” Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 754 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1299, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)).

The meaning of “policy” “is not exhausted by ‘fixed plans of actions to be followed under

similar circumstances consistently and over time.’” Id. (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480–

81, 106 S.Ct. at 1298–99); see also Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480, 106 S.Ct. at 1298 (“No one has

ever doubted . . . that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a single decision by

its properly constituted legislative body.”).

Aguero Ramirez has pled that Dr. Elias, acting pursuant to authority delegated to

him by Villegas and the newly elected Board, used his new position as Interim

Superintendent to demote her because of her political affiliation with the pro-Arredondo

faction. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5–6, 8–9). This plainly constitutes a “policy” attributable to PSJA

ISD under Monell and Pembaur. Moreover, it is clear that Villegas, as Board President,

and Dr. Elias, as Interim Superintendent with Board-delegated authority to reclassify

Aguero Ramirez’s position, were municipal policymakers with actual knowledge of the

policy considering they were the ones to effectuate it. See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579

(“‘Actual or constructive knowledge of [a] custom must be attributable to the governing

body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body has delegated policy making

authority.’” (quoting Webster, 735 F.2d at 842)). Because the constitutional violation

Aguero Ramirez alleges is her retaliatory demotion resulting from her perceived support

of the anti-Arredondo faction, she has established that the “moving force” behind her

violation was the alleged policy. Perdomo, 765 F.Supp.3d at 625. Aguero Ramirez’s

Complaint thus states a claim for Monell liability against PSJA ISD. Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss, (Dkt. No. 5), must be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

(Dkt. No. 5), as to the claims against Dr. Elias and Villegas in their official capacity and

DENIES the Motion as to the individual-capacity claims and the Monell claim against

PSJA ISD. The claims against Dr. Elias and Villegas in their official capacity are

DISMISSED with prejudice. No additional 12(b)(6) motions will be considered.

Defendants may file a summary judgment motion, if appropriate, after the Parties have

had the opportunity to engage in discovery

It is SO ORDERED.

Signed on March 30, 2026.

DREW B. TIPTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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