The opinion
Filed 4/29/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
CHRISTOPHER GARNER, B330418
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCP02382)
v.
CALIFORNIA VICTIM
COMPENSATION BOARD,
Defendant and Respondent;
THE PEOPLE,
Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, James Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
Pavone & Fonner and Benjamin Pavone for Plaintiff
and Appellant Christopher Garner.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Iveta Ovsepyan, Assistant
Attorney General, Jessica R. Marek and Parry A. Black, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent California
Victim Compensation Board.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jessica C. Leal, Jonathan M. Krauss, and
Seth P. McCutcheon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party
in Interest and Respondent The People.
________________________________
In 2007, a jury convicted Christopher Garner of murder
on a theory of implied malice that, as a result of the enactment
of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 1437), the law no longer recognizes. (See Pen. Code, §§ 188,
189, as amend. by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.)
Penal Code section 1172.6 permits vacatur of such convictions if
the prosecution cannot prove to a trial court that the defendant
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under current murder law. 1
A court vacated Garner’s murder conviction under section 1172.6,
resentenced him to a prison term approximately eight years
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
Section 1172.6 was initially enacted as section 1170.95
and later renumbered. (See § 1172.6, as renumbered from former
§ 1170.95 by Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10, eff. June 30, 2022.) For
ease of reference, we refer to the law both before and after this
renumbering as section 1172.6.
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shorter than he had already served, and ordered him released
from custody.
Section 4900 permits “inmates who are exonerated
of their crimes [to] apply to [the California Victim Compensation
Board] for compensation for the time they were erroneously
imprisoned.” (Gonzales v. California Victim Compensation Bd.
(2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 427, 433 (Gonzalez); see § 4900, subd. (a).)
Garner sought such compensation from the California Victim
Compensation Board (the Board), alleging entitlement on the
basis that he is not guilty under the current definition of murder.
The Board denied Garner’s application. It concluded he had
failed to state a legally cognizable section 4900 claim because he
did not allege he was innocent of murder as the law defined the
crime in 2007. The Board also rejected Garner’s argument that
he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his application, citing
the California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 642 (California
Code of Regulations section 642), which creates a motion-to-dismiss
type procedure for section 4900 applications. (See Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 2, § 642.)
Garner filed a petition for administrative writ of mandamus
challenging the Board’s denial and the validity of California Code
of Regulations section 642. The court denied the writ. Garner
appealed.
On appeal, Garner argues the Board misapplied section 4900.
We disagree. The plain language of section 4900 requires, inter
alia, an “erroneous conviction.” The Legislature’s prospective
redefinition of “murder” in 2019 does not establish that the previous
conviction, valid when decided, was erroneous. Rather, the change
in the law was a legislative act of lenity, not the correction of any
error.
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Garner further argues that California Code of Regulations
section 642 exceeds the Board’s rulemaking authority. Again,
we disagree. Garner has not established, as is his burden, that
this regulation is either inconsistent with the Board’s authorizing
statute or not reasonably necessary for the Board to carry out its
statutory mandate.
Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Criminal Proceedings
On January 15, 2006, Garner and two men drove to Blake
Crawford’s home to steal marijuana from Crawford. Garner
waited in the car while one of the men entered Crawford’s home,
took his marijuana, and shot him. The shooter returned to the
car and Garner drove them home.
In 2007, a jury convicted Garner of the first degree murder
of Crawford. The jury also convicted him of robbery and
burglary, and the court sentenced Garner to 26 years to life in
prison.
We affirmed the judgment. (People v. Garner (Apr. 7, 2008,
B197920) [nonpub. opn.].) We concluded substantial evidence
supported: “that a plan to steal the marijuana was formulated
in Garner’s apartment before the offenses and on the drive to
Crawford’s residence; that the plan contemplated the use of force
against Crawford”; that the shooter “possessed a gun for that
purpose,” which the jury could have inferred Garner knew; that
Garner participated in developing the plan and “accordingly,
had advance knowledge of the unlawful purpose”; and “that
Garner encouraged, facilitated and aided in the commission of
the [robbery and burglary] by approving the plan, accompanying
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[the shooter] to the scene of the offenses, waiting for [the shooter]
to complete the plan, and driving away after the offenses to avoid
detection or arrest.” (Ibid.) We held these findings sufficient to
“support[ ] Garner’s conviction for murder under both aiding and
abetting and conspiracy theories.” (Ibid.)
In a 2018 uncontested habeas proceeding, a court reduced
Garner’s murder conviction from first to second degree based on
People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 158–159, which modified
accomplice liability for first degree premeditated murder. The
court resentenced Garner to 16 years to life in prison.
B. Garner’s Section 1172.6 Petition
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437,
which prospectively redefined the crime of murder and provided a
procedure under section 1172.6 to obtain retroactive relief based
on the new definition.
On August 23, 2019, the trial court vacated Garner’s
murder conviction pursuant to section 1172.6. The court
resentenced Garner to a total of seven years in prison for his
robbery and burglary convictions. Because Garner had been
in prison approximately eight years longer than this revised
sentence required, the court ordered him released from prison.
C. Requests for Section 4900 Compensation and
Related Relief
1. Section 4900 Compensation
Under section 4900, any person imprisoned for a felony
conviction who is “innocent” of the charged crime because “the
crime . . . was either not committed at all or, if committed, was
not committed by the person” may “present a claim against
the state to [the Board] for the injury sustained by the person
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through the erroneous conviction and imprisonment or
incarceration.” (§ 4900, subd. (a).)
Under California Code of Regulations section 642, requests
“that are untimely or are otherwise not in compliance with . . .
sections 4900 and 4901 will be rejected by a hearing officer and
will not be heard or considered by the Board.” (Cal. Code Regs.
tit. 2, § 642, subd. (a).) Before such rejection, however, the
hearing officer must give the claimant an opportunity to cure the
deficiency with new evidence or argument. (Id., § 642, subd. (b).)
If the claimant cures the deficiency, the claim is deemed “filed”
and the Board will consider it on the merits. (Id., §§ 640,
subd. (d), 642, subd. (c).)
In most cases, hearing a claim on the merits begins
with the Board providing the Attorney General the opportunity
to submit a written response. (See § 4902.) The Board then
holds an informal adversarial hearing, at which the parties
may present evidence of innocence and injury. (See § 4903.)
Under certain special circumstances, however—for example,
when a court previously made a finding of factual innocence
under subdivision (b) of section 1485.55—section 4900 requires
the Board to grant a compensation request without a hearing.
(See § 4900, subds. (a) & (b).)
2. Garner’s Request for Finding of Factual
Innocence
Garner filed a motion in the superior court for a
section 1485.55, subdivision (b) innocence finding, claiming
he was innocent because his murder conviction was vacated
under section 1172.6. The court denied the motion because this
“remedy does not apply in these circumstances.” Garner does not
challenge this decision.
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3. Garner’s Section 4900 Claim
On January 25, 2022, Garner submitted a section 4900
application and supporting memorandum to the Board. Based on
the statutory rate of $140 per day (see § 4900, subd. (a)), Garner
requested $391,860 for the 2,799 days he spent in custody beyond
his revised seven-year sentence.
On January 27, 2022, the Board hearing officer notified
Garner that “it appear[ed] [the Board] lacks jurisdiction to
consider [his] application” because it “fail[ed] to raise a valid
claim . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . due to the absence of any allegation that
Garner is factually innocent of murder under the laws in effect
at the time of the crime. Instead, it appears the application
only asserts that Garner is innocent under the current definition
for murder as revised by [Senate Bill No.] 1437 in 2019.” Citing
California Code of Regulations section 642, the hearing officer
informed Garner he had 30 days to “submit written proof and
argument to cure the identified jurisdictional deficiencies,” and
that if he failed to do so, his “application [would] be deemed
rejected and returned unfiled.”
Garner did not provide additional allegations. Instead,
he responded that the Board was incorrectly interpreting
section 4900 and challenged the facial validity of California Code
of Regulations section 642 as well as the Board’s application of it
to his claim. Garner disavowed any claim based on his innocence
under 2007 law.
In a 13-page final decision, the hearing officer denied
Garner’s application. The decision explains “[the Board] lack[ed]
jurisdiction to approve” a request “solely based upon [Garner’s]
dismissed conviction pursuant to . . . [section 1172.6], without
any allegation of factual innocence under the law in effect at the
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time the charged offense occurred.” The decision explained
the term “jurisdiction” was “a shorthand expression that the
claim . . . fails to state facts upon which relief may be granted
under section 4900[,] . . . [¶] . . . regardless of what terminology
best describes this procedural mechanism.”
The hearing officer also rejected Garner’s facial and
as-applied challenges to the California Code of Regulations
section 642 motion-to-dismiss type procedure. The officer found
the procedure was a proper exercise of the Board’s rulemaking
discretion and enabled a hearing officer to reject any claim that
the Board lacked authority to approve as a matter of law.
D. Writ Proceedings Below
Garner filed a petition for a writ of mandate to (1) compel
the Board to pay him $391,860 under section 4900 and (2) declare
California Code of Regulations section 642 facially invalid.
The court agreed with the Board’s interpretation of
section 4900 and its view of California Code of Regulations
section 642 as a valid regulation.
Garner appealed.
DISCUSSION
Garner’s appeal does not affect a fundamental right.
(See Tennison v. California Victim Comp. & Government Claims
Bd. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1181–1182.) Therefore, in
reviewing denial of the writ, we “step into the trial court’s shoes”
and scrutinize the Board’s decision using the same criteria a trial
court must apply. (Gonzales, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 441.)
We reverse where the agency decision reflects a “prejudicial
abuse of discretion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) This
occurs when, inter alia, the agency “has not proceeded in the
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manner required by law.” (Ibid.) Whether the agency did so is
an issue we review de novo. (See Gonzales, supra, at p. 441.)
Garner contends the Board did not proceed in the
manner required by law in two ways. First, he argues the
Board incorrectly interpreted section 4900 as requiring him
to establish his innocence under the law applicable at the time
of his conviction. Second, he challenges the Board’s use of
the motion-to-dismiss type procedure in California Code of
Regulations section 642, which he argues is invalid. He also
argues the current version of that regulation is invalid. We
disagree on all points.
A. Garner Did Not Allege a Cognizable
Section 4900 Claim
Garner argues his entitlement to section 4900
compensation depends entirely on current law: If he cannot
be found guilty of murder under current law, he is “innocent”
for purposes of section 4900, and his murder conviction is
“erroneous.” (§ 4900, subd. (a).)
We need look no further than the plain language of the
statute to reject Garner’s interpretation. (See Pacific Palisades
Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th
783, 803 [“ ‘ “If the statute’s text evinces an unmistakable plain
meaning, we need go no further” ’ ”]; accord, Washington v.
County of San Diego (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 874, 879.)
Section 4900 contemplates compensation for “the injury
sustained by [a] person through . . . erroneous conviction and
imprisonment or incarceration.” (§ 4900, subd. (a).) A claim
cognizable under section 4900 thus requires, inter alia, an
“erroneous conviction.” (Ibid.; see also § 4903, subd. (d).) As a
matter of “common[ ]sense” (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc.
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(2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724), a factfinder’s failure to apply a
definition of murder not yet in existence at the time of trial and
conviction does not render the resulting verdict and conviction
erroneous.
Garner argues—but cites no authority supporting—that
the Legislature’s decision to revise the definition of murder
implies the previous definition applied in convicting Garner was
erroneous. We disagree.
Garner’s 2007 conviction under a law that was valid in
2007 is not erroneous simply because the Legislature later
decided a different version of that law should apply going
forward. (See People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
241, 256 [Senate Bill No. 1437’s changes to murder law were
prospective].) The Legislature has the general power to amend or
repeal laws without identifying any error or deficiency in existing
law. (See, e.g., People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 943.) And
the “Legislature retains the constitutional authority to preserve
criminal sanctions for acts committed prior to repeal” of a statute
that criminalized conduct for which a defendant was convicted.
(People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 303; see Gov. Code, § 9608
[“[t]he termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected)
of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar
to the . . . punishment of an act already committed in violation
of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to
bar such . . . punishment is expressly declared by an applicable
provision of law”].)
That a court vacated Garner’s murder conviction pursuant
to section 1172.6 also does not suggest it was erroneous.
Section 1172.6 creates relief the Legislature crafted in “ ‘an act of
lenity’ that requires, under specified circumstances, reduction of
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the offense for which [a defendant] was properly convicted.”
(People v. James (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 604, 609.) The
section 1172.6 vacatur of Garner’s murder conviction does not
change that he “was properly convicted of . . . murder under
the law that was in effect at the time of his offense.” (James,
supra, at p. 609; see ibid. [describing underlying conviction after
successful section 1172.6 petition].) Again, Garner provides no
authority to the contrary.
Garner’s arguments for a contrary interpretation of
section 4900 focus on the reference in subdivision (a) to innocence
of the “crime . . . charged.” He argues this language refers to
the definition of the crime under current law. Even if Garner
is correct—and we are not concluding he is—section 4900 also
requires an “erroneous conviction.” (See In re Anthony (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 204, 209 [section 4900 claim requires both of
these elements].) As discussed above, Garner’s conviction is
not erroneous. Garner’s arguments interpreting the “crime . . .
charged” language thus do not provide even a potential basis for
relief.
In sum, the actions the jury found Garner to have
committed constituted murder under the law’s definition of
that crime at the time of his conviction. The conviction was
thus not erroneous. Because Garner failed to allege an erroneous
conviction in seeking compensation from the Board, Garner failed
to state a legally cognizable claim.
B. Garner Has Not Established California Code
of Regulations Section 642 Is Invalid
“[A] regulation adopted by a state agency is presumed
valid.” (Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v.
Dept. of Industrial Relations (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 243, 266.)
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Accordingly, “the burden is on the party challenging the
regulation to establish its invalidity.” (Ibid.) A regulation is
invalid if it is inconsistent or “ ‘ “in conflict with” ’ the provision
that authorizes it” or if it is not “reasonably necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the authorizing law.” (In re Gadlin
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 915, 926; see also § 4906 [authorizing the
Board “to make all needful rules and regulations consistent
with the law for the purpose of carrying into effect this chapter”];
Gov. Code, §§ 13920 & 13909, subd. (b) [authorizing Board
to make regulations “governing any matter over which it has
jurisdiction” and to delegate “any statutory power” of the Board
to its staff upon a majority vote].)
Garner challenges as inconsistent with the law (1) the
procedure California Code of Regulations section 642 creates
for dismissing claims without a hearing, and (2) a provision
added to that regulation after the Board denied Garner’s claim.
The new provision Garner challenges deems any claim
“solely based upon a conviction that was vacated due to a change
in the legal definition of the crime, for example pursuant to . . .
section 1172.6” not legally cognizable under section 4900.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 642, subd. (a)(3).) Garner contends
this reflects an incorrect interpretation of section 4900. We have
already rejected this argument and, therefore, need not further
discuss it.
In support of his argument that the Board was required
to hold a hearing, Garner cites the following language in
section 4903: “Except [in situations requiring the Board to
grant a request for compensation without a hearing,] the [B]oard
shall fix a time and place for the hearing of the claim.” (§ 4903,
subd. (a), italics added.) Garner interprets this language as
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requiring the Board to hold a hearing on a compensation request
regardless of the basis it alleges for seeking relief. Thus, Garner
argues, California Code of Regulations section 642’s procedure
for denying a hearing based on failure to allege a cognizable
claim “create[s] a remedy for the agency that the [L]egislature . . .
withheld” in section 4903. (Citing California Teachers Assn. v.
Commission on Teacher Credentialing (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1469,
1475.) But section 4903 presupposes the existence of a “claim,”
which, under section 4900, subdivision (a), must allege “injury . . .
[from an] erroneous conviction” suffered by an individual who is
innocent of the “charged . . . crime.” To the extent a request for
compensation does not allege both elements, it is not a “claim”
on which, under section 4903, the Board “shall” hold a hearing.
California Code of Regulations section 642 is not inconsistent
with section 4903.
We also are not persuaded by Garner’s arguments that
use of the term “jurisdiction” in California Code of Regulations
section 642 changes this analysis or proves invalidity. We
agree with the Board that use of the term “ ‘jurisdiction’ is
of no moment. . . . [T]he Board’s determination that it lacks
jurisdiction is a shorthand expression that the claim either fails
to allege sufficient facts under section 4900 or is untimely under
section 4901. . . . Under either scenario, the Board lacks authority
to grant relief.”
Garner thus fails to establish that California Code of
Regulations section 642 is inconsistent with the law. He does not
argue the regulation is not reasonably necessary for the Board
to accomplish its statutory obligation to process section 4900
compensation requests.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Parties shall bear their own costs on
appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
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