Joshua Matthew Brown v. Kimberly Higginbotham Brown

04/29/2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

May 21, 2025 Session

JOSHUA MATTHEW BROWN v. KIMBERLY HIGGINBOTHAM

BROWN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumner County

No. 2023-CV-387 Joe Thompson, Judge

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No. M2024-01179-COA-R3-CV

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This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The parties were married over twenty

years and had three children. The mother was a stay-at-home parent while Father was

employed. At trial, they stipulated to separate parenting schedules for their two teenagers

but could not agree on a parenting schedule for their youngest daughter, a former foster

child they had adopted years earlier. The trial court designated the father primary

residential parent of the youngest daughter and adopted a parenting schedule with equal

parenting time on an alternating weekly basis. The trial court denied the mother’s request

for alimony in futuro and awarded her transitional alimony for a period of five months.

The trial court ordered the father to pay $6,000 of the mother’s attorney fees, but each party

was deemed responsible for the remainder of his or her own attorney fees. The mother

appeals. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed in

Part, Vacated in Part, and Remanded

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KENNY W.

ARMSTRONG and VALERIE L. SMITH, JJ., joined.

Russell E. Edwards, Hendersonville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kimberly Higginbotham

Brown.

Christopher Beauchamp and Thomas A. Maynard, Lebanon, Tennessee, for the appellee,

Joshua Matthew Brown.

OPINION

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Joshua Matthew Brown (“Father”) and Kimberly Higginbotham Brown (“Mother”)

married in 2002 in Georgia. Father has a master’s degree in educational management,

issue, and policy; and Mother has a master’s degree in literacy. Early in the marriage,

Father worked for an educational publishing company, while Mother worked as a teacher

in Georgia. In 2006, the parties adopted a newborn son, Noah. They agreed that Mother

would stay home to care for Noah and no longer work outside the home. Mother gave birth

to the parties’ second child, Anna, in 2008. At some point, the family moved to Tennessee,

and Father began working for the Lebanon Special School District in 2011. Noah and

Anna attended public school for a year or two before the parties decided that Mother would

homeschool the children.

In 2015, Father and Mother began serving as foster parents to another newborn

child, Lasa. They eventually adopted Lasa, just before her third birthday. The parties

agreed to send Lasa to a public school because she is African-American, and they wanted

her to have a diverse school environment. They lived in Bethpage in Sumner County and

sent Lasa to Benny Bills Elementary School in Gallatin. Father remained employed by the

school district in Lebanon, where he worked 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. However, his commute

was 38 minutes, so he typically left between 6:30 and 7 a.m. and arrived home between

4:40 and 5:20 p.m., although sometimes it was later. His salary was $102,500.

After twenty years of marriage, in March 2023, Father announced to the family that

he wanted a divorce. He filed his complaint for divorce in April. Mother filed an answer

denying that grounds for divorce existed or that the parties should be divorced. The divorce

trial was held over the course of two days in December 2023 and January 2024. Thus, the

divorce proceeding had been pending for just seven months when trial began. At the outset,

Father’s counsel informed the judge that the two older children had essentially “chosen a

parent” – “Noah has chosen his father, Anna has chosen her mother.” However, all of the

family members were still residing together in the marital residence. The parties stipulated

to the divorce, a “50/50” division of the marital estate, and to a schedule for the two older

children. The parenting plan and child support worksheet would provide that Anna (age

15) resided with Mother 233 days and Father 132 days and that Noah (age 17) resided with

Father 233 days and Mother 132 days. Ultimately, however, the parents agreed to respect

the wishes of the teenagers on how much they actually visited the other parent. The

primary issues left for determination were the parenting schedule for eight-year-old Lasa;

alimony; and attorney fees. However, the trial judge agreed to hear evidence regarding

parenting issues concerning the older children to the extent that it was relevant to

determining a parenting schedule for Lasa. Father proposed an alternating weekly schedule

for Lasa with the parties designated joint primary residential parents, while Mother

proposed that Lasa primarily reside with her, having parenting time with Father every other

weekend and every Thursday night.

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The trial court heard testimony from Father, Mother, and Anna. Father was 45 years

old. He testified first regarding Noah. Father explained that the relationship between

Mother and Noah had become “pretty rocky, here recently especially.” In the last couple

of weeks, Mother had sent Father a message stating that Noah had become “defiant,

disrespectful, and disgusting” and that she believed it was unsafe for him to be alone with

their daughters. She informed Father that Noah was becoming “more aggressive,

threatening, AND deceitful in hiding it and taking advantage when there is no parent

around.” Father testified that he did not agree with Mother’s opinion that Noah was unsafe

to be around the other children. He was also asked if he recalled Mother referring to Noah

as a “cheater” and “liar” during her deposition and whether he agreed with those

statements. Father admitted that “[Noah has] had some times where that’s been a struggle

for him.” Still, he said he did not think it was fair to “characterize him as a liar and cheater.”

He testified that Noah had been “struggling” but that he had encouraged him to respect and

love Mother. Father said that Mother has “a tone that makes Noah uncomfortable” and

that she yells at the children “maybe once or twice a week.” He said that Mother uses a

“very loud raised voice that Noah describes as yelling and so do I.” He said he encourages

the relationship between Noah and Mother and tells Noah to approach their conflict calmly.

Next, Father testified regarding Anna. He said that he and Anna had a very close

relationship before he filed for divorce. He explained that in the first couple of weeks after

the divorce was filed, they were “all in shock” but still talking and spending time together,

but then the situation changed and Anna had communicated with him very little since.

Father testified that Anna responded to a few text messages “early on” when he reached

out, but he had tried sending notes to Anna and that she had not responded to those. He

estimated that anytime the family members were all in the marital home at the same time,

Anna spent “probably 95 percent of the time” in Mother’s bedroom with her. He said “a

lot of times” Anna will communicate things to him through Mother. He admitted, however,

that Anna had asked him a few things directly lately and “kind of expressed where she is

in this difficult time.” When asked if Mother encourages Anna to communicate with him,

Father said, “I do not think so because a lot of the things that she would normally come tell

me, she doesn’t, and [Mother] is the one that communicates that.” Father was then asked,

“Do you know if [Mother] has communicated this matter with Anna?” He responded, “I

feel like, from the things that have been said, it sounds like there’s been a lot

communicated.” The following exchange occurred between Father and his counsel:

Q. . . . Has [Mother] told Anna what this divorce was and given her her

opinion?

A. I believe so.

Q. Do you think that her mother’s opinion has influenced Anna on how

she treats you?

A. Yes.

Q. What does she say? You recall in her deposition she called it

something. What did she call this divorce?

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A. She’s used wrong and unbiblical.

Father was asked if he believed Mother was encouraging a relationship with him and the

children and said no. When asked if he thought Mother had “discouraged a relationship

and maybe poisoned that relationship,” he replied, “I believe so.” Finally, Father was asked

if he agreed with Mother’s deposition testimony that it was Father who caused his

relationship with Anna to change by filing for divorce. He replied, “It has changed

dramatically. I know this is a very hard time, but I feel like that there’s been influence.”

Still, he believed he could rebuild their relationship.

Next, Father testified about Lasa. He and Mother had been Lasa’s foster parents,

and Lasa had lived in their home her entire life with the exception of ten days. Father

described his relationship with Lasa as “very tight.” He said that, when he is at home, Lasa

spends the “vast majority” of that time with him, and they love doing activities together.

He described Lasa’s daily schedule, stating that on weekdays she wakes up by 6:15 and

gets ready for school independently, although Mother lays out her clothes for her. Father

acknowledged that caring for Lasa’s hair requires special techniques and that Mother had

been the one primarily caring for Lasa’s hair, but he had already purchased necessary

products and had a salon appointment scheduled. Father testified that Mother takes Lasa

to school four days per week and that he takes her on Thursdays. He said he had asked

Mother recently if he could take Lasa to school on additional days, but she declined.

Father was asked to explain his plan for Lasa’s schedule in the event the trial court

granted his request for equal parenting time on an alternating weekly basis. He planned to

take Lasa to school each morning during his week. Father said he was looking at rental

properties in the school zone for Benny Bills Elementary. He explained that he would drop

off Lasa at her elementary school at 7:00 a.m. in order to be at work in Lebanon by 8:00

a.m. He testified that he had enrolled Lasa in the after-school care program at Benny Bills

Elementary and that she would need to stay there until 4:30 in the afternoons when he could

get there after work. He acknowledged that Mother believed the after-school program was

a terrible idea. Mother had picked up Lasa from school every day of the previous semester,

and she wanted to continue to do so even on days when Father would have parenting time.

However, Father testified that he believed the after-school program would be beneficial

because it offered tutoring, and Lasa was struggling with her grades. He noted that Lasa

had once attended a pre-K program at a school in his district and attended after-school care

there until he could pick her up after work. Father testified that he also planned to enroll

Lasa in a summer program in his school district because he would have to work six of the

eight weeks of summer break, although he would have Fridays off during the summer.

Father conceded that Mother is a good mother to the children. However, his counsel

asked him the following questions:

Q. Do you believe the deterioration of your relationship with Anna could

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happen to Lasa?

A. I do.

Q. Okay. And that would have been from [Mother] talking to Anna and

eventually talking to Lasa; is that right?

A. That’s right.

Q. Do you believe that [Mother’s] behavior is emotionally damaging or

harmful to the children?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think that would increase with you being out of the home and

not having equal time with the children?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Has [Mother] attempted to alienate you from Anna?

A. I think so.

Father conceded that Mother had been “the primary caregiver” for all three children due to

his work schedule. He testified that he expected Mother to enter the workforce and work

full-time since the parties were divorcing. On cross-examination, Father conceded that

although he only works four workdays during the summer, he works for an hour longer on

those days. During the previous summer, for example, he had arrived at work in Lebanon

at 7:00 a.m. Monday through Thursday. With his 24-mile commute, he left for work each

morning during the summer about 6:20 a.m. He had no relatives nearby who would be

available to help with childcare. Still, Father maintained that it was in Lasa’s best interest

to attend after-school care rather than being with Mother because it would provide

“consistency” and she would not be going “back and forth.”

Father’s salary was $102,500. His monthly net income was $6,162.78, but he

admitted this would soon increase because he would no longer have deductions for family

coverage on insurance. He submitted an income and expense statement as an exhibit at

trial, reflecting current monthly expenses of $5,478.01, leaving a monthly surplus of

$684.77. However, he explained that this reflected current expenses for the entire family

over the past year. Father had prepared a separate “Post-Divorce Budget” of expenses that

he anticipated after the divorce. This document listed only $4,402.90 in post-divorce

expenses (without child support). Still, when asked how much money he would have left

each month to pay as far as spousal support, Father estimated “600 maybe.” Father was

asked how much spousal support he proposed should be awarded and responded, “I would

very much like to see her reach full employment and see what I’m able to do to help.” He

noted that Mother had recently taken a job working about twenty hours per week and

believed there was nothing preventing her from working forty. Finally, Father was asked

“[w]hat do you think would be a fair length of time for you to have to pay her spousal

support?” He said, “I think until Anna is done with high school.”

Father testified that he and Mother did not currently communicate very often, even

though they continued to live in the marital residence together, and they generally

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communicated by text message. He admitted it was “a hard environment at home.” He

also admitted he understood why his family was not completely supportive of his decision

to get a divorce. Father testified that he had taught the children about faith and Christianity.

He believed that his decision to seek a divorce was consistent with what he had taught his

children and believed that divorce was acceptable because of “the environment we’ve been

in.” He no longer attended the church where the family attended during the marriage, but

Mother and the children did. Father was also asked if he understood why Anna lost some

trust in him because of the divorce. He responded, “I understand this has been very difficult

for all of them and especially for her.” He was asked if being divorced was more important

than getting to see his children every day and said it was, adding, “That’s what I needed to

do.”

Father testified that he had been seeing a counselor since 2021. Prior to trial, the

trial court had denied Mother’s motion to compel Father to execute a release for his

counseling records, as the trial court deemed them protected therapy records. Father

admitted at trial that he reacts differently than others when people express frustration and

anger, as he “feel[s] like it’s more intense” than what other people perceive, and it takes

him longer than most people to calm down. 1 He admitted that what he perceives as hostility

1

Father had written a letter to his parents explaining his issue with the following examples:

. . . The first one is an experience from one of the last times I visited your house

with all the kids. Daddy was on the phone with a customer service agent I think with an

Internet provider. His voice was raised and he was being very unkind to the agent. There

was an awkward silence at the kitchen table as we all listened to his part of the exchange.

We tried to make light of it at the moment but it was uncomfortable. Noah still references

that event sometimes.

Next story. I think it was January and [Mother] was driving the car down the

highway. Someone in front of her was driving slowly in the left lane and [Mother]

expressed her frustration with the driver out loud with a frustrated, raised voice. There was

an awkward silence in the car for a short while afterwards.

Now, in both of those examples a normal person (so I have recently learned) might

hear the anger or frustration of Daddy or [Mother], may or may not comment to them

directly, might even talk to them about it in an effort to help them work through it, but

would likely give them a short time or space to calm down and then move on with their

day and normal interactions. What happens in me is sickness in my stomach, my pulse

increasing, muscles tighten up, my mouth gets dry, and above all a desire to get away. So

much so that this fight or flight reaction lasts for days afterwards. Three days to be specific.

Whatever that abnormal reaction is that makes me want to get away from the person

expressing a raised voice, frustration, or anger lasts for three days. Three days where I don’t

want to be in their presence, don’t want to talk to them, and feel on edge and tense around

them.

Why do I react differently to anger than other people? Why do I react like that with

expressions of anger, frustration, and raised voices? In the two very simple examples above

the anger/frustration was not even directed toward me. In the countless memories I’m

working through of when it was directed toward me the reaction and recovery time was

about the same but with much greater intensity.

This recognition is what I began working with my counselor on. Sara (my

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or anger, from Mother or anyone else, might not seem hostile or threatening to others.

Father testified that he believed Mother was emotionally abusive to Noah, but he admitted

it was possible his perception of abuse might be different than someone else’s. He testified

that he had also been diagnosed with mild seasonal depression and that he had been taking

an antidepressant seasonally from October through February since 2016. He said it had

not impacted his ability to parent.

At the end of the first day of trial, on December 15, Mother informed the trial judge

that she and Anna planned to move out of the marital home into a rental house owned by

friends. The trial judge adopted a temporary parenting schedule for Lasa for the holiday

break. When the trial resumed on January 24, Father testified regarding events that had

transpired over the break. He testified that the plan for Christmas was for Noah to go to

Alabama with Mother and his sisters to visit family, but a couple of days before, Noah

“voiced” that he wanted to leave there midday and drive back to Tennessee to spend the

night with him. Father testified that Noah’s announcement “was met with a response from

[Mother] that essentially said, just don’t come at Christmas.” He testified that it was his

understanding of the parties’ agreement that the older children would be able to visit each

parent as he or she preferred. When asked if he believed Noah needed to apologize to his

mother for the situation, Father said, “I could not understand what it was that needed an

apology for, for him asking to spend Christmas day with both parents.” 2

Father testified about another incident that also occurred during Christmas break

when Mother, Anna, and Lasa came to the marital residence to retrieve some items. Father

knew they were coming beforehand and had set up security cameras that recorded them

while they were there. He testified that he saw on the footage that Anna threw down a

remote control while she was there, and when she saw the security camera, she unplugged

it. He said he later learned that Anna took the key out of the “side-by-side” and threw it

counselor) calls it a trauma response.

Father wrote that he was “learning through counseling that anger is a normal human emotion, frustration is

not the same as anger, and a raised voice does not always mean a person is angry.”

2

Some of the parties’ text messages about the issue were introduced at trial. In those messages,

Mother stated that Noah was proposing to arrive in Alabama on Sunday and drive back by himself on

Monday at lunchtime, and she stated that Noah was “being insensitive to the situation and dismissive and

rude.” Father said he had advised Noah to think about the decision overnight, but Mother responded,

“Unfortunately, it’s not his decision to make anymore. He’s made them all uncomfortable and hurt and

they don’t want that energy there.” She later added, “Neither do I.” Her separate text message to Noah

said that he had been “wrong headed and cold” toward a lot of people and that she expected him to send a

sincere apology to their family members. Father asked Mother to call him to discuss the situation and stated

that “[c]oparenting requires communication,” but Mother responded by stating that it was “time you step

up and actually actively parent without relying on me to always tell you what is going on.” She stated that

Noah had “defiantly” not answered her messages at Father’s direction and that “nobody in that courtroom

is going to believe your charade about helping him understand,” stating Father had “stood in the way of

communication.” She explained that Noah had “called me pissy, childish, and whiny.”

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beneath a hot water heater.

Father testified that his communication with Mother had been okay aside from these

two incidents. They had met with a realtor and handled financial issues in a civil manner.

Father testified that he had “very little communication with Anna outside of text exchanges,

group texts,” and he bought her Christmas presents that she sent back unopened. In

contrast, Father explained that things were going very well with him and Lasa and that she

had adjusted well and started after-school care. Father testified that even though he

proposed equal parenting time with Lasa, he wanted to be designated primary residential

parent “[f]or educational purposes, just to be able to make decisions that we need to for

her.” He testified that he intended to move to Gallatin to the school district for Benny Bills

Elementary when the marital home sold. His counsel submitted an amended proposed

parenting plan changing the primary residential parent designation for Lasa from “Joint”

to “Father.”

Father’s most recent paystub was submitted as an exhibit, which showed that his net

income had increased to $6,301 per month. Mother was still covered under his insurance

for the time being, so he admitted that his net income would increase again, by an additional

$312 per month, once Mother was removed from his policies at the end of the month.

Father also submitted a child support worksheet listing his monthly gross income at $8,541

and Mother’s at $1,923, which would result in Father owing child support of $1,400 per

month. He testified that if he was ordered to pay that much child support, he would not be

able to afford spousal support. He introduced a separate child support worksheet with an

alternative calculation, which imputed income to Mother at $2,994 per month and resulted

in a reduced child support payment of $1,049. Father suggested that Mother was

voluntarily underemployed. His counsel introduced as an exhibit a chart he had

downloaded from the website of Sumner County Schools, displaying a pay scale for

teachers. It indicated that a teacher with a master’s degree and five years of service would

earn $51,600. Father noted that he was going to be assuming the homeschool

responsibilities for Noah and suggested that Mother could work full-time while

homeschooling Anna.

Father testified the parties’ home was valued at around $600,000, with a mortgage

balance of $232,500, so any equity realized from the sale of the home could be split equally

and/or used to pay any award of alimony or attorney fees he was required to pay to Mother

in a lump sum. However, he asked the court to deny any alimony award, stating that money

was going to be “very tight” if he was ordered to pay $1,400 in child support. Father

testified that he had received raises over the years, but they were not guaranteed in the form

of a pay scale like a teacher, and there had been a few years when he did not receive one.

When asked if he understood that Mother would “never be able to earn close to what you’re

earning after the marriage,” Father responded, “Right.” But, he added, “If I look at that

pay scale and we go even up to the 20, that can be an expectation.” The exhibit reflected

that a teacher with a master’s degree would reach a maximum salary, after 25 years of

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service, of $70,172. When asked if it was really his position that Mother should receive

no alimony, Father testified that it depended on how much child support he had to pay,

because if he was ordered to pay $800 versus $1,400, “that’s a very different scenario of

what I can pay a month,” so “depending on where child support lands, I do think there

could be hopefully some room to help, if that’s you know, but it really depends upon the

numbers.” Father had withdrawn $6,000 from an IRA to pay a portion of his attorney fees.

Mother testified next. First, with respect to Noah, Mother acknowledged telling

Father that she believed he was unsafe around his sisters. She explained that Noah had

“threatened Anna” after becoming upset with her and that she had growing concerns about

his safety when driving. She explained that one day in recent months Noah had “dropped

Anna off a good distance from our house out in Bethpage because he just kind of gets on a

power trip when he’s in a car and there’s no other adults there, so he’s very bully-ish with

her and apparently irresponsible with her, because he dropped her off on the side of a road

and then went on with his friends.” Mother had not allowed Noah to drive his sisters ever

since. She described several other issues that had occurred during the divorce proceeding.

Noah had been kicked out of a summer camp for taking a knife and trying to sell it. She

objected to Noah going on a camping trip out-of-state with older coworkers until Father

said he would go as a chaperone, but then Father left early, leaving Noah to ride home with

a friend. Mother saw on Life360 they were driving almost 100 miles per hour. Mother

explained that Noah had also been grounded from his vehicle for the majority of December

due to driving while on his phone, even though he had been grounded for such behavior

“[a]gain and again and again.” When asked about her deposition testimony when she

referred to Noah as a cheater and liar, Mother admitted that she still believed that, stating

that he “is regularly dishonest and he has cheated at every opportunity he can get.” 3 She

had also stated during her deposition that “he can be a jerk,” in the context of explaining

why Noah would never commit to babysitting Lasa after school. Mother characterized the

recent Christmas incident as another example in which “[h]im being rude was on display.”

She explained that she received a text message from Noah that was “so disrespectful and

rude and dismissive and mocking.” She believed Father stood in the way of her

communication with Noah by instructing him not to respond. She also believed that

Father’s text messages about the incident were false and that he was “posturing” for screen

shots about coparenting to use in court, while undermining her decisions on other matters.

She explained that during the same month, in December, Father had unilaterally allowed

Noah to spend the night with his birth parents, even though they were “known drug addicts”

and Mother had opposed overnight contact in the past, and Father made no effort to

coparent with her about that decision. Finally, she noted that Father had permitted Noah

to work full-time instead of doing homeschool that month. Overall, Mother explained that

3

During her deposition, Mother had used the terms “cheater” and “liar” when asked if she had

concerns about Noah’s school performance if he was in Father’s care, and Mother expressed her fear that

Father would not hold Noah accountable. Mother testified that Noah requires more oversight in the

homeschool program because he “will do as little as possible and he will cheat,” noting that he will simply

find answer guides and copy the answers.

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she was responsible for disciplining Noah and that frequently made her “the bad guy in

Noah’s eyes.” On the other hand, she described Father’s approach to Noah over the last

year as “let’s just give Noah everything he wants.” She said “[Father] ha[d] become

[Noah’s] ‘yes’ man” and gave him permission to do things he would not have before the

divorce. She also testified that Noah had told her, “Dad says I only have to put up with

you for two more months.”

Mother also testified about Anna. When asked if she had encouraged the

relationship between Anna and Father, Mother replied, “I’ve not gotten involved with that.”

She testified that Anna had “made her own decisions” and that she understood her

decisions. According to Mother, on the day Father announced that he wanted a divorce,

the family “sat down together, we talked about the rightness or wrongness of this before

the Lord, how this is unbiblical.” Thus, Mother acknowledged telling the children that this

was “an un-biblical divorce.” She added, “That’s scripture.” She noted that Father was in

the room when this was discussed and “did not disagree.” Mother explained that she

characterized the divorce as unbiblical “[i]n scriptural opinion” and noted that “this is the

opinion that [Father] has raised our family on too.” She said they had attended church as

a family for eleven years and that Father taught Sunday School there, although he had to

step down from that position and stopped attending after he announced the divorce. Mother

testified that Father was removed from the membership of their church “as a result of this

unbiblical divorce.”

Mother testified that after Father filed for divorce, “[Anna] was confused on how to

proceed after that because she knows it’s wrong and she knows it’s not the man that he has

purported to be for all her life.” She explained that Anna “went through a few weeks of

just almost disorientation” after Father said that he wanted a divorce, and Father continued

to play with the children “like it’s life as usual, when it’s not[.]” She believed Anna did

not know what to do at first but after a few weeks decided that “she didn’t like what was

going on,” she did not like “his stance,” and she “pulled away from him greatly.” Mother

testified that Father had not been able to answer Anna’s questions about the divorce, and

“it really upsets her that he won’t answer her.” She testified that there had been “whole

family conversations” about the divorce when Father was present, and she acknowledged

that she and Anna had also talked about the divorce separately, stating, “For sure. It’s

unavoidable.” Mother was asked if she had discussed with the children “things that are

going on with your divorce,” and she said no. However, she acknowledged that she and

the children had discussed logistical matters such as where they would live or attend school,

stating “that’s not a gag order topic, I wouldn’t think.”

When asked again if she had tried to “redirect” Anna and encourage the relationship

between her and Father, Mother said, “No, I don’t think I did. . . . I stayed out of it. I have

honestly been in survival mode.” Mother believed it was not her responsibility to

encourage Father’s relationship with Anna because it was his responsibility. She also said,

“I don’t think that’s my responsibility to convince her to approve of something that she

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doesn’t want to -- that she knows to be wrong.” She noted that Anna and Noah were

teenagers and that the parties had agreed that “they will make their own choices,” so she

believed that also applied to how much Anna wanted to interact with Father. Mother said

she had not relied on Father to help her navigate her relationship with Noah and that he had

come to her house repeatedly since Christmas break. Mother testified that she believed

Father was harassing Anna. She explained that he continued to go into her space when

they were still living in the same house and left notes for her, even after Anna’s counselor

had told Father “to stay out of her space.” 4 Mother testified that Father went through her

trash and questioned things she had thrown away. She said he also “manipulated situations

to try to make her be with him against her will,” which resulted in Anna being “in tears and

her fleeing.” During her deposition, Mother testified that the last interaction she had

observed between Anna and Father was a month earlier, when they had a disagreement

about Father eating the eggs from their family chickens, which Anna sells. She said this

was very upsetting to Anna and when “[Father] picked that fight with her, [] it didn’t go

well. It made her madder.” She testified that since then Anna had been avoiding Father

and “won’t even make eye contact, honestly.” Mother also testified that on the day when

she and Anna went to retrieve items from the marital home, Father left presents on the

porch for Anna, but Anna found the secret camera and it was “very upsetting for her.” She

said that Noah had texted after the incident and admitted that “we set this up to catch you.”

Mother said she told Anna that Father was probably trying to catch her on video rather than

Anna, which she believed would relieve Father of some of the blame in Anna’s view, but

Anna “took it personally.” Mother said she was not present in the room when Anna had

thrown the remote or the key and did not know those things occurred, but once she learned

about it, she was shocked and redirected her. Mother said she did not encourage that

behavior.

Ultimately, Mother acknowledged that it is not healthy for a child to be without a

parent, but at the same time, she noted that Anna currently did not trust Father, disagreed

with him, and felt harassed by him. Mother testified, however, that she did not want to

limit Anna’s involvement with Father. She also testified that she was not going to

discourage Anna from having a relationship with Father. She said she had even told Anna,

“it’s going to be okay if you feel differently later.” Mother also testified that she had not

spoken negatively about Father in front of the children, nor had she allowed anyone else to

do so.

Mother admitted that, while they had remained living in the marital residence during

the divorce proceeding, she had avoided Father and generally went into her bedroom once

he got home from work, as it was terribly uncomfortable for her to be constantly in his

4

Father had arranged for Anna to begin counseling sessions a couple of months before he filed for

divorce, stating at the time that it would be beneficial in helping with sibling rivalry. He admitted during

his deposition that he did this at least in part in anticipation of him filing for divorce, so that Anna would

have a counselor in place once he made the announcement.

- 11 -

presence given his desire for the divorce. She admitted that Anna had avoided Father as

well but said their actions were not “robotic” or “orchestrate[d].” She testified that it was

“very much an exaggeration” to say that she and Anna were always in her bedroom, as

Anna spent time in other places too, going outside or in her own room. She said Anna was

currently a Sophomore, was doing great in school, and was a very gifted student.

As for Lasa, Mother admitted that Father had a good relationship with her and

testified that she does encourage their relationship. She acknowledged that Father had

asked, a few months earlier, about taking Lasa to school in the mornings two days a week

rather than one. Mother had responded with a message stating, “No thanks. That’s my job

and I’d like to maintain our normal routine.” Since the last trial date, Mother had moved

into a home in Hendersonville, about 25 minutes away from Lasa’s school. She was

working part-time at another elementary school in Sumner County as a reading

interventionist, from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. She typically left in the mornings at 6:45 a.m.

and drove Lasa to school in Gallatin, and Lasa’s school lasted from 7:40 a.m. to 2:40 p.m.

Mother was in favor of Lasa remaining at Benny Bills Elementary but opposed Father’s

plan to enroll her in after-school care. She testified that she would be available to pick

Lasa up from school every day. Mother explained that her part-time work schedule was

by design so that it worked with Lasa’s schedule, and she said that it was Father who told

her to find such a schedule when he pushed her to find a job in the last year. She wanted

to continue picking Lasa up and said that arrangement would be in line with “what we’ve

made an entire family lifestyle.” Mother admitted that Lasa had attended an after-care

program once before when she went to a pre-K program in Lebanon and rode with Father,

but she said it was a “terribly long day” and that the parties only utilized it for one year.

Mother questioned Father’s statement that Lasa would only be staying at after-care at

Benny Bills until 4:30 in the afternoons and stated that during the marriage he had a history

of not getting home until 5:30 or 6:30 in the evenings. She noted that this would result in

Lasa having a nine to ten-hour school day. She also noted that Father would be working

an hour longer in the summer. Mother testified that Lasa’s bedtime is typically 7:30 p.m.

She said that since Father had enrolled Lasa in after-school care, there had already been

one occasion where he picked her up late and had to take her back to work in Lebanon with

him for a night meeting. Mother said it seemed “silly and mean-spirited” for Father to have

Lasa in after-school care at an expense when she was available and wanted to spend the

time with her.

Mother sought to be named primary residential parent of Lasa and proposed that she

spend the majority of the time with her, visiting Father every other weekend and every

Thursday overnight. She stated that her goal was to maintain stability and assurance for

Lasa regarding where home was, with Mother continuing in the role of primary caregiver

as she always had. She believed her plan would serve Lasa’s best interest by providing her

“steadiness and routine and structure.” She testified that she hoped to shield Lasa from

any further trauma of “breaking up” her life and wanted her to have a “home base” with

Anna at her house. Mother stated, “Lasa already has a number of traumas under her belt.

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The divorce adds another.” However, she admitted that Lasa “still needs her father” and

said she had already informed Father that she would have no problem with him exercising

more time with Lasa than the official schedule adopted by the court.

Mother testified that, throughout the marriage, she had performed the majority of

parenting responsibilities, handling school, doctor’s appointments, transportation, laundry,

discipline, social activities, “everything.” She noted that during Father’s deposition, he did

not know the name of the medication Anna had been taking since age seven, what dentist

the children see, or what size clothes Lasa wears, believing she wore size 10/12 when it

was actually size 16, as she is very big for her age. Mother testified that Father was a

“passive parent” before he filed for divorce and had become “hyper-engaged” since, which

she believed was “for show” in an attempt to demonstrate his involvement to the court.

Mother claimed that Father had gone “into overdrive playing with Lasa” since the divorce

was filed, and she conceded that Lasa was enjoying all the attention and entertainment.

However, she stated her concern that Father was “more of a playmate” and that Lasa needed

a parent. She explained that the past six months had really been “a tough trial” with the

divorce and Mother starting a new job, and Lasa was struggling with math. However, she

testified that she and Lasa had “buckled down” and did a lot of work on math during

Christmas break, so that she was “evening out this new semester” and “grinning with

confidence again.”

Mother also believed it would serve Lasa’s best interest to live primarily with her

and Anna given issues that would be arising with puberty. Anna and Lasa had shared a

bedroom for several years. Mother testified that Anna and Lasa were “really close” and

had gotten closer during the divorce proceeding. She said she had never asked Lasa what

she wanted, but Lasa had “offered up that she wants to be with me -- on more than one

occasion.” Mother testified that if the trial court ordered the alternating weekly schedule

“[w]e’d survive it,” but she did not think it was in Lasa’s best interest to be going back and

forth every week, noting that it would be difficult to plan extracurricular activities if she

was spending a week at each house. She wanted to be named sole decision-maker and

believed making decisions jointly would be “a path for more conflict.”

Mother acknowledged that the parties had not experienced any issues with Lasa

using an alternating weekly schedule during the month that elapsed between the trial dates,

although she noted that school was not in session for most of that time due to Christmas

break and snow days. She admitted that during her deposition she made a comment about

not looking forward to co-parenting; however, she had added, “I don’t want this divorce.

I don’t want my family to break up.” Mother testified that she envisioned coparenting with

Father as “[c]ommunicating on the necessities” so that it would be smoother for Lasa going

back and forth. She conceded that this would require direct communication and testified

that she and Father had been able to effectively communicate regarding the children on the

things that were required. However, Mother noted a recent example of poor

communication when she and Anna took Lasa to her school musical performance and had

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no knowledge that Father was even in attendance, and when they went to pick up Lasa,

they happened to see Father leaving with her. Mother said it shocked Lasa, Anna, and her

because Father did not communicate this plan to any of them.

Mother testified that Father had informed her in December 2022 (shortly before the

divorce was filed and just one year before trial), that during their marital struggles in the

past two years he had “wished for his death or my own.” She thought it was concerning

that Father’s depression was so severe that he would wish for his own death or hers. She

said he had been seeing a counselor for several years. Mother said she had also learned

from Father that when they moved into the marital residence in 2021, that a “little water

closet was where he felt safe – the only place he felt safe,” and apparently he would go into

the water closet even though she did not know it at the time. She believed his

“disengagement” and depression reflected poorly on his parenting. Mother admitted that

she no longer trusted or respected Father, feeling as if she did not “even know who he is

any more.” She noted Father’s letter to his parents explaining his “abnormal reactions to

normal situations” and suggested it was outrageous for him to suggest that she had been

emotionally abusive to Noah when he admittedly reacts abnormally to normal things.

Mother was 44 years old and had been a stay-at-home mother since Noah was

adopted with the exception of working “little side jobs” for a friend’s organizing business.

She had renewed her teaching certificate the previous summer and began working in

August 2023. She testified that she had not applied for any other jobs because she wanted

to complete homeschooling Anna and get Lasa through elementary school before working

full-time. Thus, Mother testified that she was not opposed to working as a teacher but

wanted to wait two years until Anna, currently a Sophomore, finished homeschool, and

Lasa, currently in third grade, reached middle school.

Mother testified that her current job paid $30 per hour and that she typically worked

five hours per day five days per week, but her hours were less if the month included a break

from school. Her monthly net income was typically around $1,800, but in January, she

earned less than $1,000, and she would not work during summer breaks. Her income and

expense statement reflected monthly net income of $1,542.52 and monthly expenses of

$4,793.90, for a monthly deficit of $3,251.38. She would also begin paying for health

insurance the following month. She testified that she was seeking an award of spousal

support somewhere between $1,000 and $2,000 per month, which, with child support, she

said would give her just “enough to be able to get by” if she carefully managed her finances.

Mother testified that she believed such an award would be fair given how much money

Father earned per year and the fact that she stayed home to raise their children. She

believed Father should also be responsible for paying her attorney fees because she was

opposed to getting a divorce in the first place.

Finally, the trial court heard testimony from Anna, who was 15 years old. She stated

that she was not entirely sure why she was there but “just hope[d] to maybe get more time

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with Lasa.” She testified that she and Lasa were really close and spent a lot of time

together, and she wanted that to continue. When asked what they do together, Anna

responded, “Everything.” She listed a number of activities. Anna was asked how often

she had seen Mother or Father helping Lasa with homework. She testified that she had

seen Mother helping Lasa “very often” but never Father prior to the divorce being filed.

When asked to describe Father and Lasa’s interactions, she said “[t]hey’d play together

after dinner.”

Anna was then asked about her own relationship with Father prior to the divorce.

She said, “I loved my dad.” When asked how the relationship had changed, Anna testified

that “he’s kind of altered my life in a way that is negative and he can’t answer for it.”

Father’s counsel asked her the following questions:

Q. Have you and your dad talked about what all’s going on, what this is

about, what you would come in and testify about?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Have you and your mom talked about what’s going on?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. What’s your mom told you about what’s going on?

A. She won’t tell me any of like the legal stuff, but she tells me that -- I

don’t know. She doesn’t talk to me a lot about it anymore.

Q. Okay. Did she at one point talk to you about it?

A. Back this summer there was, yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. But then she told me that you or dad said that she can’t talk to me

anymore. It’s really annoying.

Q. Okay. You and her spend a lot of time together?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Was that in her room when your dad would come home?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Did she ever encourage you to talk with your dad or y’all try to

patch things up?

A. She did at first, but then she just let me do my thing.

Q. Okay. Do you still want to see your dad?

A. No.

The trial judge then asked Anna why she did not want to see Father. Anna replied, “It’s

just a very broken relationship and it’s not one that I’m ready to mend.” She added that

Father “[has] not done anything to fix it.” She testified that Father “has hurt me in a lot of

ways this year.” She noted that he filed for divorce when “he knew [it] was going to affect

me and my siblings negatively.” She also said, “He’s gone against everything he’s ever

taught me about my faith and he can’t answer my questions.” Anna explained that she had

asked him: “How do you think this is okay?” She testified that the Bible taught that unless

- 15 -

divorce is on the basis of sexual immorality, it “is not okay, and yet he’s doing it” and

“can’t tell me why he’s doing it.” She said she was “sick” of Father telling her that he

would talk to her about it when she was older. When asked how much time she currently

spends with Father, Anna said “[n]one,” and she said when they still resided in the marital

residence she “avoided him as much as possible.” She explained that the relationship

between her and Father began to change at the end of April, about a month after the divorce

was filed. She explained, “I tried to maintain a relationship with him, but I felt two very

different things after spending time with each of my parents and I know there can only be

one truth. And my mom’s able to answer when I asked her questions. My dad could not.”

The trial judge suggested that she consider that people have different perspectives and

asked her to explain her view on truth, to which Anna replied, “There’s right and wrong.

There’s no in between, usually. My faith, there is one truth.” She explained that she had a

strong Christian faith that was instilled by both her parents. When asked why she sent back

Father’s Christmas gifts unopened, Anna testified, “I don’t want anything to do with him.

He’s being a hypocrite.” She noted that Father attempted to give her Christmas presents

while setting up a camera in the house to watch them, as Noah “even said there were

multiple ones specifically to watch us.” Anna said, “That doesn’t make sense, giving me

Christmas presents and then doing that.” The trial judge then took the matter under

advisement.

The trial judge announced his oral ruling as to parenting time in February 2024.

Despite listing the sixteen best interest factors for consideration, the trial judge stated that

“one factor has played an outsized role in the Court’s determination.” The trial judge found

that Mother “has not attempted to foster a healthy relationship with specifically Anna and

[Father], and that has sometimes reflected itself in the care of Lasa.” The trial judge gave

some examples, which we will discuss in detail later in this opinion. As a result of this

analysis, the trial judge adopted Father’s proposed parenting plan and designated him as

Lasa’s primary residential parent, with Lasa having an alternating weekly schedule. The

trial court reserved its decision on alimony and attorney fees.

The trial court entered a final decree of divorce in May 2024. Pertinent to this

appeal, Father was named primary residential parent of Lasa, with the parties alternating

weekly parenting time. The parties were given joint decision-making authority. The trial

court imputed income to Mother and calculated Father’s child support obligation at $1,048

per month. The trial court denied Mother’s request for alimony in futuro and instead

awarded her transitional alimony of $2,203.38 for a period of five months. Father was

ordered to pay this amount from his share of the proceeds of the marital residence. The

order stated that the court anticipated that Mother could obtain a full-time teaching job by

the coming school year, in August 2024. The trial court found that Father had incurred

$17,422 in attorney fees while Mother had incurred $30,001.76. It found that Father had

paid $6,000 of his attorney fees from a retirement account, so the court ordered him to pay

an equal amount toward Mother’s attorney fees out of his share of the marital residence.

Each party was responsible for paying the remainder of his or her own fees. Mother timely

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filed a notice of appeal. 5

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Mother presents the following issues for review on appeal:

1. Whether the Trial Court erred in its adoption of the Father’s proposed

parenting plan.

2. Whether the Trial Court erred in its award of spousal support to the

Ex-Wife.

3. Whether the Trial Court erred in its allocation of marital debt,

specifically as it relates to the Ex-Wife’s attorney fees; alternatively,

whether said fees should have been awarded as alimony in solido.

4. Whether the Ex-Wife should be awarded attorney fees incurred on

appeal.

For the following reasons, we reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further

proceedings. 6

III. DISCUSSION

A. Parenting Issues

Appellate courts review a trial court’s factual findings “de novo upon the record,

accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance

of the evidence is otherwise.” Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn.

2013). We review questions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id. With

5

Mother filed a motion to alter or amend, stating that Father had moved to Lebanon after the sale of

the marital home and that she feared he would enroll Lasa in a school there using his designation as primary

residential parent. She noted Father’s trial testimony that he intended to reside in Sumner County where

Lasa was attending Benny Bills Elementary. She asked the trial court to amend its order to require that

Lasa attend school at Benny Bills. Father filed a response, claiming that he had been unable to find a

suitable apartment near Benny Bills and that Lasa’s out-of-zone approval had been denied by the school in

any event. Husband’s response stated that he was obtaining a residence in the Lebanon school district and

that he had offered to drive halfway to Mother’s residence each day due to the additional distance, but she

had declined. Mother filed a reply, attaching documentation from the principal of Benny Bills stating that

Lasa could continue to attend school there because of Mother’s employment with the county. Mother

claimed that the school Father wanted Lasa to attend would be “a 50-minute drive each way” from her

home in Hendersonville. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion to alter or

amend and stating that Mother’s request to be named primary residential parent of Lasa and her oral request

that the parenting plan be amended to order that Lasa attend Benny Bills Elementary were denied.

6

We note that Mother raises no issue regarding the denial of her motion to alter or amend. As

such, the trial court’s decision regarding that motion is not before us on appeal. As it is, the only proof that

is in the record and properly before us regarding the parties’ circumstances is that presented at trial.

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respect to parenting matters, our supreme court has further explained:

Because decisions regarding parenting arrangements are factually

driven and require careful consideration of numerous factors, Holloway v.

Bradley, 190 Tenn. 565, 230 S.W.2d 1003, 1006 (1950); Brumit v. Brumit,

948 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), trial judges, who have the

opportunity to observe the witnesses and make credibility determinations,

are better positioned to evaluate the facts than appellate judges. Massey-Holt

v. Holt, 255 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Thus, determining the

details of parenting plans is “peculiarly within the broad discretion of the trial

judge.’” Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988) (quoting

Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 291 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973)). “It is not

the function of appellate courts to tweak a [residential parenting schedule] in

the hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the trial court.” Eldridge

v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s decision regarding

the details of a residential parenting schedule should not be reversed absent

an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court

... appl[ies] an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves

the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on

reasoning that causes an injustice.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99,

105 (Tenn. 2011). A trial court abuses its discretion in establishing a

residential parenting schedule “only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside

the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of

the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the record.” Eldridge, 42

S.W.3d at 88.

Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693.

“Decisions involving the custody of a child are among the most important decisions

faced by the courts.” Grissom v. Grissom, 586 S.W.3d 387, 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019)

(citing Steen v. Steen, 61 S.W.3d 324, 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). When fashioning a

residential schedule for a child,

[t]he court shall make residential provisions for each child, consistent with

the child’s developmental level and the family’s social and economic

circumstances, which encourage each parent to maintain a loving, stable, and

nurturing relationship with the child. . . . If the limitations of § 36-6-406 7 are

not dispositive of the child’s residential schedule, the court shall consider the

factors found in § 36-6-106(a)(1)-(15).

7

The referenced section, 36-6-406, instructs a court to limit residential time for a parent who “has

engaged in certain specified conduct or who exhibits certain traits.” Ford v. Ford, No. M2023-01762-

COA-R3-CV, 2026 WL 125827, at *4 n.9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2026).

- 18 -

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404(b). “The paramount concern in establishing a permanent

parenting plan is the best interest of the child[.]” Maupin v. Maupin, 420 S.W.3d 761, 770

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). Taking into account the child’s best interest, the trial court “shall

order a custody arrangement that permits both parents to enjoy the maximum participation

possible in the life of the child consistent with the factors set out in [] subsection (a), the

location of the residences of the parents, the child’s need for stability and all other relevant

factors.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a).

Mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred in its analysis of the statutory best

interest factors, so we will address each one in turn. At the outset, however, we note the

limited findings that are present in the final decree of divorce regarding parenting issues.

The order simply states:

The parties have three (3) children born of this marriage: Noah Brown

[], Anna Brown [], and Lasa Brown []. Based on the testimony of the parties

and of the minor child, Anna Brown, and all factors contained in Tenn. Code

Ann. § 36-6-106, this Court finds that it is in the minor children’s best interest

that this Court adopt Husband’s proposed Permanent Parenting Plan

regarding Lasa. The parties have jointly stipulated that Mother will have 233

days of parenting time per year with Anna Brown with Father having 132

days. The parties have further jointly stipulated that Father will have 233

days of parenting time per year with Noah Brown with Mother having 132

days. Noah and Anna Brown shall have discretion to move between the

parties’ homes as they choose. This Court further finds that Wife has been

the primary caregiver for the parties’ children prior to this proceeding;

however, Father has taken advantage of the time he has had with Lasa and

Father has supported her both financially and in other ways. This Court

further finds that Wife has failed to facilitate a relationship between the

children and Husband and testified to this Court that she does not believe it

is her responsibility to do so. This Court further finds that Wife has attempted

to make the parties’ daughter, Anna Brown, a confederate in this matter and

has sought emotional support from Anna. This Court further finds that Wife

has caused psychological damage to the parties’ children. This Court

seriously considered limiting Wife’s parenting time with Lasa due to the

provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. §36-6-406(d)(5) which provides, “A parent’s

residential time as provided in the permanent parenting plan shall be limited

if the limitation is found to be in the best interest of the minor child and if the

Court determines based upon reliable evidence that a parent has engaged in

the abusive use of conflict by the parent that creates the danger of damage to

the child’s psychological development.” Had Husband requested a

traditional every other weekend schedule for Wife, this Court would have

given that serious consideration. Therefore, Husband shall be deemed

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primary residential parent of the youngest child, Lasa Brown, and the parties

shall share decision making authority.

There is no attached transcript of the trial judge’s oral ruling, nor was it incorporated by

reference into the final decree. However, the record before us does contain a transcript of

the proceedings from the day the trial judge announced his decision on parenting issues,

entitled, “Judge’s Ruling.” The trial court also entered a “Memorandum Opinion” on a

proposed final decree of divorce, which mentioned “the Court’s oral ruling from the

bench.” In the interest of judicial economy, we will consider the trial court’s oral ruling

regarding the best interest factors to enable appellate review of the trial court’s decision.

However, as we will explain below, even this action does not cure all of the deficiencies

with the trial court’s ruling.

During his oral ruling, the trial judge summarily stated that he “found that Factors

3, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 were either not applicable or did not militate substantially

in favor of either party.” However, the trial court never specifically stated whether the

remaining eight unlisted factors weighed in favor of Father, Mother, or both equally.

Rather, the court simply stated that “one factor has played an outsized role in the Court’s

determination.” The trial court made some general factual findings but did not separate

those findings as applying to particular factors. Thus, we will review the trial court’s

general factual findings and attempt to attribute them to the various factors.

The first factor for consideration is “[t]he strength, nature, and stability of the child’s

relationship with each parent, including whether one (1) parent has performed the majority

of parenting responsibilities relating to the daily needs of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. §

36-6-106(a)(1). The final decree of divorce states that “[Mother] has been the primary

caregiver for the parties’ children prior to this proceeding; however, Father has taken

advantage of the time he has had with Lasa and Father has supported her both financially

and in other ways.” In the trial judge’s oral ruling, he found that Lasa had a strong, healthy,

and stable relationship with both parents. He found that the parties agreed that “[Mother]

would perform the majority of caregiving tasks for Lasa, and [Father] would serve as the

breadwinner for the family.” The trial judge found that Mother helped Lasa with her

schoolwork, did most of the cooking and laundry, and “served the role that the parties

agreed upon well and faithfully.” The trial judge found that Father acknowledged that

Mother was a good mother and was equally capable of providing for Lasa’s needs. The

judge noted that Father “took full advantage of the time that he had with Lasa, however

limited it might have been by his work schedule.” He noted Father’s testimony that “Lasa’s

love language was quality time, and that he had tried to make that priority, whether it was

cooking with her, playing with her, or reading bedtime stories together.” Ultimately, the

trial court did not state whether this factor weighed in favor of either party. We conclude

that it weighs in Mother’s favor given that she clearly performed the overwhelming

majority of parenting responsibilities relating to the daily needs of the child, and Father’s

time with Lasa was limited. See Rajendran v. Rajendran, No. M2019-00265-COA-R3-

- 20 -

CV, 2020 WL 5551715, at *5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2020).

We now turn to factor 2, which the trial court gave “significant weight.” It requires

us to consider:

Each parent’s or caregiver’s past and potential for future performance of

parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability of each of the

parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing

parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s parents,

consistent with the best interest of the child. In determining the willingness

of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and

continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s

parents, the court shall consider the likelihood of each parent and caregiver

to honor and facilitate court ordered parenting arrangements and rights, and

the court shall further consider any history of either parent or any caregiver

denying parenting time to either parent in violation of a court order.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(2). Specifically, we consider Mother’s willingness and

ability “to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship”

between Lasa and Father, consistent with her best interest. See id. We consider the

likelihood that Mother would honor and facilitate court ordered parenting arrangements

and rights and any history of denying parenting time in violation of a court order. See id.

“[T]his factor may, depending upon the circumstances of the case, be an important part of

the court’s best interests determination and ‘may very well dictate the outcome of the

analysis.’” Solima v. Solima, No. M2014-01452-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 4594134, at *5

(Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2015) (quoting In re Marr, 194 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2005)). “Our case law is accordingly replete with examples where the greater willingness

of one parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship

between the child and the other parent has been the decisive factor in determining parenting

arrangements.” In re Zamorah B., No. M2011-00864-COA-R3-JV, 2013 WL 614449, at

*6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013) (citing In re Jonathan S. C-B, M2010-02536-COA-R3-

JV, 2012 WL 3112897 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2012); Howe v. Howe, E2008-02580-

COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 323068 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010); Morman v. Morman,

M2005-00931-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 2068757 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2006)). 8

8

We briefly note the facts, however, in these examples. In Jonathan S. C-B, 2012 WL 3112897,

at *14, this factor was deemed “especially relevant” where the trial court found that the mother engaged in

“a deliberate process of alienation by accusing Father of abusing the minor child, that she had refused to

consider any evidence that the alleged abuse had not occurred, and that her obsession had led her to subject

the child to multiple physical and verbal interviews and examinations of the child, which were not merited,

did not produce any valid disclosures, and were detrimental to the child’s well-being.” In Howe, 2010 WL

323068, at *2, the trial court stated “the father won ‘hands down’ on [this] factor” and noted that the mother

had tried to get the father arrested on more than one occasion, deprived him of visitation for no good reason,

and said inappropriate things to the father in the child’s presence. The mother had “screaming episodes in

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We now examine the findings the trial court made in support of its decision to give

this factor significant weight. In the final decree, the trial court found that “[Mother] has

failed to facilitate a relationship between the children and [Father] and testified to this

Court that she does not believe it is her responsibility to do so.” We cannot agree with this

finding regarding Mother’s testimony to the extent that it relates to Lasa. Mother testified

that she did not believe it was her responsibility to encourage a relationship between Father

and Anna. However, Mother testified that she does encourage the relationship between

Father and Lasa. She testified:

Q. Okay. What about Lasa? Do you encourage a relationship between

Lasa and [Father]?

A. Sure.

Q. Give me an example of how you encourage that relationship.

A. I don’t stand in the way of her going back and forth. When she comes

back from doing things with [Father], I’m excited to hear the details

of the things they did. Yeah. There’s been no discouragement.

When asked again what she would do to foster a good relationship between Lasa and

Father, Mother said she would abide by all court-mandated directives, provide him notice

of things, “meeting up,” and “not talking about [Father].” She noted that after Lasa spends

time with Father, “when she comes home and tells me what she’s done, I meet her and I

celebrate with her.” As an example, she stated, “I wasn’t a fan of [Father] taking her to get

her braids done, but they were lovely and she loves them, so I love them with her.” As

the child’s presence.” Id. at *1. Finally, in Morman, 2006 WL 2068757, at *5, the trial court relied on

“Father’s ability to better facilitate a positive parent-child relationship between Mother and the children,”

concluding that “Mother had taken affirmative steps to interfere with Father’s relationship with the

children.” The mother made his contact with the children as difficult as possible, failed to timely respond

to his requests for information about them, unilaterally demanded changes in the transportation arrangement

after she moved, indicated that “knowing the children’s whereabouts [was] none of [Father’s] business,”

failed to inform him of daycare arrangements, and lied to him about the fact that the children were seeing

a counselor. Id. at *4.

Similarly, in In Zamorah B., 2013 WL 614449, at *6-7, we affirmed a trial court’s decision to deem

factor 2 the “decisive factor” where the mother “repeatedly refused to abide by the Court’s order regarding

derogatory remarks about the father in the presence of the minor child, visitation, and medical issues,”

“continuously allowed her feelings about the father to control her behavior despite numerous Court Orders,”

and had been held in contempt for withholding visitation. In Rucker v. Harris, No. M2013-01240-COA-

R3-JV, 2014 WL 3530851, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2014), this Court acknowledged that factor 2

“has been decisive in a number of cases,” but we distinguished Zamorah B. and Johnathan S. C-B as cases

in which “one of the parents showed such unrelenting and irrational hostility towards the other that it would

have eliminated any possibility for the child to have a healthy relationship with both parents if left in the

care of the hostile one.” That was not the situation in Rucker, as the parties “generally put the best interest

of the children first, despite the disagreements that have sometimes arisen between them.” Id. at *4. See

also Solima, 2015 WL 4594134, at *6 (distinguishing this line of cases because the case before it was not

one in which “one party has engaged in egregious behavior while the other has steadfastly maintained his

or her willingness to co-parent”).

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such, the trial court’s finding that Mother “testified to this Court that she does not believe

it is her responsibility” to facilitate a relationship between Father and Lasa is not supported

by the evidence.

Next, during his oral ruling, the trial judge stated that “[t]he difficult part of this

case, and a theme that has emerged consistently in this case is that [Mother] has not

attempted to foster a healthy relationship with specifically Anna and [Father], and that has

sometimes reflected itself in the care of Lasa.” However, he only listed one example that

concerned Lasa. The trial judge stated:

One example that the Court found telling was [Father] testified that

though he expressed a desire to take Lasa to school more than once a week,

[Mother] was not open to that idea and she felt that that was her job.

In her pretrial deposition, [Mother] testified that even though [Father]

would be taking Lasa to school post-divorce more often, she did not think it

was appropriate for [Father] to take Lasa to school more often to prevent

adjustment to a new routine that was certain to happen.

Having carefully reviewed the record, we do not discern anything unreasonable about

Mother’s actions with respect to this issue. She testified that she had been taking Lasa to

school in the mornings “all of these years,” with the exception of Father taking her one day

a week “off and on, when he could . . . for a little while.” It was not until after the divorce

was filed that he proposed to start taking Lasa two days a week rather than one. The parties’

text message exchange is in the record before us, and Mother simply responded, “No

thanks. That’s my job and I’d like to maintain our normal routine.” Mother explained that

she had always taken Lasa to school and that it was “a stretch” to say Father had been

taking her one day a week. Still, the parties ultimately agreed that Father would take Lasa

to school on Thursdays. Mother testified that she wondered how Father would manage

taking Lasa to school on additional days “because there are days when he leaves very early

and he would not be able to drop her off.” On the days when Father took Lasa to school,

he dropped her off at 7:00 a.m. so that he could arrive in Lebanon by 8:00 a.m. Mother

also admitted that she felt this was an attempt by Father to remove some of her

responsibilities in order to “set up his token participation” for the court, as it was something

he had never done before. Mother conceded that, in the midst of the divorce proceeding,

she was wary of Father pushing her out of her regular responsibilities so that he could come

to court and say, “I do this, I do this.” As for the deposition testimony the trial judge

referenced, Mother was asked during her deposition:

Q. Now, you agree that when this divorce is final, that he will be required

to take Lasa to school.

A. Absolutely. That will be out of my hands.

Q. Do you think it would be a good idea to allow him to do some of that

now, while y’all are still living together, and she’s able to adjust to

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that and -

A. No, I don’t.

The judge stated that this “prevent[ed] adjustment to a new routine that was certain to

happen.” However, a new routine was not certain to happen at the time of Mother’s

deposition. She proposed a parenting schedule whereby Lasa would live primarily with

her and have parenting time with Father one weeknight per week and every other weekend.

Thus, Mother testified that she was trying to “maintain[] the routines” the family had. In

our view, this does not reflect negatively on Mother’s parenting or require weighing this

factor against her. Maintaining a routine the parties had for years would provide stability

for Lasa during the divorce.

We now turn to the trial court’s findings with respect to this factor regarding the

older children. Based on Mother’s “history with her older two children,” the trial judge

predicted in his oral ruling that “Lasa will be forced into a damaging game of you’re either

with me or against me.” The judge stated that he was “struck by the contrast” in the older

children’s relationships with Mother and Father. He stated that “[t]he situation with Noah

and Christmas” was “a good example.” The judge said that Noah was supposed to spend

time with Mother during Christmas but changed his mind and wanted to spend time with

both parents during the holiday. The trial judge found that the text messages showed that

Father “was attempting to handle Noah’s change of plans in a thoughtful, considerate way,”

while Mother, rather than recognizing the way the divorce could be affecting Noah, “told

him she didn’t want him to come to Alabama for any time during the Christmas holiday.”

This, however, is only half of the story. Noah proposed to leave Alabama on Christmas

day and drive back himself, and Mother stated in her text message to Father that Noah was

“insensitive to the situation and dismissive and rude.” When Father said he had advised

Noah to think about it “overnight and into tomorrow before deciding,” Mother responded

with a message stating, “Unfortunately, it’s not his decision to make anymore. He’s made

them all uncomfortable and hurt and they don’t want that energy there.” She later sent

another message stating, “Neither do I.” She added that “the decision to be unkind was

his.” Mother wrote that “the selfishness, disrespect, and disregard for his mother and

family continues.” Her text message to Noah explained that he had been “wrong headed

and cold toward a lot of people who have loved you and done good to you at every turn,”

as he hurt not only her and Anna but his grandparents and cousins, and she expected him

to send a sincere apology to them in his stead. She explained to Father that Noah “called

me pissy, childish, and whiny,” “refused to meet up,” and “wrapped it up in sarcasm and

mockery.” Thus, it appears that it was Mother’s family who made the decision to disinvite

Noah, and it was because of his rudeness to them. While the situation was unfortunate, it

was not a simple case of Mother wanting to punish Noah for asking to spend time with

Father at Christmas, as she appeared primarily concerned with his behavior and attitude.

The next issue the trial judge mentioned in his oral ruling relates to language used

by Mother during her deposition. He stated:

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The Court is also tremendously concerned with respect to how

[Mother] discusses Noah. She doesn’t refer to Noah as a child who isn’t

always honest and sometimes doesn’t play fair. She labels him as a cheater

and a liar. Labeling a child is damaging. A parent is supposed to teach, guide,

and correct inappropriate action, not label. Labeling tells a child that one of

the two most important people in their life has defined them and given up on

them.

We agree that it would have been preferable for Mother to state, when explaining why

Noah needed more supervision with his homeschool, that he cheats and lies rather than

using the terms she did. When asked about Mother’s statements, Father agreed that Noah

“[has] had some times where that’s been a struggle for him.” Ultimately, though, “we do

not wield custody and parenting time decisions as weapons to punish parents for their poor

decision-making.” In re Gabby G., No. M2024-00541-COA-R3-JV, 2025 WL 2335851,

at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2025). Misconduct of parents may properly be considered

in the determination of custody when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

Id. However, “[c]ustody should never be used to punish or reward the parents, but rather

should promote children’s best interests by placing them in an environment that will best

serve their physical and emotional needs.” Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). Mother’s use of these two terms in her deposition with

respect to her nearly eighteen-year-old son does not weigh heavily in our analysis of what

parenting schedule is in the best interest of Lasa.

Next, the trial judge credited Father for his position with respect to Anna. He found

that Father “has clearly not given up on his daughter,” but “[r]ecognizing that Anna has

taken a side, [Father] has not tried to force a relationship on – upon her but has continued

to stay in contact with Anna and to be available when and if she is ready.” This is at odds

with Mother’s testimony that Anna feels harassed by Father. Mother testified that Father

continued to go into her space when they were still living in the same house and left notes

for her, “[e]ven after her counselor has told him to stay out of her space.” She testified that

Father went through her trash and questioned things she had thrown away. She said he

also “manipulated situations to try to make her be with him against her will,” which resulted

in Anna being “in tears and her fleeing.” Thus, the trial court’s finding that Father “has

not tried to force a relationship” with Anna is not supported by the record.

Next, the trial judge stated during his oral ruling that he found “the impact that

[Mother’s] behavior has had on her daughter Anna” to be disturbing. He found that Mother

had treated Anna “not as her child, but as an ally.” The judge listed several examples:

Whether stating that it’s not her responsibility to facilitate and encourage a

close and continuing parent/child relationship between Anna and her father,

promoting physical separation by spending large amounts of time alone in

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her bedroom with Anna, sequestering her from her siblings and her father,

discussing the wrongness of [Father’s] desire for a divorce with Anna, or in

a telling response to a deposition question, when asked whether the home

environment was healthy for Anna, [Mother’s] response was, “No. We are

ready for it to be over.”

The trial judge stated that a parent is supposed to provide emotional support to a child, and

yet Mother was seeking emotional support from her daughter.

Interestingly enough, Mother testified that Father’s counselor told him that he was

having his emotional needs met in the children. As for the living situation while the parties

continued to reside in the marital residence together during the divorce, everyone appeared

to agree that it was an unhealthy environment and that they were ready for it to be over.

Father testified during his deposition, “It’s a hard environment at home, yes.” He said he

and Mother generally only communicated by text message. Father even filed a motion to

sell the marital residence prior to trial, which stated that Anna’s therapist had informed him

“that the child is emotionally struggling and will not be able to begin to accept the parties’

separation, heal, or repair her relationship with Husband as long as the parties continue to

reside together.” Mother testified that she stayed in her bedroom once Father got home

from work because she did not want to “hang out” with Father and wanted each of them to

have their own space. However, she said, “I do not separate Anna from him.” She said

she also informed Noah and Lasa that they could come and go from her room as they

pleased. We view this as a reasonable response to a difficult situation. The trial court

essentially faulted Mother for staying in her bedroom while saying nothing of Father hiding

in a water closet.

We presume that the trial court’s reference to Mother discussing the “wrongness”

of the divorce was due to her discussion of whether the divorce was unbiblical. Again, it

appears that this issue was handled in an entirely appropriate manner given that the entire

family sat down together to discuss the matter, and Father did not object to what was said.

Mother testified that she characterized the divorce as unbiblical “[i]n scriptural opinion”

but noted that “this is the opinion that [Father] has raised our family on too.” According

to Mother, Father was removed from the membership of their church “as a result of this

unbiblical divorce.”

Finally, the trial court found that Mother “has caused psychological damage to the

parties’ children.” The judge found that Mother’s “parentification of Anna will

psychologically damage her in ways that will manifest themselves later in her adult life,”

and he found that “[t]hrough Anna’s own testimony, it is clear to the Court that [Mother]

has co-opted her daughter as a confederate in this divorce and that damage has been done.”

Again, we find no support for the trial court’s conclusion that psychological damage has

been done. There was certainly no expert testimony to that effect at trial, and we find

nothing to suggest that Mother has caused psychological damage to any of the children.

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Although Anna was seeing a counselor, the proof at trial was that the counselor told Father

“to stay out of her space” and yet he continued to go into her space anyway and leave notes

and go through her trash. 9

In summary, it is undisputed that Mother has taken the position that it is not her

responsibility to encourage the relationship between Anna and Father. At the same time,

she testified that she was not going to discourage Anna from having a relationship with

Father and told Anna, “it’s going to be okay if you feel differently later.” Mother testified

that she had not spoken negatively about Father in front of the children, nor had she allowed

anyone else to do so. This testimony was not disputed by anything except possibly Father’s

unsupported speculation. In essence, Mother had taken a neutral position regarding this

particular relationship. Factor 2 requires us to consider each parent’s “past and potential

for future performance of parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability

of each of the parents [] to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child

relationship between the child and both of the child’s parents, consistent with the best

interest of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(2). Thus, Mother’s refusal to

encourage the relationship between Anna and Father is a factor to be considered, and it

weighs against her in the best interest analysis. But, we must keep in mind that we are

considering the best interest of Lasa. Returning to the language of the statute, we do not

foresee any likelihood that Mother would fail to facilitate court ordered parenting

arrangements, and she has not denied parenting time to Father in violation of a court order.

See id. We also note that despite Father’s suspicions about Mother alienating the children,

he does not point to a single derogatory remark by Mother about him. Having carefully

reviewed each of the examples cited by the trial judge, we find no egregious behavior by

Mother. Thus, we deem this factor to favor Father, but we do not give it significant

weight. 10

9

For the same reasons, we find no basis for the trial court to have threatened the use of Tennessee

Code Annotated section 36-6-406(d)(5), which provides that a parent’s residential time shall be limited if

the Court determines that a parent has engaged in “[t]he abusive use of conflict by the parent that creates

the danger of damage to the child’s psychological development.”

10

We considered a comparable situation in Brown v. Brown, 571 S.W.3d 711, 718-19 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2018), where a trial court deemed factor 2 “dispositive” and named a father primary residential parent,

largely relying on text messages between the parties during the early months of the divorce in which the

mother displayed “quite the temper” and used derogatory terms and an expletive “to describe what type of

father she believed him to be.” She had been critical and dismissive of the father during early hearings but

by the time of the final hearing “had softened her attitude and articulated an understanding of the need of

the child to have a good relationship with both parents.” Id. The father offered the messages to prove “the

name-calling itself” but did not contend that the mother threatened interference with his parenting rights.

Id. at 720. We concluded that the messages had “little to no probative value in the factor (2) analysis.” Id.

We explained, “It is common for divorcing parents to harbor animosity toward one another, especially in

the early stages of the divorce. It is also common for divorcing parents to be uncivil in their communications

with one another.” Id. However, we noted that the parties had largely sheltered the child from the brunt of

their verbal attacks by containing their incivility to private messages. Id. Putting aside the messages, we

were “left only with the trial court’s speculation” about the reason for the mother’s recent improved

behavior and “the possibility of future bad conduct.” Id. We noted, “Although a trial court has extensive

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We now move on to factor 3, regarding refusal to attend a parent education seminar.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(3). We agree with the trial court that it is inapplicable.

Factor 4 is “[t]he disposition of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing,

medical care, education and other necessary care.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(4). In

the trial court’s oral ruling, it found that the parties’ traditional homemaker-breadwinner

arrangement during the marriage “provided stability for Lasa and reflected the positive

disposition of each party to create and provide her with a home structure that provided for

her food, clothing, education, medical, and other necessary care.” It found that “[b]oth

parties have the capability, the willingness, and most importantly, the desire to meet her

needs.” The court did not state whether this factor weighed in favor of either party. We

conclude that this factor weighs equally in favor of both parties.

Factor 5 requires us to consider “[t]he degree to which a parent has been the primary

caregiver, defined as the parent who has taken the greater responsibility for performing

parental responsibilities.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(5). The court did not state

whether this factor weighed in favor of either party. Father admitted at trial that Mother

had been the children’s primary caregiver and conceded that this factor favors Mother. For

the same reasons discussed with respect to factor 1, we likewise conclude that this factor

weighs in favor of Mother.

Factor 6 is “[t]he love, affection, and emotional ties existing between each parent

and the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(6). The trial judge found “ample evidence

in the record reflecting that both mother and father were bonded with Lasa in a way that

reflected love and affection.” He did not state whether this factor weighed in favor of either

party. We conclude that this factor weighs equally between the parents.

discretion in determining which parent is more likely to facilitate and encourage a good relationship

between the child and both parents, the court’s decision must be guided by the language of the statute.” Id.

The statute “specifically instructs courts to ‘consider the likelihood of each parent ... to honor and facilitate

court ordered parenting arrangements and rights, and the court shall further consider any history of either

parent ... denying parenting time to either parent in violation of a court order.” Id. (quoting Tenn. Code

Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(2) (emphasis added)). We also pointed to caselaw regarding this factor that had

“emphasized the importance of considering a parent’s compliance with court-ordered parenting

arrangements” while rejecting a trial court’s “mere speculation” without any evidentiary basis for its

“implicit prediction.” Id. at 721 (citing Burden v. Burden, 250 S.W.3d 899, 910 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)).

In conclusion, we held that the trial court “erred by overemphasizing the petty insults that mother directed

at father in private communications during the early stages of the divorce” when “[t]he content of those

messages [was] not probative of mother’s willingness to facilitate and encourage a good relationship

between the child and father.” Id. There was nothing to suggest that the mother had a history of violating

court orders or interfering with the father’s rights, so we found that the trial court “erred by presuming that

mother would seek to undermine the child’s relationship with father absent any evidence that mother had

previously interfered with their relationship or threatened to do so in the future.” Id. Thus, we deemed

factor 2 neutral and ultimately reversed the designation of the father as primary residential parent. Id. at

722, 727.

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The seventh factor for consideration is “[t]he emotional needs and developmental

level of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(7). The trial court did not state whether

this factor weighed in favor of either party, but the court found “no evidence that Lasa had

any specific emotional need or developmental abilities/disabilities that favor either party.”

We agree and deem this factor equal.

The eighth factor is “[t]he moral, physical, mental and emotional fitness of each

parent as it relates to their ability to parent the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(8).

This is one of the factors that the trial judge summarily stated was either inapplicable or

“did not militate substantially in favor of either party.” We disagree with this conclusion

as it relates to mental and emotional fitness. Father takes an antidepressant for seasonal

depression. He admits that he has an abnormal “trauma response” to normal situations

caused by events in his past. As Father put it, “What happens in me is sickness in my

stomach, my pulse increasing, muscles tighten up, my mouth gets dry, and above all a

desire to get away. So much so that this fight or flight reaction lasts for days afterwards.

Three days to be specific.” Mother learned that Father had hidden in a water closet in the

marital home because it was the only place he felt safe. He admitted to Mother and others

at his church that in recent years he had wished for Mother’s death or his own. Even though

Father testified that his depression has not impacted his ability to parent, Mother testified

that she had “concerns for his influence emotionally.” She found it concerning that “his

depression would be so severe that he would wish for his death or mine.” We agree that

these issues are concerning and deem this factor as weighing in Mother’s favor.

Factor 9 requires consideration of “[t]he child’s interaction and interrelationships

with siblings, other relatives and step-relatives, and mentors, as well as the child’s

involvement with the child’s physical surroundings, school, or other significant activities.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(9). “[A] parenting schedule that separates siblings is

discouraged; however, the best interests of the child should be the foremost consideration.”

Strickland v. Strickland, No. M2012-00603-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 6697296, at *14

(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2012). The trial court did not state whether this factor weighed

in favor of either party, but it did mention factor 9 in its oral ruling when stating that “given

the significant amount of time that Anna will be with her mother as agreed upon by the

Browns, it is not only likely, but probable that Lasa would be exposed to an echo chamber

of criticism towards her father.” As previously noted, however, Mother testified that she

had not spoken negatively about Father in front of the children, and she said she had not

allowed anyone else, including family members, to speak negatively about him either. We

deem this factor as weighing equally between the parties given that each parent will have

one of Lasa’s siblings residing in his or her home.

The tenth factor is “[t]he importance of continuity in the child’s life and the length

of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-

6-106(a)(10). The trial judge did not state whether this factor weighed in favor of either

party. He noted that Lasa came to live with the family at three days old and was adopted

- 29 -

shortly before her third birthday. We conclude that Lasa has lived in a stable, satisfactory

environment. Unfortunately, Lasa’s home environment must necessarily change because

both parents are moving from their current residence and city. Mother asked the trial court

to adopt her proposed parenting plan and permit Lasa to live primarily with her and Anna

in order to provide her with a “home base” and stable environment, given that Mother had

always served as Lasa’s primary caregiver and Anna had shared a room with her for several

years. Father’s proposal is for Lasa to alternate weeks between each parent’s house.

Mother’s proposed plan would permit her to continue taking Lasa to and from school, while

Father’s plan requires her to begin an after-school care program. Considering the

importance of continuity and stability for Lasa, we conclude that this factor weighs in favor

of Mother and her proposed schedule.

We agree with the trial court that factors 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16 were either

inapplicable or equal. However, Factor 14 requires consideration of “[e]ach parent’s

employment schedule.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(14). The trial court listed this

among the factors it summarily deemed inapplicable or equal and inexplicably made no

findings regarding the parties’ employment schedules as they related to parenting issues.

This is troubling. See, e.g., Grissom, 586 S.W.3d at 398 (observing that the trial court’s

mere statement that factor 14 was “inapplicable” was troubling and perplexing when there

was an abundance of proof about the issue at trial and this factor “should have been quite

important in the best interest analysis”). We conclude that this factor strongly favors

Mother. As we have said before,

[W]hile virtually all divorced parents must work outside the home, and some

parents must work atypical hours, it is not punishment to the parent to

consider the effect of her work schedule on the child. Rather, it is the court’s

job to ensure that the everyday quality of the child’s life is not sacrificed to

meet the parents’ needs or desires. Consideration of how “child-friendly”

each parent’s schedule must necessarily be part of that determination. “[T]he

child’s best interest i[s] the paramount consideration. It is the polestar, the

alpha and omega.” Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)

(emphasis in original). In this case, it is not unfair to [the parent] to consider

the effect of her work schedule on [the child]; rather, it is unfair to [the child]

not to consider it.

Wall v. Wall, No. W2010-01069-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 2732269, at *28 (Tenn. Ct. App.

July 14, 2011); see also Kathryne B.F. v. Michael B., No. W2013-01757-COA-R3-CV,

2014 WL 992110, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2014) (Kirby, J., concurring)

(“Emphasis on the ‘fairness’ to one parent or another is misguided; the trial court’s focus

should instead be on the child’s best interest. In this case, if Father’s work schedule means

that the child must spend the majority of his waking hours in the care of someone other

than his parent, that must be considered.”). Framing the issue in a manner consistent with

the traditional comparative fitness analysis, we ask: “Which parent’s work schedule is

- 30 -

better suited to serve the best interest of the child?” Brown, 571 S.W.3d at 724. In Brown,

for example, we found that a mother’s work schedule “would provide the most stability for

the child and would minimize the number of hours the child is in the care of third parties,”

as the father sometimes worked overtime and extended hours. Id. at 725. Likewise, in In

re Jayden C., No. M2014-00957-COA-R3-JV, 2015 WL 1384346, at *2, *5 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Mar. 23, 2015), we explained that a father who was home each evening was in a better

position “to provide [the child] with a stable, satisfactory environment,” where the mother

had long hours and relied on her parents to care for the child. See also In re McKayla H.,

No. W2020-01528-COA-R3-JV, 2023 WL 2809507, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2023)

(“Regarding factor (14), because Father is unemployed, he has more flexibility to care for

the Child. Thus, factor (14) weighs in favor of Father.”).

Here, Father testified that he was looking at rental properties in Gallatin in the

school zone for Benny Bills Elementary. However, he had to be at work in Lebanon by

8:00 a.m., so he planned to drop off Lasa at school at 7:00 a.m., the earliest that students

could be dropped off. School began at 7:40. It is unclear how much additional time would

be spent on their commute to the school in the mornings because it was unknown where

Father would live. He had already enrolled Lasa in the after-school care program and

planned for her to stay there from 2:40 to 4:30 in the afternoons until he could return after

work. So, Lasa would be at school from 7:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. each day. She would then

have some unspecified commute time home before her bedtime at 7:30. Given Father’s

history of working much later than 4:00 in the afternoons throughout the marriage, Mother

feared that Lasa would, in reality, be staying much longer at school. She testified that

Father had already picked her up late once from after-school care and returned to his office

with Lasa for a night meeting. Mother, on the other hand, lived 25 minutes away from the

school and was available to drive Lasa to and from school without the need for after-care.

In addition, Father would be working an hour longer most days during the summers, while

Mother would not be working. Mother’s work schedule is clearly better suited to serve

Lasa’s best interest, and this factor strongly favors her.

In summary, we conclude that one factor favors Father, five favor Mother, and the

remainder are either equal or inapplicable. The trial court did not state how many factors

weighed for or against either parent and apparently gave determinative weight to factor 2,

stating that “one factor has played an outsized role in the Court’s determination.” We

recognize that the relevancy and weight of the factors depend on the specific facts of the

case, and any one factor may prove determinative. Waddell v. Waddell, No. W2020-

00220-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2485667, at *37 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2023).

“Determining best interest is not a mathematical formula wherein one can find that certain

factors favor one parent over another and then somehow add up the factors to determine

the end result.” Broadnax v. Lawrence, No. E2016-01176-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL

2482986, at *26 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 8, 2017). Here, however, we have reviewed the

factual findings the trial court made in support of its decision to give determinative weight

to one particular factor and found that some of those findings were not supported by the

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evidence while others reflected entirely reasonable actions by Mother. Notably, in its

discussion of factor 2, the trial court gave only one example of conduct by Mother

involving Lasa, regarding the issue with taking her to school in the mornings, which the

court described as an “example that the Court found telling.” From our review of the

record, however, nothing about that situation warrants any limitation of Mother’s parenting

time with Lasa or deserves significant weight in our analysis. “[T]rial courts have broad

discretion in determining which parent should be the primary residential parent and

appellate courts are reluctant to second guess a trial court’s decision on this issue when so

much depends on the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility.” In re Taylor

G., No. W2024-01507-COA-R3-JV, 2026 WL 36225, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2026)

(quoting In re Shayla H., No. M2013-00567-COA-R3-JV, 2014 WL 2601564 at *5 (Tenn.

Ct. App. June 9, 2014)). “Nevertheless, trial courts ‘still must base their decisions on the

proof and upon the appropriate application of the applicable principles of law.’” Brown,

571 S.W.3d at 716 (quoting Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d at 631).

[Although] we are reluctant to second-guess a trial court’s decisions

regarding the adoption of a parenting plan, we will not hesitate to do so if we

conclude that the trial court’s decision is not supported by the evidence, that

the trial court’s decision rests on an error of law, or that the child’s interests

will be best served by another parenting arrangement.

Id. (quoting Massey-Holt, 255 S.W.3d at 611). 11

11

This Court’s decision in K.B.J. v. T.J., 359 S.W.3d 608 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) is also instructive.

In that case, the trial court designated the husband primary residential parent and ordered equal parenting

time on an alternating week basis. Id. at 610. The trial court treated only one statutory factor as “particularly

weighty” in its analysis -- the issue of stability and the fact that the wife had expressed a desire to move.

Id. at 615. We agreed with the wife that the trial court made its decision “not based on a reasoned exercise

of discretion, but out of a misdirected focus on whether she could move to Clarksville and whether the

parties had agreed on parental decision making.” Id. The trial court’s decision appeared to be based to a

degree on frustration that the wife refused to agree to the 50/50 schedule. Id. at 617. We explained that

“‘[w]hile the details of child custody and visitation arrangements are generally left to the discretion of the

trial court ... this discretion is not unbounded,’ and “[i]t is our job in reviewing for an abuse of discretion to

see that the trial court’s order is made with due regard for controlling law and based on the facts proven in

the case.” Id. at 615-16 (internal quotation omitted). We concluded that the trial court’s reasoning “over-

emphasize[d]” the importance of the marital home and “under-emphasize[d] other important facts proved

in the case.” Id. at 616. Other factors to which the trial court gave little or no consideration weighed heavily

in the wife’s favor. Id. We concluded that the trial court “erred in not assigning significant weight to

Wife’s role as primary caregiver.” Id. In addition, the husband worked in another city and left before 7:00

a.m., and he did not return home until 5:00 p.m. or later. Id. at 611. His employment schedule prevented

him from taking the children to and from school, while the wife had an employment schedule “subservient

to the needs of the children.” Id. at 616. We concluded that “[t]he trial court’s award of primary residential

parent status to Husband, with an equal and inflexible parenting schedule, has the undesirable effect of

making the grandfather a de facto parent for several hours every other week when Wife is available to care

for them and is asking to be allowed to fill that role.” Id. We reversed the designation of the husband as

primary residential parent and adopted a new parenting schedule. Id. at 617.

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Here, we conclude that “[a] proper balancing of all factors leads to the conclusion

that mother should have been designated as the primary residential parent.” Brown, 571

S.W.3d at 727. The trial court failed to make any findings regarding Father’s employment

schedule and commute and the burden that it would impose on Lasa. “[I]f Father’s work

schedule means that the child must spend the majority of [her] waking hours in the care of

someone other than [her] parent, that must be considered.” See Kathryne B.F., 2014 WL

992110, at *10 (Kirby, J., concurring). The trial judge erroneously assumed the existence

of psychological damage to the children while failing to even mention Father’s emotional

issues or the fact that he had wished for Mother’s death or his own. Given Mother’s long

history as primary caregiver since Lasa’s adoption and her flexible work schedule that

would permit her to take Lasa to and from school without the need for after-school care,

we conclude that it is in Lasa’s best interest to designate Mother as primary residential

parent. We reverse the trial court’s designation of Father as primary residential parent and

remand to the trial court for entry of a parenting plan consistent with this decision and the

plan proposed by Mother at trial, in which Mother is named the primary residential parent

and Father is awarded liberal, though not equal, visitation. We recognize, however, that

“‘[e]vents and lives have not stood still while this custody dispute has been in the courts.’”

Rajendran, 2020 WL 5551715, at *11 (quoting Wall, 2011 WL 2732269, at *26). As such,

when a trial court is directed to reconsider an issue on remand that involves

the circumstances of children and their parents, “the trial court should

endeavor to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ actual circumstances,

which will necessarily change over the course of time, e.g., people remarry,

have more children, insurance premiums rise and fall, and child care needs

change.” Accordingly, the trial court may, in its discretion, consider such

additional evidence to insure that any custody order is based on “the parties’

actual circumstances.”

Id. (quoting Kathryne B.F., 2014 WL 992110, at *7).

Mother also challenged on appeal the trial court’s decision to grant both parties joint

decision-making authority. The final decree simply stated that “the parties shall share

decision making authority” without any explanation. Tennessee Code Annotated section

36-6-407(c) provides factors for consideration in making such a determination. In the

absence of findings by a trial court, “this Court cannot glean its reason for [its ruling on]

decision-making authority nor can we discern whether the trial court considered the

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-407(c) factors in reaching its decision.” In re

Lennon R., No. M2018-00541-COA-R3-JV, 2019 WL 2226007, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App.

May 23, 2019). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s ruling as to decision-making

authority and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to

that issue. See id.; see also Rajendran, 2020 WL 5551715, at *12 (“In light of our decision

to remand the parenting plan issue, we believe that the best course of action is to vacate the

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decision of the trial court and remand for reconsideration in light of this Court’s opinion,

the changed parenting plan, section 36-6-407(c), and any changed circumstances that the

trial court, in its discretion, chooses to entertain. If the trial court nevertheless finds that

joint education decisions remain in the best interest of the child, the trial court is directed

to make specific findings of fact in support of that decision.”).

Due to the change regarding the designation of primary residential parent, we also

vacate the trial court’s rulings regarding child support and alimony and remand for

redetermination of those issues. See Anderton v. Anderton, 988 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1998) (“Child support decisions should precede decisions about spousal support

because a spouse’s ability to pay spousal support may be directly and significantly

influenced by the amount of child support he or she has been ordered to pay.”); see also

Holliday v. Holliday, No. E2023-01494-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 4646252, at *16 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2024) (“[W]e vacate the portion of the trial court’s order awarding

alimony to Wife and remand the issue of the appropriate amount of alimony to be awarded

once Husband’s child support obligation has been recalculated.”). Thus, we do not reach

the issues presented on appeal by Mother regarding the trial court’s alimony award and

award of attorney fees.

Finally, Mother requests an award of her attorney fees on appeal pursuant to

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c). “Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-

5-103(c) allows this Court, in its discretion, to award attorney’s fees ‘in regard to any suit

or action concerning the adjudication of the custody ... of any child[.]’” Cali v. Cali, No.

W2024-00773-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 3474133, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2025).

In cases involving the custody and support of children, it has long been the

rule in this State that counsel fees incurred on behalf of minors may be

recovered when shown to be reasonable and appropriate. Although there is

no absolute right to such fees, their award in custody and support proceedings

is familiar and almost commonplace. In awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to

section 36-5-103(c), the trial court may consider proof of inability to pay, but

such consideration will not be controlling.

In re Gabby G., No. M2024-00541-COA-R3-JV, 2025 WL 2335851, at *15 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Aug. 13, 2025) (quoting Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tenn. 2005)). Given

the purpose of the statute, Mother’s success on appeal, and the parties’ financial

circumstances, we exercise our discretion to grant her request for an award of reasonable

attorney fees on appeal. This case is remanded to the circuit court to determine the

appropriate amount of attorney fees to be awarded.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the decision of the circuit court is hereby reversed

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in part, vacated in part, and remanded. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellee, Joshua

Matthew Brown, for which execution may issue if necessary.

s/ Carma Dennis McGee

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE

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