Heather Sawyer Carvajal v. Danielle Santos Ferretti

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

HEATHER SAWYER CARVAJAL,

Appellant,

v.

DANIELLE SANTOS FERRETTI,

Appellee.

No. 4D2024-3293

[April 29, 2026]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

Broward County; Stefanie C. Moon, Judge; L.T. Case No.

062024DR019428AXDVCE.

Heather Sawyer Carvajal, Pompano Beach, pro se.

Hollis Elizabeth Mandell, of The Law Offices of Hollis E. Mandell, Davie,

for appellee.

KLINGENSMITH, J.

Appellant (“Girlfriend”) seeks review of a final judgment of injunction

for protection against stalking entered for Appellee (“Wife”). Because the

record does not contain competent, substantial evidence establishing the

statutorily required two separate instances of harassment, we reverse.

I. Background

The parties’ dispute arises from a contentious domestic situation. Wife

and her husband separated in 2021 and initiated divorce proceedings in

2022. Girlfriend began a relationship with the husband in 2019, prior to

the dissolution proceedings.

In October 2024, Wife filed a petition for an injunction for protection

against stalking, alleging four categories of conduct occurring between

August 2023 and October 2024:

1. August 2023 social media post: Girlfriend accused Wife of

manipulating others, using her child to spy, and included language

Wife perceived as threatening.

2. February 2024 social media post: Girlfriend again accused Wife of

stalking behavior, tagged Wife’s workplace, and warned others about

her. Wife testified this led to a meeting with her employer.

3. October 16, 2024 text message: Girlfriend contacted Wife

regarding a child support payment being sent via Zelle and

requested identifying information. Wife provided the information

and confirmed receipt through a court-approved communication

application.

4. October 23, 2024 communications: Following an incident

involving Wife’s cousin, Girlfriend sent Wife a series of messages

calling her derogatory names, accusing her of stalking, and telling

her to stay away. When Wife blocked her number, Girlfriend resent

the same messages via WhatsApp and email within minutes and

referenced possibly appearing at Wife’s workplace.

At the hearing, both parties appeared pro se. The trial court found the

statutory requirements satisfied and entered a three-year injunction

prohibiting Girlfriend from contacting Wife.

II. Standard of Review

“Trial courts have broad discretion in granting . . . injunctions, and

unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated, appellate courts will

not disturb the trial court’s decision.” Garcia v. Soto, 337 So. 3d 355, 359

(Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (quoting DiTanna v. Edwards, 323 So. 3d 194, 200

(Fla. 4th DCA 2021)).

However, “the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to

justify imposing an injunction is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Id.

at 359-60 (citation modified). Likewise, “legal sufficiency . . . as opposed

to evidentiary weight, is the appropriate concern of an appellate tribunal.”

Rosaly v. Konecny, 346 So. 3d 630, 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (citation

modified).

III. Governing Law

Section 784.0485(1), Florida Statutes (2024), authorizes injunctions for

protection against stalking. “Stalking” occurs when a person “willfully,

maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another

person.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2024).

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“Harass” means engaging in a course of conduct directed at a specific

person that:

1. Causes substantial emotional distress; and

2. Serves no legitimate purpose.

§ 784.048(1), Fla. Stat. (2024).

A “course of conduct” is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of

acts over time evidencing continuity of purpose. § 784.048(1)(b), Fla.

Stat. (2024).

Thus, to obtain an injunction against “stalking” based on allegations of

“harassment,” the petitioner must prove “willful[], malicious[], and

repeated[] . . . harass[ment].” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2024). Each

instance of “harassment” must be comprised of a “course of conduct” (that

is, a pattern of a series of acts over time evidencing continuity of purpose)

that both causes substantial emotional distress and serves no legitimate

purpose. § 784.048(1), Fla. Stat. (2024). Because the “harassment” must

be “repeated[]” for an injunction to issue, at least two instances of

“harassment” are required. §§ 784.048(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2024); see Carter

v. Malken, 207 So. 3d 891, 893-94 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (citation modified)

(“Stalking requires proof of repeated acts . . . . A minimum of two incidents

of harassment are required to establish stalking.”). Critically, “[t]wo or

more acts that are part of one continuous course of conduct are legally

insufficient to qualify as separate instances of harassment.” Garcia, 337

So. 3d at 360 (quoting Cash v. Gagnon, 306 So. 3d 106, 109 (Fla. 4th DCA

2020)). A qualifying course of conduct requires acts “separated by time or

distance.” Id.; see also Eichelberger v. State, 949 So. 2d 358, 361 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2007).

IV. Analysis

A. The Record Does Not Establish Two Separate Instances of

Harassment

1. The October 23 communications constitute a single incident

The October 23, 2024 communications—sent via text message,

WhatsApp, and email—were transmitted within minutes, contained

substantially identical content, and arose from a single triggering event.

Under Florida law, this constitutes a single “course of conduct.” See

Garcia, 337 So. 3d at 360 (multiple approaches during a single encounter

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constitute one act); Cash, 306 So. 3d at 111; Eichelberger, 949 So. 2d at

361 (different forms of contact within a short time frame may constitute

one continuous episode). Accordingly, even if any of these

communications equated to qualifying incidents, these communications

would be considered only one “course of conduct” giving rise to, at most,

one instance of “harassment,” and not multiple.

2. The remaining incidents lack continuity of purpose

The remaining alleged acts do not combine to form a second qualifying

instance of “harassment.”

The August 2023 and February 2024 social media posts were separated

by months and were reactive in nature. The posts do not demonstrate the

continuity of purpose required to establish a course of conduct. See §

784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2024).

The October 16, 2024 communication concerned child support and was

unrelated in purpose to the earlier posts. Communications about financial

support for a child constitute conduct with a legitimate purpose and are

analytically distinct from alleged harassment. See Reid v. Saunders, 282

So. 3d 151, 152 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

Thus, these incidents are discrete and disconnected, not part of a

unified course of conduct.

3. No legally sufficient second instance exists

The difficulty in this case is not the absence of conflict, but the absence

of the kind of repeated, legally distinct conduct which section 784.048

requires. The record reflects a relationship marked by hostility,

accusation, and reactive communication. But when the allegations are

carefully examined through the lens of the governing law, the allegations

collapse into either a single continuous episode or isolated, unrelated

events—neither of which satisfies the requirement of two separate

instances of “harassment.”

The October 23 communications illustrate the point most clearly. On

that date, Girlfriend sent a rapid succession of messages to Wife, first by

text and then, after being blocked, through WhatsApp, and shortly

thereafter, by email. The messages were substantively identical, sent

within minutes of each other, and prompted by the same triggering event

involving Wife’s cousin. Although transmitted through multiple platforms,

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the messages were part of a single, uninterrupted effort to convey the same

message.

Florida courts have repeatedly rejected the notion that such conduct

can be artificially divided into multiple acts. In Garcia, we held that

multiple encounters during a single evening constituted only one act of

harassment, emphasizing that conduct must be meaningfully distinct—

not merely repeated in quick succession—to qualify as separate instances.

337 So. 3d at 361. Likewise, in Cash, we explained that multiple

communications forming one continuous episode cannot be parsed into

separate acts to meet the statutory threshold. 306 So. 3d at 111. And in

Eichelberger, the court recognized that different forms of contact occurring

within a short period and reflecting a single purpose constitute one course

of conduct, not multiple qualifying incidents. 949 So. 2d at 361. Under

these principles, the October 23 barrage of messages, however offensive

the Wife may deem the messages to be, amounts to only one incident as a

matter of law to be considered under section 784.048.

That leaves the remaining allegations: two social media posts made

months apart and a single communication regarding child support. But

these events, which also lack the necessary continuity of purpose, likewise

do not combine to form a second qualifying instance of harassment for our

consideration. Section 784.048 requires a “course of conduct,” meaning a

pattern of behavior evidencing a sustained objective. § 784.048(1)(b), Fla.

Stat. (2024). Here, the August 2023 and February 2024 posts were

temporally remote and reactive, each tied to discrete grievances. The

October 16 communication, by contrast, concerned the transmission of

child support and was wholly unrelated in purpose. Such disconnected

acts cannot be stitched together to create a qualifying course of conduct.

As Garcia explains, section 784.048 requires acts that are not only

multiple, but meaningfully related and separated by time or circumstance

in a way that demonstrates repetition and not randomness. 337 So. 3d at

360.

What remains, then, is a record showing one short episode of

continuous communication, and several isolated incidents spread over

more than a year. That is not enough. Section 784.048 demands two

separate, legally sufficient instances of “harassment,” not one incident

supplemented by unrelated or non-qualifying conduct. To hold otherwise

would be to dilute the statutory requirement and permit injunctions based

on the very type of intermittent, emotionally charged exchanges that

Florida courts have repeatedly held fall outside the scope of stalking.

Because Wife failed to prove two separate instances of harassment, the

injunction cannot stand. See Garcia, 337 So. 3d at 360-61.

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B. The Nature of the Conduct Does Not Satisfy the Statutory

Definition of Harassment

Although our conclusion regarding the lack of two qualifying instances

of harassment is dispositive for resolving this matter, the communications’

nature and alleged effect similarly reinforce the insufficiency of the

evidence to satisfy section 784.048’s definition of stalking or harassment.

1. No substantial emotional distress under an objective standard

“Whether a communication causes substantial emotional distress

should be narrowly construed and is governed by the reasonable person

standard.” Rosaly, 346 So. 3d at 633 (quoting David v. Textor, 189 So. 3d

871, 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)).

“A reasonable person does not suffer substantial emotional distress

easily.” Kaye v. Wilson, 363 So. 3d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (citation

modified). Rather, the conduct must be “extreme and outrageous.”

Rosaly, 346 So. 3d at 633.

Even accepting Wife’s testimony that she felt frightened, lost sleep, and

experienced anxiety as a result of Girlfriend’s conduct, the law requires

more than a subjective reaction. Section 784.048 demands proof of

“substantial emotional distress” measured by an objective,

reasonable person standard, and Florida courts have consistently

emphasized that threshold is high. § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2024). This

objective standard does not elevate generalized concern or unease into

legally sufficient distress. As explained in Rosaly, the inquiry is “narrowly

construed” and turns not on how this particular petitioner subjectively

felt, but on whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances

objectively would suffer distress of a truly significant magnitude. 346 So.

3d at 633. In other words, section 784.048 does not protect against all

emotional discomfort, but instead targets only conduct so extreme that it

would overwhelm an ordinary person. See Kaye, 363 So. 3d at 1159

(‘“[S]ubstantial emotional distress’ connotes an unjustifiable infliction of

stress of great proportion, in the nature of fear and concern.”) (quoting

Washington v. Brown, 300 So. 3d 338, 341 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)).

Measured against that standard, the conduct here does not qualify.

The record reflects insults, accusations, and disparaging social media

posts, namely being called a “psychopath,” a “stalker,” or an “abuser,” and

being criticized publicly. While such statements are undoubtedly offensive

and may be embarrassing or upsetting, Florida courts have repeatedly

held, as stated above, that this type of speech does not rise to the level of

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causing substantial emotional distress. Similarly, in Shannon, the court

held that even conduct causing embarrassment in a professional setting

does not meet the statutory threshold. 278 So. 3d 173, 175-76 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2019).

Nor do the communications here approach the type of “extreme and

outrageous” conduct required to satisfy the standard. Florida courts

reserve that label for behavior far more severe—such as repeated, intrusive

surveillance or conduct that invades a person’s physical sense of security.

See Rosaly, 346 So. 3d at 633. By contrast, the communications here

were electronic, intermittent, and easily avoidable—demonstrated by the

fact that Wife blocked Girlfriend’s number and did not respond to further

messages. Courts have recognized that a reasonable person is expected

to possess a degree of resilience in the face of unpleasant communications,

particularly where those communications can be ignored or avoided.

“Unpleasant, uncivil, and distasteful communications do not rise to the

level required to support a permanent injunction against stalking.” Id.

(citation modified).

As noted in Kaye, a reasonable person does not suffer substantial

emotional distress easily; the law requires a showing of something more

than worry or discomfort arising from a contentious relationship. 363 So.

3d at 1159. Section 784.048 is not triggered simply because a party feels

uneasy or wishes to prevent further unpleasant interactions. Mere

irritation, annoyance, embarrassment, exasperation, aggravation, and

frustration, without more, does not equate to ‘substantial emotional

distress.’ See Shannon, 278 So. 3d at 175-76.

In sum, the record reflects a series of emotionally charged exchanges,

but not conduct that would cause a reasonable person to experience the

level of distress which section 784.048 requires. Thus, even accepting

Wife’s testimony that she felt threatened or lost sleep, the conduct does

not meet the objective threshold which section 784.048 requires as a

matter of law. See Johnstone v. State, 298 So. 3d 660, 665 (Fla. 4th DCA

2020); Rosaly, 346 So. 3d at 633. Because the alleged behavior amounts,

at most, to embarrassment, frustration, and interpersonal conflict, it does

not satisfy the objective standard for substantial emotional distress and,

therefore, cannot support the issuance of a stalking injunction.

2. The conduct served legitimate purposes

Conduct cannot constitute harassment if it serves a legitimate purpose.

§ 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat (2024). “Conduct is legitimate when there is a

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reason for the conduct other than to harass the victim.” Gonzalez v.

Funes, 300 So. 3d 679, 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (citation modified).

Here, the record demonstrates that the communications at issue, even

if contentious or poorly worded, were not undertaken without purpose.

Rather, the communications were rooted in identifiable, legitimate

objectives falling outside of section 784.048’s definition of “harassment.”

Section 784.048 requires proof that the conduct “serves no legitimate

purpose,” and Florida courts have consistently interpreted that limitation

broadly, recognizing that human interactions, particularly those arising

out of domestic disputes, often carry mixed motives without becoming

unlawful. § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2024).

The October 16 communication regarding child support is the clearest

example. Girlfriend contacted Wife to facilitate payment of child support

on the husband’s behalf, requesting the information necessary to complete

the transaction. Even if Girlfriend herself had no independent legal

obligation to make the payment, the communication plainly related to the

financial support of the husband’s and Wife’s minor child where Girlfriend

was involved in paying those financial obligations. Florida courts have

held that such communications are inherently legitimate. In Reid, for

example, the court concluded that messages concerning child support,

“although worded harshly,” served an underlying legitimate purpose and

therefore could not support an injunction. 282 So. 3d at 152. Similarly,

in Gonzalez, the court recognized that a third party may have a legitimate

reason to involve herself in communications where the subject matter

concerns a shared financial or relational interest. 300 So. 3d at 683. Here,

Girlfriend’s involvement in transmitting child support on husband’s behalf

places her squarely within that principle.

The remaining communications likewise reflect purposes that courts

have deemed legitimate, even when expressed in an accusatory or

emotional manner. Much of Girlfriend’s messaging—particularly the

October 23 communications—was directed at telling Wife to cease contact

and to stay away following an incident involving Wife’s cousin. Florida

courts have expressly recognized that such communications serve a lawful

function. In Leach, the court held that contacting another person to

demand that they leave one’s relationship or personal affairs alone

constitutes a legitimate purpose. 162 So. 3d 1104, 1106 (Fla. 2d DCA

2015). This is notwithstanding the communication’s confrontational tone.

See Gonzalez, 300 So. 3d at 683. The same reasoning applies here. A

demand for distance, even if delivered with hostility, is not the kind of

purposeless harassment which section 784.048 contemplates.

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Importantly, the presence of anger, insult, or even an ulterior motive

does not negate legitimacy. As explained in Gonzalez, conduct remains

legitimate so long as it is driven by some reason other than pure

harassment, even if that reason is accompanied by personal animus. 300

So. 3d at 683. Human communications, especially those in strained

relationships, are rarely devoid of emotion. The law does not require

civility. Rather, the law requires only that the conduct not be wholly

without legitimate purpose.

Viewed in this light, the communications at issue—addressing child

support, responding to perceived interference, and demanding cessation

of contact—fall within the realm of legitimate, even if contentious,

interpersonal interaction. Because the communications were not

undertaken solely to harass, the communications cannot satisfy the

statutory requirement that the conduct serve “no legitimate purpose,” and

thus cannot support the issuance of an injunction for stalking.

C. Injunctions Are Not a Remedy for Interpersonal Conflict

The trial court’s ruling focused on the parties’ contentious relationship

and the perceived impropriety of Girlfriend’s communications stemming

from her involvement with husband and his personal affairs with Wife.

Though Florida courts have repeatedly cautioned against this practice in

other cases, the message bears repeating: stalking injunctions are not

designed to regulate contentious personal disputes.

The law draws a firm—but still misunderstood—line between conduct

that is unlawful and conduct that is simply unpleasant, offensive, or

emotionally charged. That distinction becomes especially important in

cases involving requests for injunctions against stalking, where courts are

frequently asked to intervene in deeply personal disputes.

At first glance, it is easy to see why someone embroiled in an

acrimonious relationship might turn to the courts for relief. Words are

exchanged, accusations are made, reputations feel threatened, and

emotions run high. The concern can be real. But the legal question is not

whether the conflict is intense, it is whether the conduct meets section

784.048’s definition of “stalking.” And that definition is intentionally

narrow.

Florida courts have long recognized that injunctions are extraordinary

remedies, not tools for refereeing personal disputes. In Logue, we made

this point plainly: injunctions are not available “to stop someone from

uttering insults or falsehoods.” 297 So. 3d 605, 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

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That principle reflects a broader judicial reluctance to transform everyday

conflict into legally actionable wrongdoing. Similarly, in Klemple, the court

cautioned that injunctions are not meant “to keep the peace between

parties who, for whatever reason, are unable to get along.” 197 So. 3d

1283, 1286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citation modified). In other words, the

law does not—and cannot—guarantee harmonious relationships.

This restraint is rooted first in section 784.048 itself. Section 784.048

does not prohibit rude behavior, social media arguments, or even harsh

personal attacks. Instead, section 784.048 targets a specific kind of

conduct: repeated, directed actions that cause 1) substantial emotional

distress, and 2) serve no legitimate purpose. That standard excludes

much of what occurs in interpersonal disputes. Arguments between

neighbors, former romantic or business partners, disputes involving family

members, and emotionally charged communications often arise from

recognizable—if imperfect—human motives. Such communications may

be regrettable, but are not necessarily unlawful.

Section 784.048’s requirement of “substantial emotional distress”

further underscores this limitation. Courts evaluate distress using an

objective standard, asking how a reasonable person would respond and

not how the affected individual before the court subjectively felt. As

explained in Rosaly, this standard is “narrowly construed.” 346 So. 3d at

633. The law assumes that reasonable people can withstand a certain

level of friction, insult, and discomfort without requiring judicial

intervention. Everyday emotions like embarrassment, anger, and anxiety

are part of the human condition. Section 784.048 is concerned only with

conduct that is so extreme it would overwhelm an ordinary person, not

merely upset them.

Another important limitation is the concept of “legitimate purpose.”

Human interactions, even contentious ones, often have underlying

reasons. A message about child support, a demand to cease contact, or

even a heated response to perceived wrongdoing may all serve legitimate

ends. As Gonzalez recognized, conduct does not lose its legitimacy simply

because the conduct is accompanied by anger or hostility. 300 So. 3d at

683. This principle prevents section 784.048 from sweeping too broadly

and ensures that courts do not penalize individuals for engaging in

ordinary though less-than-perfect communication.

Overlaying all of this is a constitutional concern. Many interpersonal

disputes are carried out through speech: texts, emails, social media posts.

When a court issues an injunction restricting communication, the court is

not merely resolving a dispute—it is limiting expression. As noted in

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DiTanna, such orders can function as prior restraints on speech, which

are viewed with deep skepticism under the First Amendment. 323 So. 3d

at 204. If courts were to issue injunctions whenever speech was offensive

or upsetting, they would risk suppressing protected expression and

overstepping constitutional boundaries.

A practical dimension also exists. Courts are institutions designed to

resolve legal disputes, not to manage ongoing personal relationships. If

injunctions were available whenever a relationship deteriorated into

hostility, the judicial system would become a forum for supervising human

behavior at its most personal level. Courts are not in the business of

monitoring arguments, policing tone, and adjudicating grievances that,

while real, are not legal violations. The law resists this role. Instead, the

law intervenes only when conduct crosses a defined threshold into

repeated, harmful, and unjustified behavior.

Ultimately, the limitation serves an important purpose. By reserving

injunctions for true stalking or harassment—by conduct that is repeated,

malicious, and seriously distressing—the law preserves the remedy for

those who genuinely need protection. At the same time, the law

acknowledges a difficult truth: not all harmful interactions are legally

remediable. Some conflicts must be managed outside the courtroom,

through personal boundaries, social consequences, or other legal avenues

better suited to address the dispute.

While a trial judge may understandably feel compelled to resolve the

full scope of a bitter and emotionally charged dispute brought into court,

the judge’s authority is not guided by sympathy or a desire to restore

harmony, but by the limits of the law itself. The judiciary’s role is not to

mediate every personal conflict or to impose civility where relationships

have broken down, but to determine whether the specific legal standards

established by the Legislature have been met. Again, as Florida courts

have cautioned, injunctions are not a means “to keep the peace between

parties who, for whatever reason, are unable to get along,” Klemple, 197

So. 3d at 1286, nor are injunctions available simply to restrain offensive

speech or interpersonal friction. Logue, 297 So. 3d at 614 (“[I]njunctions

are not available to stop someone from uttering insults or falsehoods.”).

However compelling the circumstances may appear, a judge must resist

the temptation to act beyond those bounds and instead apply the law as

written, granting relief only where the statutory requirements are satisfied.

The record here reflects precisely that type of acrimonious dispute.

Seciton 784.048, however, imposes a higher threshold that was not met.

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Section 784.048 exists to address specific, defined harms and where those

harms are not present, an injunction is not the appropriate remedy.

V. Conclusion

The record reflects a highly acrimonious dispute involving overlapping

personal relationships, accusations, and emotionally charged

communications. But section 784.048 requires more than hostility,

offensiveness, or discomfort. And, because the evidence does not establish

two separate instances of “harassment” supported by competent,

substantial evidence, the injunction was improperly entered and is hereby

reversed.

Reversed.

SHAW and LOTT, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.

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