Richburg

INTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

CRAIG RICHBURG,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 25-cv-195-ABA

v.

HOUSE OF RUTH OF MARYLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Craig Richburg alleges that between February 2020, when he met his

now ex-wife, Defendant Kalkidan Kifle,and approximately September 2023, various

domestic incidents occurred between him and Kifle that resulted in police and court

intervention. He claims that Defendant Kifle fabricated the claims against him. Plaintiff

initially filed this case in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland, against

various defendantsfor claims arising out of an alleged conspiracy to defame and

incarcerate him. One of the defendantsremoved the case to this Court. This Court

dismissed the claims against Anne Arundel County, Marylandand Anne Arundel Police

Department with prejudice and dismissed claims against Sgt. Jennifer Spieth and Cpl.

C.J. Eslick in June 2025 without prejudice.

Defendants Luann Edwards, Deena Hausner and House of Ruth of Maryland (the

“House of Ruth Defendants”) and Heartly House also filed motions to dismiss the

amended complaint. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended

complaint, which is opposed by Defendants Sgt. Spieth, Cpl. Eslick, the House of Ruth

Defendants, and Heartly House. Defendant Kifle has not participated in this case in the

two years it has been pending; therefore, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment

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against her. For the reasons that follow, the House of Ruth Defendants’ and Heartly

House’s motions to dismiss will be granted, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second

amended complaint will be denied, and Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment as to

Defendant Kifle will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND1

A. Factual background

Plaintiff Richburg first connected with Defendant Kifle over the phone and online

on February 24, 2020, and they first met in person on March 9, 2020. ECF No. 3 ¶¶15,

16. When Richburg first met her, Kifle allegedly told him that her name “was Beza

Gerbremaraium (phonetically).” ECF No. 3 ¶ 21. He alleges that when she later asked

him to send her $500 for a new lease and he asked her how to spell her name, she said

her name was Kalkidan Kifle. Id. ¶¶21, 22. Richburg alleges other examples of Kifle

makingfalse statements. Id. ¶¶ 24–28.

In April 2020, Kifle informed Richburg that she was pregnant, and they married

on October 2, 2020. Id. ¶¶ 17, 19. Richburg alleges that, between March and

approximately June 2020, there were at least three incidents in which Kifle either

threatened to harm herself or did in fact cut herself. Id. ¶¶ 31–39. On November 13,

2020, a dispute between the two ensued during which Kifle cut her wrists. Id. ¶ 40.

Richburg also alleges that during the dispute Kifle attempted to ingest Richburg’s

medication but was stopped; then, “Kifle also injured Richburg.” Id. ¶¶ 40–41. Richburg

called 911, and Kifle was transported to Baltimore Washington Medical Center

1At the pleadings stage, the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations

contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”

King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016).

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(“BWMC”). Id. ¶¶ 42–43. Richburg contends that the records from this visit show that

Kifle told the BWMC staff that she had cut herself out of anger and denied any physical

altercation and any history of self-harm or mental illness. Id. ¶ 43. BWMC personnel

allegedly also spoke to Kifle’s father, who reported that Kifle had a history of cutting

herself when she was angry. Id. ¶ 44. On January 19, 2021, Kifle allegedly reported to

her doctor that she felt safe at home. Id. ¶ 45.

In early 2021, Kifle and Richburg’s daughter was born. Id. ¶ 46. Richburg alleges

that he tried to help Kifle make several appointments for mental health evaluations and

treatments but that Kifle refused to go and would cancel or reschedule any

appointments. Id. ¶ 47. On March 1, 2021, Kifle was evaluated at Family Intervention

Partners and the report allegedly indicated that Kifle had suicidal ideations and was

“unable to control herself when angry[,] is easily frustrated[, and] experiences

wandering thoughts and is confused.” Id. ¶¶ 50–51. The evaluation diagnosis allegedly

stated that Kifle had an unspecified adjustment disorder. Id. ¶ 54.

Richburg contends that, on March 28, 2021, Kifle again attempted to take

medication while threatening to kill herself, but Richburg and Kifle’s father were able to

stop her. Id. ¶ 55. Kifle then allegedly hit Richburg; so, he called the Anne Arundel

Police Crisis Intervention Unit. Id. ¶¶ 56–57. On March 29, 2021, Richburg filed a

petition for protective order against Kifle based on Kifle’s suicide attempt and attempt

to harm Richburg and their daughter. Id. ¶ 59. A temporary protective order was issued

until April 5, 2021, when a hearing would be held on the petition. Id. ¶ 60.

On March 30, 2021, Anne Arundel police took Kifle to a court-ordered mental

health evaluation. Id. ¶ 65. During the evaluation, one of the officers allegedly told one

of the nurses that Richburg’s protective order petition was “not completely factual” and

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that they were concerned about Kifle’s situation. Id. ¶ 67.Kifle allegedly agreed that the

petition was not “completely factual”and denied that she had any suicidal thoughts. Id.

¶ 68. Kifle then filed a petition for protective order against Richburg, allegingthat on

March 17, 2021, Richburg pushed her to the ground in the basement and placed his

hands over her nose and mouth so she could not scream or breathe. Id. ¶¶ 69, 76–77.

Richburg contends that a statement of charges was filed against him for that March 17,

2021 incident and that he “was arrested and spent time in jail.” Id. ¶¶ 69, 75. Richburg

contends that this was the first he had heard such an allegation and that it was false and

made based on the prompting, coaching, and influence of the police, specifically Cpl.

Eslick. Id. ¶¶ 70–73, 79.

Richburg contends that a separate statement of charges, for second degree

assault, was filed “on or about March 31, 2021 . . . stemming from an incident on or

about 2/21/21.” Id. ¶ 81. That statement of charges was filed by “Police officer Detective

Owens” and “Off. Hubbard.” Id. ¶¶ 81, 86. Richburg contends that these allegations were

also false and were the result of prompting, coaching, and influence of the police. Id. ¶¶

82–85. “Upon information and belief, based in part upon discussions Richburg had with

Kifle, the false allegations of rape and abuse were at least in part generated by

employees and agents of Heartly house [sic], a non-profit shelter.” Id. ¶ 104.2

2In the amended complaint, Plaintiff does not specify when this alleged influence by

Heartly House occurred; however, in his proposed second amended complaint, Plaintiff

specifies that these discussions were the basis of the charges filed on March 31, 2021.

See ECF No. 57-1 ¶ 25. Therefore, any alleged generation or prompting of the rape

allegation would have occurred on or before March 31, 2021.

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On April 5, 2021, a judge held a hearing on both protective order petitions (based

on the incidents on March 17 and 28, 2021, respectively) and found by a preponderance

of the evidence that Kifle had assaulted Richburg and entered a final protective order for

Richburg against Kifle through July 5, 2021. Id. ¶ 61. The judge also granted Kifle a final

protective order against Richburg. Id. ¶ 88.

Richburg contends that at some unspecified time(s), “[t]he police crisis

intervention team hid Kifle,” id. ¶ 62, and Kifle began alleging that Richburg had raped

her—allegations he says she had not mentioned in any medical reports, id. ¶¶ 89–90.

On April 26, 2021, Kifle sent a text message: “I don’t care how much we argue,

he’s mine until I kill him. Then he’s Jesus’s problem.” Id. ¶¶ 91-92. An arrest warrant

was then issued for Kifle for violation of the protective order, and Richburg filed a

petition for custody of their daughter. Id. ¶¶ 91, 93–94. A judge ordered that Kifle

undergo another mental health evaluation. Id. ¶ 95. Richburg told the judge that the

police had previously interfered with Kifle’s evaluation on March 30, 2021; so, the judge

ordered that all mental health records be attached to the order for evaluation. Id. ¶ 96.

Sgt. Spieth allegedly removed the records from the order and again spoke to the

evaluating medical professional indicating that Kifle was not mentally unwell and that

Richburg was abusive. Id. ¶ 98. Cpl. Eslick allegedly went to the state’s attorney’s office

and told them that Richburg was “attempting to use the new charges to take custody of

his child.” Id. ¶ 100.

“Several weeks later, Richburg and Kifle reconciled” and sought dissolution of

their respective protective orders. Id. ¶¶ 101–102. Kifle allegedly admitted to Richburg

that the allegations in her protective order petition were not true. Id. ¶ 103.

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On July 28, 2022, Richburg and Kifle were in a car together with their daughter

in Ohio when Kifle allegedly “became dangerously abusive to Richburg while he was

operating the vehicle.” Id. ¶¶ 105–106. Richburg contacted the local police. Id. ¶ 107.

In the summer of 2022, Defendants Hausner and Edwards, employees of House

of Ruth of Maryland, began providing Kifle with legal representation. Id. ¶ 110. Richburg

alleges that the House of Ruth Defendants “illegally and improperly shared a copy of a

confidential, sealed[] evaluation that had been related to a completely unrelated matter

involving Richburg.” Id. ¶ 111. The complaint does not identify with whom the House of

Ruth Defendants allegedly “shared” the evaluation, but the complaint states, “The Court

in a contempt hearing concurred that the evaluation had been obtained illegally.”Id. ¶

112. On January 23, 2023, Kifle, in a sworn deposition, admitted to having fabricated

the rape allegation against Richburg. Id. ¶ 113. In September 2023, Kifle allegedly

admitted in court that Richburg had not committed any acts of abuse during their

marriage. Id. ¶ 114. Plaintiff contends that, as a result of the false allegations and his

arrest, he suffered damages from lost contracts with insurance companies worth

millions for his business. Id. ¶ 115.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff initially filed this case in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County,

Maryland, on April 2, 2024 against Defendants Kifle, Anne Arundel County, Anne

Arundel County Police Department, Sgt. Spieth,Cpl. Eslick, the House of Ruth

Defendants, and Heartly House. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on

October 26, 2024. ECF No. 3. One of the defendants removed the case to this Court on

January 21, 2025. ECF No. 1.

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On October 29, 2024, Defendant Kifle was served with a writ of summons

requiring her to respond within 30 days. ECF No. 18-2 at 2. On December 18, 2024, she

was served with the writ of summons as well as the amended complaintrequiring her to

respond within 30 days. Id. at 1. Kifle has not filed any response to the case in the

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County or before this Court; therefore, on March 6,

2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for entry of default. ECF No. 18. The Clerk entered default

on March 12, 2025 and sent Kifle a Notice of Default giving her 28 days to file a motion

to vacate default. ECF Nos. 27 & 28. Kifle has not filed any motion or response or any

other filing in this Court. OnApril 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment

as to Kifle. ECF No. 41.

On June 17, 2025, the Court dismissed the claims against Anne Arundel County,

Maryland and Anne Arundel Police Department with prejudice given that Anne Arundel

Police Department is not an legal body capable of being sued and for failure to file a

notice of intent to sue prior to the deadline as required under the Local Government

Tort Claims Act, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 5-301 through 5-304. Richburg v.

Anne Arundel Cnty., Md., Case No. 25-cv-195-ABA, 2025 WL 1697465, at *2 (D. Md.

June 17, 2025). The Court also dismissed the claims against Sgt. Spieth and Cpl. Eslick

(the “Officer Defendants”) without prejudice based on a failure to properly serve and

failure to allege facts sufficient to overcome the officers’ qualified immunity. Id. The

Court noted that Plaintiff’s claim based on allegedly seeking “false” criminal charges

against him was insufficient as he was arrested pursuant to a warrant and Plaintiff had

not plausibly alleged facts that would permit the Court to conclude that the warrant

lacked probable cause. Id. (citing Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998)).

Further, to the extent Richburg argued in his opposition brief to the Officer Defendants’

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motion to dismiss that the officershad “racial or gender animus against plaintiff,”the

Court noted that Plaintiff had not alleged such animus in his complaint. Id.Finally, the

Court stated that “[i]f Plaintiff wishes to move forward with claims against Defendants

Heartley [sic] House, House of Ruth of Maryland, Deena Hausner, [and] Luann

Edwards, he must file proposed summonses, properly serve them upon issuance of

summonses by the Clerk, and file new Return of Service forms.” Id. at *3.

On July 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that summonses be issued

for Sgt. Spieth and Cpl. Eslick. ECF No. 53. The Court denied the motion noting that the

claims against Sgt. Spieth and Cpl. Eslick had been dismissed and that “If Plaintiff

wishes to amend his complaint to re-assert claims against Sgt. Jennifer Spieth and Cpl.

C.J. Eslick, Plaintiff must file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint pursuant

to Local Rule 103.6.” ECF No. 56. On August 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to

file a second amended complaint. ECF No. 57. Sgt. Spieth and Cpl. Eslick filed a

response in opposition to the motion. ECF No. 61. The House of Ruth Defendants filed a

separate response in opposition to the motion, ECF No. 63, for which Heartly House

adopted the legal arguments and analysis, ECF No. 82. Plaintiff filed replies to each.

ECF Nos. 62, 65, & 88. At the same time as filing their response to Plaintiff’s motion, the

House of Ruth Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, ECF No.

63, for which Heartly House adopted the legal arguments and analysis, ECF No. 81.

Plaintiff opposes those motions. ECF Nos. 75 & 83.

C. Claims

In the amended complaint, Richburg alleges ten claims. He alleges negligence

(Count 1), negligent hiring, retention, or supervision (Count 3), intentional infliction of

emotional distress (“IIED”) (Count 4), civil conspiracy (Count 6), defamation: libel

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(Count 7), defamation: slander (Count 8), and malicious prosecution (Count 9) against

all Defendants. ECF No. 3at 12–23. He alleges violationsof 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 2)

against Anne Arundel County, Anne Arundel County Police, Sgt. Spieth, Cpl. Eslick,

House of Ruth of Maryland, and Heartly House only.Id.at 13. Healleges assault (Count

5) against Kifle only.Id. at 18.Finally, he alleges violation of the Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) (Count 10) against Heartly House, House

of Ruth of Maryland, Hausner, and Edwards only.Id. at 23.

In the proposed second amended complaint, Richburg alleges eleven claims. He

alleges negligence (Count 1), negligent hiring, retention, or supervision (Count 3), IIED

(Count 4), civil conspiracy (Count 6), defamation: libel (Count 7), defamation: slander

(Count 8), and malicious prosecution (Count 9) against Defendants Kifle, the House of

Ruth Defendants, and Heartly House. ECF No. 57-1 at 11–24. He alleges violations of 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 2) against Defendants Sgt. Spieth and Cpl. Eslick only. Id. at 12. He

alleges assault and battery (combined under Count 5) against Kifle only. Id. at 20.

Finally, he alleges violations of HIPAA (Count 10) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse

Act (“CFAA”) and corresponding Maryland law (Count 11) against Defendants Heartly

House and the House of Ruth Defendants. Id. at 25–26.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When a defendant asserts that, even

assuming the truth of the alleged facts, the complaint fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted,” the defendant may move to dismiss the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). At the pleadings stage, the Court “must accept as true all of the factual

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allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff.” King, 825 F.3d at 212.

To withstand a motion to dismiss, acomplaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative relief” by containing “enough facts

to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Although a court reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion “must accept as true all of the factual

allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff,” King, 825 F.3d at 212, bare legal conclusions “are not entitled to the

assumption of truth” and are insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

B. Motion for Leave to Amend

A party may request, and the court should freely give, leave to amend pleadings

“when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Generally, “courts should ‘liberally

allow amendment,’ and deny such leave only in cases of ‘prejudice, bad faith, or

futility.’” In re Triangle Cap. Corp. Sec. Litig., 988 F.3d 743, 750 (4th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Galustian v. Peter, 591 F.3d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Oroweat

Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 510 (4th Cir. 1986))(internal citations omitted). “[D]istrict

courts are free to deny leave to amend as futile if the complaint fails to withstandRule

12(b)(6) scrutiny.” Id. (citing Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 471 (4th

Cir. 2011)).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Negligence and Negligent Hiring, Retention, or Supervision

(Counts 1 and 3)

Under Maryland law, “[a] valid negligence claim . . .must allege: (1) that the

defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant

breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the

defendant’s breach of duty proximately caused the loss or injury.” Pendleton v. State,

398 Md. 447, 460 (2007) (citing cases). The same elements apply for a claim of

negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. See Jones v. State, 425 Md. 1, 18 (2012)

(citing Horridge v. St. Mary’s Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 382 Md. 170, 180 (2004)).

“[T]here can be no negligence where there is no duty that is due; for negligence is

the breach of some duty that one person owes to another.” Pendleton, 398 Md. at 460

(quoting W. Va. Cent. & Pittsburgh Ry.Co.v. State, 96 Md. 652, 666 (1903)).“Whether

a duty exists depends upon whether one party is entitled to the protection of, or is under

an obligation to, the other party.” Id. at 461 (citing Doe v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co.,

Inc., 388 Md. 407, 415 (2005)). A defendant only owes a duty to “foreseeable plaintiffs.”

Furr v. Spring Grove State Hosp., 53 Md. App. 474, 482 (1983). “Where the failure to

exercise due care creates a risk of economic loss only, courts have generally required an

intimate nexus between the parties as a condition to the imposition of tort liability. This

intimate nexus is satisfied by contractual privity or its equivalent.” Iglesias v. Pentagon

Title & Escrow, LLC, 206 Md. App. 624, 638 (2012) (quoting Jacques v. First Nat’l

Bank, 307 Md. 527, 534–35 (1986)). The statute of limitations for a negligence claim is

three years. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101.

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The House of Ruth Defendants, and Heartly House by adoption, argue that

Richburghas failed to allege with “certainty and definiteness” facts and circumstances

sufficient to set forth any duty that theyowed to Richburg. ECF No. 63-1 at 9, 12. They

contend that there are no facts in the amended complaint to show that there was any

intimate nexus or contractual relationship between them and Richburg or to establish

any foreseeability of harm to Richburg. Id. at 9–10. They contend that the complaint

merely statesa conclusory allegation that Defendants owed Richburg a duty of ordinary

care. Id. at 9. The House of Ruth Defendants further argue that, even if they did owe

him a duty,Richburg failed to articulate any facts of how House of Ruth of Maryland

failed to use reasonable care when hiring, retaining, and/or supervising Defendants

Hausner and Edwards or any alleged breach that caused his injuries. Id. at 12.

Plaintiff contends that a duty arose, not from a formal relationship, but rather

from the foreseeable risk of harm created by Defendants’ allegedly illegal actions. ECF

No. 75 at 4. He contends that the House of Ruth Defendants acted in concert with others

to defameand maliciously prosecutehimand violate hiscivil rightsand that their

participation in this scheme created a foreseeable risk of harm to his reputation, liberty,

and livelihood. Id. He further contends that House of Ruth of Maryland had a duty to

supervise Defendants Hausner and Edwards and knew or should have known that they

were capable of inflicting harm. Id. As to Heartly House, Plaintiff contends that “[s]ince

the complaint directly alleges that employees and agents of Heartly House generated

false allegations, the Plaintiff has established the basis for the underlying tortious

conduct necessary for these vicarious claims. Heartly House owed a duty of care, and its

agents’acts (generating false claims and conspiring) breached that duty and proximately

caused the damages.” ECF No. 83 at 4.

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The amended complaint alleges that the House of Ruth Defendants began

representing Defendant Kifle in Summer 2022 and that they allegedly illegally obtained

a confidential evaluation in alleged violation of HIPAA. ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 110–112. Nothing

in these three paragraphs establishes that the House of Ruth Defendants had any

intimate nexus relationship with Richburg or establishes how Richburg was a

foreseeable plaintiff such that any duty arose for the House of Ruth Defendants. Even if

any duty existed, the complaint is devoid of any facts to show a breach of that duty,

particularly in terms of the hiring, retention, or supervision of Defendants Hausner and

Edwards. Therefore, the House of Ruth Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts 1 and 3 of

the amended to complaint will be granted.

Similarly, as to Count 3, the amended complaint lacks any facts regarding a duty

or breach by Heartly House and, in fact, does not mention any specific employees

alleged to have been negligently hired, retained, or supervised by Heartly House.

Therefore, Heartly House’s motion to dismiss Count 3 of the amended complaint will be

granted.

As to Count 1, the amended complaint does allege that Heartly House generated

false rape and abuse allegations against Richburg, which he contends would make him a

foreseeable plaintiff with a sufficiently intimate nexus that a duty of ordinary care would

be established and possibly breached. Id. ¶ 104. But even if the complaint adequately

alleged that Heartly House owed him a duty that could give rise to a negligence claim

(which the Court need not and does not decide), Richburg has confirmed when this

alleged false allegation was generated: prior to March 31, 2021. ECF No. 57-1 ¶¶ 23,25

(the proposed second amended complaint stating that Blaine Hoffmann, a former

employee of Heartly House, had generated these false allegations to prompt the March

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31, 2021 charges).3Under the statute of limitations, any negligence claim based on these

statements had to be filed on or before March 31, 2024. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.

Proc. § 5-101. Richburg, however, did not file his original complaint until April 2, 2024.

Therefore, this claim is barred by the statute of limitations and Heartly House’s motion

to dismiss Count 1 of the amended complaint will be granted.

Richburg’s proposed second amended complaint is futile as to Counts 1 and 3 as

it does not state any additional facts to establish that the House of Ruth Defendants or

Heartly House owed him any duty or breached any duty. To the extent that any duty has

been established as to these defendants, such alleged breaches are alleged to have

occurred prior to April 2, 2021, the relevant limitations period. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

motion for leave to file the second amended complaint as to Counts 1 and 3 is denied.

B. Section 1983 Claim (Count 2)

1. The House of Ruth Defendants and Heartly House

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs may only sue state officials or private parties

that act with such a “close nexus” to the state that they “may fairly be said to be a state

actor.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Jackson v.

Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,

937 (1982)) (internal citations omitted). “Private persons, jointly engaged with state

officials in the prohibited action, are acting ‘under color’ of law for purposes of the

statute. . . . It is enough that [the private person] is a willful participant in joint activity

with the State or its agents.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)

3According to Heartly House and the House of Ruth Defendants, Richburg’s proposed

second amended complaint misspells Mr. Hoffmann’s name as “Hoffman.” See ECF No.

64 at 5 n.6; ECF No. 82-1 at 2–3.

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(quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794(1966)) (internal quotations omitted).

“[P]rivate lawyers do not act under color of state law merely by making use of the state’s

court system.”Roginsky v. Blake, 131 F. Supp. 2d 715, 719 (D. Md. 2000) (quoting

Fleming v. Asbill, 42 F.3d 886, 890 (4th Cir. 1994))(internal quotations omitted).

Section 1983 claims are subject to a state’s personal injury statute of limitations. Cooper

v. City of Wheeling, --F.4th--, 2026 WL 585778, *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026) (citing

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985)).

The House of Ruth Defendants and Heartly House argue that the amended

complaint offers no facts to show that they were acting under the color of state law or as

a state actor in order for a Section 1983 claim to be asserted against them. ECF No. 63-1

at 11. Plaintiff argues that the “Amended Complaint explicitly alleges that the House of

Ruth Defendants conspired with the police defendants, who are state actors, to violate

the Plaintiff’s civil rights” and specifically that “they worked together to fabricate false

charges and interferewith a court-ordered evaluation.” ECF No. 75 at 5.

Richburg’s conclusory allegations regarding the House of Ruth Defendants and

Heartly House working with the Anne Arundel police are insufficient to establish that

they were acting under the color of law for a Section 1983 claim to survive. The amended

complaint does not include any factual allegations to show any coordination between

the House of Ruth Defendants, Heartly House, and the state. Further, the only role that

the amended complaint alleges that the House of Ruth Defendants played in the various

incidents was that they provided Defendant Kifle with legal representation,which is

insufficient to establish them as a state actor. Therefore, the House of Ruth Defendants’

and Heartly House’s motions to dismiss Count 2 of the amended complaint will be

granted.

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The House of Ruth Defendants and Heartly House argue that the motion for

leave to file a second amended complaint fails for the same reasons because no new facts

were alleged to support any conclusion that they were acting under color of state law.

ECF No. 64 at 4. Plaintiff argues that the Section 1983 claim against the House of Ruth

Defendants and Heartly House is meritorious because the proposed second amended

complaint alleges a long-standing conspiratorial relationship as evidence of the “joint

action” theory of liability under Section 1983. ECF No. 65 at 7 (citing Adickes, 398 U.S.

144). He contends that the proposed second amended complaint alleges House of Ruth

of Maryland’s involvement with Kifle beginning in January 2021 when they urged her to

leave Richburg and that the Officer Defendants became “personal friends” with Kifle,

“with whom House of Ruth Defendants were actively working, and that the police

officers even sat at the defense table in court on Kifle’s behalf.” Id.

The proposed second amended complaint is futile as itfails for the same reason

as the amended complaint.4 Theproposed second amended complaint alleges only

independent actions taken by the House of Ruth Defendants unrelated to actions taken

by the Officer Defendants, including actions taken by the House of Ruth Defendants in

their legal representation of Kifle. See ECF No. 57-1 ¶¶ 13, 35, 39–42, 49, 51. Other than

a conclusory allegation that “[f]rom August 2022 to April 2025, [House of] Ruth[of

4 The Court notes that, although the header of Count 2 in the proposed second amended

complaint states that Count 2 is alleged only against the Officer Defendants, see ECF No.

57-1 at 12, the paragraphs therein refer to Defendants broadly, see id. ¶¶ 66, 70, 80.

Further, Plaintiff’s reply brief argues that Count 2 is meritorious as to the House of Ruth

Defendants. See ECF No. 65 at 7. Therefore,although the second amended complaint

appears on its face to exclude defendants other than the Officer Defendants, given that

the outcome is the same, the Court willanalyze the Count 2 claim as to the House of

Ruth Defendants and Heartly House.

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Maryland]represented, advised, conspired with, encouraged, and provided legal

support to Kifle as Kifle, Spieth, Eslick, [House of] Ruth [of Maryland], Edwards, and

Hausner presented knowingly false accusations,” id. ¶ 57, and a statement that Sgt.

Speith sat at the defense table in court for Kifle, id. ¶ 38, the proposed second amended

complaint lacks any facts to allegeany joint activity between the House of Ruth

Defendants and the state.

Similarly for Heartly House, the proposed second amended complaint broadly

alleges that Mr. Hoffmann and the Officer Defendants prompted Defendant Kifle’s false

allegations but does not allege that they did so jointly rather than independently. See id.

¶¶ 23, 25, 28. Other than a conclusory allegation that “Eslick, Hoffman, and Spieth

allegedly conspired with Kifle, knowing the allegations were false and intended to help

Kifle regain custody,” id. ¶ 24, the proposed second amended complaint lacks any facts

to allege any joint activity between Heartly House and the state. And to the extent any

joint activity is alleged between Mr. Hoffmann and the Officer Defendants, the actions

are alleged to have occurred on or before March 31, 2021. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25. Because that is

beyond the limitations period, any joint activity theory for a Section 1983 claim against

Heartly House is barred by the statute of limitations. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.

Proc. § 5-101.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint as to

Count 2 against the House of Ruth Defendants and Heartly House will be denied.

2. The Officer Defendants

The Officer Defendants argue that the proposed second amended complaint is

futile as it still does not overcome qualified immunity. ECF No. 61 at 2. They point to the

Court’s prior decision holding that the Officer Defendants were entitled to qualified

17

immunity as there were no facts to show any racial or gender animus and the claims

regarding Richburg’s criminal charges failed because he was arrested pursuant to a

warrantand argue that nothing in the newly added facts addresses either of these

deficiencies. Id. (citing Richburg, 2025 WL 1697465, at *2; ECF No. 3 ¶ 99). The Officer

Defendants further argue that Richburg’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims

fail because Richburg was arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant and the proposed

second amended complaint includes no facts to allege that the warrant was premised

upon a lack of probable cause. Id. at 2–3. They argue that “[n]one of the new facts

alleged in the proposed amended complaint demonstrate that Sgt. Spieth or Cpl. Elsick

‘deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth made material false statements in

[the] affidavit’ supporting the warrant application, or that they ‘omitted from that

affidavit material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether

they thereby made, the affidavit misleading.’” Id. at 3 (quoting Jackson v. Carin, 646 F.

Supp. 3d 656, 666 (D. Md. 2022)). They contend that the proposed second amended

complaint does not identify who swore out the supposedly misleading arrest warrantor

which allegedly false statements were made with reckless disregard for the truth. Id.

Finally, they argue that to the extent qualified immunity does not apply, the new facts in

the proposed second amended complaint relate to police work that occurred between

February 2021 and April 2021, and thus would be barred by the three-year statute of

limitations based on when the original complaint was filed, and that the claims related

to police work alleged to have occurred “approximately a week later” than July 28, 2022

would be barred by the statute of limitation based on when the motion for leave to file a

second amended complaint was filed—August 1, 2025. Id. at 3–4 (quoting ECF No. 57-1

¶¶ 36–37).

18

Richburg argues that the proposed second amended complaint does have

sufficient facts to demonstrate credible violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights and overcome qualified immunity, such as the obstruction of a court-

ordered evaluation, abuse of legal process by quashing an arrest warrant, interference in

an out-of-state investigation, and conspiracy and subornation of perjury. ECF No. 62 at

5–6. He further argues that the facially valid warrant exception to a false arrestclaim

applies only when an officer makes a good faith error in a warrant affidavit rather than

when the officer is actively fabricating evidence and therefore does not apply to this

case. Id. at 7 (citing Miller v. Prince George’s Cnty., 475 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2007)).

Finally, he argues that the statute of limitations does not bar his claims (1) because the

Officer Defendants’ argument ignores the facts alleged to have occurred after January

21, 2022, (2) the actions that occurred after January 21, 2022 show “the continuous

nature of the alleged conspiracy which began on or about March 2021” and continued

through 2024, and (3) the legal viability of the malicious prosecution claim does not

accrue until the underlying criminal proceedings have been favorably terminated as this

is a required factor for the claim and therefore is not time-barred. Id. at 12–14.

The proposed second amended complaint fails to allege who specifically made

allegedly false allegations in a warrant affidavit and whether that specific officer did so

with “serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or [] obvious reason to doubt the

accuracy of the information he reported” in order to constitute reckless disregard.

Jackson, 646 F. Supp. 3d. at 666 (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir.

2000)) (internal quotations omitted). In any event, any claims based on actions that

occurred prior to April 2, 2021, such as any alleged obstruction of Kifle’s court-order

mental health evaluation, see ECF No. 57-1 ¶ 22, the issuance of the statement of

19

charges, id. ¶23, or quashing of Kifle’s warrant, id. ¶ 31, aretime-barred.5 As for

Richburg’s claim of malicious prosecution as a basis to overcome qualified immunity,

the proposed second amended complaint lacks sufficient facts from which the Court can

find this claim to have been timely filedas he does not state when any acquittal

occurred. Id. ¶ 32. Finally, Richburg has failed to sufficiently allege how his allegations

that Sgt. Spieth contacted Ohio authorities in the summer of 2022 or invited Defendant

Kifle to her family farm after the institution of this case constitute independent

constitutional claims in order to overcome qualified immunity. Id. ¶¶ 37, 46.Therefore,

the proposed second amended complaint is futile and thus Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

file a second amended complaint as to Count 2 against the Officer Defendants will be

denied.

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count 4)

For a claim of IIED to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff

must sufficiently plead all four elements of the tort: (1) the defendant’s conduct must be

intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) there must

be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and

(4) the emotional distress must be severe. Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 733 (1992)

(quoting Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566 (1977)). Factor 2 requires conduct “so

extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as

5 Richburg incorrectly states that the statutory period starts on January 21, 2022 as he

claims that his “original complaint was filed on January 21, 2025.” ECF No. 62 at 12.

Plaintiff, however, confuses the date that he filed his complaint, which was April 2,

2024, and the date in which the case was removed to this Court. ECF Nos. 1 & 2.

20

atrocious,and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”Id.(quoting Harris, 281

Md. at 567)(internal quotations omitted).

The House of Ruth Defendants and Heartly House argue that the amended

complaint fails to allege any actions by them that rise to the level of outrageousness

required for an IIED claim. ECF No. 63-1 at 14. They further argue the amended

complaint also fails to describe how any conduct by them contributed to any emotional

distress. Id. Plaintiff does not directly contest the arguments for dismissal of the IIED

claim and only says under his argument for his HIPAA claim that “the factual allegation

that the House of Ruth Defendants ‘illegally and improperly shared a copy of a

confidential, sealed, evaluation’ in violation of HIPAA is a validfactual allegation that

can be used to support other tort claims, such as civil conspiracy or intentional infliction

of emotional distress.” ECF No. 75 at 6.

The amended complaint fails to allege facts to assert that the House of Ruth

Defendants or Heartly House participated in any conduct that would rise to the level of

outrageousness required for an IIED claim. Further, the amended complaint lacks

allegations regarding the emotional distress, if any, experienced by Richburg and how

they were caused by these defendants’ actions. Therefore, the House of Ruth

Defendants’ and Heartly House’s motions to dismiss Count 4 of the amended complaint

will be granted.

The proposed second amended complaint is futile for the same reasons.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the second amended complaint as to Count

4 will be denied.

21

D. Defamation (Counts 7 and 8)

Under Maryland law, there is no distinction between libel and slander where

non-media defendants are involved. Metromedia Inc. v. Hillman, 285 Md. 161, 168

(1979).In order to state a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) the

defendant made a defamatory statement to a third person (a requirement known as

publication); (2) the statement was false; (3) the defendant was legally at fault in

making the statement; and (4) the plaintiff thereby suffered harm.” Doe v. Johns

Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 3d 355, 365 (D. Md. 2017) (citingGohari v.

Darvish, 363 Md. 42, 54 (2001)). “To satisfy federal pleading standards,a plaintiff must

specifically allege each defamatory statement.” Doe v. Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d

748, 757 (D. Md. 2015) (citing English Boiler & Tube, Inc. v. W.C. Rouse & Son, Inc., 172

F.3d 862 (Table), 1999 WL 89125, at *3 (4th Cir.1999)). Without specific facts as to the

contents of the alleged statements or when and how they were communicated, a

defamation claim cannot stand. See Brown v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., CaseNo. 12-cv-

1817-CCB, 2012 WL 6185310, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2012).

Actions for libel or slander must be filed within one year of the date the claim

accrues. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-105. “One important judicial exception to

the statute of limitations in Maryland is the ‘discovery rule,’ which ‘tolls the accrual date

of the action until such time as the potential plaintiff either discovers his or her injury,

or should have discovered it through the exercise of due diligence.’” Green v. Pro

Football, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 3d 714, 722 (D. Md. 2014) (quoting Poole v. Coakley &

Williams Constr., Inc., 423 Md. 91, 131 (2011)). “Under the discovery rule, limitations

begin to run when a claimant gains knowledge sufficient to put him or her on inquiry.”

Id. (citing Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., 358 Md. 435, 444 (2000)).

22

The House of Ruth Defendants argue that the amended complaint fails to allege

specific facts regarding any alleged defamatory statements made by them such as

whether the statements were made orally or in writing, when such statementsoccurred,

or whether such a statement appears defamatory on its face or was found to be false

based on extrinsic facts. ECF No. 63-1 at 16. They assert that the paragraphs relating to

the House ofRuth Defendants do not describe any alleged false or defamatory

statements or any statements made at all by theHouse of Ruth Defendants specifically.

Id. The House of Ruth Defendants and Heartly House argue that, to the extent any

defamatory statements have been alleged, they are barred by the statute of limitations as

these alleged statements occurred in 2021 or 2022, more than a year prior to the filing

of this action. Id. at 20.

Richburg argues that the amended complaint sufficiently “alleges that the

Defendants made ‘a false statement of fact about Plaintiff, that he committed a criminal

act and/or was a domestic abuser.’”ECF No. 75 at 6. He further argues that the statute

of limitations does not apply because, while some statements occurred in 2021, the

amended complaint states that the House of Ruth Defendants began their involvement

in the “Summer of 2022,” and he broadly alleges that the House of Ruth Defendants’

actions relating to the sharing of the confidential evaluation accrued within the relevant

time period. Id. at 5.

As to the House of Ruth Defendants, the defamation claims fail because none of

the three paragraphs in the factual allegations relating to the House of Ruth Defendants

mentions any statements made by them, let alone false statements. See ECF No. 3 ¶¶

110–112. Richburg’s broad conclusory statement that all Defendants made false

statements about him is insufficient to state a defamation claim against the House of

23

Ruth Defendants specifically. See id. ¶¶ 159, 165.Further, to the extent Richburg argues

that the House of Ruth Defendants’ allegedsharing of a confidential evaluation

constituted defamation, he has failed to allege how this constitutes a false statement (as

is required for a defamation claim) or when this alleged sharing took place. See id. ¶¶

111–112. Finally, Richburg initiated this action on April 2, 2024 and has not alleged facts

regarding when he discovered any alleged statements to account for any tolling;

therefore, only statements that occurred after April 2, 2023 would be considered timely

and no such statements are alleged in the amended complaint.

As to Heartly House, while Richburg does allege that Heartly House generated

false allegations of rape and abuse against him, he does not allege when these actions

took place in order to sufficiently plead that his action is timely. The only facts alleged

for events that occurred in 2023 relate to Kifle’s actions, not any of the other defendants.

See id. ¶¶ 113–114. Therefore, the House of Ruth Defendants’ and Heartly House’s

motions to dismiss the amended complaint as to Counts7 and 8 will be granted.

The House of Ruth Defendants and Heartly House argue that the proposed

second amended complaint is futile as it still does not allege that any statements were

made by them after April 2, 2023, as required to be considered timely. ECF No. 64 at 4.

They point out that one of the new facts alleged in the proposed second amended

complaint “references false allegations made by Defendant Kifle that Plaintiff ‘believes’

were ‘partly generated’ by both the House of Ruth Defendants and Heartly House.” Id.

at 4 n.4 (quoting ECF No. 57-1 ¶ 35). That paragraph of the proposed second amended

complaint begins with “about a year later” with the preceding paragraphs relating to an

incident occurring in March 2021; therefore, the House of Ruth Defendants and Heartly

24

House contend that the alleged statements are alleged to have occurred in or around

March 2022—well before the April 2, 2023 limitations period. Id.

Richburg argues that the discovery rule tolled theaccrualtime forthe defamation

claims as he “explicitly pleads that the full extent of the conspiracy, and the involvement

of the defendants in fabricating false statements, was not and could not have been

reasonably discovered until Kifle’s reconciliation with the plaintiff beginning ‘around

August 2024.’” ECF No. 65 at 8.

The proposed second amended complaint lacks any facts regarding any

statements made by the House of Ruth Defendants or Heartly House after April 2, 2023.

Richburg has not alleged any facts to show that he was not aware of the alleged

generation of false allegations until August 2024; in fact, in his original complaint,

which was filed in April 2024, he included the same paragraph as in the amended

complaint alleging that Heartly House generated false allegations about him. As

Richburg has failed to allege facts to show that his claim is timely, his motion for leave

to file a second amended complaint as to Counts 7 and 8 will be denied.

E. Malicious Prosecution (Count 9)

In order to establish a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege “(1)

that a criminal proceeding was instituted or continued by the defendant against the

plaintiff, (2) that the proceeding terminated in favor of the plaintiff, (3) the absence of

probable cause for the proceeding, and (4) malice, meaning that a primary purpose in

instituting the proceeding was other than that of bringing the plaintiff to

justice.” Garwood v. Walmart, Inc., Case No. 22-cv-1029-SAG, 2023 WL 8529122, at *8

(D. Md. Dec. 8, 2023) (quoting DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 54 (1999)) (internal

quotations omitted). “A private party can initiate a prosecution for the purposes of

25

amaliciousprosecutionclaim if it takes some affirmative act to ‘institute[ ], instigate[ ]

or inspire[ ] in any fashion’the state to bring criminal charges.” Id. (quoting Smithfield

Packing Co., Inc. v. Evely, 169 Md. App. 578, 593 (2006)).

The House of Ruth Defendants and Heartly House argue that Richburg’s

allegation that they “criminally charged [] and prosecuted Plaintiff without probable

cause” fails because they are private entities and individuals incapable of initiating

Richburg’s criminal prosecution. ECF No. 63-1 at 19. They further argue that the only

criminal charges that Richburg alleges were instituted against him were in 2021, over a

year before any alleged involvement by theHouse of Ruth Defendants or Heartly House.

Id.

Richburg agrees that a private entity or individual cannot institute a criminal

prosecution but argues that his theory for malicious prosecution is based on the House

of Ruth Defendants’ and Heartly House’s actions in influencing or urging the prosecutor

to bring charges without probable cause. ECF No. 75 at 6.

Even insofar asa private entity or individual can be liable for malicious

prosecution should they take some affirmative action to instigate or inspire criminal

charges without probable cause, Richburg has not pled any facts in the amended

complaint to establish that theory. As to the House of Ruth Defendants, the amended

complaint specifically alleges that they were not involved until the summer of 2022 but

that the two statements of charges against Richburg were in March 2021, making it

impossible for them to have instigated or inspired those criminal charges. See ECF No. 3

¶¶ 69, 81, 110. While the amended complaint lacks facts as to when Heartly House

allegedly became involved, it also lacks facts to show that they took any affirmative

actions to “institute[ ], instigate[ ] or inspire[ ]” the state to bring criminal charges.

26

Smithfield Packing Co., 169 Md. App. at 593; see ECF No. 3 ¶ 104. Therefore, theHouse

of Ruth Defendants’ and Heartly House’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint as

to Count 9 will be granted.

In the proposed second amended complaint, Richburg added a new fact that

Defendants Hausner and House of Ruth of Maryland allegedly visited Kifle in the

hospital on January 26, 2021 and “urg[ed]her to leave with them because Richburg had

previously sued them, which Kifle refused.” ECF No. 57-1 ¶ 13. This is the only new fact

placing the House of Ruth Defendants into the series of incidents prior to the March

2021 criminal charges, and the House of Ruth Defendants argue that “Plaintiff appears

to have included this detail in an effort to shore up his claims that involve the various

Defendants working togetheragainst him, such as his claims of malicious prosecution

and defamation.” ECF No. 64 at 11. Plaintiff does not dispute this or make any new

arguments for why the proposed second amended complaint is not futile as to the

malicious prosecution claim on this basis.

Richburg’s claim that the House of Ruth Defendants encouraged Kifle to leave

Richburg in January 2021 without more appears disconnected from the state’s decision

to institute criminal charges against him in March 2021 and Richburg has not alleged

any facts to connect the two. All other actions alleged to have been done by the House of

Ruth Defendants occurred after the criminal charges were instituted and, therefore, the

claim would fail as to them for the same reason it does in the amended complaint.

Therefore, Richburg’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint as to Count 9

against the House of Ruth Defendants will be denied.

In the proposed second amended complaint, Richburg alleges that Heartly House

(through Mr. Hoffmann) created knowingly false allegations of rape and assault against

27

Richburg and encouraged Kifle to requestthe stateto file charges for these alleged

incidents, which prompted the statements of charges against him. ECF No. 57-1 ¶¶ 23–

25.Richburg alleges that he was acquitted on the criminal charges based on the March

17, 2021 incident. Id. ¶ 32. But Richburg does not allege when the acquittal occurred in

order to establish the timeliness of his claim, and he does not allege facts regarding the

outcome of the criminal charges relating to the alleged February 2021 incident. As

presently drafted, Richburg’s proposed second amended complaint is futile as to Heartly

House as there are insufficient facts to support Richburg’s allegation that his claim is

timely. Therefore, Richburg’s motion for leave to file the second amended complaint as

to Count 9 against Heartly House will be denied.

F. Violation of HIPAA (Count 10)

HIPAA provides that “[a] person who knowingly . . . obtains . . . or[] discloses

individually identifiable health information to another person” without authorization

will be fined, imprisoned, or both. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6. But there is not a private right of

action under HIPAA. Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648, 660 (4th Cir. 2021).Instead, “[a]

person who believes a covered entity or business associate is not complying with the

administrative simplification provisions may file a complaint with the Secretary” of the

Department of Health and Human Serviceswithin 180 days of the act occurring. 45

C.F.R. § 160.306(a), (b)(3).

Richburgconcedes that there is no private right of action under HIPAA and

instead requests that the facts regarding the alleged improper sharing of the confidential

evaluation be used to support his other tort claims. ECF No. 75 at 6; ECF No. 65 at 9.

As there is no private right of action under HIPAA, Plaintiff’s claim for violation

of HIPAA must be dismissed and thus is also futile in the proposed second amended

28

complaint. Therefore, theHouse of Ruth Defendants’ and Heartly House’s motions to

dismiss the amended complaint as to Count 10 will be granted and Plaintiff’s motion for

leave to file a second amended complaint as to Count 10 will be denied.

G. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act & Md. Rule 9-205.3 (Proposed

Count 11)

Aperson violates the CFAA by “intentionallyaccess[ing] a computer without

authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, and therebyobtain[ing] .. . information

from any protected computer,” or “intentionally access[ing] a protected computer

without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, caus[ing] damage and loss.” 18

U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C), (a)(5)(C). Under Maryland law, it is also illegal for a party to

disseminate a written report of assessment or transcript of an oral report of a custody

evaluation report other than to individuals intended to be called as experts by the party.

Md. Rule 9-205.3(i)(1), (j). This only applies should the court order appointing or

approving an assessor “include . . . any restrictions upon the copying and distribution of

reports, whether pursuant to this Rule, agreement of the parties, or entry of a separate

protective order.” Id. 9-205.3(g)(6), (j). Should someone violate the Maryland Rule, the

harmed party can seek contempt in the court that issued the order. Id. 9-205.3(j) (cross-

referencing the Maryland Rules governing contempt proceedings in Title 15, Chapter

200 of the Maryland Rules).

The House of Ruth Defendants and Heartly House argue that the claim in the

proposed second amended complaint is futile because there are no facts alleging that

anyone intentionally accessed a protected computer without authorization and there are

insufficient facts regarding whether the allegedly improperly obtained evaluation

constitutes a custody evaluation under the Maryland Rule. ECF No. 64 at 5–6. They

29

further note thatRichburg does not allege that there was any court order preventing the

dissemination of any allegedcustody evaluationand, even if Richburg believed that the

House of Ruth Defendants and Heartly House violated the Maryland Rule, the proper

remedy would be for Richburg to seek contempt in the court that issued the order, not a

claim here. Id. at 7.

Richburg acknowledges that “[t]he CFAA prohibits accessing a protected

computer ‘without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access.’” ECF No. 65 at 10

(emphasis removed). He further acknowledgesthat courtsapply a narrow

interpretation, limited “to situationswhere an individual accesses a computer or

information on a computer without permission.” Id. (quoting WEC Carolina Energy

Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2012)). He argues, however, that the fact

the prior courts found the document to be “illegally obtained” provides compelling

support that the access was “without authorization.” Id. Plaintiff does not respond to the

argument regarding the Maryland Rule.

As for the federal CFAA claim, Richburg concedes that CFAA applies only“where

an individual accesses a computer or information on a computer” and yet the proposed

second amended complaint provides no facts regarding any alleged access of a protected

computer. See id. In fact, the proposed second amended complaint alleges that the

House of Ruth Defendants received the document from Mr. Hoffmann of Heartly

House, not from accessing a computer, and there are no allegations that Mr. Hoffmann

accessed a computer without authorization to obtain the document. ECF No. 57-1 ¶ 39.

Further, Richburg has not identified a right to sue under the Maryland Rule rather than

seeking contempt in the court that ordered the evaluation. In fact, he alleges that both

Howard County Circuit Court and Anne Arundel County Circuit Court held the House of

30

Ruth Defendants and Heartly Housein contemptfor this document, but he has

providedno authority upon which he can filea subsequent case upon the same alleged

action. Id. ¶ 41. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended

complaint as to Count 11 will be denied.

H. Civil Conspiracy (Count 6)

“[A] plaintiff cannot prevail on a claim for civil conspiracy under Maryland law

‘in the absence of other tortious injury to the plaintiff.’” Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince

George’s Cnty., Md., Case No. 20-cv-2632-DLB, 2022 WL 888424, at *6 (D. Md. Mar.

25, 2022) (quoting Marshall v. James B. Nutter & Co., 758 F.3d 537, 541 (4th Cir.

2014). Given that all tort claims against the House of Ruth Defendants and Heartly

House will be dismissed and a civil conspiracy claim cannot stand alone, the House of

Ruth Defendants’ and Heartly House’s motions to dismiss the amended complaint as to

Count 6 will be granted and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended

complaint as to Count 6 will be denied.

I. Dismissals

“The determination [of] whether to dismiss with or without prejudice under Rule

12(b)(6) is within the discretion of the district court.” 180s, Inc. v. Gordini U.S.A., Inc.,

602 F. Supp. 2d 635, 638–39 (D. Md. 2009) (citing Carter v. Norfolk Cmty.

Hosp. Ass’n, 761 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir. 1985)). The policy of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure generally favors allowing the amending of pleadings particularly where

minimal time had been spent or expense incurred as a result of the inadequate pleading

and in the absence of bad faith. Id. at 639 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)).

Given that the Court had previously granted the Officer Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the amended complaint based on qualified immunity without prejudice, ECF

31

No. 50, and Richburg’s proposed second amended complaint is futile for the same

reason, the dismissal of theOfficer Defendants shall be withprejudice.

Given that this is the first dismissal of claims against the House of Ruth

Defendants and Heartly House, the dismissal shall be without prejudice.

J. Motion for Default Judgment as to Defendant Kifle

1. Legal standard

“When a party . . . has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is

shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

55(a). If a complaint does not specify a “sum certain” amount of damages, the court may

enter a default judgment against the defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)–(2). In

considering such motion, “the court accepts as true the well-pleaded allegations in the

complaint but must determine whether those allegations ‘support the relief sought in

this action.’” Parrish v. Leithman, 733 F. Supp. 3d 371, 373 (D. Md. 2024) (quoting

Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001)). Default

judgment “is appropriate when the adversary process has been halted because of an

essentially unresponsive party.” Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v.

Cap. Restoration & Painting Co., 919 F. Supp. 2d 680, 684 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting

S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (D. Md. 2005)) (internal quotations

omitted).

If default judgment is warranted, the Court must then “make an independent

determination regarding damages and cannot accept as true factual allegations of

damages.” Parrish, 733 F. Supp. 3d. at 373–74 (quoting Int’l Painters, 919 F. Supp. 2d

at 684). The movant “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to recovery.” Id. at

32

374 (citing United States v. Nazarian, Case No. 10-cv-2962, 2012 WL 2045944, at *3

(D. Md. June 5, 2012)).

2. Liability

Richburg has filed a motion for default judgment as to Defendant Kifle under the

amended complaint. ECF No. 41.6 Based on the facts in the amended complaint,

Richburg has not alleged an entitlement to default judgment as to the claims for

violation of 43 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 2), defamation (Counts 7 & 8), and HIPAA (Count

10) for the same reasons stated as to the other defendants. See §§ III.B.1, III.D, III.F,

infra. Richburg also has not shown an entitlement to default judgment as to the

negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim (Count 3) as he does not allege that

Defendant Kifle was anyone’s employer or that any employee of hers breached any

alleged duty. Finally, Richburg has not alleged facts to show an entitlement to default

judgment as to the civil conspiracy claim (Count 6) against Kifle as he has failed to

allege that she had an agreement or understanding with another person or that any

tortious act was done in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. See Tessemae’s, LLC v.

McDevitt, Case No. 20-cv-2013-GLR, 2021 WL 1216669, at *10 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2021)

(citing Van Royen v. Lacey, 262 Md. 94, 97–98 (1971)).That leaves Counts 1

(negligence), 5 (assault) and 9 (malicious prosecution).

As to the assault claim (Count 5), thestatute of limitationsis one year. Md. Code

Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-105; see Carey v. Wolford, Case No. 22-cv-0782-RDB, 2023

6 Given that Richburg’s motion is for default judgment based on the amended complaint

and his motion for leave to file the second amended complaint will be denied as futile,

the Court will only consider the facts alleged in the amended complaint and the motion

for default judgment.

33

WL 3276217, at * 1 n.2 (D. Md. May 5, 2023) (dismissing assault claimas time-barred

after one year); Hines v. French, 157 Md. App. 536, 550 (2004) (affirming the dismissal

of an assault claim as time-barred after one year). Given that Richburg’s original

complaint was filed on April 2, 2024, only assault claims based on actions that occurred

after April 2, 2023 are within the statutory period. Richburg does not specify upon what

incident he bases his assault claim against Kifle; however, all instances thatcould

arguably constitute assault by Defendant Kifle alleged in the amended complaint

occurred in 2021 or 2022. ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 41, 56, 92, 106. Therefore, Richburg is not

entitled to default judgment as to the assault claim (Count 5).

As to the negligence claim (Count 1), the statute of limitations is three years. Md.

Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101. Therefore, only alleged breaches that occurred

after April 2, 2021 are timely. Richburg has sufficiently pled facts to constitute a claim

based on Defendant Kifle allegedly “bec[oming] dangerously abusive to Richburg while

he was operating the vehicle” thatRichburg, Kifle, and their daughter were in, on July

28, 2022. ECF No. 57-1 ¶ 106. Any other basis for negligence against Kifle is time-

barred. With the factual allegations accepted as true, Richburg has established that Kifle

was negligent.

As to the malicious prosecution claim (Count 9), the amended complaint alleges

that Defendant Kifle made false rape and abuse allegations against Richburgthat led to

statements of charges being issued against him and that she admitted in 2023 thatthese

statements were false. ECF No. 57-1 ¶¶ 69–71, 77–78, 83, 89, 103, 113–115. Accepting

these allegations as true, as the Court must given Kifle’s failure to defend against

Richburg’s claims, Richburg has sufficiently alleged a claim for malicious prosecution

against Defendant Kifle.

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3. Damages

“[C]ompensatory damages are intended to make the plaintiff whole”; “they are

not intended to grant to the plaintiff a windfall as a result of the defendant’s tortious

conduct.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Albright, 433 Md. 303, 414 (2013) (citing cases). “Thus,

an awardfor compensatory damages must be anchored to a rational basis on which to

ensure that the awards are not merely speculative.” Id. (citing McAlister v. Carl, 233

Md. 446, 455 (1964)). Where the alleged harm is emotional distress, although a court

should “recogniz[e] that a plaintiff’s testimony can provide sufficient evidence to

support an emotional distress award, [courts] have required a plaintiff to ‘reasonably

and sufficiently explain the circumstances of [the] injury and not resort to mere

conclusory statements.’” Sloane v. Equifax Info. Servs., 510 F.3d 495, 503 (4th Cir.

2007) (quoting Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1251 (4th Cir. 1996)).

“Negligence, however gross, is not enough to support a request for punitive damages.”

Hanson v. Hanson, Case No. 19-cv-2214-GLR, 2020 WL 4734313, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 14,

2020) (citation omitted); see Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.Co.v. JT Walker Indus., Inc., 554 F.

App’x 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (noting that punitive damages are

generally only awarded when the plaintiff has shown that a tort was done willfully,

wantonly, or recklessly). “[F]or punitive damages to be allowable inmalicious

prosecutionactions, a plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence the

defendant’s wrongful or improper motive for instigating the prosecution.” Montgomery

Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 735 (1995). Attorneys’ fees are calculated using the

lodestar method, which is “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).

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Richburg submitted an affidavit from himself with his motion for default

judgment stating that the extent of his damages caused by Defendant Kifle amountsto

$25 million per claim in compensatory damages, and he further requests $100 million

in punitive damages and costs in the amount of $340,052plus attorneys’ fees and

interest. ECF No. 41-6 at 1–2.

Richburg’s claim for $25 million in compensatory damages for each claimis

frivolous. Richburg provides no medical evidence or explanation of specific economic

harm, emotional distress,or other harm to indicate how he is entitled to any of these

amounts. He also has provided no basis for an entitlement to punitive damages for

negligence and malicious prosecution. Further, his attorney has not provided any

documentation to support the alleged $340,052 in costs or any documentation from

which the Court can calculate attorneys’ fees under the lodestar method.

Plaintiff does not allege any basis for Kifle’s negligence causing him any economic

damages or that he had to receive any medical treatment as a result of the July 28, 2022

incident. Therefore, without evidence to the contrary (which was Plaintiff’s burden to

provide), any physical injury shall be deemed to have been minimal. As such, the Court

will award Richburg $100 in compensatory damages from Kifle for his negligence claim.

Richburg’s request for punitive damages for the negligence claim will be denied.

The amended complaint and motion for default judgment fail to allege specific

economic or non-economic damages as a result of the malicious prosecution claim

against Kifle. The amended complaint broadly states that “[a]s a result of the knowingly

false accusations of the Defendant Kifle, . . . Plaintiff has suffered damages including

loss of contracts with insurance companies for whom he contracted and which were

worth millions of dollars in business. Plaintiff’s entire business fell apart.” ECF No. 3 ¶

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115.But hedoes not provide any information on his business, how much the business

made before and after the alleged malicious prosecution, or how any alleged loss of

contracts was caused by Kifle’s actions.Further, he does not allege that Kifle acted with

actual malice as to be entitled to punitive damages. Therefore, the Court will award

Richburg $0 in compensatory damages for his malicious prosecution claim and his

request for punitive damages will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the House of Ruth Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended

complaint (ECF No. 63) will be granted, Defendant Heartly House’s motion to dismiss

the amended complaint (ECF No. 81) will be granted, Richburg’s motion for leave to file

a second amended complaint (ECF No. 57) will be denied, and Richburg’s motion for

default judgment as to Defendant Kifle (ECF No. 41) will be granted in part and denied

in part. A separate order follows.

Date: March 27, 2026 __________________________

Adam B. Abelson

United States District Judge

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