Miles

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

THEREASE ANITA MILES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-158-MMH-PDB

HON. JOHN AUGUSTINE MORAN,

II, in his official capacity,

Defendant.

____________________________

O R D E R

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Judge John Augustine Moran, II’s

Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice (Doc. 21; Motion), filed October 2, 2025. In the

Motion, Judge Moran seeks dismissal of Therease Anita Miles’s Amended

Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Doc. 6; Second Amended Complaint),1

filed April 16, 2025. In opposition to the Motion, Miles, proceeding pro se, timely

filed her Motion to Deny Dismissal with Prejudice (Doc. 28; Response), filed

October 15, 2025.2 Accordingly, the Motion is ripe for review.

1 Although this document is titled “Amended Complaint,” it is Miles’s Second Amended

Complaint. The Court struck Miles’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 2) and directed her to file

a second amended complaint, which she did on April 16, 2025. The Second Amended Complaint

is the operative complaint.

2 Although Miles styles this document as a motion, in substance, it is a response to

Judge Moran’s Motion. Indeed, in it, Miles addresses Judge Moran’s arguments for dismissal

and explains why she believes they are wrong. See generally Response. Therefore, the Court

I. Background3

The Court notes that the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint

are sometimes difficult to understand and internally contradictory. Despite

these issues, the Court attempts to recount Miles’s factual allegations as they

are presented in the Second Amended Complaint.

On April 14, 2022, Miles initiated a lawsuit against her insurance

company, Heritage Property & Casualty (Heritage), for failing to remit funds

she believed were owed to her. Second Amended Complaint ¶ 6. A “court

document” allowed Miles to pick either an “‘[i]n-person’ or ‘Zoom’ trial[,]” and

Miles chose the in-person option. Id. ¶ 9. After learning which judge would hear

her case, on July 27, 2022, Miles wrote to Judge Moran, explaining her situation.

Id. ¶ 11.

Despite her request for an “[i]n-[p]erson trial[,]” Judge Moran’s judicial

assistant, Ms. Johnson, sent Miles a Notice of Hearing by Zoom (Notice),

scheduling a hearing for October 4, 2022. Id. ¶ 12. Reviewing the Notice, Miles

believed that another judge’s name had been “whited out” and Judge Moran’s

will treat the document as a response, rather than a motion, and will direct the Clerk of the

Court to correct the docket to reflect that the document is a response to the Motion.

3 In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in

the Second Amended Complaint as true, consider the allegations in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, and accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations.

Miljkovic v. Shafritz and Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015). As such, the

recited facts are drawn from the Second Amended Complaint and may differ from those that

ultimately can be proved.

2

name had been inserted to be the judge for the hearing instead. Id. ¶ 13.

According to Miles, “Judge Moran signed his name two spaces above the

[s]iganture [l]ine where the original name was whited out[,]” which was “not a

normal way” to “sign . . . a legal court document.” Id.

The day of the Zoom hearing, Miles asserts Judge Moran was being

belligerent because she had asked if another judge could conduct an in-person

hearing. Id. She asserts Judge Moran complained that he was not able to see

Miles on the screen and could only hear her voice. Id. ¶ 15. Judge Moran failed

to note that while Miles was present, Heritage was not. Id. ¶ 16. She complains

that Judge Moran did not swear the parties in, id. ¶ 18, call the case, id. ¶ 19,

ask the parties to identify themselves, id. ¶ 20, or allow Miles to “state her

case[,]” id. ¶ 21. Instead, Judge Moran “did all the talking as a Judge and as the

part[ies’] lawyer.” Id. ¶ 22. Ultimately, he dismissed the case with prejudice. Id.

¶ 23.

Miles was outraged by the manner in which Judge Moran conducted the

hearing. Id. ¶ 24. She filed a complaint with the Judicial Qualifications

Commission (JQC), id. ¶ 25, but the JQC dismissed it finding no violation of the

Codes of Judicial Conduct, id. ¶ 26.

On January 16, 2024, Miles received a call from the assistant to Judge

Rhonda Peoples-Waters, advising her that Judge Peoples-Waters wanted Miles

3

to appear for a hearing regarding her case against Heritage. Id. ¶ 27. Miles was

confused by the request but agreed to attend because the assistant assured

Miles she would be able to argue her case. Id.

On February 28, 2024, Miles appeared for the second Zoom hearing. Id. ¶

28. Judge Peoples-Waters called the case with the same case number as the one

in her case against Heritage. Id. ¶ 29. She had Miles state her name but did not

let her argue her case. Id. Like Judge Moran, Judge Peoples-Waters dismissed

Miles’s case with prejudice. Id.

The second dismissal of her case infuriated Miles. Id. She contacted the

CEO of Zoom to request “a copy” of her hearing before Judge Moran. Id. ¶ 30.

According to Miles, a Zoom representative advised that Judge Moran’s Zoom

hearing “was never activated” by Judge Moran. Id. ¶ 31. In December 2024,

Miles filed suit against Judge Moran “for orchestrating a non-existent Zoom”

hearing. Id. ¶ 34. Judge Moran “picked Judge Rhonda Peoples-Waters as his

lawyer again to hear the case[.]” Id. ¶ 36. Miles moved to disqualify Judge

Peoples-Waters, but Judge Peoples-Waters denied the motion and dismissed her

lawsuit against Judge Moran with prejudice. Id. ¶¶ 36, 37.

Following the dismissal of her lawsuit against Judge Moran, see id. ¶¶

37–38, 40, Miles noticed that she was “being stalked and harassed every day

around the clock[,]” id. ¶ 39. People have followed her, id. ¶¶ 39, 40–41, 44, 46–

4

47, 50, 52–54, hacked her phone, id. ¶¶ 55–57, damaged her vehicles, id. ¶¶ 42,

47, 50, and destroyed evidence of these incidents, id. ¶¶ 48–50, 53. The people

doing these things include employees of Durham Bus Service, id. ¶ 41, attorneys

from Boren, Oliver & Coffey, LLP, id. ¶ 50, Publix employees, id. ¶ 51, and

courthouse employees, id. ¶ 52.

On February 13, 2025, Miles filed a Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights

(Doc. 1; Initial Complaint) in this Court. The next day, she filed another

Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Doc. 2; First Amended Complaint), filed

February 14, 2025. The First Amended Complaint was almost identical to the

Initial Complaint, except Miles included an additional basis for jurisdiction,

removed some allegations, and omitted the “Injuries” and “Relief” sections.

Compare Initial Complaint at 3, 5–8 with First Amended Complaint at 3, 5–6.

On February 27, 2025, the Court issued an order (Doc. 4; Order) striking the

First Amended Complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading and ordering

Miles to correct the deficient pleading by filing a second amended complaint.

See Order at 4–6 (explaining that the First Amended Complaint is “replete with

conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any

particular cause of action[]” and Miles “commits the sin of not separating into a

different count each cause of action or claim for relief[]” (quoting Weiland v.

Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2015))).

5

On April 16, 2025, Miles filed her Second Amended Complaint as directed.

In the Second Amended Complaint, Miles contends that Judge Moran is liable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating her First and Fifth Amendment rights.4 Id.

¶ 5; Attachment at 3. Although it is difficult to discern the bases of these claims,

it appears that they stem from two distinct kinds of conduct: (1) Judge Moran’s

“belligeren[ce]” when he presided over Miles’s lawsuit against Heritage, id. ¶ 14,

and (2) “random people” stalking and harassing Miles, id. ¶ 39; see generally id.

4 Miles also completed Pro Se Form 15 and attached it to her Second Amended

Complaint. See Doc. 6-1 (Attachment). In the “Basis for Jurisdiction” section, Miles asserts

that Judge Moran violated several of her “federal[,] constitutional[,] or statutory right[s,]”

including the First Amendment; the Fifth Amendment; 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1506, 1621, and

2261A; Florida Statutes sections 784.048(3), 914.22, and 934.03–05; and “C.C.P. § 170.1(a)(1).”

Attachment at 3. There are two problems with these assertions. First, Miles attempts to sue

Judge Moran under various criminal statutes, including federal and state stalking statutes

(18 U.S.C. § 2261A and Fla. Stat. § 784.048); federal conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371), theft or

alteration of record or process (18 U.S.C. § 1506), and perjury (18 U.S.C. § 1621) statutes; and

state tampering (Fla. Stat. § 914.22) and interception of communication (Fla. Stat. §§ 934.03–

05) statutes. See Attachment at 3. Although “Congress has given the federal district courts

exclusive jurisdiction over ‘all offenses against the laws of the United States[,]’ . . . this

jurisdictional provision does not amount to authorization of a federal private right of action

any time a civil plaintiff invokes a federal criminal statute.” Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v.

Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3231). Therefore, the

Court will not consider references to these statutes. Second, by citing “C.C.P. § 170.1(a)(1)[,]”

see Attachment at 3, Miles appears to rely on section 170.1(a)(1) of the California Code of Civil

Procedure, which disqualifies a judge if he has “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary

facts concerning the proceeding[,]” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.1(a)(1)(A). However, the

California Code of Civil Procedure only applies to lawsuits pending in California courts. See

id. § 4 (“The Code establishes the law of this State[.]”). Thus, because Miles initiated her

lawsuit against Heritage in a Florida state court, she cannot attempt to enforce California’s

civil procedure rules against Judge Moran. As a result, the Court will not consider references

to this rule either. The only alleged violations of Miles’s rights that the Court will consider are

the § 1983 claims based on violations of the First and Fifth Amendments.

6

II. Legal Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual

allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see

also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.

2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the

plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless,

the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.

BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while

“[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

A “plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

7

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation

and quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal[]”) (quotations omitted).

Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]” which simply

“are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the

complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally

construed[,]” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.

1998), “this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for

a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an

action[,]” Alford v. Consol. Gov't, 438 F. App'x 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2011)

(quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir.

1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds as

recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

8

III. Discussion

In the Motion, Judge Moran asserts that this action must be dismissed for

five reasons: (1) it is “barred by res judicata[,]” (2) “Judge Moran is entitled to

absolute judicial immunity[,]” (3) Judge Moran is entitled to “Eleventh

Amendment immunity[,]” (4) the “Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires

dismissal[,]” (5) the Second Amended Complaint is an impermissible shotgun

pleading in violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)) 8 and 10, and

(6) Miles “fail[ed] to state a claim.” See Motion at 1, 13. In the Response, Miles

addresses the res judicata, absolute judicial immunity, Eleventh Amendment

immunity, and Rules 8 and 10 arguments. See Response at 12–13. First, Miles

questions why she would “need a second case with Judge . . . Peoples-Waters”

after Judge Moran “already [d]ismiss[ed] [the case] with [p]rejudice[.]” Id. at 12

(internal quotation omitted). Second, Miles contends that “[i]mmunity does not

shield a judge when they are breaking the law[]” and “[s]talking and harassing

someone is a criminal act, not a judicial one.” Id. Third, she asserts that “[t]he

Eleventh Amendment does not stop a federal court from issuing an injunction

against a state or federal official who is violating federal laws.” Id. Finally, Miles

appears to suggest that the Second Amended Complaint does not violate Rules

8 and 10 because she “[a]mended her original complaint so that the [C]ourt

[w]ould accept it[,] and the [C]ourt did.” Id. at 13.

9

As mentioned previously, it is difficult to discern the bases of Miles’s §

1983 claims. To the extent that her claims are based on Judge Moran’s conduct

while he presided over Miles’s lawsuit against Heritage, they are barred by

judicial immunity. And to the extent that they are based on stalking and

harassment by “random people[,]” Second Amended Complaint ¶ 39, they are

due to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). In any event, the entire Second

Amended Complaint is due to be dismissed because it runs afoul of Rules 8 and

10. The Court will discuss each of these reasons for dismissal in turn.5

A. Judicial Immunity

To the extent that Miles’s claims are based on Judge Moran’s conduct as

the presiding judge in her case against Heritage, the Court addresses the issue

of judicial immunity first as it is dispositive. The application of the doctrine of

absolute immunity is strictly a question of law for the Court to determine. See

Brown v. Crawford Cnty., 960 F.2d 1002, 1012 (11th Cir. 1992). “Few doctrines

were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from

liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction[.]”

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967), overruled in part on other grounds

by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). “As early as 1872, the Court

recognized that it [is] ‘a general principle of the highest importance to the proper

5 Because these three bases for dismissal are sufficient, the Court will not address

Judge Moran’s other arguments.

10

administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested

in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension

of personal consequences to himself.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355

(1978) (second alteration in original) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335,

347 (1871)). For these reasons, the Supreme Court has determined that judges

cannot be held liable for their judicial acts even if those acts are corrupt, done

with malice or in excess of the judges’ jurisdiction. Id. at 355–56 (quoting

Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351); see also Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1172 (11th Cir.

1985). “Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for

those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted

in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” William B. Cashion Nev. Spendthrift Tr.

v. Vance, 552 F. App’x 884, 885–86 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bolin v. Story, 225

F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000)).6

6 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that strong public policy

arguments support upholding the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.

First, and foremost, a judge must be free to act upon his own

convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences; second,

the controversiality and importance of the competing interests in a

case before a court make it likely that the losing party may be overly

willing to ascribe malevolent motives to the judge; third, judges faced

with the prospect of defending damages actions and, perhaps,

satisfying money judgments would be driven to wasteful and

destructive self-protection devices and, moreover, may be less inclined

to administer justice; fourth, alternative remedies such as appeal and

impeachment reduce the need for private rights of action against

judges; and fifth, the ease of alleging bad faith would make a qualified

“good faith” immunity virtually worthless because judges would

constantly be forced to defend their motivations in court.

11

In Stump, the Supreme Court recognized a two-part test to be used in

determining whether a judge is absolutely immune from potential civil liability.

See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–62. The reviewing court must ask whether the judge

was acting in a judicial capacity while dealing with the plaintiff, id. at 360, and

whether the judge acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction[,]” id. at 356–57.

Only in circumstances where a judge acted in the “clear absence of all

jurisdiction” or dealt with the plaintiff in a non-judicial capacity can the judge

face civil liability for actions taken. See id. at 356–57, 360.

In determining whether the judge was acting within his or her judicial

capacity, the Eleventh Circuit instructs a court to consider several factors,

including: whether “(1) the precise act complained of . . . is a normal judicial

function; (2) the events involved occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the

controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the

confrontation arose directly and immediately out of a visit to the judge in his

official capacity.” Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 858 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar.

1981) (quoting McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972));7 see

also William B. Cashion Nev. Spendthrift Tr., 552 F. App’x at 886. Notably, “[a]

Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 949 (11th Cir. 1985).

7 This case, and all Fifth Circuit cases decided prior to September 30, 1981, are binding

precedent pursuant to Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en

banc).

12

judge is entitled to immunity ‘even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious,

or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.’” William B. Cashion Nev. Spendthrift

Tr., 552 F. App’x at 886 (quoting Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239). Utilizing this

framework, the Court will now consider whether Judge Moran would be entitled

to immunity from the claims Miles wishes to assert.

Liberally construing Miles’s allegations, it is evident that she complains

of actions taken by Judge Moran in his judicial capacity. In the Second Amended

Complaint, Miles alleges that Judge Moran was “belligerent” at the Zoom

hearing, Second Amended Complaint ¶ 14, because he “complained” about not

being able to see Miles, id. ¶ 15, did not address Heritage’s absence, id. ¶ 16, did

not swear in the parties, id. ¶ 18, did not call the case number, id. ¶ 19, did not

have the parties state their names for the record, id. ¶ 20, did not allow Miles to

state her case, id. ¶ 21, “did all the talking as a [j]udge and as the part[ies’]

lawyer[,]” id. ¶ 22, and dismissed the case with prejudice, id. ¶ 23. Presiding

over hearings and dismissing cases are normal judicial functions.8 See Austin v.

Mullins, No. 24-13231, 2025 WL 2030051, at *3 (11th Cir. July 21, 2025) (per

8 In the Second Amended Complaint, Miles does not explain why these actions violate

her First and Fifth Amendment rights, let alone why they constitute wrongdoing of any kind.

See generally Second Amended Complaint. But even if Judge Moran took certain actions at

the Zoom hearing in error or out of malice, judicial immunity would still bar Miles from seeking

relief against him for those acts. See William B. Cashion Nev. Spendthrift Tr., 552 F. App’x at

886.

13

curiam);9 Wilson v. Bush, 196 F. App’x 796, 799 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam);

Juravin v. Rada, No: 5-24-cv-618-PGB-PRL, 2025 WL 1688251, at *6 (M.D. Fla.

May 27, 2025).10 Although the hearing may not have occured in Judge Moran’s

chambers, he held it to discuss a case pending before him—Miles’s lawsuit

against Heritage. See Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 6, 9, 11–12, 16. And the

conduct Miles complains of arose directly out of the virtual interaction with

Judge Moran, who was acting in his capacity as presiding judge, about her case.

See id. ¶¶ 11, 14–16, 18–23. Therefore, the first part of the Stump test is

satisfied.

The Court also considers the second inquiry identified by the Supreme

Court in Stump. This question, which focuses on whether the judge acted in the

clear absence of all jurisdiction, has been interpreted to preclude immunity in

those circumstances “in which a judge acts purely in a private and non-judicial

capacity[,]” Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1979), in a matter

“clearly outside the judge’s subject matter jurisdiction[,]” Dykes, 776 F.2d at

948.

9 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however, they

may be cited in this order when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See

McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P.

32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they

may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

10 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not binding, they

may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310

(11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any

other district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects[]”).

14

Miles appears to question Judge Moran’s jurisdiction to hold the Zoom

hearing by alleging that it looked like Judge Moran “whited out” another judge’s

signature on the Notice and added his own in an abnormal way. See Second

Amended Complaint ¶ 13. And, though it is not entirely clear, it is possible that

Miles attempts to contend that the second hearing with Judge Peoples-Waters

shows that Judge Moran lacked the authority to hold the first hearing and

dismiss the case. See id. ¶ 29.

However, even using the most liberal construction, Miles fails to allege

facts giving rise to a plausible inference that Judge Moran acted in the clear

absence of all jurisdiction. Indeed, the only concrete allegation that Miles

makes—that Judge Moran was assigned to preside over her lawsuit against

Heritage—precludes such an inference. See id. ¶ 11 (“Plaintiff found out through

the clerk what judge will hear my case so Plaintiff wrote to Defendant on July

27, 2022 explaining my situation[.]”). Moreover, her allegations about the

signature on the Notice and the hearing with Judge Peoples-Waters fail to call

Judge Moran’s jurisdiction into question because they are entirely speculative

and ambiguous. See id. ¶¶ 13, 29. Therefore, Judge Moran did not act in the

clear absence of all jurisdiction when he held the Zoom hearing and dismissed

Miles’s case against Heritage.

15

Because both parts of the Stump inquiry are satisfied, the Court concludes

that Judge Moran enjoys absolute judicial immunity from civil liability to Miles

based on her claims arising out of Judge Moran’s conduct at the Zoom hearing.

Accordingly, these claims are due to be dismissed.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Miles also appears to base her §1983 claims on “random people” stalking

and harassing her.11 To the extent that her claims are based on this conduct,

they are due to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived her of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d

734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit “requires proof of an

affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the

alleged constitutional deprivation” in §1983 cases. Zatler v. Wainwright, 802

F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986).

11 Although it is not clear, it is possible that Miles did not intend for the stalking and

harassment allegations to form the basis of her § 1983 claims. Instead, it seems more likely

that Miles included these allegations because she attempted to sue Judge Moran under federal

and state criminal statutes. See supra n.4. Indeed, in the Response, Miles says that judicial

immunity does not shield Judge Moran from criminal conduct. See Response at 12. However,

Miles would still have failed to state a claim because, as the Court explained above, she cannot

sue Judge Moran under criminal statutes. See supra n.4.

16

More than conclusory and vague allegations are required to state a cause

of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See L.S.T., Inc., v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684 (11th

Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556–57 (11th Cir.

1984). As such, “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts, or

legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Rehberger

v. Henry Cnty., 577 F. App'x 937, 938 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Oxford Asset

Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)). In the absence of

well-pled facts suggesting a federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a

federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

Additionally, a civil rights complaint must include a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2). While not required to include detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff

must allege “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, a complaint is insufficient “if it

tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). To avoid dismissal

for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, a plaintiff must

provide “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Moreover, “[w]hile

17

legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679.

Here, Miles fails to allege that Judge Moran took any action that deprived

her of her First and Fifth Amendment rights. In the Second Amended

Complaint, Miles contends that various people stalked her, including employees

of Durham Bus Service, Second Amended Complaint ¶ 41, attorneys with Boren,

Oliver & Coffey, LLP[,]” id. ¶ 50, Publix employees, id. ¶ 51, and courthouse

employees, id. ¶ 52. However, nowhere in the Second Amended Complaint does

Miles allege that Judge Moran stalked her, arranged for the other individuals

to stalk her, or participated in the stalking and harassment incidents in any

way.12 See generally id.

Moreover, Miles does not explain how these stalking and harassment

incidents constitute violations of either her First or Fifth Amendment rights.

See generally id. Miles only mentions the First and Fifth Amendments in the

“Cause of Action” section of her Second Amended Complaint, id. ¶ 5, and the

12 The Court notes that, in the Response, Miles alleges that Judge Moran “has been

having [Miles] stalked and harassed[.]” See Response at 5. She also alleges that Judge Moran

is responsible for additional conduct that she did not include in the Second Amended

Complaint, such as breaking into her house and stealing pages from her legal documents. See

id. at 5–7. However, on a motion to dismiss, the Court’s consideration is limited to those facts

contained in the complaint and the attached exhibits. Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d

1189, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007). “Under Rule 10(c)[,] . . . attachments are considered part of the

pleadings for all purposes, including a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Solis-Ramirez v. U.S. Dep’t of

Just., 758 F.2d 1426, 1430 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (stating that the

exhibits are part of the pleading “for all purposes”). Therefore, the Court does not consider the

additional allegations Miles includes in the Response.

18

“Basis for Jurisdiction” section of the Attachment, Attachment at 3. Throughout

the rest of the Second Amended Complaint, Miles merely details the stalking

and harassment incidents without connecting them to any particular harm or

cause of action. See generally Second Amended Complaint.

Because Miles does not allege a constitutional deprivation, she necessarily

fails to allege that any purported deprivation occurred while Judge Moran acted

under color of state law. See generally id. Nor does she allege a causal link

between any purported deprivation and conduct by Judge Moran. See generally

id. Therefore, Miles fails to state a §1983 claim. Accordingly, to the extent that

Miles’s claims are based on the stalking and harassment incidents, they are also

due to be dismissed.

C. Rules 8 and 10

The Court notes that Miles’s Second Amended Complaint is also due to be

dismissed because it constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleading in violation

of Rules 8 and 10. While pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard

than those drafted by an attorney, Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th

Cir. 1986), the pro se litigant is still required to “conform to procedural rules[,]”

Riley v. Fairbanks Cap. Corp., 222 F. App’x 897, 898 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002)). The Rules require that

a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

19

pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “A complaint need not

specify in detail the precise theory giving rise to recovery. All that is required is

that the defendant be on notice as to the claim being asserted against him and

the grounds on which it rests.” Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 964

n.2 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Sams v. United Food & Comm’l Workers Int’l

Union, 866 F.2d 1380, 1384 (11th Cir. 1989)). Despite the liberal pleading

requirements of Rule 8, “a complaint must still contain either direct or

inferential allegations respecting all material elements of a cause of action.”

Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted).

Rules 8 and 10 work together

to require the pleader to present h[er] claims discretely and

succinctly, so that h[er] adversary can discern what [s]he is claiming

and frame a responsive pleading, the court can determine which

facts support which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated any

claims upon which relief can be granted, and, at trial, the court can

determine that evidence which is relevant and that which is not.

Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1082 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting T.D.S.,

Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1543 (11th Cir. 1985) (Tjoflat, J.,

dissenting)).

Significantly, a complaint may not run afoul of the Eleventh Circuit’s

prohibition against shotgun pleading. See generally Weiland, 792 F.3d at

20

1321–23 (outlining four broad categories of impermissible shotgun pleadings).13

The Eleventh Circuit has unequivocally instructed that shotgun pleadings are

“altogether unacceptable.” Cramer v. Florida, 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.

1997); see also Cook v. Randolph Cnty., 573 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir. 2009)

(“We have had much to say about shotgun pleadings, none of which is

favorable.”) (collecting cases). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has engaged in “a

thirty-year salvo of criticism aimed at shotgun pleadings, and there is no

ceasefire in sight.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321; see, e.g., id. at 1321 n.9 (collecting

cases). As the court in Cramer recognized, “[s]hotgun pleadings, whether filed

by plaintiffs or defendants, exact an intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket,

lead to unnecessary and unchannelled discovery, and impose unwarranted

expense on the litigants, the court and the court’s parajudicial personnel and

13 In Weiland, the Eleventh Circuit “identified four rough types or categories of shotgun

pleadings.” See Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Weiland,

792 F.3d at 1321). As the Barmapov court explained,

The first [category] is “a complaint containing multiple counts where each count

adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to

carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire

complaint.” The second is a complaint “replete with conclusory, vague, and

immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” The

third is a complaint that does not separate “each cause of action or claim for

relief” into a different count. And the final type of shotgun pleading is a

complaint that “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions,

or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.”

Id. at 1324–25 (citations omitted) (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23).

21

resources.” Cramer, 117 F.3d at 1263. As such, when faced with the burden of

deciphering a shotgun pleading, it is the trial court’s obligation to strike the

pleading on its own initiative and force the plaintiff to replead to the extent

possible under Rule 11. See id. (admonishing district court for not striking

shotgun complaint on its own initiative); see also Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321 n.10

(“[W]e have also advised that when a defendant fails to [move for a more definite

statement], the district court ought to take the initiative to dismiss or strike the

shotgun pleading and give the plaintiff an opportunity to replead.”).

Miles appears to argue that the Second Amended Complaint should not

be dismissed because she corrected the deficiencies identified in the First

Amended Complaint in accordance with the Court’s Order. See Response at 13.

However, the Second Amended Complaint still falls into the second and third

categories of shotgun pleadings. See generally Second Amended Complaint; see

supra Part I at 5.

The Second Amended Complaint falls into the second category of shotgun

pleadings because it is “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not

obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at

1322. In the Second Amended Complaint, Miles vaguely implies wrongdoing by

Judge Moran before and during the Zoom hearing without explaining how his

conduct violates the law. See Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 6–37. She also

22

includes a litany of immaterial facts that obscure any claim she may have

arising out of the Zoom hearing. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 8, 13, 17, 32–33, 35. Moreover,

Miles states that she is “being stalked and harassed every day around the clock

by random people who she do[es] not know personally[.]” Id. ¶ 39. However, she

fails to explain how the stalking and harassment incidents give rise to the §

1983 claims she brings. See generally id. And, significantly, she fails to state,

let alone explain how, Judge Moran is responsible for these incidents. See

generally id.

Additionally, the Second Amended Complaint falls into the third category

of shotgun pleadings because Miles does “not separate[e] into a different count

each cause of action or claim for relief.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. In fact, the

Second Amended Complaint does not contain any counts. See generally Second

Amended Complaint. Instead, Miles merely states that she “brings this action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that [Judge Moran], acting under color of state

law, violated [Miles’s] First Amendment rights[,]” id. ¶ 5, and mentions the Fifth

Amendment in the “Basis for Jurisdiction” section of the Attachment,

Attachment at 3. Nowhere in the Second Amended Complaint or the

Attachment does Miles separate each cause of action into distinct counts and

explain which facts support any claim. See generally Second Amended

Complaint. This kitchen sink manner of pleading fails to comply with Rules 8

23

and 10 and makes it impossible to discern which causes of action are actually at

issue in this particular lawsuit. See Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla.

Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a properly drawn

complaint “will present each claim for relief in a separate count, as required by

Rule 10(b), and with such clarity and precision that the defendant will be able

to discern what the plaintiff is claiming and to frame a responsive pleading[]”

(internal footnote omitted)). Therefore, the Second Amended Complaint is due

to be dismissed.

Ordinarily, “a pro se plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend”

a complaint before a district court dismisses it with prejudice. Silberman v. Mia.

Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Woldeab v. Dekalb

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018)) (alteration adopted).

Nevertheless, where an amendment would be futile, a district court may

properly dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s complaint without an opportunity to amend.

See Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Leave to amend

a complaint is futile when the complaint as amended would still be properly

dismissed or be immediately subject to summary judgment for the defendant.”).

Here, the Court already gave Miles a chance to amend the First Amended

Complaint when the Court struck it as an impermissible shotgun pleading. See

Order at 6. In the Order, the Court explained why the First Amended Complaint

24

was a shotgun pleading and provided Miles with resources to help her draft the

Second Amended Complaint. See generally id. Nonetheless, Miles failed to draft

a pleading that complied with the Court’s Order. See generally Second Amended

Complaint. Instead, the Second Amended Complaint suffers from the very same

shotgun pleading deficiencies as the First Amended Complaint. Compare id.

with First Amended Complaint. Despite the Court’s guidance and resources,

Miles failed to improve the Second Amended Complaint in even the slightest

amount. As a result, the Court concludes that granting her another opportunity

to amend would be futile.14 Therefore, the Second Amended Complaint is due to

be dismissed with prejudice as a shotgun pleading.

IV. Conclusion

In sum, judicial immunity shields Judge Moran from civil liability for any

claims Miles seeks to bring against him due to his conduct at the Zoom hearing.

And Miles fails to state a § 1983 claim against him based on the stalking and

harassment incidents. Moreover, the Second Amended Complaint constitutes

an impermissible shotgun pleading. Therefore, the Second Amended Complaint

is due to be dismissed with prejudice.

14 Amendment would also be futile to the extent that Miles bases her claims on Judge

Moran’s conduct at the Zoom hearing because he is absolutely immune from civil liability for

those actions. See supra Part III.A.

25

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice (Doc. 21) is GRANTED.

2. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the

Court is directed to enter judgment, terminate any pending motions

and deadlines as moot, and close the file.

3. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to correct the docket to reflect

that the Motion to Deny Dismissal with Prejudice (Doc. 28) is a

response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice (Doc. 21).

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, this 10th day of

February, 2026.

United States District Judge

1c36

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

Pro Se Party

26