Easter

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RANDALL J. STANTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 26-cv-62-NJR

OFFICER EASTER, ABIGAIL DINN,

DANIEL COCKRUM, SHERIFF KYLE

BACON, GERRY POOLE, CAPTAIN

MARIE HALL, JOHN DOE

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER, JANE

DOE CORRECTIONAL OFFICER,

JANE DOE JILL FROM PRETRIAL

SERVICES, OFFICER MICHELLE,

JOHN DOE, TIM HALL, and ILLINOIS

STATE TROOPER PAYNE,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

Plaintiff Randall J. Stanton, who at the time he filed his original Complaint was a

pretrial detainee at the Franklin County Jail, brings this action for deprivations of his

constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stanton subsequently filed a First

Amended Complaint (Doc. 14) alleging improper searches and seizures, but the pleading

was dismissed for failure to state a claim (Doc. 19). Stanton was granted leave to file an

amended pleading. In his Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 21), Stanton alleges a

campaign of harassment from various officers of a drug task force in Franklin County,

Illinois. He alleges violations of his First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment

rights.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Second Amended

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to

screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Second Amended Complaint

On February 2, 2023, Stanton alleges that he and his girlfriend left his house and

were immediately pulled over by Trooper Payne (Doc. 21, p. 4). Stanton alleges the stop

was directed by Officer Easter as a pretext for officers to obtain his house keys (Id.).

No contraband was found during the search of his car, but members of a multi-

jurisdictional drug task force swarmed the scene and seized Stanton’s phone, wallet, and

house keys (Id.). Easter then drove Stanton’s vehicle back to his residence and directed

that Stanton’s exterior security cameras be destroyed (Id. at p. 5). The officers then used

the keys to enter Stanton’s house based on a warrant that Stanton claims was defective

because it included only the address for his home, but failed to list him as the occupant

(Id.).

Stanton later received discovery materials from Franklin County State’s Attorneys

Abigail Dinn and Daniel Cockrum, which were falsified and omitted Easter’s presence

from the search (Doc. 21, p. 5). But Stanton alleges that he possesses security footage from

the night that was not destroyed and proves that Easter was present, drove Stanton’s

vehicle, and ordered the destruction of video evidence (Id.). Inside the house, officers

demanded access to Stanton’s safe, which he alleges he provided “under extreme

duress.” (Id.). Inside, officers located 13 ounces of N-isopropylbenzylamine, a substance

Stanton alleges is legal to possess (Id.). Stanton accused the officers of framing people

with this chemical (Id.).

After the search, Stanton was taken to the Franklin County Jail where for seven

hours Easter sought to obtain Stanton’s cooperation to become a confidential informant

(Doc. 21, p. 6). Easter promised to make the case against him go away if he cooperated.

Stanton alleges that he agreed, under coercion, and acted as an informant for

approximately one week (Id.). He then retained counsel and texted Easter, informing him

that he would no longer participate as a confidential informant; he directed any future

communication to his attorney (Id.). Easter allegedly warned Stanton that “if you fuck the

task force over, the task force is gonna fuck you over.” (Id.).

Because Stanton obtained counsel, he alleges that he immediately faced retaliation

from Easter and other officers from the task force (Doc. 21, p. 6). Criminal charges were

brought against him based on the February 2 search, and Assistant State’s Attorneys

presented a false narrative of the circumstances surrounding the search to a judge.

Cockrum claimed that Stanton was followed from St. Louis and pulled over at the

Benton/West City exit, where a K9 unit alerted to his car. A search of the trunk revealed

one pound of methamphetamine and fentanyl (Id.). Cockrum obtained the testimony

from Trooper Hall through leading questions, and Stanton alleges that Hall committed

perjury by affirming the false narrative (Id.). Stanton alleges that the State’s story

regarding the surveillance, traffic stop, discovery of drugs, and search of his home was

entirely false (Id. at pp. 6-7). Stanton alleges that the presiding judge expressed skepticism

regarding some of the charges, but Dinn and Cockrum continued to pursue all of the

charges against him (Id. at p. 7).

Stanton alleges that during the February 2 stop and search, Easter seized $840.00

from Stanton’s wallet (Doc. 21, p. 7). Officials then claimed that a forfeiture hearing

occurred on February 17, 2023, but Stanton claims that no such hearing took place and

the money was never returned (Id.).

Stanton further alleges that after he obtained counsel, officers began harassing

him. On May 23, 2023, Officer Michelle of the Christopher Police Department and John

Doe Officer from the Zeigler Police Department arrested Stanton on a $300,000 warrant

for trafficking drugs (Doc. 21, p. 7). Stanton alleges that arrest stemmed from the

fabricated stop on February 2 (Id.). During the arrest, the officers shouted that “you

fucked the task force over, now the task force is fucking you over.” (Id.). Between 2023

and 2025, Stanton was subjected to at least five traffic stops. On one occasion, Trooper

Hall watched Stanton’s car while he was at an establishment and then pulled him over

for a dull license plate light. No ticket was issued for the light (Id. at p. 8). Every time

Stanton was stopped, he was subjected to a K9 unit that alerted on his car, resulting in a

destructive search of his vehicle. Each time, Stanton alleges that he was released. Stanton

alleges that these actions were part of a policy of harassment committed under the

authority of Sheriff Kyle Bacon (Id.).

In June 2024, Tim Hall conducted a stop, searched Stanton’s car based on a

K9 alert, and arrested him for possessing brass knuckles (Doc. 21, p. 8). On September 9,

2025, Easter arrested Stanton for narcotics based on another stop, K9 alert, and search

(Id.). Stanton accused Easter of planting the drugs, and only Stanton was arrested despite

the presence of three additional occupants in the vehicle (Id.). On the ride to jail, Easter

reminded Stanton that he kept his word about what would happen if he messed with the

task force (Id.).

After the September 2025 arrest, Stanton alleges that he should have been eligible

for pretrial release because of the less serious charges. Instead, Dinn and Cockrum

conducted what Stanton labels as a “bond swap.” (Doc. 21, p. 8). They returned the bond

for his 2023 case in order to ensure that Stanton was not released on the 2025 charges (Id.).

They held him on the more serious 2023 trafficking charges (Id.).

Stanton alleges that he was held at the Franklin County Jail on the charges from

September 2025 to February 2026 (Doc. 21, p. 9). He alleges that he faced more retaliation.

Jail nurse Gerry Poole allegedly packaged the incorrect doses of Stanton’s medication on

numerous occasions (Id.). On some occasions, he received a triple dose of his blood

pressure medication. As a result of Poole’s actions, Stanton suffered from seizures and

gastrointestinal bleeding (Id.). He requested medical care, informing officials that he was

pooping blood, but his requests were ignored (Id.). Captain Hall informed Stanton that

she would not obtain medical care for him unless she saw his rectal bleeding, and Stanton

was placed in a holding cell to defecate for inspection. He remained in the cell for six

hours in his own waste (Id.). Unknown correctional officers who distributed the

medication on a daily basis saw that the doses were incorrect but did nothing to remedy

the situation (Id.). After Stanton suffered from a seizure, he was placed, unconscious, in

a holding cell (Id.).

At some unknown point, Captain Hall allegedly cut off Stanton’s communication

for thirty days (Doc. 21, p. 9). Stanton alleges this was done to prevent him from filing a

timely appeal in his criminal case. As a result, Stanton alleges he was denied access to the

courts. Just prior to his release in February 2026, jail staff administered Suboxone (Id. at

p. 10). Stanton alleges that he was not previously prescribed this medication. Stanton was

released on February 5, 2026, and he went to the emergency room where narcotics were

found in his system (Id.). Stanton alleges that Dinn and Cockrum tried to use this incident

as a basis to revoke Stanton’s bond. The attempt failed. Jane Doe Jill from Pretrial Services

then claimed that Stanton missed a drug test, in another attempt to revoke his bond.

Because of their actions, Stanton alleges he is currently on restrictive conditions including

GPS monitoring and home confinement (Id.).

Discussion

Based on the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, the Court designates

the following counts:

Count 1: Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim

against Easter and Payne for initiating a pretextual traffic

stop, conducting an illegal search of Stanton’s vehicle,

seizing his personal items, and searching Stanton’s home on

a defective warrant.

Count 2: First Amendment retaliation claim against Easter for

conducting and directing a multi-year campaign of

harassment, searches, and arrests in retaliation for Stanton

obtaining an attorney in 2023.

Count 3: Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim against

Dinn, Cockrum, and Hall for pursuing the drug trafficking

charge against Stanton on a fraudulent basis and

committing perjury regarding the February 2, 2023 stop and

search.

Count 4: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Easter,

Dinn, and Cockrum for confiscating Stanton’s $840.00

without due process of law.

Count 5: Conspiracy claim against Easter, Dinn, Cockrum, Hall,

Payne, Jane Doe Jill, Officer Michelle, and John Doe Officer

for fabricating criminal charges against Stanton, destroying

evidence, making pretextual traffic stops, and falsifying

evidence.

Count 6: Monell claim against Sheriff Kyle Bacon (official capacity)

for maintaining and sanctioning a custom or policy of

pretextual K9 alerts to justify illegal searches of vehicles.

Count 7: Fourteenth amendment medical claim against Gerri Poole,

Captain Hall, and John and Jane Doe Correctional Officers

for providing Stanton with the wrong dosage of his

medications and failing to provide him with medical care

for his medical conditions.

Count 8: First and/or Fourteenth Amendment access to courts claim

against Captain Hall for depriving Stanton of all forms of

communication for 30 days.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is

mentioned in the Second Amended Complaint but not addressed in this Order should

be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly

pleading standard.1

Count 1

The Fourth Amendment establishes “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is

reasonableness,” which is “measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the

circumstances.” United States v. Yang, 39 F.4th 893, 899 (7th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, ––– U.S.

––––, 143 S. Ct. 754, 214 L.Ed.2d. 454 (2023) (quoting United States v. Price, 28 F.4th 739,

748 (7th Cir. 2022), and United States v. Cole, 21 F.4th 421, 427 (7th Cir. 2021) (en banc)).

For a traffic stop, the stop must be based on “a reasonable articulable suspicion that [the

individual] had committed, were committing, or were about to commit an offense. Huff

v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 1004 (7th Cir. 2014). See also United States v. Riley, 493 F.3d 803,

808 (7th Cir. 2007) (investigatory stop requires reasonable suspicion which is “less than

probable cause but more than a hunch.”).

Here, Stanton alleges that Easter and Payne initiated the traffic stop as a pretext to

search the car; he alleges that they lacked any reasonable suspicion or probable cause

(Doc. 21, pp. 4, 10). He notes that he had just left his home, and the vehicle was

immediately pulled over. He further alleges that the car was searched, and although no

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face”).

contraband was located, his personal items were still seized. Construing the facts in the

light most favorable to Stanton, he adequately alleges that the stop and search of his

vehicle lacked reasonable suspicion and probable cause.2

But as to the search of his home, Stanton fails to state a claim. Stanton alleges that

after the traffic stop, the officers drove to his home and conducted a search of the

premises. He acknowledges that the officers had a warrant for the search of the home but

alleges that the warrant was defective because it included only an address and lacked his

name.

Under the Fourth Amendment, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,

and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The particularity

requirement “limits ‘the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which

there is probable cause to search,’ and in doing so ‘ensures that the search will be carefully

tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging

exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.’” United States v. McMillian,

786 F.3d 630, 639 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)). The

requirement is satisfied if “the description is such that the officer with a search warrant

can, with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.” Steele v. United

2 As the Court previously noted in dismissing Stanton’s original pleading, Stanton’s claims

stemming from the 2023 stop and search may well be barred by the statute of limitations, which

in Illinois is two years. Lewis v. City of Chi., 914 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2019). Stanton alleges,

however, that his claims were tolled because the nature and extent of the violations were

fraudulently concealed from him. At this early stage, the Court will allow the claim to proceed

until the record can be fully developed as to the timeliness of his lawsuit.

States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). Minor defects and omissions in the warrant do not

invalidate the warrant if “there is no danger that the officers might inadvertently search

the wrong place.” United States v. Kelly, 772 F.3d 1072, 1081 (7th Cir. 2014). See also

McMillian, 786 F.3d at 640 (collecting cases). Stanton contends that the warrant included

his address but lacked his name. But there are no allegations to suggest that the warrant

was so defective that the officers could not reasonably identify the place to be searched.

See Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d 455, 462-63 (7th Cir. 2005) (warrant for home was valid when

issued despite lacking name of occupants and specific apartment number, but invalid as

executed because officer knew of ambiguity in the number of apartments on the level to

be searched). The warrant included the correct address, and Stanton acknowledged that

Easter drove him to his home where they entered the house pursuant to the warrant.

Officers clearly knew the home identified in the warrant. Nothing in the Complaint

suggests that the warrant was invalid. Further, there are no allegations to suggest that

any other errors invalidated the warrant, nor does Stanton allege that the warrant lacked

probable cause. Thus, Count 1 is DISMISSED as to the search of Stanton’s home.

Count 2

In order to state a viable retaliation claim in Count 2, Stanton must allege that

“(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a

deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the

First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to

take the retaliatory action.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009). Stanton

alleges that Easter retaliated against him after Stanton secured an attorney to represent

him. Stanton claims that the invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel led

Easter to threaten him and then conduct a multi-year campaign of arrests, retaliation, and

criminal charges.

The Court assumes, at this stage, that obtaining counsel for a criminal case

constitutes protected conduct. Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 85 (2nd Cir. 2000)

(an individual states a Section 1983 retaliation claim when “the government takes

negative action against an individual because of his exercise of rights guaranteed by the

Constitution”); Williams v. Mitchell, 122 F.4th 85, 89 (4th Cir. 2024) (individual stated a

First Amendment retaliation claim under Section 1983 when officers retaliated against

him for exercising his Sixth Amendment right by demanding to go to trial on the charges

against him). Stanton further alleges that he suffered a deprivation by being subjected to

stops, searches, and arrests over the course of two years (Doc. 21, p. 8). Stanton also

alleges that the actions were in response to his decision to invoke his right to counsel

because numerous officers told him that he was being stopped, searched, and/or arrested

because he messed with the task force. Stanton notes that when Easter arrested him on

September 9, 2025, Easter noted that he kept his word to get back at Stanton for messing

with the task force. At this stage, Stanton states a viable retaliation claim against Easter.

Count 3

Stanton alleges that the two State’s attorneys and Officer Hall initiated and

continued with the criminal prosecution against him without evidence and have based

their allegations on fraud. He alleges that Hall perjured himself when he testified falsely

as to the stop and search.

In order to allege a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Stanton

must allege that the “criminal prosecution (1) was instituted without probable cause;

(2) for a malicious motive—a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice; and

(3) ended without a conviction.” Evans v. Matson, No. 23-2954, 2024 WL 2206638, at *2 (7th

Cir. May 16, 2024) (quoting Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 44, 49 (2022)). The Court notes

that Stanton’s case has not ended without a conviction; in fact, it is still ongoing.

McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 117-18 (2019) (claim for malicious prosecution and false

evidence does not accrue until the underlying criminal proceedings are resolved). Thus,

Stanton’s malicious prosecution claim against Dinn, Cockrum, and Hall fails to state a

claim.

Stanton’s claim also fails because he sues the State’s attorneys and the officer who

testified at his preliminary hearing, both of which are immune from suit under Section

1983. “Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for damages under [Section] 1983

for conduct that is functionally prosecutorial; this immunity is understood to broadly

cover all conduct associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Bianchi v.

McQueen, 818 F.3d 309, 316 (7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Here, Stanton alleges that

the two State’s attorneys presented a fabricated narrative to the court, elicited false

testimony from Hall during a preliminary hearing, and orchestrated a “bond swap” to

hold Stanton on the charges. All of these actions were taken in furtherance of their

prosecutorial duties. The decision to indict and continue to pursue a case are protected

by absolute immunity. Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2012). Presenting

evidence to the court in furtherance of a prosecution, even if the evidence is allegedly

fabricated is also protected by absolute immunity. Id. at 512 (“If a prosecutor plants

evidence before someone is arrested, he enjoys only qualified immunity…. Yet, for that

same fabrication of evidence, if he commits the act during a judicial proceeding, he

receives absolute immunity.”). Hall is also protected by absolute immunity for his

testimony at the hearing. See also Kincaid v. Eberle, 712 F.2d 1023, 1023-24 (7th Cir. 1983)

(extending immunity to testimony in pretrial proceedings); Curtis v. Bembenek, 48 F.3d

281, 284-85 (7th Cir. 1995) (absolute immunity for preliminary hearing testimony). Thus,

Count 3 is DISMISSED with prejudice.

Count 4

To the extent that Stanton alleges that State’s attorneys Dinn and Cockrum denied

him due process by “fabricating an official court record of a forfeiture hearing,” the two

attorneys are entitled to absolute immunity. As to his claim against Easter, Stanton alleges

that he was not afforded due process because the procedures under Illinois’s forfeiture

act were not properly followed. But as the Court stated in dismissing his original

pleading, an individual cannot maintain a claim if the state provides an adequate post-

deprivation remedy. Murdock v. Washington, 193 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1999); Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530–36 (1984) (where the state provides an adequate remedy,

plaintiff has no civil rights claim). The Seventh Circuit has found that Illinois provides an

adequate post-deprivation remedy for those who did not receive notice of forfeiture

through a motion to vacate the forfeiture. Robinson v. Winslow, 88 F. App’x 93, 95-96 (7th

Cir. 2004) (collecting cases). Thus, Stanton has an avenue to challenge the forfeiture of his

funds, and his claim in this case is DISMISSED.

Count 5

Stanton alleges that numerous officials conspired with Easter to retaliate against

him by fabricating a drug trafficking case against him. In furtherance of the conspiracy

they allegedly conducted pretextual stops, destroyed evidence, improperly charged him,

conducted additional arrests, and manufactured bond violations. Under Section 1983,

“the function of [the] conspiracy doctrine is merely to yoke particular individuals to the

specific torts charged in the complaint.” Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir.

1988). See also Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008) (conspiracy is not an

independent basis of liability in Section 1983 actions). “To establish conspiracy liability

in a [Section] 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) the individuals reached an

agreement to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and (2) overt acts in furtherance

actually deprived him of those rights.” Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir.

2015). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff must allege “the parties, the general purpose, and

approximate date of the agreement to form a conspiracy so that the defendant has notice

of the charges against him.” Est. of Sims ex rel. Sims v. Cnty. of Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 517

(7th Cir. 2007)

At this early stage, Stanton states a claim for conspiracy to retaliate against Easter,

Hall, Payne, Officer Michelle, and John Doe Officer Zeigler Police Department. He alleges

that Officer Michelle and John Doe Officer arrested him on May 23, 2023, repeating the

phrase Easter had initially invoked, stating that Stanton messed with the task force and

now the task force would mess with him (Doc. 21, p. 7). Stanton alleges that Hall

conducted numerous stops of his vehicle and arrested him in June 2024. He further

alleges that Easter arrested him a second time, after conducting a pretextual stop and

K9 search (Id. at p. 8). Stanton alleges these actions were taken in retaliation for his

invocation of his Sixth Amendment rights and refusal to participate as an informant.

But Stanton fails to state a claim against Dinn, Cockrum, and Jane Doe Jill from

Pretrial Services. Stanton alleges that Dinn and Cockrum participated in the conspiracy

to retaliate by prosecuting the criminal cases against Stanton and conducting a “bond

swap” related to his two charges in an attempt to detain him. As previously stated,

however, Dinn and Cockrum are entitled to absolute immunity for the actions taken

during the course of prosecuting the claims against Stanton. As to Jane Doe, Stanton

alleges that she fabricated a report regarding his drug test, but there are no allegations to

suggest that she was in agreement with the other conspirators or even aware of the

conspiracy. Stanton merely alleges in conclusory fashion that the bond violation was part

of the “ongoing conspiracy.” (Doc. 21, p. 10). The statement is not enough to state a claim

against Jane Doe.

Count 6

Stanton alleges that as part of the conspiracy to retaliate against him, numerous

officers, both known and unknown, subjected him to at least five pretextual traffic stops.

He alleges that on each occasion, the officers would stop him, claim that a K9 alerted, and

search the vehicle (Doc. 21, p. 8). He alleges that these stops were done under the

authority of Sheriff Kyle Bacon (Id.). Notably, Stanton does not allege that Bacon was part

of the retaliation conspiracy. Instead, he alleges that Bacon, acting in his official capacity

as sheriff, implemented a policy or sanctioned a widespread practice or custom of

utilizing K9 alerts to create probable cause for a search of vehicles, including Stanton’s.

Stockton v. Milwaukee Cnty., 44 F.4th 605, 617 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Municipal action giving rise

to [Section] 1983 liability may take the form of: (1) an express policy, (2) a widespread

practice or custom, or (3) action by one with final policymaking authority.”). In order to

be liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the

“policies must be the moving force behind the constitutional violations.” Thomas v. Cook

Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Woodward v. Correctional

Medical Services of Illinois, Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004)).

But Stanton fails to allege that the widespread practice of utilizing K9 alerts to

justify a search of a vehicle was a moving force behind the retaliatory efforts by various

members of the task force. He provides very few factual allegations surrounding these

searches. Other than alleging that they were retaliatory, he fails to allege how these K9

initiated searches violated his rights, nor does he indicate how each K9 alert was

“pretextual.” He simply fails to provide enough factual allegations regarding these stops

to suggest that his rights were violated by the stops themselves or that a custom or policy

was behind any violation he currently alleges. Thus, Count 6 is DISMISSED without

prejudice for failure to state a claim.

Severance of Counts 7 and 8

Stanton’s claims in Counts 7 and 8 are distinctly different from those claims in his

earlier counts and involve different defendants. As such, the Court must determine

whether the claims are improperly joined and subject to severance or dismissal. See George

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 prohibits a

plaintiff from asserting unrelated claims against different defendants or sets of

defendants in the same lawsuit. Under Rule 20, multiple defendants may not be joined in

a single action unless the plaintiff asserts at least one claim to relief against each

respondent that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions

or occurrences and presents a question of law or fact common to all. George, 507 F.3d at

607. Rule 21 grants district courts broad discretion when deciding whether to sever claims

or to dismiss improperly joined defendants. See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th

Cir. 2011).

Stanton’s claims regarding his medical care and access to communications while a

pretrial detainee at the Franklin County Jail involve different factual allegations,

defendants, and legal theories from the claims in Counts 1-6 regarding the stops,

searches, and seizures by members of the task force. In an apparent attempt to tie these

claims to his claims against the task force, Stanton mentions that the actions of Gerry

Poole and others were part of the “retaliation” he experienced. But there are no

allegations to suggest that any of the other defendants were involved in his medical care

at the jail, nor is there any evidence that any of the other defendants were personally

involved in denying Stanton access to communications at the jail. Because these claims

are distinct and different than the claims regarding the criminal charges against him, the

Court SEVERS Counts 7 and 8 into a new case.

Motion for Injunctive Relief

In addition to his Amended Complaint, Stanton filed a motion for temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction (Doc. 20). He subsequently filed a brief in

support of his motion (Doc. 22) and an affidavit (Doc. 23). He requests that the Court

intervene and stop his prosecution (Doc. 22, p. 6). He asks that the Franklin County State’s

Attorney’s Office be enjoined from filing a motion to revoke his bond based on a prior

drug test, that pretrial services be enjoined from manufacturing reports regarding his

compliance, and that all involved agencies be enjoined from contacting, surveilling, or

“harassing” Stanton. This is Stanton’s second motion for injunctive relief. The Court

previously denied his motion for injunctive relief under the Younger abstention doctrine.

“[F]ederal courts are required by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27

L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims

that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.” Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d

634, 651 (7th Cir. 2018). Stanton’s motion presents a classic Younger abstention scenario.

He asks the Court to pause a pending state court criminal case and interfere with bond

decisions. There are, however, three exceptions to the Younger abstention that can require

federal intervention: where “(1) the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or

is conducted in bad faith, (2) there is an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate

equitable relief, or (3) the challenged provision is flagrantly and patently violative of

express constitutional prohibitions.” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505 F.3d 658, 664 (7th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Jacobson v. Village of Northbrook Mun. Corp. 824 F.2d 567, 569–70 (7th

Cir.1987)). The exceptions are meant to be narrow. Mulholland v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.,

746 F.3d 811, 818 (7th Cir. 2014)

Stanton argues that the first exception is applicable to this case. He argues that he

has been subjected to a coordinated campaign of harassment. He alleges that his current

criminal proceedings are a direct result of retaliation by Easter and other officials, and he

faces the imminent threat of re-incarceration with recent threats to his bond.

To support his claim of bad faith, Stanton points to the transcript from his

preliminary hearing, as well as the warrant for the search of his home, and records for

the February 2 stop. In regard to his preliminary hearing, he notes that the presiding

judge found no probable cause for four of the five felony charges (Doc. 22, p. 5). But the

attached transcript demonstrates that the state court found there was probable cause that

a felony offense was committed (Doc. 22-2, p. 9). Although the presiding judge noted that

some of the counts seemed to lack probable cause, he was not required to go charge by

charge, and he found probable cause as to one count (Id.). There is also no indication that

the judge dismissed those charges or found them to be based on a fraudulent narrative

as Stanton alleges. That the State is still proceeding on the charges does not evidence bad

faith. And Stanton has the ability to seek the dismissal of those charges in his pending

criminal case.3 The continued prosecution of his criminal cases does not constitute bad

faith. See Harris v. Ruthenberg, 62 F. Supp.3d 793, 800 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“The mere

continuation of the case… does not constitute harassment, let alone harassment for

Younger purposes. If it did, the federal court would have to intervene in every ongoing

criminal prosecution.”).

3 In fact, a review of the dockets of Stanton’s two criminal cases in Franklin County reveals that

he has filed motions to dismiss the cases, as well as several motions regarding the admissibility

of evidence. He is also currently represented by counsel in both cases.

The Court also notes that Stanton’s original motion for injunctive relief focused on

his fear that his bond would be revoked, but he acknowledges in this new motion that he

ended up receiving GPS monitoring and home confinement (Doc. 20, p. 4). It appears that

Stanton has received some favorable rulings from the state court, suggesting that the case

is not proceeding in bad faith. And he currently has motions pending to dismiss the cases,

as well as motions regarding the admissibility of certain evidence. People v. Stanton,

Case No. 2025CF309 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 10, 2025); People v. Stanton, Case

No. 2023CF210 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed May 23, 2023).

Finally, records regarding the search warrant and traffic stops seem to refute

Stanton’s claims that they lacked probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion. The

written warning Stanton’s girlfriend received from the traffic stop by Trooper Payne on

February 2, 2023, notes that the car was pulled over for disobeying a stop sign (Doc. 22-

7, p. 1). Documents filed in one of his cases note that a confidential source purchased

methamphetamine from Stanton at his home, indicating probable cause for the search

warrant (Doc. 22-4, p. 1). Stanton’s exhibits call into question his claim that the searches

were baseless and that subsequent legal proceedings and stops were harassment.

Although Stanton’s pleading alleges harassment and bad faith, his motion and

attached exhibits call those allegations into question and demonstrate that he has an

opportunity to present arguments regarding the legality of the stops and searches during

the course of his state court cases. Thus, the Court finds that the alleged bad faith and

harassment do not justify an exception to abstention in this case. Because abstention is

appropriate in this case, Stanton’s request for injunctive relief is DENIED.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Count 7 against Gerri Poole, Captain Hall, and John

and Jane Doe Correctional Officers and Count 8 against Captain Hall are SEVERED into

a new case. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to file the following documents in the new

case:

e This Memorandum and Order;

e The Amended Complaint (Doc. 21); and

e Stanton’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2).

As to the remaining claims in this case, Count 1 shall proceed against Officer Easter

and Trooper Payne. Count 2 shall proceed against Easter. Count 5 shall proceed against

Easter, Payne, Tim Hall, Officer Michelle, and John Doe Officer Zeigler Police

Department. Count 3 is DISMISSED with prejudice. Count 4 is DISMISSED with

prejudice. Count 6 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

The Court finds that a stay is warranted pursuant to the Younger abstention

doctrine. The stay is premised on the finding that the challenged conduct is connected

with criminal charges in two criminal cases that are still ongoing. Nonetheless, the Court

finds it convenient to go ahead and serve the identified defendants in this case. The stay

shall go into effect after Defendants Easter, Trooper Payne, Tim Hall, Officer Michelle

have been served and counsel has entered their appearance on their behalf. The

Defendants shall NOT be required to answer the Complaint at this time. Upon lifting the

stay, the Court shall enter a scheduling order including the time allowed for Defendants

to file Answers.

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The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Officer Easter, Illinois State Trooper Payne,

Tim Hall, and Officer Michelle (Christopher Police Department): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a

Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons) and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service

of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Second

Amended Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to the defendants’ place of

employment as identified by Stanton. If a defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver

of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were

sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and

the Court will require that defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent

authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Stanton,

the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending

the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the

address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained

in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

If judgment is rendered against Stanton, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)(A).

Finally, Stanton is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 13, 2026 7 g i

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

United States District Judge

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