Reyes-Medrano

soutnern District or □□□□□

ENTERED

March 03, 2026

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MCALLEN DIVISION

DAVID ABISAI §

REYES-MEDRANO, §

Plaintiff, §

§

vs. § CIV. NO. 7:25-cv-00363

§

INVESTIGATOR LOPEZ, §

CITY OF EDINBURG, JORGE §

MORENO, SERGEANT RODRIGUEZ, §

DANIEL PENA, ORLANDO §

GARCIA, GUSTAVO VILLEGAS, §

ANGELA VILLADARES, §

PABLO JUAREZ, DOCTORS §

HOSPITAL AT RENAISSANCE, LTD. §

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, David Abisai Reyes-Medrano, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing

Plaintiff’s Original Complaint for violation of Civil Rights and Disability Discrimination

(“Complaint”) on July 22, 2025, against Defendants Investigator Lopez and the City of Edinburg.

(See Dkt. No. 2). On August 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed an addendum/amendment to the Complaint,

adding the following as defendants: Detective Orlando Garcia, Dr. Gustavo Villegas, M.D., Angela

Valladares, Juarez Pablo, Officer Daniel Pena, and Doctors Hospital at Renaissance, Ltd. (See

Dkt. No. 6). Plaintiff alleges various infractions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and Texas state law.

(Dkt. No. 2 at 3; Dkt. No. 6-1 at 3). This case was subsequently referred to the undersigned

magistrate judge for memorandum and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b) and LR

72.

After careful review of the record and relevant law, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's

Complaint be DISMISSED as outlined within this Memorandum. It is further recommended that

the Motion for Criminal Investigation (Dkt. No. 7), Motion for Service of Process (Dkt. No. 20),

Motion for ADA Accommodation (Dkt. No. 21), Motion for Liberal Construction of the Filings

(Dkt. No. 22), Motion for Special Appearance and Process Under an Alias (Dkt. No. 23), Motion

to Compel Discovery (Dkt. No. 24), Motion for Subpoena Duces Tecum (Dkt. No. 25), and Motion

to Consolidate Cases (Dkt. No. 26), all be DENIED as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint

Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint on July 22, 2025.' (See Dkt. No. 2). Plaintiff claims

that, on or about May 17, 2023, he was “placed under police custody” for investigation purposes.

(id. at 3). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Investigator Lopez was assigned to Plaintiff’s case, and

despite Plaintiff being the victim, Defendant Lopez “refused to take his affidavit, failed to collect

witness statements, and ignored key facts that would support criminal charges.” (/d.). Plaintiff

claims he is a legally blind individual with medical needs, and that Defendant Lopez failed to

accommodate his needs while in custody. (/d.). Plaintiff asserts he was jailed overnight at the

Hidalgo County Jail without cause. (/d.). While an internal affairs complaint was allegedly filed

with Detective Orlando Garcia, Plaintiff never received a case number or follow-up, delaying any

probable investigation. (/d.). Plaintiff claims this “failure to investigate and advocate on behalf

of a disabled citizen directly contributed to delays in justice, harm to Plaintiff’s mental and physical

| Petitioner’s pro se petition is entitled to a more liberal construction than those drafted by practicing

attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420,

426-27 (5th Cir. 2011) (“It is the substance of the relief sought by a pro se pleading, not the label that the

petitioner has attached to it, that determines the true nature and operative effect of a [filing].”). Thus, the

Court reviews Plaintiff's filings in a more forgiving light.

health, and obstruction of Plaintiff’s rights under state and federal law.” (/d.). Plaintiff further

claims the City of Edinburg, through its agents and departments, failed to provide reasonable

disability accommodations under the ADA, failed to properly document or follow up on the

incident, and failed to investigate or protect Plaintiff’s civil and human rights as a victim of prior

offenses. (Dkt. No. 2-1 at 2). This has caused Plaintiff physical distress, vision-related worsening,

emotional trauma, fear of retaliation, anxiety, delayed access to justice in related investigations,

and financial hardship and prolonged suffering. (/d.). Thus, Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount

of $15,000,000.00. Ud).

B. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

On August 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed Addendum to Complaint. (See Dkt. No. 6). Therein,

Plaintiff reiterates that while in custody on May 17, 2023, Defendant Lopez failed to take

Plaintiff’s affidavit, ignored witness statements, and neglected Plaintiff's medical needs. (Dkt.

No. 6-1 at 2). Plaintiff then adds that on May 27, 2023, Sergeant Moreno used excessive force

“despite warnings about a known medical condition, causing permanent vision damages.” (/d.).

Plaintiff claims that, on multiple occasions, Sergeant Rodriguez and Officer Pena failed to respond

appropriately to complaints, mishandled or omitted police reports, and denied Plaintiff’s right to

service. (/d.).

Then, between 2021 and 2023, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Villegas fraudulently billed

Plaintiff’s insurance for medical services without resolution, harassed Plaintiff, and ignored his

medical needs. (Dkt. No. 6-1 at 2). Plaintiff claims Angela Valladares refused to allow

appointments, Juarez Pablo reported false statements to police which caused wrongful police

action against Plaintiff, and both the City of Edinburg and Doctors Hospital at Renaissance

“tolerated, covered up, and failed to discipline these actions, constituting a policy/custom under

Monell.” (/d. at 2-3). Plaintiff seeks economic damages for fraudulent billing, medical costs, and

lost income, non-economic damages for pain, suffering, emotional distress, and permanent

disability aggravation, and punitive damages for malicious and reckless disregard of rights. □□□□

at 3). Thus, Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $50,000,000.00, along with injunctive relief

requiring policy reforms, training, and accommodations and a criminal referral for white collar

crime, obstruction, and fraud. (/d.).

C. Hearing and Subsequent Filings

The Court held a status conference on September 26, 2025, discussing the status of the case

and advising Plaintiff that an amended complaint would be due by October 27, 2025. (See Dkt.

Entry, Dated September 26, 2025; see also Dkt. No. 17).2 Plaintiff failed to file an amended

complaint within the designated window. Thus, the Court held a second status conference on

December 5, 2025, providing Plaintiff with an additional extension to file an amended complaint

by December 12, 2025. (See Dkt. Entry, Dated December 5, 2025).

Plaintiff filed First Amended Complaint [sic] on December 9, 2025.7 (See Dkt. No. 19).

Therein, Plaintiff specifies his claims. On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff claims he was detained by

Edinburg Police while attempting to report an assault in which he was the victim, and Defendant

Lopez failed to record an affidavit, ignored evidence and witness accounts, and refused to

accommodate Plaintiff’s visual disability. (/d. at 3). Plaintiff asserts Sergeant Moreno used

Said order mooted the motion to file amended complaint filed on August 12, 2025. (See Dkt. No. 6).

* Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is the current live pleading and does not incorporate by reference any

of the prior filings. (See Dkt. No. 19); see King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (Sth Cir. 1994) (“An amended

complaint supersedes the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint

specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleading.) (citing Boelens v.

Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 508 (Sth Cir. 1985)). As such, the Original Complaint (Dkt. No. 2) and

subsequently filed addendum (Dkt. No. 6) are of no legal effect. However, in an abundance of caution, and

affording Plaintiff the benefit of liberal construction, the Court has reviewed the legitimacy of all pleadings

filed by Plaintiff. See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520; see also Hernandez, 630 F.3d at 426-27.

excessive force during a separate incident on May 27, 2023, which aggravated Plaintiff's visual

impairment. (/d.). Sergeant Rodriguez and Officer Pena neglected to file reports and denied

Plaintiff services despite repeated requests, and Detective Garcia failed to properly investigate

Internal Affairs complaints, contributing to the obstruction of justice. (/d.). Plaintiff suggests Dr.

Villegas engaged in fraudulent billing and failed to provide adequate care over multiple years,

Angela Valladares obstructed access to medical records and care, Juarez Pablo filed a false police

report against Plaintiff, and that the City of Edinburg and Doctors Hospital at Renaissance failed

to correct or supervise these acts, which fostered a pattern of abuse. (/d.).

Plaintiff additionally filed a slew of motions with the Court on the same day. Plaintiff filed

Motion for Service of Process by the United States Marshal (Dkt. No. 20), Motion for ADA

Reasonable Accommodation and for Procedural Safeguards for Disabled Pro Se Litigant (Dkt. No.

21), Plaintiff’s Motion for Liberal Construction of Pro Se Filings (Dkt. No. 22), Motion for Special

Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction and to Proceed Under the Alias “Don Doe” (Dkt. No. 23),

Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery (Dkt. No. 24), Motion for Subpeona [sic] Duces Tecum

(Dkt. No. 25), and Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate Cases Pursuant to Rule 42(a) (Dkt. No. 26).

II. APPLICABLE LAW/ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), the Court must screen any complaint proceeding in

forma pauperis seeking relief against “a government entity, officer, or employee and dismiss the

complaint if the court determines it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief

may be granted.” Pacheco-Morales v. Belt, SA-23-CV-00417-JKP, 2023 WL 9105552, at *3 (W.D.

Tex. Aug. 3, 2023); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring dismissal of a case filed IFP

where it is determined the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief

may be granted.).

An action is considered frivolous where “there is no arguable legal or factual basis for the

claim.” /d. (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). “A complaint lacks an arguable

basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges

the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716,

718 (Sth Cir. 1999) (quoting Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Sth Cir. 1998)). An action may

be considered factually frivolous “where the facts alleged are “fantastic or delusional scenarios’ or

the legal theory upon which a complaint relies is ‘indisputably meritless.’” Eason v. Thaler, 14

F.3d 8, 9 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28).

Analysis of claims under § 1915A(b)(1) and § 1915(e)(2)(B) directs the court to apply the

standards governing dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Pacheco-Morales, 2023 WL 9105552, at *3

(citing DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 152 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule

12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with the pleading standard set forth in Rule 8(a), which requires “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). “Thus, claims may be dismissed

under Rule 12(b)(6) ‘on the basis of a dispositive issue of law[,]°” and also “if the complaint does

not contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.”” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (Sth Cir. 2019)

(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326; Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 678). This plausibility standard does not

require detailed factual allegations. Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). However, a party’s “obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

‘entitle[ment] to relief? requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a

cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original). A claim

has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court, drawing upon its “judicial

experience and common sense[,]” to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556), 679. “But where the well-

pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—“‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Jd. at 679

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (alteration in original)).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 creates a private right of action for the deprivation of certain rights. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. To state a cause of action under § 1983, Plaintiff must (1) allege the Defendants violated

“a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) show “a person acting

under color of state law” committed the violation. Perdomo v. City of League City, 765 F.Supp.3d

613, 620 (S.D. Tex. 2025) (citing Petersen v. Johnson, 57 F.Ath 225, 231 (Sth Cir. 2023)).

However, in the context of § 1915A(b)(1) and § 1915(e)(2)(B), and, thus, Rule 12(b)(6),

the Court must determine whether the facts, taken as true, would overcome the defense of qualified

immunity. /d. (quoting Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (Sth Cir. 2012)). Qualified immunity

“shields officers from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” /d. (quoting

City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021)). Thus, to overcome qualified immunity, Plaintiff

must show (1) whether the facts alleged, taken as true, show a constitutional violation; and (2)

whether the right was clearly established in light of existing precedent. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.

7, 11-12 (2015).

For a law to be clearly established, Plaintiff “must be able to point to controlling

authority—or a robust consensus of persuasive authority—that defines the contours of the right in

question with a high degree of particularity.” Perdomo, 765 F.Supp.3d at 620 (quoting Hogan v.

Cunningham, 722 F.3d 725, 735 (5th Cir. 2013)). Simply put, qualified immunity protects “all but

the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” /d. (quoting City of Tahlequah,

595 U.S. at 12).

3. Monell Municipal Liability

First, a municipality may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a theory of

respondeat superior. Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (Sth Cir. 2002). Rather,

municipalities may be held liable “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

capacity, inflicts the injury...” /d. (quoting Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978)). For Plaintiff to prove the municipality should be liable, he must show: (1) an official

policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive

knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose “moving force” is that policy (or custom). /d.

(citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (Sth Cir. 2001)).

Such an official policy may be “(1) a policy statement, ordinance, or regulation, or (2) ‘a

persistent, widespread practice of City officials or employees, which, although not authorized by

officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom

that fairly represents municipal policy.’” Holley v. Blomberg, 142 F.Supp.3d 517, 523 (S.D. Tex.

2015) (citing Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579). “The description of a policy or custom and its

relationship to the underlying constitutional violation, moreover, cannot be conclusory; it must

contain specific facts.” Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Dept, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir.

1997).

4, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act

To make out a valid claim under Title I] of the ADA, Plaintiff must show (1) he is a

qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he was excluded from

participation or denied meaningful access to services, programs, and activities, or that he was

otherwise discriminated against by Defendants; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or

discrimination is by reason of his disability. Lathan y. Stevens, No. 2:16-cv-147, 2017 WL

7037704, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2017) (citing Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421,

428 (5th Cir. 1997)), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 497125 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 19,

2018).

For a failure-to-accommodate claim specifically, Plaintiff must show “(1) he is a qualified

individual with a disability; (2) the disability and its consequential limitations were known by the

covered entity; and (3) the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations.” K.R. ex rel.

Shannon vy. Cedar Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:25-cv-489-BN, 2025 WL 3265486, at *5 (N.D. Tex.

Nov. 22, 2025) (citing Smith v. Harris County, 956 F.3d 311, 317 (Sth Cir. 2020)).

To show that the denial of services was “‘by reason of’ Plaintiff’s disability, Plaintiff must

show that the denial was intentional.” E.M. ex rel. Guerra v. San Benito Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,

374 F.Supp.3d 616, 624 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (citing Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567,

574 (Sth Cir. 2002)). While the Fifth Circuit has not yet defined the intentionality requirement,

the cases that have touched on the issue have required something more than deliberate indifference.

v. Paley, 81 F.4th 440, 449-50 (Sth Cir. 2023) (citing Cadena v. El Paso County, 946 F.3d 717,

724 (5th Cir. 2020)). For a failure-to-accommodate claim, “intentional discrimination requires at

least actual knowledge that an accommodation is necessary.” Paley, 81 F.4th at 450 (citing Smith,

956 F.3d at 319). A plaintiff may “ordinarily satisfy the knowledge element by showing that they

identified their disabilities as well as the resulting limitations to a public entity or its employees

and requested an accommodation in direct and specific terms.” K.R. ex rel. Shannon, 2025 WL

3265486, at *5 (citing Smith, 956 F.3d at 317) (cleaned up). And, if Plaintiff “failfed] to request

an accommodation in this manner, he can prevail only by showing that the disability, resulting

limitation, and necessary reasonable accommodation were open, obvious, and apparent to the

entity’s relevant agents.” (cleaned up).

5. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides:

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall,

solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be

denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity

receiving Federal financial assistance ...[.]

29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

Analysis under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act follows that of Title II of the ADA

above. “The RA is operationally identical to the ADA in that both statutes prohibit discrimination

against disabled persons; however, the ADA applies only to public entities while the RA applies to

any federally funded programs or activities, whether public or private.” Lathan, 2017 WL

7037704, at *3 (citing Borum v. Swisher County, No. 2:14-CV-127-J, 2015 WL 327508, at *3

(N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015)). As such, “[c]ourts utilize the same standards in analyzing claims under

both the ADA and RA.” /d. (citing Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 223 (Sth Cir. 2011)).

The main difference between Title I] of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA is the causation

requirement. “Section 504 requires that the plaintiff’s disability be the ‘sole reason’ for the

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exclusion or denial of benefits, but the ADA’s standard is less stringent.” Paley, 81 F.4th at 449

(citing Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (Sth Cir. 2005)).

6. State Law Claims

Plaintiff brings various claims which appear to be based on Texas state law, including

medical fraud and billing violations, gross negligence, defamation and perjury, and corporate

liability under the theory of respondeat superior. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3-4).

When a federal court has original jurisdiction over a claim, the district court may also

extend supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are so related such that “they form part

of the same case or controversy.” Shields Doe v. Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:24-CV-171,

2025 WL 2625566, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2025) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367). However, the

district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the court has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). “So although

supplemental jurisdiction persists, the district court need not exercise it: Instead, the court may

(and indeed, ordinarily should) kick the case to state court.” /d. (quoting Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc.

v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 32 (2025)). As such, “the general rule [is] that ‘a court should decline

to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal-law claims are eliminated

before trial.’” Jd. (quoting Heggemeier v. Caldwell County, 826 F.3d 861, 872-73 (Sth Cir. 2016))

(alteration in original).

Accordingly, because the Court concludes that all of Plaintiff’s federal claims should be

dismissed, and in the absence of any other basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the District Court

should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, regardless of

whether Plaintiff has stated a valid claim for relief. See Shields Doe, 2025 WL 2625566, at *11

11

(declining supplemental jurisdiction on state law claims where the court dismissed § 1983 and

ADA claims under Rule 12(b)(6)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Investigator Lopez

Plaintiff claims on May 17, 2023, he was detained by Edinburg Police while attempting to

report an assault in which he was the victim. (Dkt. No. 19 at 2). Specifically, Plaintiff claims

Investigator Lopez “failed to record an affidavit, ignored evidence and witness accounts, and

refused to accommodate Plaintiff’s visual disability.” (/d. ).

Of Plaintiff’s various claims, this claim against Investigator Lopez actually contains an

offense date. However, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim in Texas is two years. See Ali

v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 439 (Sth Cir. 1990) (noting the applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983

claim in Texas is two years). Here, Plaintiff filed his application to proceed in forma pauperis on

June 27, 2025, which was subsequently granted on July 21, 2025, and followed by Plaintiff's

Complaint on July 22, 2025. (See Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Case No. 7:25-mc-

00142; see also Dkt. Nos. 1, 2). Thus, Plaintiffs claims fall just outside of the two-year statute of

limitations period and are time-barred.

Moreover, if Plaintiff seeks liability against Investigator Lopez for failing to investigate or

prosecute an individual, such claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because there is no

constitutional right to have another person investigated or prosecuted and should be dismissed.

See Morrison v. Dall. Cnty. Sex Trafficking Task Force, No. 3:23-CV-2046-N-BH, 2023 WL

9231399, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2023) (“Any claims for criminal investigation and prosecution

should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL

150506 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2024); Lefebure v. D’Aquilla, 15 FAth 650, 657 (Sth Cir. 2021)

12

(“[V]ictims of crime do not have a cognizable interest in the investigation or prosecution of

others.”’).

Similarly, insofar as Plaintiff meant to bring claims against Investigator Lopez under Title

II of the ADA or the RA, such claims are not available against individual defendants. See Keith v.

Tex. Tech Med. Ctr., 2:24-CV-00010-Z-BR, 2024 WL 5112762, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2024)

(collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 5113192 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 13,

2024).

Accordingly, claims against Investigator Lopez should be dismissed.

2. City of Edinburg

Plaintiff claims the City of Edinburg failed to correct or supervise the acts of its employees,

which fostered a pattern of abuse. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).

First, Plaintiff fails to identify any custom or policy that could foster liability against the

City of Edinburg under Monell, nor does he make any attempt to do so. Plaintiff's complaints

appear to solely encompass the individual alleged acts of the City’s employees, and Plaintiff may

not hold the City of Edinburg vicariously liable based on the theory of respondeat superior under

Monell. See Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 316 (Sth Cir. 2018) (“A municipality cannot

be held liable under § 1983 ona theory of respondeat superior.”); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Thus,

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Monell.

On the other hand, Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act do provide

for vicarious liability. See Paley, 81 F.4th at 449 (“[A] plaintiff need not identify an official policy

to sustain a claim against a public entity as it may be held vicariously liable for the acts of its

employees under either [the ADA or RA].”). Thus, Plaintiff could plausibly hold the City of

13

Edinburg liable under these provisions for the acts of the City’s employees. Nevertheless, Plaintiff

fails to state a claim under either provision.

First, Plaintiff claims Investigator Lopez failed to accommodate his visual disability. (Dkt.

No. 19 at 2). Second, Plaintiff claims Sergeant Rodriguez and Officer Pena denied Plaintiff

services despite repeated requests. (/d. at 3). Third, Plaintiff claims Angela Valladares obstructed

Plaintiff’s access to medical records and care, which Plaintiff argues violates ADA standards. (/d.

at 3).

At the preliminary level, Plaintiff's claims in general are simply insufficient to survive

dismissal. Plaintiff includes no details or facts that expand on the alleged ADA and RA violations.

This, alone, warrants dismissal. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting

that the Rule 8 pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.”).

However, even if sufficient facts were included in Plaintiff's pleadings, Plaintiff makes no

insinuation that he was “excluded from participation or denied meaningful access to services,

programs, or activities[.]” Lathan, 2017 WL 7037704, at *3. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to state a

claim because he is unable to show that he was denied such access to services because of his

disability. See Delano-Pyle, 302 F.3d at 574 (*A plaintiff asserting a private cause of action for

violations of the ADA or the RA may only recover compensatory damages upon a showing of

intentional discrimination.”’). Plaintiff makes no claim that he was denied any service because of

his disability, and this claim must fail.

Accordingly, claims against the City of Edinburg should be dismissed.

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3. Jorge Moreno

Plaintiff claims Sergeant Moreno “used excessive force during a separate incident on May

27, 2023, aggravating Plaintiffs visual impairment. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).

The Fifth Circuit has found that “the use of excessive force to apprehend a subject

implicates the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable seizures.” Colston v.

Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 1997). To make out a claim of excessive force, Plaintiff must

show: “(1) [an] injury (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly

excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” Walcotte v. Wicks, No.

C-08-323, 2009 WL 1373601, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 2009) (citing Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d

404, 416 (Sth Cir. 2007)). In considering whether an officer used excessive force, the court should

pay “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case[.]” Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Factors to be considered include “the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether

he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” /d. (citing Tennessee v.

Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)). Further, the reasonableness of the force “must be judged from

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)).

At the outset, Plaintiff’s claims against Sergeant Moreno are impermissibly vague. While

Plaintiff asserts excessive force against Sergeant Moreno, Plaintiff does not identify any details to

the altercation whatsoever, other than utilizing the term “excessive force” and noting an offense

date. This will not suffice. See Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Aus., 836 F.3d 467, 469 (Sth Cir. 2016)

(“We take the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, but we do not credit

conclusory allegations or allegations that merely restate the legal elements of a claim.”).

15

However, even if the Court could look past this fatal flaw, Plaintiff’s claim still fails, for

the same reason as the claim against Investigator Lopez (See supra Section II(B)(1)) because it is

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Ali, 892 F.2d at 439.

Accordingly, claims against Sergeant Moreno should be dismissed.

4, Sergeant Rodriguez

Plaintiff claims Sergeant Rodriguez neglected to file reports and denied Plaintiff services

despite repeated requests. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Sergeant Rodriguez are factually insufficient. Plaintiff does

not identify which reports he sought to file, which were neglected, or when this interaction

occurred. While Plaintiff is afforded the benefit of liberal construction, this is insufficient to

survive dismissal. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

Similarly, insofar as Plaintiff takes issue with the lack of reports filed in pursuit of criminal

investigation or prosecution, as noted, such claims are not actionable under § 1983 and must be

dismissed. See Morrison, 2023 WL 9231399, at *5; Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 657.

Finally, if Plaintiff intended on pursuing claims under Title II of the ADA or Section 504

of the RA against Sergeant Rodriguez, those provisions do not apply to individual defendants and

must be dismissed with regard to Sergeant Rodriguez. See Keith, 2024 WL 5112762, at *5.

Accordingly, claims against Sergeant Rodriguez should be dismissed.

5. Officer Daniel Pena

Plaintiff claims Officer Pena neglected to file reports and denied Plaintiff services despite

repeated requests. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Pena are factually insufficient. Plaintiff does not

identify which reports he sought to file, which were neglected, or when this interaction occurred.

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While Plaintiff is afforded the benefit of liberal construction, this is insufficient to survive

dismissal. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

Similarly, insofar as Plaintiff takes issue with the lack of reports filed in pursuit of criminal

investigation or prosecution, as noted, such claims are not actionable under § 1983 and must be

dismissed. See Morrison, 2023 WL 9231399, at *5; Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 657.

Finally, if Plaintiff intended on pursuing claims under Title II of the ADA or Section 504

of the RA against Officer Pena, those provisions do not apply to individual defendants and must

be dismissed with regard to Officer Pena. See Keith, 2024 WL 5112762, at *5.

Accordingly, claims against Officer Pena should be dismissed.

6. Detective Orlando Garcia

Plaintiff claims Detective Garcia failed to properly investigate Internal Affairs complaints

and contributed to the obstruction of justice. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).

These claims, too, are factually insufficient to pass muster. Plaintiff provides no details

regarding the failure to properly investigate, the subject matter of the investigation, or the date of

the incident. This claim may fail on this ground alone. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft,

556 U.S. at 678.

Even if the facts were sufficient, this claim fails under § 1983 because Plaintiff has no

constitutional right to investigate or prosecute another person. See Morrison, 2023 WL 9231399,

at *5; Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 657.

Accordingly, claims against Detective Orlando Garcia should be dismissed.

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7. Dr. Gustavo Villegas

Plaintiff claims Dr. Villegas “engaged in fraudulent billing and failed to provide adequate

care over a multi-year period.” (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).

At the outset, Plaintiff's claims against Dr. Gustavo Villegas are too vague to survive

dismissal. Plaintiff does not provide any specific details other than the generalized frustration with

billing and care over an extended period of time. This, again, will not suffice. See Chhim, 836

F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

Moreover, Plaintiff provides no details with regard to Dr. Gustavo Villegas that may allow

the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. (See supra Section II(A)(6)

(declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims).

Accordingly, claims against Dr. Gustavo Villegas should be dismissed.

8. Angela Valladares

Plaintiff claims Angela Valladares obstructed Plaintiff’s access to medical records and care,

which Plaintiff argues violates ADA standards. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).

The claims against Angela Valladares are factually insufficient as well. Plaintiff provides

no details regarding the alleged obstruction, when it occurred, nor how it falls under the scope of

Title II discrimination. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. This claim

must fail.

Further, Plaintiff provides no grounds for the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction

over this claim, and the Court recommends dismissal of state law claims. (See supra Section

II(A)(6) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims).

Finally, even if the claims could survive the pleading requirements, which they cannot, an

ADA claim is not available against an individual defendant. See Keith, 2024 WL 5112762, at *5.

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Accordingly, claims against Angela Valladares should be dismissed.

9. Juarez Pablo

Plaintiff claims Juarez Pablo filed a false police report against Plaintiff, which resulted in

adverse legal action. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).

This claim is factually insufficient. Plaintiff omits any details regarding this alleged

offense. Plaintiff does not include an offense date, what the context of the interaction was, or how

Juarez Pablo’s alleged police report was false. This claim must fail. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469;

see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

Similarly, while the Court recommends dismissal of any and all state law claims (See supra

Section II(A)(6) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims), to the

extent that Plaintiff seeks a claim of perjury, “neither federal nor state law provides a private cause

of action for such a claim.” Bey v. Delgado, No. 3:23-cv-00454-B-BT, 2023 WL 8262702, at *3

(N.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 846253 (N.D. Tex. Feb.

27, 2024) (citing Graneto v. Humpert, No. 3:23-CV-76-G-BK, 2023 WL 1973231, at *1 (N.D. Tex.

Jan. 17, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 1972008 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13,

2023)).

Accordingly, claims against Juarez Pablo should be dismissed.

10. | Doctors Hospital at Renaissance Ltd.

Plaintiff claims Doctors Hospital at Renaissance Ltd. failed to correct and supervise the

acts of its employees, which fostered a pattern of abuse. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).

In following suit, Plaintiff’s claims against Doctors Hospital at Renaissance are

accompanied with no factual support. Plaintiff does not explain what acts of its employees should

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force liability, when they occurred, nor how they constituted a pattern of abuse. This simply will

not do. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

Similarly, Plaintiff fails to identify grounds for subject matter jurisdiction over these

purported state law claims and the Court recommends dismissal of any state law claims. (See

supra Section II(A)(6) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims).

Accordingly, the claims against Doctors Hospital at Renaissance should be dismissed.

C. Additional Motions

1. Motion for Criminal Investigation

Plaintiff filed Motion for Criminal Investigation on August 12, 2025. (See Dkt. No. 7).

Therein, Plaintiff requests the Court refer this matter to the United States Department of Justice,

Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section; Federal Bureau of Investigation, White Collar Crime

Division (Houston Field Office); Texas Rangers, Public Integrity Unit; and Texas Attorney

General’s Office, Criminal Investigations Division. (/d. at 2).

As mentioned, Plaintiff does not have the right to have another individual criminal

investigated or prosecuted. See Morrison, 2023 WL 9231399, at *5; Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 657.

Regardless, because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, this Motion (Dkt.

No. 7) should be dismissed.

2. Motion for Service of Process by the United States Marshal

Plaintiff filed Motion for Service of Process by the United States Marshal on December 9,

2025. (See Dkt. No. 20). Therein, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order directing the United

States Marshals Service to serve the summons and complaint on the listed defendants in

accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. (/d. at 1).

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Because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No.

20) should be denied as moot.

3. Motion for ADA Reasonable Accommodation and_for Procedural

Safeguards for Disabled Pro Se Litigant

Plaintiff filed Motion for ADA Reasonable Accommodation and for Procedural Safeguards

for Disabled Pro Se Litigant on December 9, 2025. (See Dkt. No. 21). Plaintiff specifically

requests (1) authorization to correct any filings deficiencies arising from disability-related

limitations, like caption errors, formatting irregularities, or missing attachments; (2) procedural

flexibility allowing simplified pleadings, liberal construction, and accessibility assistance from the

Clerk’s Office as needed; (3) extensions of time under Rule 6(b) for any deadlines impacted by

Plaintiff’s disability and reduced access to transportation or assistive technology; and (4)

recognition that all pro se filings by Plaintiff shall be interpreted liberally. (/d. at 1-2).

While Plaintiff’s filings are afforded liberal construction, because the Court recommends

dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No. 21) should be denied as moot.

4. Motion for Liberal Construction of Pro Se Filings

Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Motion for Liberal Construction of Pro Se Filings on December 9,

2025. (See Dkt. No. 22). Therein, Plaintiff, again, requests that his filings be interpreted with the

liberal construction standard established by the Supreme Court and federal statutes. (/d. at 4).

As noted, Plaintiff’s filings are interpreted using liberal construction; however, because the

Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No. 22) should be denied

as moot.

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5. Motion for Special Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction and to Proceed

Under the Alias “Don Doe”

Plaintiff filed Motion for Special Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction and to Proceed

Under the Alias “Don Doe” on December 9, 2025. (See Dkt. No. 23). Plaintiff specifically

requests the Court (1) permit a special appearance solely to challenge personal jurisdiction; and

(2) allow Plaintiff to proceed under the alias “Don Doe” due to compelling privacy and safety

concerns. (/d. at 1-2).

Though curious minds may wonder why Plaintiff seeks to challenge the personal

jurisdiction of the Court in a case he initiated himself, the Court ultimately recommends dismissal

of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and this Motion (Dkt. No. 23) should be denied as moot.

6. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery

Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery on December 9, 2025. (See Dkt.

No. 24). Therein, Plaintiff claims the Defendants have engaged in unlawful investigative practices

and/or failed to provide adequate disclosures relevant to this matter, including but not limited to

investigative files, reports, and records. (/d. at 2). Thus, Plaintiff seeks an order compelling full

production of such materials. (/d.).

Because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No.

24) should be denied as moot.

7. Motion for Subpoena Duces Tecum

Plaintiff filed Motion for Subpeona [sic] Duces Tecum on December 9, 2025. (See Dkt.

No. 25). Therein, Plaintiff appears to inadvertently request records from the Pharr Police

Department, the subject of separate litigation initiated by Plaintiff (Cause No. 7:25-cv-00362). (dd.

at 1). Plaintiff then requests production of reports, body/dash cam footage, and “other materials

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identified in Plaintiff's exhibit list, relevant to claims of officer misconduct, neglect, and civil

rights violations[,]” from the Edinburg Police Department. (/d.).

Because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No.

25) should be denied as moot.

8. Motion to Consolidate Cases Pursuant to Rule 42(a)

Finally, Plaintiff filed Motion to Consolidate Cases Pursuant to Rule 42(a) on December 9,

2025. (See Dkt. No. 26). Plaintiff seeks to consolidate this Action (Cause No. 7:25-cv-00363)

with Civil Action No. 7:25-cv-00362, claiming they arise from the same operative facts, involve

common legal issues, and seek similar relief under federal civil rights statutes. (/d. at 2).

Because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No.

26) should be denied as moot.

Il. CONCLUSION

Recommended Disposition

After careful review of the filings and relevant case law, and for reasons outlined above, it

is recommended that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED as follows:

(1) Plaintiff’s claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be DISMISSED with

prejudice for failure to state a claim;

(2) Plaintiff’s claims brought against the municipality under Monel] should be

DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim;

(3) Plaintiff’s claims brought under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA should

be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim; and

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(4) Any and all claims brought under Texas state law should be DISMISSED without

prejudice.’

It is further recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Criminal Investigation (Dkt. No. 7),

Motion for Service of Process (Dkt. No. 20), Motion for ADA Accommodation (Dkt. No. 21),

Motion for Liberal Construction of the Filings (Dkt. No. 22), Motion for Special Appearance and

Process Under an Alias (Dkt. No. 23), Motion to Compel Discovery (Dkt. No. 24), Motion for

Subpoena Duces Tecum (Dkt. No. 25), and Motion to Consolidate cases (Dkt. No. 26), all be

DENIED as moot.

It is further recommended that the matter be closed.

Notice to the Parties

Within 14 days after being served a copy of this report, a party may serve and file specific,

written objections to the proposed recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b). The district judge to whom this case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon

the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge’s disposition to

which specific written objection has been made. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify

the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate

judge with instructions.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained

in this report within 14 days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from de novo review by the

District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations and from appellate review of factual

* See Lucky Tunes #3, L.L.C. v. Smith, 812 F. App’x 176, 184 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding that state law claims

dismissed where district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should have been dismissed

without prejudice); Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 246 (Sth Cir. 1999) (concluding that such claims

“should expressly be without prejudice so that the plaintiff may refile his claims in the appropriate state

court.”).

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findings accepted or adopted by the District Court, except on grounds of plain error or manifest

injustice. See Douglas v. United Serv. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en

banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The Clerk shall also provide a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and Counsel for Defendants.

DONE at McAllen, Texas, this 3rd day of March 2026.

Juan F, Alanis

United States Magistrate Judge

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