“[I]f the debtor-in- possession defaults in this respect, Section 1104(a)(1) commands that the stewardship of the reorganization effort must be turned over to an independent trustee.”
How later courts described this case
- “[I]f the debtor-in- possession defaults in this respect, Section 1104(a)(1) commands that the stewardship of the reorganization effort must be turned over to an independent trustee.”
- failure to pay all taxes owed after the petition was filed support appointing a trustee under section 1112(b)
- stating that a “chronic failure to pay taxes” constitutes “gross mismanagement” under section 1104(a)(1)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In re:
BEXIN REALTY CORPORATION, Chapter 11
Debtor. Case No. 24-12080 (MG)
MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING BEXIN REALTY’S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND GRANTING CATHAY BANK’S CROSS MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE
A P P E A R A N C E S:
DAVIDOFF HUTCHER & CITRON LLP
Attorneys for Bexin Realty Corporation
605 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10158
212-557-7200
By: Robert Leslie Rattet, Esq.
Craig M. Price, Esq.
PRYOR CASHMAN LLP
Attorney for Cathay Bank
7 Times Square
New York, NY 10036
212-421-4100
By: Joseph A. Shifer, Esq.
MARTIN GLENN
CHIEF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
Pending before the Court is debtor Bexin Realty Corporation’s (the “Debtor” or “Bexin”)
Motion for Order Dismissing Chapter 11 Case pursuant to Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code (The “Motion,” ECF Doc. # 94). The Motion was filed indirectly in response to Cathay
Bank’s (“Cathay”) Ex Parte Motion for An Order Pursuant to Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure Authorizing Subpoenas for Production of Documents and Oral
Examination (the “Rule 2004 Motion,” ECF Doc. # 92.) The Rule 2004 Motion seeks to compel
by way of subpoena the production of documents and oral examinations under oath of several
parties associated with the Debtor including Benaram Benaresh (a/k/a Gilbert Benaresh), Claudia
Benaresh, and Jonathan Aghravi (“Aghravi”) (collectively, the “Discovery Parties.”)
Objections were filed against both the Motion and the Rule 2004 Motion. With respect to
the Motion, Cathay filed Cathay Bank’s (I) Objection to Debtor’s Motion for Order Dismissing
Chapter 11 Case Pursuant to Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and (II) Cross-Motion for
the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee, or Alternatively, Converting Case to Chapter 7
Pursuant to Sections 1104(a) and 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Objection,” ECF Doc. #
101) and accompanying declaration of Joseph A. Shifer (the “Shifer Decl.,” ECF Doc. # 102), to
which the Debtor filed a response (the “Response,” ECF Doc. # 104).
With Respect to the Rule 2004 Motion, the Debtor filed their Objection to Cathay Bank’s
Ex Parte Motion for an Order Pursuant to Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure Authorizing Subpoenas for Production of Documents and Oral Examination (the
“Rule 2004 Objection,” ECF Doc. # 93). Cathay Bank filed the Reply to Debtor’s Objection to
Ex Parte Motion for an Order Pursuant to Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure Authorizing Subpoenas for Production of Documents and Oral Examination (the
“Rule 2004 Reply,” ECF Doc. # 97).
As set forth below and in the order accompanying this Memorandum Opinion (ECF Doc.
# 109), the Court:
DENIES the Motion to Dismiss;
GRANTS Cathay’s cross motion for the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee; and
DENIES the Rule 2004 Motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
The Debtor filed for Chapter 11 relief on November 27, 2024 (the “Petition Date”).
(Motion ¶ 8.) The Debtor is operating and managing real property located at 24-26 and 28-30
West 125th Street, New York, New York 10027 (the “Property”) as a debtor-in-possession under
sections 1107 and 1108 of the bankruptcy code. (Id.) The Debtor is indebted to Cathay pursuant
to a loan agreement dated October 22, 2022 (the “Loan Agreement”) and a related Consolidated,
Amended and Restated Note (the “Note”) (collectively the “Cathay Loan”) in the principal
amount of at least $16,375,500. (Id ¶ 9.) The Cathay Loan is secured by the property. (Id.) The
Debtor has defaulted on its obligations under the Loan Agreement; Cathay was owed as of the
Petition Date no less than $17,408,971.73. (Id. ¶ 10.) Prior to the Petition Date, Cathay
commenced a foreclosure action in New York state court (the “Foreclosure Action”). (Id. ¶ 11.)
Subsequent the Petition Date, the Debtor sought to retain Better Brokers, LLC (the
“Broker”) to assist the Debtor with the marketing, refinancing, and sale of the Property. (Id. ¶
12.) On June 8, 2025, the Court entered orders authorizing the retention of the Broker (ECF
Doc. # 59) and approving the Debtor’s second amended plan (the “Plan,” ECF Doc. # 56) (ECF
Doc. # 60). Bid procedures (the “Bid Procedures,” ECF Doc. # 56) were approved by the court
the next day (ECF Doc. # 61.) Relevant here is that under the Plan the Debtor was required to
“either: (i) complete a refinance the Property by the ‘Deadline to Close’ (as defined in the Plan)
of May 30, 2025, or (ii) conduct a sale of the Property no later than 15 business days after the
Deadline to Close in accordance with the Bid Procedures.” (Motion ¶ 14.) The Deadline to
Close was subject to three (3) thirty-day extensions, and in exchange for this the Debtor agreed
to pay $80,000.00 monthly in adequate protection payments and $20,000.00 monthly for
Cathay’s legal fees. (Id. ¶ 15.) The Deadline to Close was later extended to September 30,
2025, via stipulation. (Id. ¶ 17; ECF Doc. # 73.) Failure to comply with the sale obligations
under the Plan and later stipulations would constitute default under the Plan. (ECF Doc. # 73 ¶
8.)
According to the Debtor, the Broker attempted to solicit bidders but was unsuccessful in
finding bids near the outstanding $17.2 million on the Cathay Loan; the five bids received were
all in the $10-$11 million range and deemed unacceptable. (Id. ¶ 18.) Cathay and the Debtor
also failed to come to an agreement regarding refinancing the loan. (Id. ¶ 19.)
As the building has not been sold, the parties have agreed to numerous interim cash
collateral orders, the most recent of which was the Tenth Interim Order Authorizing Use of Cash
Collateral by Debtor Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 363 (the “Tenth Cash Collateral Order” ECF
Doc. # 86) entered January 29, 2026 and extending the authorized use of cash collateral through
February 28, 2026. While the parties indicated to the Court that they were seeking another
interim cash collateral order during the February 25, 2026, status conference (Objection ¶¶ 27-
28), the Debtor soon after informed Cathay that it was no longer seeking to sell the property (id ¶
29).
After learning that the Debtor would no longer be attempting to sell the property, Cathay
filed the Rule 2004 Motion claiming that it has not been provided with basic documentation,
including copies of current residential leases and documents regarding the regulation status of
the Property. (Rule 2004 Motion ¶ 3.) Cathay alleges that the failure to turn over these
documents to bidders was a large reason for why bids were far below the anticipated $17 million.
(Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) The Rule 2004 Motion also alleges that the daughter of Benaresh, Claudia
Benaresh (id ¶ 22), occupies a rent stabilized unit in the building with a two-year lease, no
security deposit, and a monthly rent of $398.97, all while the prior tenant paid $3,050 a month in
rent (id ¶ 29). While the Debtor claimed that it has not provided this information due to privacy
concerns for the tenants, Cathay alleges that the Debtor has not responded to requests to provide
redacted versions of the current leases. (Id. ¶ 30.)
Three days after Cathay filed the Rule 2004 Motion the Debtor filed its Motion to
Dismiss.
A. The Motion to Dismiss
1. Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss
The Debtor is seeking to dismiss the case under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), claiming that cause
exists to dismiss the case because no further rehabilitation is required via this proceeding and
dismissal would allow for Cathay to proceed in the Foreclosure Action. (Motion ¶¶ 28-29.) The
Debtor claims that it can no longer meet the administrative burdens of the Case, that the Property
is its sole asset or cause of action, and that it lacks the ability to reorganize. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 23, 30.)
2. Cathay’s Objection
Cathay objects to the Debtor’s claim to establish cause to dismiss. Cathay notes that the
Debtor failed to support the conclusory statements and that the statements in the Motion
regarding the failed sale process and refinancing efforts are disingenuous. (Objection ¶ 36.)
Cathay argues that not only was a deal to restart the sale process in the offing in February (id ¶
37) but that valuable assets remain in the estate, including causes of action against Benaresh
related to his control over the debtor and nearly $220,000.00 in outstanding tenant receivables (id
¶ 38). Cathay also submits that it will work with a Chapter 11 trustee to determine a workable
cash collateral budget to ensure the estate remains solvent. (Id. ¶ 39.)
Beyond arguing that cause does not exist to dismiss the case, Cathay argues that cause
exists for the Court to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee (“trustee”) under section 1104(a)(1) of the
Code. (Id. ¶ 43.) According to Cathay, there are several reasons why cause exists to appoint a
trustee:
• Unauthorized Use of Cash Collateral: The Debtor’s authorization to use cash
collateral terminated on February 28, 2026, per the Tenth Cash Collateral Order.
According to Cathay, the Debtor has continued operating in Chapter 11 without
seeking relief of the Court to use Cathay’s cash collateral, which constitutes
“substantial harm” to Cathay and is grounds for appointing a trustee. (Id. ¶ 47.)
• Failure to Timely Pay Taxes: Cathay alleges that the Debtor’s failure to pay
property taxes, currently owing more than $90,000 in post-petition taxes,
constitutes cause to appoint a trustee. (Id. ¶ 49 (citing ECF Doc. # 91 (listing
post-petition taxes past due in the amount of $90,455).)
• Unauthorized Retention of Professionals: The Debtor retained Aghravi,
principal of JBA Equites and alleged by Cathay to be the nephew of Benaresh, to
act as a loan broker to refinance the Debtor’s loan, obtain appraisals of the
Property, and coordinate with the lenders to obtain term sheets. The Debtor did
not receive authorization from the Court to employ Aghravi. (Id. ¶ 52.)
• Failure to Disclose Insider Payments: The Debtor, while representing in each of
its Monthly Operating Reports (“MORs”) that it was not making payments to
insiders, had been making payments to Benaresh for managing the Property
pursuant to a January 30, 2014, Property Management Agreement. (Id. ¶ 55.)
The Debtor had been accounting for the fee in the budgets approved under the
many interim cash collateral agreements. (Id.)
• Failure to Timely File MOR: Cathay alleges that fifteen of the sixteen MORs
filed by the Debtor were filed late, with many missing important information such
as balance sheets and statements of profits and losses. (Id. ¶ 56.)
• Hindering Reorganization: The Debtor hindered the sale process by failing to
maintain and provide basic financial documents to both Cathay and prospective
bidders. (Id. ¶ 58.) Cathay posits that they received depressed bids for the
Property due to concerns from bidders who were not provided with the customary
documents and information expected during a property sale. (Id. ¶ 59.)
• Inadequate Record Keeping: The Debtor’s failure to maintain and/or provide
basic documentation such as current lease agreements are indicative of inadequate
record keeping. Additionally, the Debtor has yet to provide Cathay
documentation regarding the regulation status of the Property, which is of
particular interest given Benaresh’s daughter residing in an allegedly rent-
stabilized apartment for approximately $2,700.00 per month less than the prior
tenant. (Id. ¶¶ 60-61.)
• Breach of Fiduciary Duties: Cathay alleges that the Debtor has failed to
investigate any potential causes of action and as a result “manifestly could cause
the estate to forfeit proceeds to which it would otherwise be entitled. Taken alone,
the Debtor’s failure to investigate avoidance actions signals a breach of fiduciary
duty sufficient to justify a finding of ‘cause’ under 1104(a)(1).” (Id. ¶ 63 (citing In
re Sillerman, 605 B.R. 631, 648 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)).)
Cathay additionally argues that even if the Court fails to find cause, the appointment of a
trustee is in the best interest of the creditors and can therefore be appointed under section
1104(a)(2). (Id. ¶ 65.) Cathay first argues that the Debtor lacks credibility as its principal
Benaresh has allowed his daughter to reside in the Property for far below market rate (id ¶ 67),
along with failing to maintain books and accurate records (id ¶¶ 68-69). Second, Cathay argues
that as the Debtor is unwilling to rehabilitate and restructure, the void must be filled by the
appointment of a trustee. (Id. ¶ 71.) Next, Cathay lacks confidence that the Debtor will do
anything constructive with its assets due to the Debtor’s lack of cooperation with Cathay, gross
mismanagement of the assets, and failure to comply with the Code. (Id. ¶ 72.) Finally, Cathay
argues that the benefits of appointing a trustee outweigh the costs: not only has Cathay’s lack of
faith in the Debtor to manage the estate suggest that the need for a trustee is great, Cathay
believes that there are actions that the trustee can take—including through pursuing potential
avoidance actions—that will lead to recoveries for creditors and ensure the estate remains
solvent. (Id. ¶¶ 74-76.)
If the Court declines to appoint a trustee, Cathay argues that the Court should instead
convert the case to Chapter 7 under section 1112(b)(1). Bankruptcy courts are afforded
significant discretion to find cause to convert a case pursuant to section 1112(b), and Cathay
believes all the reasons that support cause for appointing a trustee are reasons for why this case
should alternatively be converted to Chapter 7. (Id. ¶¶ 80-81.) Cathay also asserts the following
in support of conversion:
• Preferential Payments: While it is unclear to what extent the Debtor has
conducted a preference analysis as such information has not been included in the
SOFA, the Debtor has been making payments to Benaresh since 2014, and it is
likely that some payments were received prior to the Petition Date. (Id. ¶ 81.)
• Loss of Rights on Dismissal: Cathay states that they would be prejudiced upon
dismissal through the loss of adequate protection payments. (Id. ¶ 82.)
• Risk of Refiling: The Debtor, while claiming that Cathay can resume the
Foreclosure Action, does not make any assurances that it will not refile for
bankruptcy. (Id. ¶ 83.) Cathay views the Debtor’s past actions as instructive and
fears that it will file another bankruptcy case to frustrate the Foreclosure Action.
(Id.)
• Assets Available for Creditors: Cathay argues that, absent a Chapter 11 trustee,
a Chapter 7 trustee would be the best able to monetize the Property, collect
accounts receivable, and uncover additional assets for creditors. (Id. ¶ 84.)
• Superior Non-Bankruptcy Forum: Cathay believes that the Court is the best
forum to resolve the ultimate disposition of the Property. (Id. ¶ 85.)
• Estate Property to be Administered: Cathay argues that liquidation under
Chapter 7 will result in a better sale of the Property than a foreclosure sale
through public auction, which is what would occur if the Foreclosure Action were
to continue. (Id. ¶ 86.)
3. Bexin’s Response
The Debtor disputes Cathay’s claims regarding the ability of the Debtor to reorganize.
The Debtor claims that Cathay’s offer to restart the sale process does not mean the case can
proceed administratively, and that its statements that claims may exist against Benaresh are
unsubstantiated. (Response ¶ 10.) The Debtor also disputes Cathay’s claims regarding tenant
receivables as Cathay omitted crucial information: 80% of the $220,000 in receivables relates to
four tenants, two of which are in active litigation with the Debtor for nonpayment, and a third of
which was evicted for nonpayment. (Id. ¶ 11.) The Debtor claims that all of this information has
been included in the MORs and should be known by Cathay. (Id.) The Debtor also disputes that
Cathay would be able to work with a Chapter 11 trustee on a cash collateral budget to ensure the
estate remains solvent as the estate ultimately lacks the funds necessary, funds it would have had
Cathay not required the debtor to pay over $100,000 a month in interest and attorneys’ fees. (Id.
¶ 12.)
The Debtor additionally disputes that cause exists to appoint a trustee—Cathay had
waited until its sale effort failed to allege mismanagement of the estate. (Id. ¶ 14.) Cathay’s
silence included allowing the Debtor to manage the Property at a below-market rate which the
Debtor alleges was done in hopes of receiving full payment through a sale or refinancing, all
while receiving over $100,000 a month from the Debtor. (Id.) The Debtor believes that Cathay
has failed to meet its burden based on the following factors:
• Cash Collateral: While the parties had agreed to ten prior interim cash collateral
orders, Debtor alleges that Cathay made numerous information demands that were
ultimately unworkable during the failed negotiations for the eleventh. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Given the failure of the sale process, the Debtor has moved to dismiss. While
Cathay cites to cases asserting the unauthorized use of cash collateral may support
cause to appoint a trustee, none of them involve a situation where the Debtor has
moved to dismiss the case. The Debtor would no longer need to use cash
collateral if the case is dismissed. (Id.)
• Payment of Taxes: The Debtor claims that it is unable to pay its real estate taxes
due to the substantial adequate protection payments being made to Cathay. (Id. ¶
16.)
• Unauthorized Retention of Professionals: The Debtor disputes that Aghravi was
retained or paid by the estate. (Id. ¶ 17.)
• Failure to Disclose Insider Payments: The Debtor notes that the payments to
Benaresh were disclosed in the Debtor’s P&L Statements. These were cited by
Cathay, inherently undercutting their argument. (Id. ¶ 18.)
• Failure to Timely File MORs: While the Debtor admits some MORs were filed
late, the Debtor is currently up to date in its filings. Cathay does not demonstrate
how it was prejudiced in such filings. (Id. ¶ 19.)
• Hindering Reorganization: The Debtor states that if Cathay believed that the
lack of information provided by the Debtor during the sale process would have
hindered the sale process, then Cathay should have raised this at the time. (Id. ¶
20.) Cathay is just now blaming the Debtor for other market factors.
• Inadequate Record Keeping: The Debtor states that Cathay’s allegation is false.
The Debtor states that it has provided all leases to Cathay through an online portal
that could not be downloaded due to PII issues. (Id. ¶ 21.) Additionally, Debtor
alleges that while Cathay requested information regarding the Debtor’s renting at
rent stabilized rates, the Debtor has made Cathay aware that they do not possess
these records but are renting the units in line with New York City (the “City”)
regulations regarding rent stabilization. (Id. ¶ 22.)
• Breach of Fiduciary Duties: The Debtor disputes Cathay’s assertion that
Benaresh being paid for managing the building effectively caused a breach of
fiduciary duty. They also dispute the fact that Benaresh’s family residing in a rent
stabilized unit at below market rate suggests that “some untoward act has taken
place.” (Id. ¶ 23.)
• Benefits to Creditors: While Cathay claims that the appointment of a trustee
would benefit creditors, they do not acknowledge that the statement is self-serving
– they are the primary creditor, and they do not mention how the trustee will
benefit unsecured creditors, if at all. (Id. ¶ 24.) The Debtor reasserts that any
effort to rehabilitate itself will, like the past efforts, fail, and it would be best to
continue the Foreclosure Action. (Id. ¶ 25.)
In respect to Cathay’s effort to establish cause to convert the case to Chapter 7, the
Debtor reasserts the above in addition to noting that Cathay’s additional allegations also fail to
establish cause. They first claim that the management payments to Benaresh were not
preferential payments, but instead were contemporaneous value exchanged for services. (Id. ¶
29.) Second, Cathay cannot claim to suffer prejudice by no longer receiving the adequate
protection payments as that is something only afforded to them while the Debtor is in
bankruptcy; once the case is dismissed, Cathay will be able to exercise its right to repossess the
Property. (Id. ¶ 30.) The Debtor also claims that it has made no indication of refiling for
Chapter 11 if the case were dismissed and Cathay’s claim to the contrary is unsupported. (Id. ¶
31.) Finally, the Debtor does not need to be in bankruptcy for Cathay to collect accounts
receivable or other assets from the Debtor; it can do so in the Foreclosure Action. (Id ¶ 32.)
Cathay does not have a right for the case to continue in this Court just to collect adequate
protection payments. (Id ¶ 33.) The alleged potential of obtaining a better price for the property
is not enough to convert the case to Chapter 7.
B. The Rule 2004 Motion
As noted above, Cathay initially filed the Rule 2004 Motion seeking documents from the
Debtor regarding the value of the Property and the Debtor’s mismanagement of the estate. (Rule
2004 Motion ¶ 36.) It seeks documents and to depose the Discovery Parties as they alone
possess key information regarding the Property. (Id.) Cathay argues that it does not possess an
alternative means of obtaining these documents, and the denial of this motion would impose
undue hardship on Cathay as it is otherwise unable to properly assess the value of the Property.
(Id.)
In its objection to the 2004 Motion, the Debtor claims that Cathay lacks standing to bring
a claim for mismanagement of the estate as it derives from the Debtor’s estate; only a trustee
would have standing to bring such an action. (Rule 2004 Objection ¶ 9.) Additionally, the
Debtor claims that the Rule 2004 Motion would impose unduly burdensome discovery
obligations on the Debtor, including obtaining information from leases more than thirty years
ago. (Id. ¶¶ 15-17.)
In a short reply, Cathay argues that the Debtor only provided “red herrings” for why the
Rule 2004 Motion should not be granted. (Rule 2004 Reply ¶ 1.) First, Cathay claims that an
argument regarding standing to bring the cause of action does not implicate issues of Rule 2004,
which can be brought by “any party in interest.” (Id. ¶¶ 3-4 (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(a)).)
Additionally, Cathay disputes the Debtor’s claim that the request is unduly burdensome; if the
Debtor argues that they have already produced some of the documents, then it cannot be so hard
to produce them again. (Id. ¶ 5.) Lastly, Cathay reasserts that there is good cause to grant the
motion, as Cathay will face undue hardship through being unable to properly assess the value of
the Property and determine if there are claims for mismanagement of the estate. (Id. ¶ 7.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss
“Unlike chapter 12 and 13 debtors, ‘a Chapter 11 debtor does not enjoy an absolute right
to a dismissal of its bankruptcy.’” In re Just Plumbing & Heating Supply, Inc, 2011 WL
4962993, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011) (quoting In re Kingsbrook Dev. Corp., 261 B.R.
378, 379 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001)). A court can dismiss a Chapter 11 proceeding under section
1112(b)(1) of the Code, provided that the movant establishes cause. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).
Section 1112(b)(4) defines cause under the subsection using the following sixteen factors:
(A): substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and
the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation;
(B): gross mismanagement of the estate;
(C): failure to maintain appropriate insurance that poses a risk to the
estate or to the public;
(D): unauthorized use of cash collateral substantially harmful to 1 or
more creditors;
(E): failure to comply with an order of the court;
(F): unexcused failure to satisfy timely any filing or reporting
requirement established by this title or by any rule applicable to a
case under this chapter;
(G): failure to attend the meeting of creditors convened under
section 341(a) or an examination ordered under rule 2004 of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure without good cause shown
by the debtor;
(H): failure timely to provide information or attend meetings
reasonably requested by the United States trustee (or the bankruptcy
administrator, if any);
(I): failure timely to pay taxes owed after the date of the order for
relief or to file tax returns due after the date of the order for relief;
(J): failure to file a disclosure statement, or to file or confirm a plan,
within the time fixed by this title or by order of the court;
(K): failure to pay any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of
title 28;
(L): revocation of an order of confirmation under section 1144;
(M): inability to effectuate substantial consummation of a confirmed
plan;
(N): material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan;
(O): termination of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence of
a condition specified in the plan; and
(P): failure of the debtor to pay any domestic support obligation that
first becomes payable after the date of the filing of the petition.
11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4). The Court is free to consider other factors as Section 1112(b)(4) is a
non-exclusive list. In re UFP Holding, I, LLC, 675 B.R. 302, 307 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2025). “The
moving party has the burden of demonstrating cause for dismissal or conversion.” In re Just
Plumbing, 2011 WL 4962993, at *2.
B. Appointing a Chapter 11 Trustee
Under section 1104(a), any party in interest can move for the appointment of a trustee
“for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of
the debtor by current management.” 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). Beyond these four factors, courts
have considered other factors relevant for the inquiry including: “conflicts of interest, including
inappropriate relations between corporate parents and the subsidiaries; misuse of assets and
funds; inadequate record keeping and reporting; various instances of conduct found to establish
fraud or dishonesty; and lack of credibility and creditor confidence.” In re Ashley River
Consulting, LLC, 2015 WL 1540941, at *9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) (citing In re
Altman, 230 B.R. 6, 16 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999). If the court were to find that cause does exist
for the appointment of a trustee, then the trustee must be appointed: “there is no discretion; an
independent trustee must be appointed.” In re Ashley River, 2015 WL 1540941, at *9 (quoting In
re V. Savino Oil & Heating Co., Inc., 99 B.R. 518, 525 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989)) (emphasis
original).
A trustee can also be appointed if it is in the “best interest of the creditors.” 11 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(2). See In re Ancona, 2016 WL 7868696, at *12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2016)
(“Even if a court does not find that cause exists to appoint a chapter 11 trustee under section
1104(a)(1), the court may still appoint a trustee under section 1104(a)(2) if such appointment is
in the interest of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate[.]”).
While the ‘best interests’ standard might seem less stringent than the ‘for cause’ standard, the
standard requires the court to find that the appointment of a trustee is in the best interest of all
interested constituencies – a creditor cannot obtain the appointment of a trustee if it were to
disenfranchise other interests. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1104.02 (16th 2026). Factors to
consider when determining whether appointing a trustee is in the best interest of creditors and the
estate include: “(a) the trustworthiness of the debtor; (b) the debtor's past and present
performance and prospects for rehabilitation; (c) the confidence—or lack thereof—of the
business community and of creditors in present management; and (d) the benefits derived from
the appointment of a trustee, balanced against the cost of the appointment.” In re Sillerman, 605
B.R. at 652 (citing In re Ashley River, 2015 WL 1540941, at *8).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Motion to Dismiss
The Motion is incredibly light on reasons for why there is cause to dismiss the case or for
why the interests of both creditors and debtors will best be served through dismissal. Any
reasons given in the Motion are largely supported with conclusory statements: “No Creditor will
benefit from the cost and expenses of a second sales process other than Cathay Bank. . . .
Other than the Property, the Debtor has no assets to liquidate or further administer in this
Chapter 11 Case or a Chapter 7 proceeding.” (Motion ¶¶ 29-30.) The Response claims to
support the Debtor’s argument for cause, such as disputing the ideas that there remains both
valuable claims against Benaresh and rent receivables to collect. (Response ¶¶ 10-11.) The
Response also claims that the bankruptcy estate is administratively insolvent, blaming in large
part the adequate protection and attorneys’ fee payments the Debtor has been making. (Id. ¶ 12.)
Yet, the Debtor again fails to provide anything other conclusory statements. For
example, the Debtor claims that the efforts regarding the evicted tenants have been documented
in the MORs, yet they do not cite to any MOR with this information. They claim to have
received a DHCR report from the City (id ¶ 11), but that report is not included with their papers.
Indicating to the Court which MORs are relevant for analysis and attaching the DHCR report as
an exhibit are simple things that you would think a party trying to meet their burden of proof
would do. The Debtor has done none of this.
The Debtor, as movant, has the burden of proof and they have failed to meet it. The
Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss.
A. Appointing a Chapter 11 Trustee for Cause
To determine if there is cause to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee, the Court will examine the
factors addressed in the Response and Objection.
1. Unauthorized Use of Cash Collateral
Failure to comply with a cash collateral order constitutes cause under section 1104(a)(1).
See Sillerman, 605 B.R. at 645-46 (failing to comply with cash collateral order constitutes
“cause” under section 1104(a)(1)); see also In re AG Serv. Centers, L.C., 239 B.R. 545, 550
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1999) (“[s]ection 1104(a)(1) does not specifically list ‘noncompliance with
court orders’ or ‘failure to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’ as cause for the appointment of a
trustee, but such conduct clearly falls within the scope circumscribed by the statute – either as
‘similar cause’ or as a permutation of ‘incompetence, or gross mismanagement.’”) The Debtor
does not dispute that it used cash collateral after their authorization to do so terminated on
February 28, 2026. The Debtor only claims that it did so because of an inability to refinance
with Cathay, and the inability ultimately moved it to seek to dismiss the bankruptcy.
Notwithstanding the fact that this timeline appears suspect given how the Debtor represented to
the Court with Cathay at the February 25, 2026 status conference that they were negotiating a
new interim cash collateral order, and that nearly 1 (one) month passed between the termination
of the use of cash collateral and the filing of the Motion (which itself only occurred after Cathay
filed the Rule 2004 Motion), the Debtor admits to the unauthorized use of cash collateral.
There is cause to appoint a trustee due to the Debtor’s unauthorized use of cash collateral.
2. Late Payment of Taxes
The failure to timely pay taxes after the petition date can constitute cause to appoint a
trustee. See Mfrs. and Traders Tr. Co. v. Morningstar Marketplace, Ltd. (In re Morningstar
Marketplace, Ltd.), 544 B.R. 297, 306 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2016) (failure to pay all taxes owed after
the petition was filed support appointing a trustee under section 1112(b)); see also In re Euro-
Am. Lodging Corp., 365 B.R. 421, 426 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating that a “chronic failure to
pay taxes” constitutes “gross mismanagement” under section 1104(a)(1)). The Debtor does not
dispute that it has been unable to pay taxes recently and that it owed taxes to the City prior to the
Petititon Date, instead blaming the payments the Debtor is making to Cathay as the reason for its
inability to pay taxes. This again is insufficient to deny Cathay’s cross motion.
Cathay’s showing supports finding cause to appoint a trustee.
3. Unauthorized Retention of Professionals
Retaining professionals in noncompliance with the Code constitutes cause to appoint a
trustee. See In re Sillerman, 605 B.R. at 642 (cause was found where the debtor retained and
paid professionals without court approval and was therefore in violation of section 327(a)).
Cathay alleges that Aghravi was retained to lead efforts to refinance the Cathay Loan and cites to
email correspondence between Cathay and Aghravi which include such refinance discussions as
support. (See Shifer Decl. Ex. B.) The Debtor claims that Aghravi has never been retained nor
paid any amount from the estate for his work and that he solely assisted his uncle.
Cathay does not point to anything in the submitted budgets or other papers that indicate
that Aghravi was paid through estate funds. Without proof that Aghravi was compensated by the
debtor and did not assist his uncle for free, Cathay is unable to meet its burden of proof on this
factor to show cause.
4. Failure to Disclose Insider Payments
“Failure by a debtor-in-possession to disclose material and relevant information to the
Court and creditors or make required filings supports a finding of cause.” In re Sillerman, 605
B.R. at 643 (citing In re V. Savino Oil & Heating, 99 B.R. at 526). While the Debtor was not
clear in its disclosure of the management fee payments to Benaresh, the fee was disclosed; the
Debtor’s profit and loss statements include references to a “Management Fee” (see, e.g. ECF
Doc. # 51 at 14 (the March 2025 profit and loss statement including a $4,2750 management fee))
which, per the Management Agreement provided by the Debtor to Cathay, would be “3% of the
collected effective gross income, payable monthly” to the manager, Benaresh. (Shifer Decl. Ex.
C.) Cathay has not shown good cause to appoint a trustee for failure to disclosure insider
payments.
5. Failure to Timely File MORs
28 CFR § 58.8 requires MORs in Chapter 11 cases to be filed “no later than the 21st day
of the month immediately following the reporting period covered by the MOR.” 28 CFR §
58.8(e). The MORs must contain supporting documentation including:
(ii) Balance sheet containing the summary and detail of the assets,
liabilities, and equity (net worth) or deficit of the estate. The estate’s
prepetition liabilities and retained earnings must be reported
separately from the estate’s postpetition liabilities and retained
earnings; and
(iii) Statement of operations (profit or loss statement) that compares
the estate's actual performance with projected performance.
See 28 CFR § 58.8 (d). The Debtor does not dispute that many MORs were filed late and that
they were missing the above documents, rather claiming that Cathay was not prejudiced by the
late filings. Prejudice is not a factor in this analysis. What is relevant here is that the numerous
late filings suggest that the Debtor has been mismanaging their affairs and supports finding cause
to appoint a trustee. See In re Ashley River, 2015 WL 1540941, at *10 (the failure to timely file
monthly operating reports supported the Court’s determination to appoint a trustee).
6. Hindering Reorganization
“The job of a debtor-in-possession remains under the Code as that described by Judge
Friendly—to get the creditors paid.” In re Pied Piper Casuals, Inc., 40 B.R. 723, 727 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Grayson Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
320 F.2d 940, 949 (2d Cir. 1963)). Acting in a manner that hinders efforts to reorganize
constitutes cause to appoint a trustee as a breach of the debtor’s fiduciary duty. In re Sillerman,
605 B.R. at 650; see also In re V. Savino Oil & Heating, 99 B.R. at 526 (“[I]f the debtor-in-
possession defaults in this respect, Section 1104(a)(1) commands that the stewardship of the
reorganization effort must be turned over to an independent trustee.”) Here, the goal for the
parties was simple: sell the Property. Yet, as evidenced from the documents provided by Cathay,
the failure of the Debtor to provide the necessary documents to potential bidders was a driving
force for the lower-than-desired bids. (Shifer Decl., Exs. D, E.) The Debtor does not claim that
it did provide documents, only that the documents were not the reason the bids were so low,
blaming “larger macroeconomic factors.” (Response ¶ 20.) Even if the macroeconomic factors
were a cause for the lower-than-desired bids, the Debtor did not provide this clearly crucial
information to debtors. The Debtor’s actions here again constitute cause to appoint a trustee.
7. Inadequate Record Keeping
Inadequate record keeping is another relevant factor to consider when determining if
there is cause to appoint a trustee. In re Ashley River, 2015 WL 1540941, at *9. Cathay has
requested information regarding the regulation status of the property, with attention being paid to
the unit rented to Benaresh’s daughter for far lower than the prior tenant. (Shifer Decl. Exs. F, G
(compare the Rent Roll dated as of September 1, 2025, showing a monthly rent of $3,050.00 for
unit 31 with the lease excerpt for unit 31 showing a monthly rent of $398.97).) The Debtor in
response states that is renting the unit for far below the market rate to be in “line with City
regulations” regarding rent stabilization but then claims that Cathay “has repeatedly been made
aware that the Debor does not possess such records” being the documents indicating that the unit
is rent stabilized. (Response ¶ 22.) Ignoring the fact that the Debtor’s principal is renting a unit
to his daughter at a nearly 90% discount from the prior tenant, not possessing the “required rent
stabilization records” (id) is the type of inadequate record keeping that leads the Court to find
cause to appoint a trustee.
8. Breach of Fiduciary Duties
A debtor in possession owes a fiduciary duty to “protect and conserve estate property for
the benefit of creditors (including a duty to avoid self-dealing and to investigate and prosecute
warranted avoidance actions.” In re Sillerman, 605 B.R. at 648 (citing In re Ionosphere Clubs,
Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)) (emphasis added). A breach of such duties
constitutes cause to appoint a trustee. In re Ionosphere Clubs, 113 B.R. at 169. In Sillerman, the
court noted that the debtor-in-possession, who controlled the estate since the case was initiated,
“has not brought, much less investigated, a single avoidance action,” which coupled with the
debtor’s declaration that they would not bring any such actions, constituted “a flagrant
dereliction of his fiduciary duty to the estate.” In re Sillerman, 605 B.R. at 648. The Debtor
does not dispute that it has neither brought nor investigated avoidance actions, and while not
declaring that they would not bring such actions, the Debtor is obstinate that no self-dealing has
taken place. (Response ¶ 23 (“Cathay alleges that because a member of Benaresh’s family is
occupying a rent stabilized unit, that some untoward act has taken place.”)) Whatever has
occurred regarding that apartment does nothing to change the fact that the Debtor has breached
its fiduciary duty to investigate avoidance actions, further showing that cause exists to appoint a
trustee.
B. Appointing a Chapter 11 Trustee in the Best Interests of the Creditors
As with appointing a trustee for cause, it is in the best interest of the creditors to appoint a
Chapter 11 trustee. In examining the factors enumerated in Sillerman, they all suggest that
appointing a trustee will benefit the estate. First, the Debtor has not shown themselves to be a
trustworthy actor. In response to allegations regarding renting units to the principal’s daughter
far below the previously rented rate, the Debtor takes issue with Cathay suggesting an ‘untoward
act’ has occurred but fails to give a semblance of evidence as to why the Court should trust them
that the lease is above board. The Debtor claims that the unit is rent stabilized but cannot
provide the court with the records. The Debtor claims it received a DCHR report from the City,
but that report has not been provided. The Debtor has filed MORs late lacking requisite
information. None of this gives the Court trust in the Debtor or its principals.
The Debtor has abandoned efforts of rehabilitating the estate. (Motion ¶ 30 (“There is no
reason left for this Chapter 11 case to continue or for the Debtor to remain in bankruptcy.”))
Third, Cathay has no confidence in the Debtor to continue managing the bankruptcy.
Cathay cites to the Debtor’s “lack of cooperation, gross mismanagement of the assets, failure to
comply with the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rules and Court orders, inability to consummate
a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, inability to provide adequate diligence to prospective purchasers of
the Property, and failure to maintain accurate books and records.” (Objection ¶ 72.)
The fourth factor, the benefits deriving from the appointment balanced with the costs,
again supports appointing a trustee. The Debtor’s argument that the Court should not require the
estate to incur the expense of the trustee in comparison to allowing the Foreclosure Action to
continue is unpersuasive as, noted above, the Motion to Dismiss is denied. In addition, the cost
of the administrative expense alone is not enough for the court to decline to appoint a trustee. In
re Ashley River, 2015 WL 1540941, at *12 (citing In re V. Savino Oil & Heating, 99 B.R. at 527-
28 (“Finally, the Debtor contends that benefits conferred by a trustee are not commensurate to
the attendant expense and that the appointment of a trustee may jeopardize the rehabilitation
effort. These arguments are also without merit.”)) This is in comparison to the potential
avoidance actions that the Debtor has yet to investigate, along with the ultimate sale of the
property which the trustee will undoubtably be better at effectuating than the Debtor.
Clearly, creditors will benefit from the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee.
Given the forgoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Cathay’s cross motion to appoint a
Chapter 11 trustee.
C. Converting this Case to Chapter 7
As the Court grants Cathay’s cross motion to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee, it does not
need to consider whether to convert the case to Chapter 7.
D. Rule 2004 Motion
With the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee, the Court DENIES the Rule 2004 Motion
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court recognizes Cathay’s need for the documents to properly
assess the value of the Property. Cathay and the newly appointed trustee should meet and
determine their next steps, which can include any new discovery sought in the Rule 2004
Motion.
IV. CONCLUSION
As stated above, the Court:
DENIES the Motion to Dismiss;
GRANTS Cathay’s cross motion for the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee; and
DENIES the Rule 2004 Motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The United States Trustee is directed to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 28, 2026
New York, New York
Martin Glenn
MARTIN GLENN
Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge