Kris Daniel Roglieri

So Ordered.

Signed this 28 day of April, 2026.

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mime Ja Patrick G. Radel

□□ United States Bankruptcy Judge

eases”

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re:

Kris Daniel Roglieri, Chapter 7

Case No. 24-10157-1-pgr

Debtor.

APPEARANCES:

Kris Daniel Roglieri Pro se

Debtor

Linda Oliver Pro se

Movant

Smith, Sovik, Kendrick, & Sugnet, P.C. THOMAS J. DEBERNARDIS, ESQ.

Attorneys for Former Chap 7 Trustee,

Christian H. Dribusch

William K. Harrington HARRISON E. STRAUSS, ESQ.

United States Trustee

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING

MOTION REQUESTING LEAVE TO COMMENCE A CIVIL ACTION

On February 19, 2026, Linda Oliver (“Oliver”) filed a Motion Requesting

Leave to Commence a Civil Action (“Motion”) against Christian H. Dribusch, the

former Chapter 7 Trustee (“Trustee Dribusch”). In June of 2025, Oliver filed a

lawsuit against Trustee Dribusch in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of New York, which was dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under the “Barton Doctrine.” Oliver v. Dribusch, No. 1:25-CV-724

(AJB/DJS), 2025 WL 3251000, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2025).1

Trustee Dribusch, by and through his counsel, objected to the Motion. (Docket

No. 662). Oliver filed a Reply in further support of her Motion. (Docket No. 664).

A hearing on the Motion was held in Albany, New York, on April 16, 2026,

with appearances as indicated above. After hearing argument from the parties and

counsel, this Court reserved decision.

For the reasons set forth below, Oliver’s Motion is denied.

JURISDICTION

The Court has core jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this

contested matter in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(b)(2). Venue is

proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.

BACKGROUND

This case was initially filed as a voluntary chapter 11 case on February 15,

2024. (Docket No. 1). At the time of filing, Debtor was represented by Pashman

Stein Walder Hayden, PC. The case was converted to chapter 7 on May 15, 2024,

1 The Barton Doctrine requires a putative plaintiff to obtain the Bankruptcy Court’s permission

before suing a bankruptcy trustee. See Oliver, 2025 WL 3251000. at *3 (citing Lebovits v. Scheffel (In

re Lehal Realty Assocs.), 101 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1996)).

and Christian H. Dribusch, Esq.2 was appointed as Chapter 7 Trustee. (Docket

Nos. 159 & 160).

On May 20, 2024, the Honorable Robert E. Littlefield, Jr.,3 United States

Bankruptcy Judge, held a hearing to consider Trustee Dribusch’s Motion for

Turnover (“Turnover Motion”) (Docket No. 166). Judge Littlefield granted the

Turnover Motion and an Order was entered on May 22, 2024 (“Turnover Order”).

(Docket No. 188). On May 29, 2024, Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, PC was

granted permission to withdraw as counsel for Debtor. (Docket No. 192).

On May 31, 2024, Debtor was taken into federal custody and has been in

custody since that time. On June 4, 2024, Trustee Dribusch made a Supplemental

Motion for Enforcement of the Turnover Order (“Supplemental Motion”) (Docket No.

197), which was granted on June 10, 2024 (“Supplemental Order”). (Docket No.

205).

The Supplemental Order authorized Trustee Dribusch to enter “40 North

Street, Queensbury, New York (‘Residence’) for the benefit of the Debtor

Bankruptcy Estate and to secure and remove the property of the Debtor Bankruptcy

Estate located at the Residence.” (Docket No. 205, at ¶ 2).

Prior to his incarceration, Debtor was living at the Residence. Oliver claims

she resided full-time with the Debtor at the Residence until his arrest and

continued to reside there until she was restricted from accessing the property by

Trustee Dribusch. (Docket No. 645 at 2-4).

2 Trustee Dribusch voluntarily resigned as trustee for personal reasons in May of 2025. (Docket No.

487; see also Docket No. 662, Dribusch Decl. ¶¶ 40-41).

3 The case was reassigned to this Court on October 1, 2025, upon Judge Littlefield’s retirement.

Oliver asserts that prior to the entry of the Supplemental Order, Trustee

Dribusch entered the Residence without authority and that after the Supplemental

Order was entered he improperly locked her out. (Docket No. 645). She argues that

these actions were ultra vires. (Id.). She also claims that Trustee Dribusch

converted her personal property. (Id.).

Trustee Dribusch opposes the Motion, arguing that every action he took was

within the scope of his authority as the Chapter 7 Trustee and that Oliver has failed

to establish a prima facie case against him. (Docket No. 662).

DISCUSSION

By and through her Motion, Oliver is seeking permission to commence a civil

state court action against Trustee Dribusch. In order to do so, she must meet the

requirements of the Barton Doctrine.

The Barton Doctrine

The Barton Doctrine requires that a would-be plaintiff obtain leave from the

appointing court “before a suit may go forward in another court against the

trustee.” Lebovits v. Scheffel (In re Lehal Realty Assocs.), 101 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir.

1996) (citing Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 26 L.Ed. 672 (1881)).

The Barton Doctrine applies to bankruptcy trustees. Vass v. Conron Bros.

Co., 59 F.2d 969, 971 (2d Cir. 1932) (“[A]n action against a trustee in bankruptcy for

transactions of his own, must be brought in the bankruptcy court, unless it gives

leave to liquidate elsewhere.”). Although some courts recognize exceptions to the

Barton Doctrine, the district court determined that these exceptions do not apply in

this case. Oliver v. Dribusch, No. 1:25-CV-724 (AJB/DJS), 2025 WL 3251000, at *4

(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2025).

The Barton Doctrine is meant to protect the bankruptcy court’s “overriding

interest in the administration of the estate.” In re Endo Int'l plc, No. 22-22549

(JLG), 2025 WL 272853, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2025) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “A central purpose of the Barton Doctrine is to ensure the

[bankruptcy court’s] control over the [estate] assets.” Id. (cleaned up). “Relatedly,

the doctrine gives effect to the appointing court’s strong interest in protecting the

trustee from personal liability for acts taken within the scope of the trustee's official

duty.” Id.

In order to obtain permission to sue a trustee in another forum, the

prospective plaintiff must establish a prima facie case against the trustee. In re

Eerie World Ent., L.L.C., No. 00-13708 (ALG), 2006 WL 1288578, at *3 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006).

To meet this standard, the movant “must do more than meet the liberal

notice-pleading requirements of Rule 8.” S.E.C. v. Nutmeg Grp., LLC, No. 09 C

1775, 2011 WL 5042092, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2011). She must “plead facts with

a reasonable degree of particularity which support, either directly or inferentially,

the elements of the claim asserted.” In re Smith, No. 97-00126-JKC-11, 2002

Bankr. LEXIS 1893, at *18 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Apr. 24, 2002); see also Eerie World,

2006 WL 1288578, at *3. This standard reflects a “middle ground . . . that meets

the concerns underlying the Barton Doctrine but does not unfairly prevent a

claimant, who has not been given a full and fair opportunity to develop its case,

from going forward.” Smith, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1893, at *18.

As a pro se party, Oliver’s filings “must be ‘construed liberally’ with ‘special

solicitude’ and interpreted to raise the strongest claims they suggest.” Oliver, 2025

WL 3251000, at *3 (quoting Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 519 (2d Cir. 2013)).

Prima Facie Analysis of Oliver’s Proposed Claims

Oliver seeks permission to bring the following state law claims in New York

State Supreme Court: 1) trespass or unauthorized entry prior to June 10, 2024; 2)

ultra vires conduct exceeding judicial authorization; 3) constructive dispossession of

a non-debtor occupant; and 4) conversion of non-estate personal property.

Trespass

Under New York law, “[t]he elements of a cause of action sounding in

trespass are an intentional entry onto the land of another without justification or

permission, or a refusal to leave after permission has been granted but thereafter

withdrawn.” Del Vecchio v. Gangi, 207 N.Y.S.3d 540, 544 (App. Div. 2024).

In support of her claim for trespass, Oliver asserts that Trustee Dribusch

entered the Residence on June 4, 2024 and June 5, 2024 with third-parties, to

inventory and photograph the contents of the home. (Docket No. 645 at 3). This

argument presupposes that Trustee Dribusch needed specific authority from the

Court prior to entering the Residence.

However, Trustee Dribusch was entitled to enter the Residence pursuant to

statutory authority and did not need to obtain the Supplemental Order first.

Upon conversion of Debtor’s case to Chapter 7, “all legal or equitable

interests of the debtor in property” became property of the estate by operation of

law. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).

Upon his appointment, Trustee Dribusch, as the representative of the estate

under § 323(a), “acquire[d] . . . all pre-petition property interests of the debtor as

representative of the estate.” Slack v. The Saint Paul/Seaboard Surety Co. (In re

Slack), 164 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1994).

There is no dispute that the Debtor’s real property and its contents were

property of the estate and as the estate representative, Trustee Dribusch was

empowered pursuant to §§ 541 and 704(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, to inventory,

pursue, and protect that property. See In re Dow, 132 B.R. 853, 861 (Bankr. S.D.

Ohio 1991) (“[T]he trustee stands in the debtor’s shoes and thereby is empowered to

pursue property and causes of action of the debtor.”).

Under § 704 of the Bankruptcy Code, Trustee Dribusch was required to

“collect and reduce to money the property of the estate…” and “investigate the

financial affairs of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 704.

Additionally, under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor is required to “cooperate

with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee’s duties”

and is required to “surrender to the trustee all property of the estate . . . .” 11

U.S.C. § 521(a)(3-4). “Surrender” in this context generally means to make the

property available to the trustee. In re McCann, 537 B.R. 172, 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

2015).

As the representative of the estate, Trustee Dribusch was entitled to enter

and secure the Residence. Belfor USA Grp. Inc. v. Helms (In re Helms), 467 B.R.

374, 383 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2012) (“When a Trustee liquidates a debtor’s property . .

. he is acting as the debtor’s legal successor-in-interest.”); see also 3 Collier on

Bankruptcy P 323.02 (“The trustee . . . is entitled to administer the property of the

estate wherever located.”)

Trustee Dribusch did not need an order from the Bankruptcy Court to

inventory, collect, or secure property of the estate. Crawford v. Margabandhu (In re

Maya Restaurants, Inc.), 585 B.R. 761, 773 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2018) (holding that a

complaint that a chapter 7 trustee committed a trespass and illegally entered a

property was “‘objectively baseless’ by any measure” as a chapter 7 trustee is

“entitled to consolidate, preserve, and liquidate the assets in the Debtor's estate”).

Thus, he did not enter the Residence “without justification or permission” and

Oliver has failed to establish a prima facie claim for trespass.

Constructive dispossession of a non-debtor occupant

Oliver asserts a claim for constructive dispossession of a non-debtor occupant.

The Court will construe this as a claim under New York Real Property Actions and

Proceedings Law § 853 (“NY RPAPL § 853”) as that is what Oliver cites in the

exhibit to her motion. (Docket No. 645, Ex. E).

NY RPAPL § 853 provides: “If a person is disseized, ejected, or put out of real

property in a forcible or unlawful manner, or, after he has been put out, is held and

kept out by force or by putting him in fear of personal violence or by unlawful

means, he is entitled to recover treble damages in an action therefor against the

wrong-doer.” N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 853 (McKinney).

In order for NY RPAPL § 853 to apply, “it is not enough for the would-be

plaintiff merely to have occupied the premises; rather, the party must have been in

‘peaceable possession’ of it.” Andujar v. Hewitt, No. 02 CIV. 2223 (SAS), 2002 WL

1792065, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2002).

“Generally[,] any overt acts indicating dominion and a purpose to occupy and

not to abandon the premises will satisfy the requirements as to possession.” Lyke v.

Anderson, 541 N.Y.S.2d 817, 821 (App. Div. 1989) (internal quotation marks

omitted). For the possession to be peaceable, “entry into possession must have been

uncontested.” Truglio v. VNO 11 E. 68th St. LLC, 953 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Civ. Ct. 2012).

Here, Oliver has asserted that she “resided full-time” at the Residence.4

(Docket No. 645 at 2). And it is not disputed that Trustee Dribusch changed the

locks on June 12, 2024. (Docket No. 645, Ex. G). However, Oliver’s claim fails for

several reasons.

First, there is a one-year statute of limitations for bringing a cause of action

under NY RPAPL § 853. Gold v. Schuster, 694 N.Y.S.2d 646, 648 (App. Div. 1999)

(“‘Wrongful eviction’ claims are governed by the one-year Statute of Limitations

applicable to intentional torts.”); Kolomensky v. Wiener, 522 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (App.

Div. 1987) (“Causes of action under RPAPL 853 warrant applying a one-year

4 While the Court accepts Oliver’s claim as true for purposes of this motion, the Court notes that

Oliver has provided no evidence beyond her own assertions that she resided at the Residence. Debtor

testified under oath at his 341 meeting on March 14, 2024 that no other adults were living in his

home. He clarified that “occasionally my girlfriend comes and stays with me.” (341 Tr. at 18:10-12,

Docket No. 448, Ex. at 21).

Statute of Limitations due to the fact that they seek to recover for an intentional

tort.”). The statute of limitations “begins to run when ‘it is reasonably certain that

the tenant has been unequivocally removed with at least the implicit denial of any

right to return.’” PK Rest., LLC v. Lifshutz, 30 N.Y.S.3d 13, 17 (App. Div. 2016).

Thus, Debtor had one-year from June 12, 2024 to bring this claim.

In addition, and in the alternative, when Trustee Dribusch changed the locks

and prevented Oliver from entering the Residence without supervision, he was

acting pursuant to a court order and consistent with his statutory duties. After the

Debtor was taken into federal custody, Trustee Dribusch made the Supplemental

Motion seeking explicit authorization to secure the Residence.

At the June 7, 2024 hearing on the Supplemental Motion, Trustee Dribusch

advised the Court that when he arrived at the Residence, the property was not

secure.5 (June 7, 2024 Hr’g Tr. at 9:8-12, Docket No. 444). The gate was open; a

Ferarri was in the driveway with the doors open and keys in the car; and the doors

to the Residence were damaged. (Id.). Trustee Dribusch advised the Court that he

had a locksmith change the locks on the home. (Id. at 10:5).

At that hearing, Trustee Dribusch advised the Court that Oliver was residing

or occupying the premises and advised that he was coordinating with her to

facilitate and supervise the removal of her personal items from the premises. (Id. at

14-22).

5 This was apparently a result of the federal authorities entering the property. (June 7, 2024 Hr’g Tr.

at 9, Docket No. 444).

With these facts known to Judge Littlefield, he entered the Supplemental

Order on June 10, 2024. (Docket No. 205).

Changing locks to secure estate property is part of a chapter 7 trustee’s

statutory duties. See Phoenician Mediterranean Villa, LLC v. Swope (In re J & S

Props., LLC), 545 B.R. 91, 113 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2015) (“[A] Chapter 7 Trustee has a

duty to secure and preserve estate assets, including changing the locks to a building

when circumstances warrant.”), aff’d, 554 B.R. 747 (W.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d, 872 F.3d

138 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Wilson v. Nandlal Corp. (In re Cumberbatch), 657 B.R.

683, 699 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2024) (citing Phoenician for same premise).

“When a trustee acts pursuant to a court order or in accordance with

statutory authority, then the trustee is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.”

Mendelsohn v. Schoolman (In re Hampton Transportation Ventures, Inc.), No. 15-

73837-AST, 2024 WL 3663204, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2024); In re Smith,

400 B.R. 370, 377 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd, 426 B.R. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd,

645 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2011).

If this Court were to permit this claim to proceed the issue would be whether

Trustee Dribusch’s business judgment in securing property of the estate was

reasonable. Trustee Dribusch declared, under penalty of perjury, that he believed

that Oliver was an occasional guest of Debtor’s at the time and that she

surreptitiously removed property of the estate (namely, cigars and sunglasses) from

the Residence without his knowledge or consent. (Docket No. 662, Dribusch Decl.

¶¶ 18-20). He changed the locks to prevent Oliver from removing any more estate

property. (Id.).

These facts are not in dispute — Oliver has presented text messages from

Trustee Dribusch explaining why the locks were changed and her response

admitting that she took the items. (Docket No. 645, Ex. G).

When chapter 7 trustees act within their business judgment pursuant to a

court order and/or their statutory duties, they are immune from personal liability

for those acts. Smith, 400 B.R. at 377; In re Varela, 530 B.R. 573, 583 (Bankr.

E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[A] trustee’s actions are sanitized if the trustee, after full

disclosure, notice and hearing, obtains court approval and immunized if the trustee

makes a mistake in business judgment while carrying out his statutory duties.”).

Oliver has not established a prima facie claim for constructive dispossession.

Ultra vires conduct exceeding judicial authorization

While a “trustee may also be personally liable if the trustee's actions are

ultra vires—outside of the duties conferred by the Bankruptcy Code,” Varela, 530

B.R. at 583, as explained above, none of the acts that Oliver claims Trustee

Dribusch committed were ultra vires. Oliver alleges that Trustee Dribusch acted

with malicious motives. Even assuming arguendo the truth of Oliver’s allegation,

this does not make acts that Trustee Dribusch was entitled and required to take in

the scope of his trustee duties ultra vires. See id.

Conversion of non-estate personal property

“Conversion is the unauthorized exercise of dominion or control over

specifically identified property which interferes with the owner’s rights.” In re

Coyle, 864 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767–68 (Sur. Ct. 2008). “[W]here . . . possession of the

property is initially lawful, conversion occurs when there is a refusal to return the

property after a demand.” Id. at 768.

Oliver has not specifically identified any property that she alleges has been

converted by Trustee Dribusch. And her own evidence demonstrates that she was

permitted access to the Residence to collect her property even after the lockout on

June 12, 2024. (Docket No. 645, Ex. G).

Moreover, even if Oliver could show that Trustee Dribusch failed to return

her property to her, she would need to overcome his immunity from personal

liability when acting within the scope of his duties. In re Varela, 530 B.R. 573, 583

(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Lunan v. Jones (In re Lunan), 489 B.R. 711, 727

(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2012) (a “sale was not and cannot be an ultra vires act”).

Oliver failed to establish a prima facie claim for conversion.

CONCLUSION

Chapter 7 trustees perform vital and underappreciated services to the

bankruptcy court, estate, and public. Although most cases are routine, the trustee

is periodically called upon to think quickly and act decisively to preserve estate

assets and prevent fraud and abuse. This undoubtedly was such a case, with an

incarcerated debtor, staggering losses to creditors, and vulnerable, valuable assets.

The law rightly sets a high bar for suits against trustees. To do otherwise would be

to discourage qualified, dedicated individuals from serving and/or hinder them in

the vigorous discharge of their duties. Oliver has failed to meet this high bar with

respect to any of her proposed causes of action against Trustee Dribusch.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court DENIES Oliver’s Motion. (Docket No.

645). The Clerk is requested to mail a copy of this Memorandum Decision and

Order to Oliver.

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