Wiggins v. District of Columbia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JASON WIGGINS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:25-cv-3399 (TNM)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jason Wiggins and his former girlfriend both called 911 over what began as a fight about

a metro card. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officers arrived at Wiggins’s apartment

complex, where they interviewed both Wiggins and his ex. Each pointed the finger at the other.

In the end, the officers arrested Wiggins for making threats. A court later dismissed those

charges.

Adamant that he was not at fault, Wiggins now sues the District of Columbia and two

MPD officers (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that his arrest was unlawful. That grievance

manifests in a § 1983 claim, a Monell claim against the District, as well as several tort claims

under D.C. law. Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint on a host of grounds. The Court

will grant that motion. The Complaint and the materials attached to it show that probable cause

justified Wiggins’s arrest. That finding dooms most of Wiggins’s claims. The rest fail for other

reasons.

I.

In late 2024, MPD Officers Antonio Watson and Tiffany Williams responded to two calls

for help over a domestic disturbance. See Compl. ¶¶ 4–5, 9, ECF No. 1-1. Jason Wiggins made

one of those calls. Id. ¶ 9. His former girlfriend made the other. Id. The two were at odds after

their fight over a metro card became heated. See id.

When police arrived on the scene—a housing complex—they met Wiggins by the road.

See Compl. ¶¶ 16–17; Pl.’s Ex. 1 to Compl. (“Watson Footage”) at 16:51:23–16:51:30, ECF No.

1-1. 1. Ofc. Williams stayed with Wiggins, while Ofc. Watson headed into the complex to find

the female complainant. See Watson Footage at 16:51:40–16:54:46.

In the courtyard, the witness relayed her side of the story. Wiggins, she reported, had

threatened her. See Compl. ¶ 10. She quoted him as saying, “If you put your hands on me, I’m

going to bust you in your shit and this and that and have you bleeding out.” Id. “So he making

threats,” she added, “he even making threats y’know towards the person I’ve been going with.”

Watson Footage at 16:55:29–16:55:33. Other details about the fight and her relationship with

Wiggins followed. Id. at 16:55:33–16:57:36. Wiggins was the father of her children and still

lived in the home, though she was no longer romantically involved with him. Id. at 16:55:33–

16:57:36. Throughout her account she noted that her children witnessed the fight and stated that

they could corroborate her story. See, e.g., id. at 16:56:05–16:56:06 (“My daughter even saw

it.”); id. at 16:57:05–16:57:06 (“All three of my kids they heard it.”). Ofc. Watson took down

the witness’s name and returned to the street without her. Id. at 16:57:45–16:58:22. He never

spoke to the kids. See Compl. ¶¶ 18, 23.

Back by the road, Ofc. Watson shared what he learned with Ofc. Williams. He relayed

the witness’s threat accusation, though he misquoted her statement, reporting that Wiggins had

said, “He was going to punch her in her damn mouth and break her jaw.” Id. ¶ 31; see Watson

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For bodycam footage, the Court’s citations refer to the time stamps displayed in white on the

video. For paper documents, the Court uses the pagination generated by the CM/ECF system.

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Footage at 16:59:45–16:59:49. Ofc. Watson also told his colleague that Wiggins’s daughter

corroborated her mother’s account. Compl. ¶ 25; Watson Footage at 16:59:47–16:59:49.

Ofc. Watson then spoke with Wiggins for the first time. Watson Footage at 16:59:58–

17:00:00. Wiggins blamed his ex for the fight and told officers that she recently stirred up other

trouble in their home. Id. at 17:00:22–17:01:45. He recalled that she “hopped up in [his] face,”

which prompted him to say, “if you put your hands on me I’m going to put my hands back on

you.” Id. at 17:00:40–17:00:46. After that, Wiggins said, he went to another room but she

followed him with scissors. Id. at 17:00:47–17:01:06. Wiggins then called the police. Id. at

17:01:25–17:01:27. Once she saw the 911 call, Wiggins said, she called 911 too, promising to

tell police that he had threatened her. Id. at 17:01:25–17:01:38. To corroborate his story,

Wiggins offered to show the officers a video of her “gettin’ up in [his] face.” Id. at 17:01:49–

17:03:08. Wiggins, however, could not provide the video when officers asked to see it. Id.

At that point, the officers indicated that they would arrest Wiggins. Id. at 17:03:15–

17:03:18. “There are witnesses in the house saying you made threats,” Ofc. Watson told

Wiggins, and because this is a domestic dispute “somebody’s got to go to jail.” Compl. ¶ 35; see

Watson Footage at 17:03:29–17:03:33.

One final attempt to locate the video followed, but Wiggins again came up empty handed.

Watson Footage at 17:04:19–17:06:35. While searching, Wiggins continued to dispute the

witness’s charge. See id. at 17:04:19–17:05:00. He denied saying anything about “bussing her

in the mouth.” Id. at 17:05:57–17:05:59. He repeated that he had only said, “if you put your

hands on me,” but, officers responded, “that’s not what they said.” Id. at 17:07:16–17:07:27.

Under the impression that his kids had sided against him, he repeatedly asked officers to

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interview his children away from their mother. See, e.g., id. at 17:03:23–17:03:44, 17:05:30–

17:05:40; Compl. ¶¶ 18, 26.

In the end, officers arrested Wiggins. Watson Footage at 17:07:33. Ofc. Watson’s

affidavit supporting the arrest cited Wiggins for making “threats to do bodily harm (domestic

violence).” Pl.’s Ex. 5 to Compl. at 39, ECF No. 1-1. The next day, the U.S. Attorney’s Office

charged Wiggins with attempted threats to do bodily harm. See Pl.’s Ex. 6 to Compl. at 41, ECF

No. 1-1. A judge dismissed the charges three months later, after prosecutors were unprepared for

trial. Compl. ¶ 62; see Pl.’s Ex. 7 to Compl. at 43, ECF No. 1-1.

A few months later, Wiggins filed this suit in the Superior Court for the District of

Columbia. See ECF No. 1. He brings eight claims against the District of Columbia, and Officers

Williams and Watson: malicious prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, negligence or gross negligence, constitutional violations under

§ 1983, defamation, libel, and municipal liability. See Compl. ¶¶ 75–198. The District removed

the case here. See Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1.

Though Wiggins concedes that removal was “technically proper,” he asks the Court to

remand the case to Superior Court. See Mot. to Remand at 3, ECF No. 12. Defendants oppose

that request. See Opp’n to Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 17. They separately ask the Court to

dismiss all eight claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 24. Both motions are

now ripe.

II.

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). A complaint survives a

Rule 12(b)(6) challenge only if it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned

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up). The Court “treat[s] the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must grant the plaintiffs

the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Xia v. Tillerson, 865

F.3d 643, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). But the Court need not accept the truth of legal

conclusions or “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up).

To resolve the motion, the Court considers only “the facts alleged in the complaint, any

documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which the court

may take judicial notice.” Hurd v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2017)

(cleaned up). A document is incorporated in the complaint if it is “referred to in the complaint”

and “integral” to a claim. Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Here, that includes Ofc. Watson’s body-worn camera footage. See, e.g., Bogie v.

Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608–09 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding video footage incorporated in the

complaint and suitable to consideration of a motion to dismiss); Bailey v. City of Ann Arbor, 860

F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2017) (same). The Complaint includes as an exhibit a link to Ofc.

Watson’s body-worn camera and references the footage throughout. See, e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 1 to

Compl. (“Watson Footage”), ECF No. 1-1; Compl. ¶¶ 9–19, 24–28, 30–32, 35–42, 45–46, 54–

55, 77–78, 84, 94–95, 97–98, 114, 132–37, 149, 154, 157–59, 161–62, 169, 176, 184–86, 188.

And the parties’ briefing points the Court to the video. See, e.g., Mot. to Dismiss at 12–13; Pl.’s

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (“Opp’n”) at 5, ECF No. 25 (citing the body-worn camera footage).

They dispute only the inferences the Court should draw from the footage. So the Court will

consider the Watson body-cam footage alongside the Complaint and other materials “attached

to” it. See Hurd, 864 F.3d at 678.

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III.

The Court starts, as it must, by interrogating its jurisdiction over the claims. The Court

has original jurisdiction over the federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And 28 U.S.C. § 1367

affords the Court supplemental jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related” to the

federal claims “that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the

United States Constitution.” That jurisdictional grant includes all of Wiggins’s non-federal

claims because they arise from the same “common nucleus of operative fact” as his federal ones.

Lindsay v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416, 423–24 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). Indeed, as

discussed below, several of the D.C. claims rise and fall on the same probable cause analysis

necessary for the federal claims. Accord Burney v. Suggs, 630 F. Supp. 3d 20, 34 (D.D.C. 2022)

(exercising supplemental jurisdiction over common-law claims alongside federal-law claims

arising from an allegedly unlawful arrest).

Because the Court has jurisdiction over the claims here, it will deny Wiggins’s motion to

remand the case to Superior Court. Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12. Wiggins agrees the Court has

subject matter jurisdiction over the action but asks the Court to sever and remand the D.C.-law

claims to Superior Court. Id. at 3–4. Section 1367(c) permits the Court to “decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction” in some cases, but the Court will not exercise its discretion to do so

here. See City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997). Judicial

economy favors resolving these claims together and no strong state interest counsels otherwise.

See Compton v. Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d,

639 F. App’x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (pointing to these same considerations to justify supplemental

jurisdiction over state-law claims).

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IV.

Turn now to the motion to dismiss. The District argues that none of Wiggins’s claims

survive Rule 12(b)(6). The Court agrees. Half of the claims turn on whether probable cause

justified Wiggins’s arrest. Because it did, these claims fail. Those claims that survive the

probable cause determination require dismissal for other reasons. The Court takes each claim in

turn.

A.

First up is Wiggins’s § 1983 claim against Ofc. Williams and Ofc. Watson. See Compl.

¶¶ 144–55. Wiggins alleges that the officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights by arresting him “without probable cause.” See id. ¶ 145. The claim fails.

i. Wiggins’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim Fails. The Fourteenth Amendment “applies

only to the states,” and does not apply to the District’s actions or those of its officials. Bolling v.

Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1953). And yet those are the only defendants Wiggins sues. See

Compl. ¶¶ 4–6. So any claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment requires dismissal. Accord

Pointer v. District of Columbia, 736 F. Supp. 2d 2, 5 (D.D.C. 2010).

ii. Wiggins’s Fourth Amendment Claim Fails. As for Wiggins’s Fourth Amendment

theory, this one too falls short. D.C. officials are amenable to suit under § 1983 for Fourth

Amendment violations. See, e.g., Bushrod v. District of Columbia, 521 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20

(D.D.C. 2021). Officers, however, are immune from suit if they show that their conduct did not

“violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (cleaned up). To determine

whether this qualified immunity applies, the Court asks whether the facts alleged “make out a

violation of a constitutional right,” and “whether the right at issue was clearly established at the

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time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. at 232 (cleaned up). Both prongs separately

demand dismissal. The Court exercises its discretion to decide “which of the two prongs of the

qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Id. at 236.

To start, Wiggins forfeits any argument that the officers’ actions violated clearly

established law. “Clearly established” means “that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law

was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is

unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (cleaned up). Invoking this

principle, the officers argue that even if they violated Wiggins’s rights, they lacked notice that

the arrest was unlawful. See Mot. to Dismiss at 22. Wiggins never responds to that argument, so

he concedes the point. See Opp’n at 8–11; Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc., 775 F.3d 425, 428 (D.C.

Cir. 2014). For that reason alone, the claim fails.

More, Wiggins does not plausibly allege that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people . . . against unreasonable searches and

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A warrantless arrest is an unreasonable seizure unless “there

is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck

v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). Probable cause “is a fluid concept” and it “requires only a

probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”

Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57 (cleaned up). Whether probable cause exists turns on “the totality of the

circumstances” from the perspective of “a reasonable and prudent police officer” on the scene.

United States v. Holder, 990 F.2d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Here, the question is whether a reasonable officer would have believed that Wiggins

committed the crime for which he was arrested—making a threat to do bodily harm. See D.C.

Code § 22-407; Pl.’s Ex. 5 at 39, ECF No. 1-1 (Ofc. Watson’s affidavit describing Wiggins’s

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arrest for “threats to do bodily harm”). That crime requires proof “that the defendant (1) uttered

words to another person (2) with a result that the ordinary hearer would reasonably believe that

the threatened harm would take place.” Carrell v. United States, 165 A.3d 314, 319–20 (D.C.

2017) (cleaned up). The speaker must also intend for his words to be threatening. See id. at 320.

The witness’s statements provided probable cause to believe that Wiggins violated the

statute. When a victim “communicates to the arresting officer information affording credible

ground for believing that the offense was committed and . . . unequivocally identifies the accused

as the perpetrator,” probable cause exists so long as “materially impeaching circumstances are

lacking.” Pendergrast v. United States, 416 F.2d 776, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The witness’s

statement here fits that description.

To start, she accused Wiggins of making a statement that qualifies as a threat under § 22-

407. She told Ofc. Watson that Wiggins threatened her, quoting him as saying, “If you put your

hands on me, I’m going to bust you in your shit and this and that and have you bleeding out.”

Compl. ¶ 10; see Watson Footage at 16:55:25–16:55:29. Wiggins maintains that the statement

cannot qualify as a “true threat” because it was “conditional and framed in self-defense.” Opp’n

at 8. He is wrong. The statute applies to conditional threats. See Postell v. United States, 282

A.2d 551, 553 (D.C. 1971) (“[T]he mere fact that the infliction of the harm is upon condition

does not by any means preclude it from being a threat within the meaning of the Code.”); cf.

United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that the First

Amendment prohibited prosecution for the statement, “You come and try to pull on me . . . [y]ou

will die. Not by my hand, by the hand of God. Or maybe by my hand, but it will be self-

defense”). And, indeed, courts routinely apply § 22-407 to statements like the one attributed to

Wiggins. In Jackson v. District of Columbia, for example, the court found probable cause for a

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§ 22-407 violation in part because the plaintiff said if someone “came at him again, the plaintiff

would kill him.” 541 F. Supp. 2d 334, 343 (D.D.C. 2008).

And the circumstances did not materially impeach the ex-partner’s story. True, Wiggins

blamed her for what happened, but he agreed that an altercation occurred. And he admitted that

he said, “if you put your hands on me, I will put my hands on you.” Watson Footage at

17:00:40–17:00:46; see Compl. ¶ 27. This admission alone likely establishes probable cause for

a § 22-407 violation. His apparently false claim to have exculpatory evidence—a video showing

the witness attacking him—arguably strengthened the probable cause conclusion. See Watson

Footage at 17:01:49–17:03:08 (showing the officers allowing Wiggins to search for the video to

no avail). And even if these circumstances established the witness’s own wrongdoing, that

would not bar Wiggins’s arrest. See Frazier v. Williams, 620 F. Supp. 2d 103, 108 (D.D.C.

2009) (“[T]o the extent that the officers encountered two people who each appeared credible and

who each claimed to be the victim of assault by the other, the police had probable cause to arrest

either . . . or both.” (citation omitted)). So the “totality” of the circumstances would lead a

reasonable officer to believe that Wiggins made a threat. See Richards v. Gelsomino, 814 F.

App’x 607, 608–09 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (affirming probable cause finding based on a victim-

complaint’s statement in a similar case).

In response, Wiggins offers three arguments that come up short. First, he protests that the

officers should have done more to investigate his version of events. See Opp’n at 8–9, 10–11.

He faults the officers for not interviewing his children and not reviewing the 911 calls. See id. at

8–9; Compl. ¶¶ 18–22, 24. This argument misunderstands the officers’ duty. “Once a police

officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore

and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.” Amobi

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v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 980, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Wiggins meets

this authority by citing Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2014), for the

proposition that failure to take basic investigative steps meant probable cause was lacking, Opp’n

at 9. But the Supreme Court reversed that decision. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 62. His preferred

precedent is therefore unavailing.

Second, Wiggins argues that Ofc. Watson’s false statements undermined whatever

probable cause existed. Opp’n at 9–10. Arrests based on intentionally or recklessly false

statements are invalid if those statements were necessary to find probable cause. See, e.g.,

United States v. Williams, 827 F.3d 1134, 1145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Wiggins invokes this

principle, but the three falsehoods he alleges do not invalidate the arrest. He focuses on Ofc.

Watson’s alleged statement that the children independently corroborated their mother’s story.

See, e.g., Opp’n at 10. Crediting Wiggins’s interpretation of Ofc. Watson’s statement, this was

false. But see infra Part IV.G (flagging inconsistencies in Wiggins’s interpretation). Even so,

that false statement does not matter because the witness’s credible accusation itself provided

probable cause. See Frazier, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 108. As a result, Ofc. Watson’s statements that

the children corroborated the threat were not necessary to the probable cause determination and

thus do not invalidate Wiggins’s arrest. See Williams, 827 F.3d at 1145–56.

The other purported falsities come up even shorter. Wiggins identifies an omission and a

minor discrepancy in Ofc. Watson’s “Gerstein affidavit”—the document written to support

probable cause after the arrest. See generally Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Wiggins

faults Ofc. Watson for “omit[ing] that he never interviewed” the children. Opp’n at 10. But that

omission is immaterial because it would not “have defeated probable cause.” Williams, 827 F.3d

at 1146 (cleaned up). Again, the witness’s accusation was enough. Up last is a discrepancy in

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the affidavit. Ofc. Watson’s Gerstein affidavit quoted the witness as saying that Wiggins

threatened to “punch [her] in [her] mouth and split [her] fucking lip open,” Compl. ¶ 33, which

differs from the witness’s statement that he threated to “bust [her] in [her] shit . . . and have [her]

bleeding out,” id. ¶ 10. These are variations on a theme: Wiggins threatened to physically harm

his ex. Ofc. Watson’s recitation captured the gist of that alleged threat. Because correcting Ofc.

Watson’s statement would not “defeat probable cause,” any technical falsity is irrelevant. United

States v. Dorman, 860 F.3d 675, 684 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

Third, and finally, Wiggins describes his arrest as “predetermined,” arguing that the

officers’ gender-based assumptions about domestic violence motivated the arrest. Opp’n at 10;

see Compl. ¶ 84. Even if Wiggins is correct about the officers’ motives, the claim could not

survive. “[A]n arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant

to the existence of probable cause.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153. Because the circumstances,

viewed from the “standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,” gave rise to probable

cause, Wiggins’s arrest was lawful. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (cleaned

up).

***

In sum, Wiggins fails to make out a plausible § 1983 claim based on the Fourth or

Fourteenth Amendment. The failure of his Fourth Amendment theory is notable. The probable

cause that dooms that claim requires dismissal of several others. To those claims the Court now

turns.

B.

Next up is Wiggins’s Monell claim against the District. Compl. ¶¶ 182–98. He claims

that the District is liable for its agents’ violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Id.

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¶ 183. Section 1983 makes the District liable only for “action pursuant to official municipal

policy of some nature” that “caused a constitutional tort.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 691 (1978). To determine whether Wiggins’s Monell claim is viable, the Court

conducts a two-step inquiry. See Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir.

2003). First, a plausible constitutional violation must exist. Id. Second, it must be plausible that

a District custom or policy “was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Id.

(cleaned up). Wiggins’s claim flunks this test.

Starting with the first prong, Wiggins does not plausibly allege that the officers violated

his rights. The Fourth Amendment theory fails because probable cause supported Wiggins’s

arrest. See supra Part IV.A; Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. And though Wiggins also invokes the

Fifth Amendment, he does not explain how the officers offended it. See Compl. ¶¶ 144–55.

Because Wiggins offers the same facts to support both the Fifth and Fourth Amendment theories,

the Court takes him to be alleging that his arrest also violated the Fifth Amendment. See id. But

Wiggins cannot repackage his unlawful arrest claim in this way. See, e.g., Matthews v. District

of Columbia, 730 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2010) (explaining that “[w]here a section 1983

claim alleging police misconduct arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free

citizen, it is most properly characterized” as a Fourth Amendment claim (cleaned up)); Harvey v.

Kasco, 109 F. Supp. 3d 173, 177–78 (D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting a § 1983 claim alleging that

plaintiff’s arrest violated “the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process” because

“[a] plaintiff may not make a substantive due process claim for police misconduct when his

claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth

Amendment” (cleaned up)). Without a plausible constitutional hook for Monell liability, this

claim fails.

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More, even assuming a violation, the Monell claim would still fail without allegations

“that a policy or custom of the District of Columbia caused the constitutional violation.” Baker,

326 F.3d at 1306. Wiggins posits a “de facto [MPD] policy or longstanding custom of arresting

men in domestic incidents based on gender-based assumptions and arrest quotas or disciplinary

incentives.” Compl. ¶ 187. This invokes two ways of showing a policy or custom to support

Monell liability. His allegations, though, fall short on both fronts.

First, Wiggins does not allege “repeated behavior by D.C. municipal employees that have

reached the level of a custom.” Givens v. Bowser, 111 F.4th 117, 122 (D.C. Cir. 2024). To

make that showing, Wiggins “must allege concentrated, fully packed, precisely delineated

scenarios as proof that an unconstitutional policy or custom exists.” Page v. Mancuso, 999 F.

Supp. 2d 269, 284 (D.D.C. 2013) (cleaned up). And he must “indicate[] the contours” of the

policy or custom. Blue v. District of Columbia, 811 F.3d 14, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

Wiggins has not done so. He attributes his arrest to the District’s “entrenched custom or

unofficial policy of arresting male parties in domestic incidents without proper investigation.”

Compl. ¶ 196; see Opp’n at 15. But the only factual allegations supporting that policy are Ofc.

Watson’s statements, “[s]omebody’s got to go to jail,” and “[w]e are not fittin’ to get 20 days

suspension for not making an arrest on a domestic scene.” Compl. ¶¶ 186–87. The Court doubts

that one officer’s statements could establish a policy. See Page, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 284. Even if

they could, Ofc. Watson’s statements do not support a custom of gender-based arrests.

Second, Wiggins does not make out a deliberate indifference theory. “[W]hen city

policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training

program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city may be deemed

deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that program.” Connick v.

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Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). “A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained

employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure

to train.” Id. at 62 (cleaned up).

Again, Wiggins’s allegations do not cut it. He rests on conclusory accusations about the

District’s “deliberate failure to train” officers. Compl. ¶ 196. Iqbal and Twombly demand more.

See Page, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 283–84 (rejecting as insufficient similarly “conclusory statements”

about deliberate indifference). Another problem comes from Wiggins’s allegations cutting

against the District’s fault. He insists, for example, that Ofc. Watson received “comprehensive”

training and violated Wiggins’s rights “despite [that] training,” not because of it. Compl. ¶¶ 74,

101; see Opp’n at 15–16 (arguing that Ofc. Watson and Ofc. Williams “deviated from” MPD’s

“written training materials”).

In sum, Wiggins’s Monell claim fails twice over. He has not plausibly alleged a violation

of his constitutional rights, nor has he plausibly alleged a municipal policy or custom behind any

such violation.

C.

Third, Wiggins’s false arrest and false imprisonment claim can be quickly dismissed. See

Compl. ¶¶ 92–111. “The elements of the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment are:

(1) detention or restraint against one’s will within boundaries fixed by the defendant, and (2) the

unlawfulness of such restraint.” Harris v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 776 F.3d 907, 911–12 (D.C.

Cir. 2015). Wiggins falters on the second element. His arrest, made with probable cause, was

not “unlawful.” See id. at 912 (“The existence of probable cause for arrest defeats claims for

false arrest and imprisonment.”).

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D.

Fourth, Wiggins’s malicious prosecution claim cannot move forward. See Compl. ¶¶ 75–

91. Under D.C. law, a malicious prosecution claim has four elements: “(1) the underlying suit

terminated in plaintiff’s favor; (2) malice on the part of defendant; (3) lack of probable cause for

the underlying suit; and (4) special injury occasioned by plaintiff as the result of the original

action.” Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 198 (D.C. 1980). Wiggins stalls on the third. And

were that not enough, the District is not an appropriate defendant for this claim.

Start with probable cause. “The issue in a malicious prosecution case is not whether

there was probable cause for the initial arrest, but whether there was probable cause for the

underlying suit.” Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d 494, 502 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

But the facts that establish probable cause for Wiggins’s arrest also show probable cause for his

prosecution for attempted threats. See Jackson, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 343 (granting defendants

summary judgment on a malicious prosecution claim, pointing to the probable cause justifying

plaintiff’s arrest under D.C. Code § 22-407). So this claim fails. See id.

More, the claim against the District demands dismissal for the additional reason that

Wiggins does not plausibly allege that the District “was responsible for the institution of the

malicious proceedings.” Pitt, 491 F.3d at 505 (cleaned up). As Defendants point out, material

attached to the Complaint shows that the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia—a federal

official—prosecuted Wiggins. Mot. to Dismiss at 31–32; see Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 41. Faced with that

exhibit, the Court need not credit Wiggins’s allegation that “the Office of the Attorney General

[for the District of Columbia],” a city official, “charged [Plaintiff] with one count of Threats to

Do Bodily Harm.” Compl. ¶ 85; see Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(explaining that a court need not “accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations insofar as

16

they contradict exhibits to the complaint”). So the malicious prosecution claim against the

District fails twice over.

E.

Fifth, Wiggins brings a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Compl.

¶¶ 112–28. To survive dismissal, he must allege “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the

part of the [Defendants] which (2) either intentionally or recklessly (3) causes [Wiggins] severe

emotional distress.” Larijani v. Georgetown Univ., 791 A.2d 41, 44 (D.C. 2002). The “extreme

and outrageous” conduct requirement sets a high bar. District of Columbia v. Tulin, 994 A.2d

788, 800 (D.C. 2010). Wiggins does not meet it.

At bottom, Wiggins’s claim focuses on his arrest. But run of the mill arrests, supported

by probable cause, are not extreme and outrageous. See, e.g., Kotsch v. District of Columbia,

924 A.2d 1040, 1046 (D.C. 2007) (reasoning that because “officers had probable cause to arrest

appellant, the arrest itself cannot form the basis for a claim of extreme or outrageous conduct”);

Johnson v. Paragon Sys., Inc., 195 F. Supp. 3d 96, 98–100 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim based on plaintiff’s arrest, including two hours in

handcuffs, and subsequent “threatened criminal action” after the fact).

Wiggins dresses his claim up by pointing to Ofc. Watson’s alleged falsehoods. See

Opp’n 13–14; Compl. ¶ 113. But Ofc. Watson’s “alleged misrepresentations . . . were, at most,

an exaggeration of conduct that already justified arrest, and not a full-fledged fabrication of

criminal conduct.” Smith v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 3d 112, 124 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, 843

F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Exaggerations of that sort are not “utterly intolerable in a civilized

community,” as a successful claim requires. Armstrong v. Thompson, 80 A.3d 177, 189 (D.C.

2013) (cleaned up).

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F.

Sixth, Wiggins claims negligence (or, in the alternative, gross negligence). Compl.

¶¶ 129–43. Like most of the claims, this one is based on Ofc. Watson’s and Ofc. Williams’s

failure to take additional investigatory steps, like interviewing Wiggins’s children. Id. ¶¶ 132,

133, 137. And, like those other claims, Defendants win dismissal.

Under D.C. law, a negligence claim has three elements: “(1) that the defendant owed a

duty to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) injury to the plaintiff that was proximately

caused by the breach.” Poola v. Howard Univ., 147 A.3d 267, 289 (D.C. 2016) (cleaned up).

The duty element is dispositive here. Wiggins attempts to satisfy it by pointing to MPD

regulations, arguing that they show Ofc. Watson’s and Ofc. Williams’s duty to “conduct a

neutral, thorough, and unbiased investigation.” Compl. ¶ 130. MPD general orders, however,

“generally create no rights enforceable by the public.” Ochs v. District of Columbia, 258 A.3d

169, 174 (D.C. 2021); see also In re Walker, 856 A.2d 579, 586 (D.C. 2004) (per curiam) (“[W]e

have held, in a variety of factual settings, that internal policy manuals and similar documents

generally do not give rise to judicially enforceable rights, for they are not statutes or regulations

and have no legal force or effect.”).

Faced with this authority, Wiggins pivots to arguing that the officers’ actions violated a

different duty. See Opp’n at 12–13. “District of Columbia law,” he argues “recognizes police

officers owe a duty to exercise reasonable care in conducting investigations.” Id. at 12. But

Wiggins did not “clearly present this theory” in his Complaint. In re Danaher Corp.

Shareholder Derivative Litig., 549 F. Supp. 3d 59, 74 n.9 (D.D.C. 2021). And he cannot amend

his Complaint “through an opposition brief.” Id.

18

Even if Wiggins had raised this negligence theory, it too would fail. Under D.C. law, a

plaintiff can bring a negligence claim based on “the same course of conduct” as an intentional

tort only if “in the process of engaging in the conduct that included the intentional tort” the

defendant “also breach[ed] another recognized duty owed to the plaintiff.” Stewart-Veal v.

District of Columbia, 896 A.2d 232, 235 (D.C. 2006) (cleaned up). In other words, a negligence

claim must be “distinctly pled” and based on “a distinct standard of care.” District of Columbia

v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701, 711 (D.C. 2003). Wiggins’s negligence claim flunks that test because it

duplicates his false arrest claim. Both claims boil down to an argument that the officers’

inadequate investigation made his arrest unreasonable. Compare Opp’n at 12, with Compl. ¶ 94.

Wiggins “alleges no particular facts that distinguish the officers’ intentional conduct from their

[negligent] conduct.” Elshazli v. District of Columbia, 415 F. Supp. 3d 20, 27 (D.D.C. 2019).

That shortcoming is fatal. Accord Stewart-Veal, 896 A.2d at 235 (affirming dismissal of a

negligence claim “based on the alleged negligence of the arresting officers in conducting the

arrest”); Elshazli, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 24–28 (granting defendants summary judgment on an

excessive force claim and dismissing as duplicative a negligence claim based on the same facts).

Nor can Wiggins save the claim by arguing gross negligence. An initial hurdle is that

gross negligence is typically not a stand-alone basis for liability. Courts typically look at

whether the defendant acted with gross negligence only when “gross negligence is a specific

element of a claim or defense, or for equitable reasons.” Hernandez v. District of Columbia, 845

F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2012) (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Hawkins v. Washington Metro.

Area Transit Auth., 311 F. Supp. 3d 94, 105 (D.D.C. 2018) (same). Wiggins does not argue that

those circumstances are present here. In any event, the claim would fail. Gross negligence

demands an “extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care,” including “the failure to

19

exercise even slight care.” District of Columbia v. Walker, 689 A.2d 40, 44 (D.C. 1997)

(cleaned up). The officers’ decision to arrest Wiggins with probable cause to do so does not

meet that high standard.

G.

Last up are Wiggins’s defamation and libel claims. See Compl. ¶¶ 156–66 (Defamation);

id. ¶¶ 167–81 (Libel). Because libel is a type of defamation the Court considers these claims

together. See Murphy v. LivingSocial, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26 (D.D.C. 2013). To prevail,

Wiggins must point to a false and defamatory statement made to a third party about him.

Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005). He must also allege that Defendants acted

with “at least negligence” and that the statement is actionable as a matter of law or caused

special harm. Id. Defendants earn dismissal because Wiggins does not point to any defamatory

statements.

First, Wiggins claims that Ofc. Watson defamed him twice by garbling the witness’s

description of his threat. Opp’n at 14–15. Ofc. Watson told Ofc. Williams that the witness

accused Wiggins of saying, “[h]e was going to punch the complaining witness in her damn

mouth and break her jaw.” Compl. ¶ 157 (cleaned up). And, in his Gerstein affidavit, Ofc.

Watson wrote the witness’s description of the threat as: “Bitch, I’m not going any where [sic], I

will punch you in your mouth and split your fucking lip open.” Id. ¶ 168. These statements both

misquoted the witness. According to her, Wiggins said, “If you put your hands on me, I’m going

to bust you in your shit and this and that and have you bleeding out.” Id. ¶ 10.

Ofc. Watson’s misstatements are not defamatory. Recall that a defamatory statement

must be “false.” Oparaugo, 884 A.2d at 76. The question for falsity is not literal truth, but

whether the “the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge can be justified.”

20

Armstrong, 80 A.3d at 183. Ofc. Watson’s statements were not false because they contain only

“[s]light inaccuracies.” See Liberty Lobby Inc., v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C.

Cir. 1988). His statements captured the gist of the victim’s statement—that Wiggins had

physically threatened her. See Compl. ¶ 10. So the claims fail for lack of falsity. Accord

Newman v. Howard Univ. Sch. of L., 715 F. Supp. 3d 86, 114 (D.D.C. 2024) (dismissing

defamation claims because the statements were actually or substantially true).

More, Wiggins encounters another hurdle in the principle that “defamatory statements

published incidental to judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged, providing the statements

are relevant to the proceeding.” Mazanderan v. McGranery, 490 A.2d 180, 181 (D.C. 1984). At

least Ofc. Watson’s Gerstein statement enjoys that safe harbor. Though Ofc. Watson wrote the

statement before Wiggins encountered a judge, the clear purpose of the statement was to justify

Wiggins’s arrest and subsequent prosecution. Courts routinely apply the absolute privilege to

similar communications. See, e.g., Stith v. Chadbourne & Parke, LLP, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8

(D.D.C. 2001) (finding “absolutely privileged” statements in an “incident report prepared by the

police”).

Second, Wiggins claims that Ofc. Williams and Ofc. Watson defamed him by stating that

his “children corroborated the alleged threat.” Compl. ¶ 160. Recall that the witness told Ofc.

Watson that her children could back her up. See, e.g., Watson Footage at 16:56:05–16:56:06; id.

at 16:57:05–16:57:06. And Ofc. Watson then told Ofc. Williams that the kids corroborated their

mother’s story. See id. at 16:59:47–16:59:49. As Wiggins argued with officers over what

happened, Ofc. Williams noted “the kids said” that Wiggins threatened their mother. Compl.

¶ 26.

21

Accepting Wiggins’s interpretation of the officers’ statements as false assertions that the

officers interviewed the children, the statements are not false in a way that matters. 2 The “sting”

of the charge was not that the officers spoke to the kids. See Armstrong, 80 A.3d at 183. It was

the underlying accusation that Wiggins had threatened someone that “tend[ed] to injure”

Wiggins’s standing in the community. See Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 988–89 (D.C.

1984) (defining a defamatory remark as one that “tends to injure plaintiff in his trade, profession

or community standing, or lower him in the estimation of the community,” and that “make[s] the

plaintiff appear odious, infamous, or ridiculous” (cleaned up)). And that sting is substantially

true. See Liberty Lobby, 838 F.2d at 1296. Again, the witness said as much and told officers that

her children could corroborate her story. See Watson Footage at 16:56:05–16:56:06. So the

defamation claim requires dismissal. Accord Newman, 715 F. Supp. 3d at 114.

V.

Wiggins may disagree with how the officers handled his 911 call. But that incident does

not support the claims he now presses. None of his eight claims survives Rule 12(b)(6). And

because the Court easily resolves Wiggins’s D.C.-law claims alongside his federal ones, it will

reject Wiggins’s request to sever and remand the local claims to Superior Court. An appropriate

Order will issue today.

2026.04.28

15:22:06 -04'00'

Dated: April 28, 2026 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

2

In fact, Wiggins’s own behavior casts doubt on this interpretation. He repeatedly asked

officers to speak with his children away from their mother. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 18, 20, 26;

Watson Footage at 17:03:23–17:03:44; id. at 17:05:30–17:05:40. Those requests suggest that

Wiggins did not understand the officers to be claiming that the children independently accused

him of making threats.

22