Hef Ventures, LLC v. Township of Hanover Zoning Board of Adjustment

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2684-24

HEF VENTURES, LLC,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TOWNSHIP OF HANOVER

ZONING BOARD OF

ADJUSTMENT, a New Jersey

municipal agency,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Submitted February 24, 2026 – Decided April 28, 2026

Before Judges DeAlmeida and Torregrossa-O'Connor.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-1588-24.

Cleary Giacobbe Alfieri Jacobs, LLC, attorneys for

appellant (Marina V. Brown, of counsel and on the

briefs).

Bisgaier Hoff, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Peter M.

Flannery, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this prerogative writs matter, defendant, the Township of Hanover

Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board), appeals from the April 10, 2025 Law

Division order finding the Board improperly denied plaintiff HEF Ventures,

LLC's application seeking a favorable interpretation1 of Township zoning law

to include plaintiff's cooperative sober living residence (CSLR or facility) as a

permitted "single-family residential use." Township of Hanover, N.J., Code

§ 166-174(A). In its comprehensive written statement of reasons accompanying

the order, the trial court analyzed the controlling ordinance defining "family,"

§ 166-4(A), and concluded the facility's residents, who share bedrooms, living

spaces, housekeeping tasks, and activities, constitute a family and operate as a

"single housekeeping unit," contrary to the Board's determination. It found the

Board erred by imposing a "permanence" requirement and considerations

otherwise absent in the ordinance's definition of family. The trial court also

determined the Board's interpretation of its ordinance violated both the Federal

1

Generally, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(b) confers upon the Board the power to "[h]ear

and decide requests for interpretation of the zoning map or ordinance." An

application for a favorable interpretation requires the Board to consider a

particular definition and advise an applicant whether their use falls within that

definition and, thus, whether the applicant's use is permitted or prohibited. See,

e.g., Nouhan v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Clifton, 392 N.J. Super. 283, 291

(App. Div. 2007); Colts Run Civic Ass'n v. Colts Neck Twp. Zoning Bd. of

Adjustment, 315 N.J. Super. 240, 245-47 (Law Div. 1998).

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2

Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3605, and New Jersey Law Against

Discrimination (NJLAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50.2

We have considered the record in light of applicable legal principles and

determine the trial court correctly found the Board erred in deciding plaintiff's

residents did not constitute a family under governing zoning law. We further

conclude the trial court properly applied the plain language of the ordinance to

the record before the Board and correctly determined the facility is a permitted

single-family residential use that does not require a use variance. In view of our

decision that the trial court correctly interpreted the ordinance and properly

reversed the Board's erroneous interpretation, we need not consider the Board's

remaining arguments. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

We derive the following facts from the record before the Board and before

the trial court. Plaintiff's CSLR is a licensed residential home for individuals

recovering from alcohol and drug addiction. It is located in a single-family

structure within the Township's "R-10" single-family residential zone.

2

The Board appeals only from the first two paragraphs of the court's order

regarding the interpretation issue, not from the third and fourth paragraphs of

the order addressing plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and costs.

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3

The facility conforms with New Jersey Department of Community Affairs

(DCA) regulations governing CSLRs, promulgated in 2018, setting forth

licensing requirements and operational parameters for these facilities.

Specifically, the regulations define a CSLR as "a residential setting that serves

solely as a home for individuals who are recovering from drug or alcohol

addiction and is intended to provide an environment where the residents can

support each other's sobriety and recovery." N.J.A.C. 5:27-2.1. No more than

ten CSLR residents are permitted in each facility. Ibid.

The CSLR regulations are set forth within the section addressing Rooming

and Boarding Houses, N.J.A.C. 5:27-1 to -14. However, only a Class F license

is required to operate a CSLR, while traditional rooming and boarding houses

are required to secure either Class A, B, or C licenses and are subject to different

mandates for operation. N.J.A.C. 5:27-1.6(b). The definitions of "boarding

house" and "rooming house" reference residences with "single room

occupancy," distinct from CSLRs like plaintiff's facility wherein residents share

bedrooms. See N.J.S.A. 55:13B-3(a), (h); N.J.A.C. 5:27-2.1.

In August 2023, the DCA issued plaintiff its licenses to own and operate

a CSLR in the Township at its present location in a single-family structure. The

facility's live-in operator oversees the residence, which is occupied by fewer

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4

than ten residents. While staying at the facility, its residents—all recovering

from substance abuse addiction and participating in continued off-site

treatment—must follow specific written rules and regulations or face removal.3

The facility's rules govern use of and behavior within the residence and include

adherence to mandatory drug testing, curfews, and guest restrictions. Notably,

the residents share bedrooms and common areas, including a kitchen, sometimes

cook and dine together, and are given housekeeping assignments and weekly

chores. All must "participate in mandatory general house cleaning."

On October 26, 2023, after the facility was operating for several months,

the Township Construction Officer notified plaintiff its CSLR was prohibited

within the R-10 zone. The notice advised CSLRs are not a permitted use, and

plaintiff was required to apply for and secure a use variance to continue to

operate.

Pertinent here, Township of Hanover, N.J., Code § 166-174 establishes

the regulations applicable to the R-10 zone. It specifies "[s]ingle-family

residential uses in detached single-family structures" are "[p]ermitted principal

uses." § 166-174(A). It defines "single-family residence" as "[a] building or

3

The facility's written rules are labeled as "Citadel 12" rules, but, as clarified

at the hearing, the rules govern the facility.

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5

structure intended to lawfully accommodate one dwelling unit," and "dwelling

unit," as "[l]iving accommodations designed and used for occupancy by one

family only." § 166-4(A). Importantly, the ordinance also defines "family" to

mean "[a]ny number of individuals living privately together as a single

housekeeping unit and using certain rooms and cooking facilities in common."

Ibid.

A. The Board Hearing and Resolution

In November 2023, plaintiff applied to the Board requesting a favorable

interpretation of the ordinance defining family to include the CSLR facility as a

permitted single-family residential use, or, in the alternative, requesting a use

variance.4 Plaintiff contended the facility's residents functioned as a single

housekeeping unit sharing common areas and met the ordinance's definition of

family.

The Township Planner reviewed the application and issued a report

explaining CSLRs are not expressly listed as permitted residential uses in the

Code. The Planner suggested CSLRs generally are akin to rooming houses,

4

As the trial court concluded the CSLR constituted a "family[,]" and was thus

a permitted residential use, it did not reach the use variance issue. Therefore,

we confine our consideration to plaintiff's application for a favorable

interpretation of "family" and note only that the Board also denied plaintiff's use

variance application.

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6

similarly not identified as a permitted use in the Township ordinance. Thus, to

determine whether the facility's residents met the definition of family and the

CSLR qualified as a "[s]ingle-family residential use[] in [a] detached single-

family structure[]," the Planner recommended the Board hear testimony

concerning the nature and scope of the facility's operations. The Planner

specified the Board should explore considerations including but not limited to

criteria for admissions and departures, housing costs, oversight, residency rules

and enforcement of them, number of residents and duration of stay, maintenance

and housekeeping, visitation protocols and restrictions, and meal preparation

and kitchen use.

The Board held its first of two hearings on May 16, 2024, to consider

plaintiff's favorable interpretation application. Plaintiff presented testimony

from Morgan Taylor, plaintiff's Director of Operations. Taylor confirmed

plaintiff obtained licensing to operate the facility from the DCA in August 2023.

Taylor testified the facility's rules for its residents include curfew

requirements, specific "non-tolerated offenses," a "no violence" and "no

aggressiveness" policy, and mandated "daily chores." She clarified seven

residents occupy the facility and share bedrooms and bathrooms, as well as a

common kitchen, laundry room, dining room, living room, and basement. She

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7

explained there is no designated cook, but residents may choose "to be a

community and eat as a family." They "cook for themselves," "do their own

laundry," "clean their own rooms," and "are responsible for taking care of the

house." According to Taylor, the full-time live-in operator and an additional

staff member, as required by the DCA, are on site at all times.

Emphasizing the facility was newly opened, Taylor estimated, to date, the

average stay for residents was "about [sixty] to [ninety] days," and noted her

expectation that residents would ideally stay for a much longer duration. She

clarified there is no outer limit on the length of stay. Taylor explained residents

pay rent individually to plaintiff. Additionally, she testified residents are free

to come and go from the facility throughout the day for work or treatment or

other reasons. They are required to maintain sobriety.

Taylor likened facility residents to a "family" because "[t]hey[] maintain[]

a household together, they[] eat[] together, they[] hav[e] meals

together[,] . . . they[] shar[e] common space together, . . . [and] they[] go[] out

on activities together." As an example, she described residents watching movies

together at night. Taylor conceded the residents do not have discretion in

deciding admission of new residents.

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8

Thereafter, numerous members of the public addressed the Board in

opposition to permitting the facility in the R-10 zone. They raised concerns

regarding resident turnover and the nature of the facility in a family

neighborhood. That day, the Board denied plaintiff's application by unanimous

vote.

The Board returned for a second hearing one month later to consider

plaintiff's alternative use variance application. After incorporating by reference

the testimony from the prior proceeding, plaintiff presented two additional

witnesses, Scott Kreifels, plaintiff's representative, and Paul Ricci, plaintiff's

"professional planner."

Kreifels testified plaintiff selected the property to meet DCA's

recommendation for placement of CSLRs in single-family structures and

determined the location "checked all of [the] boxes." He indicated the average

stay of the residents as between forty-five and ninety days.

Regarding the alternative request for a use variance, Ricci described the

facility as an inherently beneficial use.5 Testifying there are no other CSLRs

within the Township, Ricci explained the facility met all criteria under the

5

An "inherently beneficial use" is "a use which is universally considered of

value to the community because it fundamentally serves the public good and

promotes the general welfare." N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4.

A-2684-24

9

Municipal Land Use Law. He further testified "drug and alcohol addictions or

substance use disorders are considered disabilities" and after a "review of [the]

zoning code, . . . individuals with substance abuse disorders are prohibited from

living in a CSLR facility anywhere in [the] Township," in violation of the

"[FHA] and other acts."

He described no harmful impacts from the facility's operation in the area

and proposed the addition of cameras and fencing to assuage community

concerns regarding the nature of the residence. Ricci reiterated "the benefits,

the need associated with these facilities[,] outweighs the detriments, which are

largely ['I] don't like this in my backyard.[']" He further opined he "believe[d]

that this site is particularly well-suited for the use as well." He noted other group

homes are allowed in the Township, including homes for those with physical

and developmental disabilities and domestic violence victims. He explained

there would be no substantial detriment to the public good and maintained the

facility would "continue to operate in a manner similar to a single-family home."

Noting community members expressed theoretical safety concerns, Ricci

indicated there had been no substantiated incidents, and he had seen no cause

for concern. He added the structure was "particularly well suited" to meet the

needs of the residents, especially given what he characterized as the absence of

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10

any "direction from the [T]ownship" concerning any suitable alternate location

for the CSLR within the Township. He distinguished the facility from a hotel

or bed and breakfast primarily based on the indefinite length of stay and

communal eating feature.

Ricci testified the State "encourage[s] this type of facility in single-family

neighborhoods" and the CSLR "serves solely as a home for individuals who are

recovering from drug or alcohol addiction and is intended to provide an

environment where the residents can support each other's sobriety and

recovery." He described "one [of] the essential purposes of a CSLR" as

"emulat[ing] a family and achiev[ing] normalization and community integration

of the residence." He further emphasized the public need for CSLRs, adding

"this use is underserved."

Members of the community again appeared and expressed concerns about

safety, the transience of resident stays, and a potential reduction in value of the

surrounding properties. Members of the Board offered comments and ultimately

voted unanimously to deny the use variance.

On July 18, 2024, the Board issued its written resolution, which

summarized the proceedings and testimony and cited the relevant provisions of

the Township's zoning law. It included the operative definitions of "single-

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11

family residence," "dwelling unit," and "family." The resolution noted the

Township's land use ordinance expressly permits certain uses in the R-10 zone,

including "single-family residential uses" and "community residences and

shelters." It found the transient nature of the facility rendered it outside the

scope of permitted uses within the R-10 zone.

In the resolution, the Board compared plaintiff's facility with residences

at issue in various cases finding unrelated residents constituted families for

residential zoning purposes. The Board considered Borough of Glassboro v.

Vallorosi, 117 N.J. 421, 423 (1990), in which the Court determined a group of

ten unrelated college students living together and sharing chores and a common

fund to pay expenses constituted a "family." Specifically, the Board noted the

CSLR's differing features from those in Vallorosi, including the CSLR's

licensing requirement, full-time operator, paid staffing, resident rules and lack

of resident discretion over admissions and removals, individual resident leases,

lack of communal funding for food or other expenses, prohibition on visitors,

and non-discretionary curfew. The Board also found the approved single-family

residence in Cherry Hill Township v. Oxford House, Inc., 263 N.J. Super. 25,

32 (App. Div. 1993) (finding recovering alcohol and substance abusers sharing

a residence constituted a "family" where there was an elected officer, residents

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12

decided who would be added or removed by majority vote, residents made their

own meals, and residents each contributed money for operating costs), distinct

from plaintiff's facility, noting the CSLR's lack of similar resident discretion and

control of the residence.

The resolution cited DCA's inclusion of the CSLR regulations within the

Code section pertaining to rooming and boarding houses, N.J.A.C. 5:27-1.1 to

-14.1, and indicated the Board found "the DCA's responses to public comments

at the time the [CSLR] regulations were adopted . . . highly relevant [and]

highly persuasive, if not determinative, to the outcome of the application."

Specifically, the Board noted "the DCA distinguished Oxford Houses from

CSLRs, which the Board accept[ed] as true." The resolution quoted from the

DCA comments to public questions contrasting CSLRs with Oxford Houses.

The Board also relied on our holding in Open Door Alcoholism Program,

Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 200 N.J. Super. 191, 200 (App. Div. 1985), in

which we held a halfway house in New Brunswick where ten recovering

substance abusers resided was not a single-family dwelling because it lacked the

"generic characteristics of a single family." The Board compared the residence

in Open Door with plaintiff's facility and found, like the halfway house in that

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case, "neither [plaintiff] nor CSLRs in general, place control in the hands of the

residents" and, thus, similarly was not an expressly permitted residential use.

The resolution then outlined the Board's denial of plaintiff's application

for a use variance. The Board found no basis to conclude CSLRs are an

inherently beneficial use and determined the use was "transient" and "not

appropriate in a single[-]family residence" or residential zone. In denying the

variance and weighing positive and negative criteria, the Board concluded the

facility would have an adverse impact on the surrounding neighborhood and

"substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning

ordinance . . . ."

B. Plaintiff's Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs and Trial

Thereafter, plaintiff filed its action in lieu of prerogative writs in the Law

Division in August 2024. The verified complaint alleged: (1) the Township's

"Unfavorable Interpretation [w]as Ultra Vires, Unlawful, Arbit[r]ary,

Capricious and Unreasonable"; (2) the Township's "Denial of [plaintiff's] Use

Variance [w]as Arbitrary, Capricious and Unreasonable"; (3) a "Violation of

[the FHA]"; (4) a "Violation of [NJLAD]"; and (5) "[plaintiff] is entitled to a

declaration of its rights and of the obligations of the Zoning Board ."

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The court held a hearing the following February. At oral argument,

plaintiff framed as "the primary issue" the interpretation of the ordinance and its

application to the CSLR. Plaintiff argued the facility was "strictly a residential

setting," and noted recent DCA guidance clarified a "CSLR is not a rooming

house." Plaintiff produced a September 7, 2023 letter from the DCA's Chief of

the Bureau of Rooming and Boarding House Standards, Bernard Raywood,

explaining CSLRs are subject to the regulations which govern rooming and

boarding houses, but are functionally distinct from a "Class A Rooming House."6

Raywood contrasted the CSLR, in which residents "live together," "support each

other," "become familiar with each other and depend on one another as part of

a single housekeeping unit," with rooming houses, in which "residents do not

operate as a single housekeeping unit," "do not know each other," "live in a

single occupancy room with a lockable door," "are not required to complete

housekeeping," and "are not supervised."

Describing CSLRs as a "relatively new use licensed by the State," plaintiff

drew comparisons with Oxford Houses, and distinguished plaintiff's facility

from a "rooming or boarding house," as the facility does not "operat[e] on a

single-room occupancy level." Plaintiff highlighted the DCA's "intent" that

6

It does not appear the Raywood letter was considered by the Board.

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CSLRs would be set up in single-family structures, citing DCA's response to

public comments regarding the new regulations. Specifically, plaintiff

highlighted DCA's stated expectation that "CSLRs would be permitted to be

located in any building arrangement covered by the one- and two-family

dwelling subcode." 50 N.J.R. 310(a) (Jan. 16, 2018) (response to comment 27);

see also N.J.A.C. 5.23-3.14(b)(3)(xv) (CSLRs are "Residential Group R-5

occupancies" which includes "detached one- and two-family dwellings").

Plaintiff further emphasized the lack of any other possible location for a

CSLR within the Township. Plaintiff disagreed with the Board's suggestion

CSLRs could be located in the B-10 zone, which allows "clinical, office-type

uses," arguing overnight lodging is prohibited in that zone with the exception of

hotels.

Plaintiff argued its residents' stays are not transient. It further asserted the

unambiguous ordinance language contained no stability and permanency

requirement in the definition of "family," citing Oxford House's "clear" mandate

that, in the absence of particular language in the ordinance, a time requirement

may not be added. Plaintiff also contended the sixty-to-ninety-day stay duration

range corresponded to other single-family home arrangements, including: "a

month-to-month lease," "members of household who are . . . home from college

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and only living in the house for a few months at a time," and "residents who are

roommates and leave for job relocation."

The Board argued plaintiff's facility was not operating as a single-family

unit and likened it instead to the Open Door halfway house we previously found

was not operating as a "functional equivalent of a family unit." 200 N.J. Super.

at 199-200. Indicating the CSLR license required "at least one person [be]

awake [twenty-four] hours a day in the facility," the Board emphasized this as a

vital distinction from a "traditional single-family housekeeping unit." The

Board also contended the court owed deference to the Board tasked with

interpreting its ordinances.

On April 10, 2025, the court entered an order reversing the Board's

decision and finding plaintiff's facility operated as a single housekeeping unit

and its residents constituted a family under the ordinance. In its thorough

accompanying statement of reasons, the court detailed the history of the case,

the applicable standard of review, general principles of statutory construction,

and the relevant sections of the Township's Code. As a threshold matter, the

court found the Board's interpretation of its ordinance would not only prohibit

the operation of a CSLR in the residential zone but "effectively bar[] the

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operation of a CSLR anywhere in the Township," as other zoning regulations

would prohibit the use for various reasons in other zones.

Addressing the alleged FHA and NJLAD violations resulting from the

Board's decision, the trial court observed "[t]he FHA considers those in recovery

to be disabled and protected," and NJLAD treats "past drug use followed by

rehabilitation . . . as a protected disability." It concluded plaintiff had

established a prima facie case pursuant to each statute and, "[b]ecause the Board

failed to establish a cognizable nondiscriminatory basis for the interpretation,

its interpretation of the Zoning Ordinance is violative of the FHA and NJLAD

and erroneous."

Next, in evaluating whether a CSLR is a "family" under the ordinance

definition, the court likened the facility to the approved single-family residences

in Vallorosi, 117 N.J. at 421, and Oxford House, 263 N.J. Super. at 25, where

residents "live together in a single-family dwelling, some share bedrooms, they

are responsible for their own cooking, laundry, cleaning, and shopping, and they

share household tasks." It distinguished Open Door, 200 N.J. Super. at 191,

finding the Open Door residents "had individual lifestyles, did not engage in

activities together, and were too transient." The court further contrasted the

facility with a rooming house in which there is "single-room occupancy and the

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presence of security locks." By contrast, the court found CSLR residents share

bedrooms and common spaces, sometimes cook and dine together, and

collectively share housekeeping and other chores.

The court determined the Board incorrectly considered the "permanence"

of the resident stays, which it found is not a "requirement under the [z]oning

[o]rdinance, thus the length of stay of residents of a CSLR is irrelevant."

According to the court, the Board also "fail[ed] to demonstrate that a CSLR

cannot operate to preserve a family style of living as required in the R -10" zone

and did "not demonstrate[] how the DCA's regulation of house rules is any

different from a landlord having rules for tenants renting a house or apartment."

The court further found no basis for the Board's emphasis of the CSLR's

"resident supervision" as a significant distinction from unsupervised Oxford

Houses. The court cited other non-prohibited living arrangements including

"live-in babysitters or unrelated caregivers who are present in a family's home

for supervision of children, the elderly or disabled." The court observed no

intent within either the Township Master Plan or any zoning ordinance to restrict

"the presence of a live-in operator" in a single-family residence. Thus, the court

concluded that including a CSLR within the definition of family is consonant

with the ordinance's intent, and the facility functions as a family within the

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ordinance's plain meaning. Finding the facility to be a permitted single-family

residential use within the R-10 zone, the court remanded plaintiff's application

for reconsideration in light of its decision.

II.

The Board appeals, arguing the trial court failed to accord the requisite

deference to its interpretation of its own ordinance, usurped the authority of the

Zoning Board and circumvented the statutory requirement of a use variance,

erroneously determined the ordinance included plaintiff's CSLR as a permitted

single-family use, and improperly determined the Board's interpretation violated

the FHA and NJLAD. The Board further asserts its interpretation of its

ordinance was supported by credible evidence in the record and was "neither

arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable."

"[W]hen reviewing the decision of a trial court that has reviewed

municipal action, we are bound by the same standards as . . . the trial court."

Fallone Props., L.L.C. v. Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd., 369 N.J. Super. 552,

562 (App. Div. 2004). Because zoning boards have "peculiar knowledge of local

conditions," Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Twp. of

Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 558 (2018) (quoting Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263,

284 (2013)), their decisions are afforded substantial deference and are shrouded

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in presumptive validity. Price, 214 N.J. at 284. Indeed, we give "substantial

deference to [the Board's] findings of fact," which will not be disturbed when

grounded in the record. Fallone Props., 369 N.J. Super. at 562. We reverse only

when those findings are proven to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,

Dunbar Homes, 233 N.J. at 558, or demonstrate a "clear abuse of discretion,"

Price, 214 N.J. at 284.

However, "[a]lthough a municipality's informal interpretation of an

ordinance is entitled to deference . . . the meaning of an ordinance's language is

a question of law that we review de novo." Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd.

of Adjustment of the Twp. of Franklin, 448 N.J. Super. 583, 595 (App. Div.

2017) (omission in original) (quoting Bubis v. Kassin, 184 N.J. 612, 627

(2005)). De novo review "is the proper standard for review despite the statutory

power granted to the Board to interpret its zoning ordinance." Colts Run Civic

Ass'n, 315 N.J. Super. at 247 (citing Cherney v. Matawan Zoning Bd. of

Adjustment, 221 N.J. Super. 141, 145 (App. Div. 1987)). Similarly, "[w]hen the

sole issue before us is the meaning of language in an ordinance, the trial judge's

determination is not entitled to any special deference because the issue is one of

law which is always subject to review de novo." Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v.

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Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Twp. of Middletown, 403 N.J. Super. 210, 234

(App. Div. 2008).

In interpreting their language, "[m]unicipal '[z]oning ordinances are to

receive a reasonable construction and application, and . . . are to be liberally

construed in favor of the municipality.'" Id. at 236 (omission and second

alteration in original) (quoting Place v. Bd. of Adjustment, Borough of Saddle

River, 42 N.J. 324, 328 (1964)). "However, '[z]oning regulations are restrictive

of property rights and ought not to be too broadly interpreted against the

possessor thereof[,]'" thus, "[s]uch 'limitations on the use of private property

must be clearly and expressly imposed, and should not be inferred.'" Ibid. (first

alteration in original) (emphasis added) (first quoting Skinner v. Zoning Bd. of

Adjustment, Twp. of Cherry Hill, 80 N.J. Super. 380, 388 (App. Div. 1963);

then quoting Hrycenko v. Bd. of Adjustment, City of Elizabeth, 27 N.J. Super.

376, 379 (App. Div. 1953)).

When language is included or excluded from a statute, "it is generally

presumed that [the Legislature] acts intentionally and purposely in

the . . . inclusion or exclusion." Shipyard Assocs., LP v. City of Hoboken, 242

N.J. 23, 38 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting DCPP v. R.L.M., 236 N.J.

123, 148 (2018)). Courts will defer to an administrative agency's "reasonable"

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or "permissible" interpretation of an ambiguous ordinance regardless of whether

the court would reach a different conclusion. Somers Assocs., Inc. v. Gloucester

Twp., 241 N.J. Super. 323, 343 (App. Div. 1990).

Preliminarily, and guided by these principles, we are not persuaded the

trial court failed to accord appropriate deference to the Board or usurped its

authority in construing the ordinance's plain meaning. We are satisfied the trial

court reviewed the Board's determination under the appropriate standards, as set

forth in painstaking and accurate detail in its written reasons. Ultimately, the

court recognized the Board's interpretation of the plain language of the

ordinance presented a question of law. It then reviewed the Board's conclusion

the facility did not constitute a family under the plain language of the ordinance

for an abuse of discretion. We discern no error and now conduct the same

review.

A review of the ordinance under applicable law persuades us, as it did the

trial court, the Board incorrectly altered the plain definition of family to include

restrictive requirements beyond those established in the ordinance. Express and

unambiguous ordinance language controls and may not be revised to change its

plain meaning or blur its clear contours. Here, the Board grafted additional

considerations, fatal to plaintiff's application, into the express and unambiguous

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definition of "family" and determined the facility was too "transient" and

controlled by its central operator rather than residents to fit within the scope of

the well-defined term. In so acting, the Board erred as a matter of law and

misused its otherwise weighty discretion.

Again, the relevant ordinance definitions here are few and their language

plain. "Single-family residential uses in detached single-family structures" are

permitted uses within the R-10 zone. § 166-174(A). A "single-family

residence" is "a building or structure intended to lawfully accommodate one

dwelling unit," and a "dwelling unit" means "[l]iving accommodations designed

and used for occupancy by one family only." Ibid. (emphasis added). And,

critically, "family" is defined as "[a]ny number of individuals living privately

together as a single housekeeping unit and using certain rooms and cooking

facilities in common." Ibid. (emphasis added).

Employing principles of statutory interpretation, we, like the trial court,

detect no language in the ordinance definitions imposing a permanence or more

lengthy duration of stay requirement imposed by the Board. We similarly

determine the Board arbitrarily emphasized the CSLR's live-in operator as a

characteristic somehow antithetical to the ordinance's definition of family,

without basis in the ordinance or other applicable law. Accordingly, we

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conclude the Board erroneously interpreted the ordinance and improperly based

its decision on that flawed interpretation.

The facility's residents' stay duration is potentially unlimited. They share

bedrooms, common areas, and housekeeping responsibility for the residence.

They share a kitchen, where they sometimes cook, dine, and share meals

together. The residents watch movies and participate in activities together. We,

like the trial court, recognize the facility operates as a single housekeeping unit

falling within the express definition of family. Applying the ordinance as

written, the uncontested record demonstrated the facility's residents are

prototypical: (1) "individuals"; (2) "living privately together as a single

housekeeping unit"; and (3) "using certain rooms and cooking facilities in

common." Thus, they fall squarely within the ordinance definition.

We discern nothing about the presence of a supervisor or strict house rules

that excludes a residence occupied by unrelated individuals from the ordinance's

clear definition of family. We do not view a group of residents living together

with a supervisor and a single-family housekeeping unit as per se mutually

exclusive groups. To the contrary, we note most family settings are marked by

some aspect of central control or supervision, often marked by house rules with

consequences. Similarly, the facility's residency durations, unlimited in length,

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are consonant with other similar family uses, such as off-campus school-related

housing or Oxford Houses.

Although we certainly recognize municipalities may enact laws to

promote family and stability, see State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 106 (1979), courts

adhere to the express language of the respective ordinance to determine the

breath of any definition of family, see Oxford House, 263 N.J. Super. at 51. The

Court in Vallorosi, determined the group of college students living together,

some with "four-month leases," met the zoning code's definition of family

because they functioned in a manner that met the "stable and permanent"

requirement explicitly stated in the controlling ordinance. 117 N.J. at 422, 424.

In determining the group met the ordinance's definition, the Court explained

"[t]he concept of a one family dwelling is based upon its character as a single

housekeeping unit." Id. at 427 (alteration in original) (quoting Berger v. State,

71 N.J. 206, 227 (1976)); see also Baker, 81 N.J. at 104, 114 (finding two

families within a single-family residence functioned as a single housekeeping

unit based in part on their common use of the residence).

In Oxford House, we reversed the trial court's and Zoning Board's finding

the unrelated recovering drug and alcohol abusers residing in the single-family

home did not constitute a "family" and were not a permitted use within a single-

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family residential zone. 263 N.J. Super. at 44. After finding unconstitutional a

portion of the municipal ordinance restricting the term family to only those in

"a domestic relationship based upon birth, marriage or other domestic bond ," we

considered the parameters of the surviving language defining as family "a

collective body of persons doing their own cooking and living together upon the

premises as a separate housekeeping unit . . . ." Ibid. We declined to read

additional requirements into the residual ordinance and clarified, "If a

municipality desires to require specific 'characteristics of a single family,' it

must set forth those requirements in a 'functional' standard which is 'capable of

being met by either related or unrelated persons.'" Id. at 48 (quoting Vallorosi,

117 N.J. at 431).

Thus, here, as we determined in Oxford House, "If the Township requires

'permanence and stability' as part of its definition of family, it must include these

requirements in its ordinance." Id. at 51 (emphasis added). It did not do so.7

Absent such language, the Board may not exclude from the definition of family

unrelated individuals, residing together for potentially limited duration, who

otherwise meet the definition of family operating as a single housekeeping unit.

7

We further observe the Township's definition of "family" was last amended in

2019, after the DCA's promulgation of CSLRs and over twenty-five years after

Oxford House was decided.

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Similarly, the Board may not arbitrarily exclude households of otherwise

qualifying residents from its definition of family merely because they are subject

to the rules of a central supervisor or arbiter of conduct—a limitation not

mentioned in the ordinance. Thus, the Board's decision cannot stand.

Even were we to afford, for purposes of argument, some further elasticity

to the otherwise plain language of the ordinance, we note the Board overlooked

the facility's significant, hallmark characteristics of a single-family

housekeeping unit. The record showed the residents' stays are of indefinite

duration, with no limitation on their outer length, and the goal of longer stays in

the supportive environment. The residents function in a collectively beneficial

manner designed to stabilize and support their continued sobriety. As did the

trial court, we equate the residents at the facility to those in Vallorosi and Oxford

House. As in those cases, we do not view the uncertain stay duration in

plaintiff's facility as undermining the otherwise clear hallmarks of family

exhibited by those unrelated groups.

We are unpersuaded that our decision in Open Door, 200 N.J. Super. at

191, commands a different conclusion. There, the ten halfway house residents

were viewed as too transient to constitute a family. Id. at 199-200. Here,

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evidence of such transience is not present in the record which instead reflects a

residence operating with a goal of promoting stability.

Indeed, CSLRs are generally designed so "residents can support each

other's sobriety and recovery." N.J.A.C. 5:27-2.1. Here, the facility's residents

endeavor together to maintain the home in that mutually beneficial manner.

They reside in common living, dining, and sleeping spaces, work in tandem

while following house rules, and participate in recreational activities together.

These are not silos operating individualistically while simply residing in one

place; these are intersecting lives, operating together daily for the common

welfare of the group. Such are central traits of family settings.

We are similarly unpersuaded the DCA's placement of the CSLR

regulations within its section on rooming and boarding houses alters the

analysis, as a review of the Code section as a whole evidences different licensing

requirements and characteristics for CSLRs. Further, DCA's own guidance and

responses to public commentary clarify DCA's intent that CSLRs operate in

residential neighborhoods, see 50 N.J.R. 310(a) (Jan. 16, 2018) (response to

comment 27); see also N.J.A.C. 5.23-3.14(b)(3)(xv). The DCA Chief of the

Bureau of Rooming and Boarding House Standards confirmed the intent that

CSLR residents "live together," "support each other," "become familiar with

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each other and depend on one another as part of a single housekeeping unit,"

distinct from rooming houses, in which "residents do not operate as a single

housekeeping unit," "do not know each other," "live in a single occupancy room

with a lockable door," "are not required to complete housekeeping," and "are

not supervised." Contrary to the Board's findings, the DCA's statements support

the view that CSLRs are single housekeeping units.

Having determined the trial court correctly interpreted "family" as defined

by Township of Hanover, N.J., Code § 166-4(A) to include plaintiff's facility,

we need not reach plaintiff's claims under the FHA and NJLAD, as plaintiff's

facility is a permitted single-family residential use.

To the extent we have not addressed them, any remaining arguments

raised by the Board lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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