Zoghaib

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-20097-MOORE/Elfenbein

JOSEPH C. ZOGHAIB,

Plaintiff,

v.

SOCIETE GENERALE DE

BANQUE AU LIBAN, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

AMENDED OMNIBUS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO STAY DISCOVERY1

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Banque du Liban’s (“BdL”) Motion to

Stay Discovery and Postpone Mediation (“BdL’s Motion”), ECF No. [75], and Société Générale

De Banque Au Liban’s (“SGBL” and collectively, the “Defendants”) Motion to Stay Discovery

and Postpone Mediation Pending Resolution of its Dispositive Motion to Dismiss (“SGBL’s

Motion”), ECF No. [78]. The Honorable K. Michael Moore referred the above-captioned case to

me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Magistrate Rules of the Local Rules of the Southern

District of Florida to take “all necessary and proper action as required by law regarding all pre-

trial, non-dispositive matters and for a Report and Recommendation on any dispositive matters.”

See ECF No. [6]. Having reviewed the briefing on the issues, the relevant case law, and exhibits,

for the reasons explained below, I RECOMMEND that BdL’s Motion, ECF No. [75], and

SGBL’s Motion, ECF No. [78], both be GRANTED.

1 The original Report and Recommendation has been amended solely to add language on page 15 informing

the Parties of their right to object and the timeframe to do so. Such language was inadvertently omitted

from the original Report and Recommendation.

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Joseph Zoghaib (“Plaintiff” or “Zoghaib”) initiated this action on January

1, 2025, see ECF No. [1], and thereafter filed filed an Amended Complaint, ECF No. [33], which

is the operative pleading. In the Amended Complaint, Zoghaib alleges that SGBL, a private bank

in Lebanon, issued a cashier’s check to him from the account he held there, and that the cashier’s

check that SGBL issued was, in turn, drawn from its account with BdL. See ECF No. [33] at ¶¶14-

15. He further alleges that, following “the collapse of Lebanon’s financial system on October 17,

2019, Defendants began issuing checks drawn on accounts at B[d]L, knowing these checks could

not be honored,” and that Plaintiff was the recipient of such a check from SGBL, which was not

honored when he attempted to deposit it in Miami, Florida. See ECF No. [33] at ¶30. Specifically,

on November 26, 2021, Zoghaib alleges that he received a cashier’s check from SGBL in the

amount of $336,000 and when he attempted to cash the check for payment on April 1, 2024, SGBL

“dishonored the cashier’s check,” citing “FOREIGN REGULATORS PROHIBIT CLEARING OF

THE CHECK— PLEASE CONTACT THE PERSON WHO WROTE IT.” See ECF No. [33] at

¶¶47-49. Against this factual backdrop, Zoghaib has alleged claims against both Defendants for

breach of contract (Count I), violation of the Uniform Commercial Code, holder in due course

(Count II), conversion (Count III), unjust enrichment (Count IV), promissory estoppel (Count V),

common law fraud (Count VI), breach of fiduciary duty (Count VII), breach of covenant of good

faith and fair dealing (Count VIII), deceptive trade practices/consumer protection (Count IX),

equitable estoppel (Count X), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count XI), constructive

trust (Count XII), punitive damages (Count XIII), negligence (Count XIV), violation of

international banking laws (Count XV), and violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1961-1968 (Count XVI).2

See ECF No. [33] at 13-25.

Both BdL and SGBL have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. See ECF No. [72]

and ECF No. [81]. BdL’s Motion to Dismiss is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq., 1608(b), and

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). See id. at 1. BdL

asserts that the Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint for a multitude of procedural and

substantive reasons including, failure to comply with the strict service requirements of the Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”); lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because BdL is entitled to

foreign sovereign immunity; lack of personal jurisdiction; the Act of State Doctrine; forum non

conveniens; improper venue; and failure to state a claim under Lebanese or Florida law. See e.g.,

ECF No. [72] at 10, 13, 20, 22, 25, 26, and 29. SGBL’s Motion to Dismiss likewise presents a

plethora of procedural and substantive arguments for dismissal, including that Zoghaib failed to

allege a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction; the mandatory forum-selection clause requires

dismissal under forum non conveniens; the Act of State Doctrine requires dismissal; and that

Zoghaib fails to assert claims under either Lebanese or Florida law. See e.g., ECF No. [81] at 8,

15, 18, and 19.

Contemporaneous with the filing of the Motions to Dismiss, both BdL and SGBL also

moved to stay discovery pending their resolution. See ECF No. [75] and ECF No. [78]. In BdL’s

Motion, ECF No. [75], it argues that it is immune from any liability under the FSIA and this

“threshold jurisdictional issue” must be resolved before it is subject to the burdens of discovery

and mediation, explaining that courts routinely stay discovery when immunity is involved. See

2 Although the Amended Complaint purports to allege 17 counts, it only contains 16 counts as there is no

Count VII identified. See generally ECF No. [33]. The Court has conformed the Count numbers to account

for this error in the Amended Complaint.

ECF No. [75] at 5. According to BdL, denying immunity under FSIA establishes interlocutory

appeal jurisdiction and BdL intends to raise the issue on appeal, should this Court deny its pending

Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. [75] at 6-7. Further, BdL points out that this argument mirrors

the arguments that “courts have repeatedly accepted in nearly identical lawsuits brought by

Lebanese-American depositors arising out of the Lebanese financial crisis against BdL.” See ECF

No. [75] at 6.

Next, BdL seeks to stay discovery, arguing that its facial challenges to the Amended

Complaint must be resolved before discovery or mediation begins as a “preliminary peek”

confirms that BdL’s Motion to Dismiss is likely case dispositive. See ECF No. [75] at 1-2, 5-7.

Specifically, BdL explains that several courts have already analyzed nearly identical lawsuits and

found them to be likewise jurisdictionally defective. See ECF No. [75] at 8-9. Adding to that

point, BdL states that discovery at this stage would be futile because discovery cannot supply

jurisdiction where the pleadings affirmatively negate it. See ECF No. [75] at 8-9. This is because,

according to BdL, “[n]o amount of discovery could transform sovereign Lebanese financial

measures into commercial acts, create U.S.-based conduct where none exists, or produce a

jurisdictional hook absent from the Amended Complaint.” See ECF No. [75] at 9. Finally, BdL

states that it cannot be subject to discovery or mediation absent proper service of process, which

BdL has also challenged, and that a temporary stay will not unduly prejudice Zoghaib. See ECF

No. [75] at 1-2, 5-7.

For its part, SGBL’s Motion argues that a “preliminary peek” at its Motion to Dismiss

reveals that it is meritorious and dispositive of all claims as well. Specifically, its Motion to

Dismiss raises several independent jurisdictional challenges and other merits-based grounds that,

if granted, require dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in its entirety, including personal

jurisdiction and a forum-selection clause. Id. at 7. It further argues that “the high burden of

engaging in discovery and mediation during the pendency of that motion—much of which will

involve locating evidence and witnesses in Lebanon by a party neither properly alleged nor subject

to this Court’s jurisdiction—outweighs any potential harm to Plaintiff for any discovery delay.”

See ECF No. [78] at 6. SGBL contends that good cause exists for the stay because its Motion to

Dismiss is “clearly meritorious and case dispositive.” See ECF No. [78] at 1.

In further support of the stay, SGBL contends that a temporary stay of discovery will avoid

potential for wasting party and judicial resources because Zoghaib’s discovery requests are very

broad and responding to them will require the Parties “to expend substantial resources negotiating

and/or litigating the scope of the requests (including, inter alia, appropriate time periods and

limitation of applicable entities), with the Court likewise having to expend judicial time and

resources to address discovery disputes.” See id. at 9-10. Finally, SGBL asserts that a temporary

stay will not prejudice Zoghaib because there are no “special circumstances warranting discovery

before final resolution of the purely legal issues raised” in its Motion to Dismiss. Id. It contends

that discovery requests do not seek information that would help Zoghaib in defending against

SGBL’s Motion to Dismiss, and that there would be no significant impact on the timely resolution

of the case if the stay were granted because Zoghaib waited over nine months to serve discovery

requests and the close of the discovery period is May 15, 2026. See id. at 10.

Zoghaib responded to both Motions to Stay. See ECF No. [96] and ECF [97]. Starting

with his Response to BdL’s Motion, Zoghaib opposes the stay, arguing that discovery is essential

because BdL disputes core jurisdictional facts, including its commercial conduct, use of U.S.

correspondent accounts, and its direct effects in Florida. See ECF No. [97] at 1. Zoghaib further

asserts that “BDL provides no affidavit, declaration, or evidence of burden under Rule 26(c), and

identifies no authority exempting foreign sovereigns from mediation.” See id. He argues that a

FSIA interlocutory appeal does not “self-execute” a stay and “provides no basis to preemptively

halt jurisdictional discovery or court-order mediation.” Id. at 7. Zoghaib further contends that the

Eleventh Circuit requires jurisdictional discovery before immunity is adjudicated where

jurisdictional facts are disputed and that a “preliminary peek” is inappropriate here because BdL

disputes nearly every jurisdictional fact and these issues cannot be resolved on the pleadings. Id.

He disagrees with BdL that discovery cannot cure jurisdictional defects. Zoghaib also includes a

litany of arguments as to why the Amended Complaint should not be dismissed in his Response.

See generally ECF No. [97]. He then argues that a stay would prejudice him because BdL’s “delay

tactics” threaten preservation of evidence, obstruct mediation, and prolong his financial harms. Id.

at 17. He further opposes BdL’s argument that mediation burdens immunity because it necessarily

addresses the merits, contending instead that no FSIA authority supports BdL’s point and that

“[m]ediation is a non-adjudicative, court-ordered settlement process requiring no discovery or

evidence, and courts routinely require it even when immunity is asserted.” See id. at 19. Citing

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which requires a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution,

Zoghaib finally argues that jurisdictional discovery promotes efficiency, and that staying discovery

would delay resolution of threshold issues including “commercial activity, correspondent-account

use, direct effect, long-arm jurisdiction, and sovereign versus commercial conduct-that cannot be

resolved without discovery.” Id. at 19. He also argues that efficiency “overwhelmingly” favors

proceeding with discovery.

Turning to his Response to SGBL’s Motion, much like his Response to BdL’s Motion,

Zoghaib makes various arguments as to why the Amended Complaint should not be dismissed.

See generally ECF No. [96]. Zoghaib opposes the stay because “discovery is essential to resolve

disputed jurisdictional issues, that SGBL has not shown good cause under Rule 26(c), and that a

stay would only prejudice [him].” See id. at 2. Regarding jurisdictional discovery, he argues it is

warranted to determine the nexus between SGBL’s correspondent account activity and Zoghaib’s

harm. See id. Zoghaib states that granting SGBL’s Motion would cause him concrete prejudice

and that courts consistently recognize that delays in discovery can impair a plaintiff’s ability to

prosecute claims, risk the loss of evidence, and exacerbate ongoing harm. Id. at 16. He contends

that balancing the movant’s burden against the prejudice to the non-movant is required under the

Rule 26(c) balancing test, and it weighs “heavily against SGBL” here. See ECF No. [96] at 16.

Similar to his Response to BdL’s Motion to Stay, he argues that delaying discovery in this

case increases the risk that evidence will be lost or rendered inaccessible and that he has already

suffered financial harm due to SGBL and continues to suffer. Id. at 17. Zoghaib contends that

jurisdictional discovery is not optional where facts are disputed and granting a stay would deprive

him of the opportunity to develop the record. See id. at 17. He further argues that judicial

efficiency favors proceeding with discovery and mediation because it will help narrow the issues

or promote settlement when jurisdictional facts are disputed. See id. at 18, 20.

In its Reply (“BdL’s Reply”), ECF No. [102], BdL argues that Zoghaib raises a multitude

of erroneous arguments that are factually and legally incorrect. In particular, BdL reemphasizes

its argument that it is subject to immunity under the FSIA as an instrumentality of the Lebanese

government and that, under such circumstances, a stay of all discovery and mediation are

appropriate. See ECF No. [102] at 2. While the remainder of the Reply seems to be directed to

Zoghaib’s arguments surrounding the Motion to Dismiss, BdL does point out that its Motion to

Dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of the Amended Complaint as pled. See ECF No. [102].

2-5. The inference then is that, because the challenge is based on the factual sufficiency of the

Amended Complaint, there are no disputed jurisdictional allegations that would require

jurisdictional discovery, making the stay appropriate.

For its part, in its Reply, ECF No. [101], SGBL largely responds to Zoghaib’s arguments

in opposition of dismissal. SGBL also explains that complying with Zoghaib’s discovery requests

would be a massive undertaking, requiring a time-sensitive and costly review of communications,

account transactional records, and other documents for an extended period of time, especially

because SGBL is a foreign defendant. Further, compliance would require, according to SGBL,

identifying and locating “the vast array of documents” maintained across dozens of branches in

Lebanon and then hand-scanning the records, which span a six-year period. See ECF No. [101] at

4; ECF No. [82] at ¶¶16-18. Finally, SGBL argues that Plaintiff’s claim for jurisdictional

discovery is meritless on both procedural and substantive grounds because Plaintiff never formally

moved for jurisdictional discovery, does not explain what facts it would be intended to uncover,

and that the Eleventh Circuit has not found abuse of discretion for denying discovery where a

complaint is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction. See ECF

No. [101] at 4-5.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“[D]istrict courts are entitled to broad discretion in managing pretrial discovery matters.”

Perez v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 297 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2002). Within that discretion, it is

“the responsibility of trial courts to manage pretrial discovery properly in order to avoid a massive

waste of judicial and private resources and a loss of society’s confidence in the courts’ ability to

administer justice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “If the district court dismisses a nonmeritorious

claim before discovery has begun, unnecessary costs to the litigants and to the court system can be

avoided.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997).

“Conversely, delaying ruling on a motion to dismiss such a claim until after the parties

complete discovery encourages abusive discovery and, if the court ultimately dismisses the claim,

imposes unnecessary costs.” Id. “For these reasons, any legally unsupported claim that would

unduly enlarge the scope of discovery should be eliminated before the discovery stage, if possible.”

Id. (footnotes omitted). “Allowing a case to proceed through the pretrial processes with an invalid

claim that increases the costs of the case does nothing but waste the resources of the litigants in

the action before the court, delay resolution of disputes between other litigants, squander scarce

judicial resources, and damage the integrity and the public’s perception of the federal judicial

system.” Id.

One kind of challenge courts should resolve “before discovery begins” is a “[f]acial

challenge[] to the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense, such as a motion to dismiss based on

failure to state a claim for relief.” Id. at 1367. See also Cabrera v. Progressive Behav. Sci., Inc.,

331 F.R.D. 185, 186 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (“As a general rule, motions to dismiss should be resolved

as soon as practicable to obviate avoidable discovery costs, especially where a dubious claim

appears destined for dismissal.”). Courts should resolve that kind of challenge before discovery

because it “always presents a purely legal question; there are no issues of fact because the

allegations contained in the pleading are presumed to be true,” so “neither the parties nor the court

have any need for discovery before the court rules on the motion.” See Chudasama, 123 F.3d at

1367.

“In deciding whether to stay discovery pending resolution of a motion to dismiss, the court

must balance the harm produced by a delay in discovery against the possibility that the motion will

be granted and entirely eliminate the need for such discovery.” Skuraskis v. NationsBenefits

Holdings, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1228 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (citation omitted). “Both concerns

are important — while a defendant should not be forced to expend substantial resources answering

discovery when the plaintiff’s claims clearly lack merit, the delay and prolongation of discovery

can also create case management and scheduling problems and unfairly hold up the prosecution of

the case.” Cabrera, 331 F.R.D. at 186.

“While it is not necessary for the Court to, in effect, decide the motion to dismiss to

determine whether the motion to stay discovery should be granted, it is necessary for the Court to

take a preliminary peek at the merits of the motion to dismiss to see if it appears to be clearly

meritorious and truly case dispositive.” Cuhaci v. Kouri Grp., LP, 540 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1187

(S.D. Fla. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). “[W]here a pending motion may dispose of the entire

action, granting a stay of discovery not necessary for resolution of the motion may be justified.”

Skuraskis, 2023 WL 8698324 at *2. If a motion to dismiss raises “potentially fatal pleading” and

jurisdictional “deficiencies,” staying discovery is warranted. See id. at *5. But if “there appears

to be a genuine dispute as to whether” a claim or defense is meritorious, staying discovery is not

appropriate. See Flecha v. Neighbors Moving Servs., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1203 (S.D. Fla.

2013). The “proponent of a stay of discovery bears the burden of demonstrating its necessity,

appropriateness, and reasonableness.” Cuhaci, 540 F. Supp. 3d at 1187 (quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

After a preliminary peek at Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, see ECF No. [72]; ECF No.

[81], the Court concludes a stay of discovery is appropriate. Cumulatively, the Motions to Dismiss

raise several potentially fatal pleading and jurisdictional deficiencies, see Skuraskis, 2023 WL

8698324 at *5, including problems with subject-matter jurisdiction and venue. The Motions to

Dismiss also raise several other arguments suggesting that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. See ECF No. [72]; ECF No. [81].

More precisely, while the Court does not comment upon the merits of all arguments raised

in the Motions to Dismiss, it observes that the following arguments BdL raises appear to be clearly

meritorious and truly case dispositive: (1) a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the FSIA,

which “provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in this country,” see

Bock Holdings, LLC v. Republic of Honduras, 654 F. Supp. 3d 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (citations

and quotations omitted) and (2) improper venue based on forum non conveniens. See ECF No.

[72]. And although Plaintiff argues that he should be entitled to jurisdictional discovery to rebut

these arguments, particularly the FSIA issue, BdL’s arguments are based on the four corners of

the Amended Complaint. Indeed, BdL’s analysis relies exclusively on Plaintiff’s own allegations.

While “[r]esolution of a pretrial motion that turns on findings of fact — for example, a motion to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) — may require some

limited discovery before a meaningful ruling can be made,” “[f]acial challenges to the legal

sufficiency of a claim or defense,” “should, however, be resolved before discovery begins.”

Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1367. This is because the arguments “present[] a purely legal question”

without any “issues of fact” as “the allegations contained in the pleading are presumed to be true.”

Id. (citing Mitchell v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 107 F.3d 837, 838 n. 1 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam)).

Here, BdL’s arguments on subject-matter jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, as well as failure to

state a claim, all of which have the potential to be case-dispositive, present purely legal questions

that do not require discovery for their resolution.

Further, when a defendant raises an argument based on immunity, such as the FSIA, that

provides even stronger grounds for a stay of discovery. See Howe v. City of Enter., 861 F.3d 1300,

1302 (11th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “district court orders that required the defendants, who had

asserted qualified or sovereign immunity, to further litigate the underlying merits of the lawsuit

without having first received a ruling as their immunity” “effectively denied immunity, which

provides ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.”) (emphasis added,

internal citations omitted); Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.

2004) (“The defense of sovereign or qualified immunity protects government officials not only

from having to stand trial, but from having to bear the burdens attendant to litigation, including

pretrial discovery.”) (emphasis added); Oueiss v. Saud, No. 20-CV-25022-KMM, 2021 WL

11606313, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2021) (Moore, J.) (staying discovery in matter raising defenses

of foreign sovereign immunity, foreign official immunity, and personal jurisdiction, explaining that

“United States Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals precedent instructs that

defenses of immunity should be resolved at the earliest stages of litigation so that defendants

subject to such immunity are not unnecessarily burdened with litigation requirements, including

discovery.”) (emphasis added); Point Conversions, LLC v. Lopane, No. 20-CV-61549, 2020 WL

6700236, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2020) (“Defendant asserts sovereign and judicial immunity

defenses, which raise serious questions regarding the viability of Plaintiff's Complaint that must

be resolved before Defendant is burdened with discovery and other pretrial obligations.”)

(emphasis added). Given the Court’s preliminary peek of BdL’s arguments in the Motion to

Dismiss, including its sovereign immunity argument, the Court concludes that a stay of discovery

and mediation is appropriate as to Plaintiff’s claims against BdL.

Turning next to SGBL, after a preliminary peek of the issues raised in its Motion to

Dismiss, the Court likewise concludes that it raises at least two meritorious, case-dispositive

arguments arising from a facial challenge to personal jurisdiction as well as a forum-selection

clause included in the banking agreement between Plaintiff and SGBL. See ECF No. [81].

Because any one of those arguments has the potential to be truly case dispositive, a stay of

discovery is warranted. See Cuhaci, 540 F. Supp. 3d at 1187. Again, Plaintiff argues that

jurisdictional discovery should be allowed; however, SGBL challenges Plaintiff’s failure to

establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction based on the allegations within the Amended

Complaint. As explained above, arguments that present a facial challenge to the allegations in a

complaint raise a purely legal question, which means the trial court need not make any factual

determinations, allowing such questions to “be resolved before discovery begins.” Chudasama,

123 F.3d at 1367. Stated differently, for the Court to rule on SGBL’s personal jurisdiction

argument, no determinations of disputed factual issues are necessary as the argument relies on the

allegations, or in some instances, lack of allegations within the Amended Complaint. As a result,

jurisdictional discovery is unnecessary. See World Media All. Label, Inc. v. Believe SAS, No. 24-

12079, 2025 WL 2102017, at *5 (11th Cir. July 28, 2025) (“[A] district court does not abuse its

discretion by denying jurisdictional discovery if ‘the complaint was insufficient as a matter of law

to establish a prima facie case that the district court had jurisdiction.’” (citing Butler v. Sukhoi

Co., 579 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir. 2009))). The same holds true to resolve SGBL’s argument

based on the forum-selection clause. Accordingly, the Court concludes that a stay of discovery

and pretrial deadlines is also appropriate as to Plaintiff’s claims against SGBL.

The Court ends its analysis by noting that, in his Responses, Zoghaib cites to various cases

for certain propositions that do not support his arguments, leading the Court to suspect that Zoghaib

used artificial intelligence (“AI”) to write them. For example, Zoghaib repeatedly cites to Meier

ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002) to support his argument

that “FSIA immunity does not bar jurisdictional discovery where the commercial-activity

exception is invoked or jurisdictional facts are disputed.” See ECF No. [97] at 1. However, the

Meier decision involves a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, making no reference to the

FSIA, immunity, the commercial-activity exception, or a stay of discovery. 3 See generally Meier,

Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264. The same holds true for Zoghaib’s repeated reliance on In re Clerici, 481

F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007).4 See ECF No. [97] at 1. The decision in In re Clerici involves a

request for discovery for use in another foreign tribunal under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 but makes no

mention of a stay of discovery, the need for jurisdictional discovery, the FSIA, or more broadly

immunity. See generally In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324. Similarly, Plaintiff cites to McCarthy v.

Barnett Bank of Polk Cnty., 876 F.2d 89 (11th Cir. 1989) for the proposition that “a[] stay of

discovery is an extraordinary remedy and the movant bears the burden of showing ‘good cause’

through specific, particularized, evidentiary facts – not attorney argument,” arguing that BdL failed

to make this showing so the request for a stay should be denied. See ECF No. [97] at 4. However,

McCarthy does not address motions to stay discovery and instead discusses a media outlet’s right

to intervene in a case where a protective order shielded information designated as confidential

during the litigation. See McCarthy, 876 F.2d at 90-91. Zoghaib’s failure to accurately

characterize the cases on which he relies has caused the Court (and likely the Defendants) to

expend unnecessary time and effort searching for language in the opinions that would support his

arguments, only to find there is none. To the extent that Zoghaib has used AI to draft his

Responses, the Court cautions Zoghaib that he is responsible for checking each citation and

quotation in his filings to verify that they indeed stand for such propositions prior to filing them

3 For the same reasons, Zoghaib also incorrectly relies on this decision to argue: “A stay is improper where

the motion to dismiss raises fact-dependent issues, jurisdictional disputes, or FSIA questions requiring

factual development.” See ECF No. [97] at 3. And he does so again when he argues that “[t]he Eleventh

Circuit repeatedly holds that jurisdictional discovery is required where facts relevant to immunity or

personal jurisdiction are disputed.” See ECF No. [97] at 4. His Response contains several other inaccurate

references to Meier.

4 Similarly, Zoghaib incorrect relies on this decision when he states: “The Eleventh Circuit requires

jurisdictional discovery where a defendant disputes facts relevant to personal jurisdiction or FSIA

immunity.” See ECF No. [97] at 3.

CASE NO. 25-CV-20097-MOORE/Elfenbein

with the Court. To the extent that Zoghaib personally researched and read this case law and drafted

the Responses himself without the use of AI, he is admonished against misrepresenting the content

of cases in his filings. Either way, if Zoghaib misstates the contents of case law in his future

filings, he is warned that he may be subject to sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

11(b) and (c)(3).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, I respectfully RECOMMEND that BdL’s Motion to

Stay, ECF No. [75] be GRANTED; SGBL’s Motion to Stay, ECF No. [78], be GRANTED; and

that discovery and mediation in this matter be stayed until resolution of BdL’s Motion to Dismiss,

ECF No. [72], and SGBL’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [81].

The Parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this

Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable

K. Michael Moore. Failure to timely file objections shall bar the Parties from a de novo

determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and shall bar the Parties from

attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report except

upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989);

11th Cir. R. 3-1.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on April 8, 2026.

Z

MARTY FULGUEIRA ELFENBEIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

15

cc: All counsel of record

Joseph C. Zoghaib

12729 SW 211th Street

Miami, FL 33177

305-360-4117

Email: domestica.jose@yahoo.com

PRO SE