Weidenfelder

nited States District Court

for the #orthern District of Oklahoma

Case No. 23-cv-369-JDR-CDL

SONIA R. WEIDENFELDER,

Petitioner,

versus

JUSTIN FARRIS, Director,'

Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Sonia R. Weidenfelder, an Oklahoma prisoner appearing

through counsel, seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 through

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Dkt. 2. Ms. Weidenfelder alleges she

received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because her counsel failed

to raise two claims on direct appeal. Jd. at 5. The Court considered Ms.

Weidenfelder’s Petition and Brief in Support of the Petition [Dkts. 2 and 7],

Respondent’s Response to the Petition [Dkt. 10], the state court records

provided by Respondent |Dkts. 10-1 through 10-17; Dkts. 12-1 through 12-41,

Dkt. 13], and applicable law. For the following reasons, the Petition [Dkt. 2]

is denied.

‘Ms. Weidenfelder is in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections,

and Justin Farris is the Director of ODOC. The Court therefore substitutes Justin Farris,

Director, in place of Tamika White as party Respondent. See Rule 2(a), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The Clerk of Court shall note on the

record this substitution.

No. 23-cv-369

On April 20, 2018, a jury convicted Ms. Weidenfelder of first-degree

murder in Tulsa County District Court Case No. CF-2017-682. Dkt. 12-20 at

46. On June 1, 2018, the trial court sentenced Ms. Weidenfelder to life

imprisonment. Dkt. 12-35 at 36.

Ms. Weidenfelder’s murder conviction stems from the death of Debra

Morgan between November 6, 2016, and November 7, 2016. Dkt. 12-24 at 11.

Ms. Weidenfelder was Richard Spaulding’s girlfriend, and the two lived

together. Dkt. 12-14 at 9-10; Dkt. 12-16 at 116. Ms. Morgan was Mr.

Spaulding’s ex-wife and mother to Ms. Morgan and Mr. Spaulding’s son,

A.S. Ms. Morgan and Mr. Spaulding were in a protracted, contentious

custody dispute. Dkt. 12-16 at 56-57.

In the spring of 2016, a judgment was entered against Mr. Spaulding

for failing to pay his child support, and he was required to pay $10,000.00 in

past due child support. Dkt. 12-16 at 57. As of November 2016, Mr. Spaulding

had not been complying with a court-ordered payment arrangement. /d. at 58.

Additionally, the state court sanctioned Mr. Spaulding for failing to comply

with discovery requests by imposing a $100.00 per day fine. /d. at 59. He also

had not paid the discovery fees. Jd. Mr. Spaulding was unemployed. Dkt. 12-

17 at 136-137. There were two upcoming hearings concerning these matters.

First, the state court scheduled a hearing for November 8, 2016, to allocate

parenting time between Mr. Spaulding and Ms. Morgan and to decide the

discovery sanctions. Dkt. 12-16 at 58. Second, the state court scheduled a

hearing for November 18, 2016, to review Mr. Spaulding’s compliance with

the payment schedule for child support arrearage. /d. Mr. Spaulding was

facing jail time for his failure to pay the child support. /d. at 58-59.

Mr. Spaulding was troubled by the upcoming court dates. See, e.g.,

Dkt. 12-16 at 82-83, 85; see also Dkt. 12-17 at 1-3 and Dkt. 12-18 at 174, 226-

227. Witnesses testified to various plans Mr. Spaulding and Ms. Weidenfelder

No. 23-cv-369

contemplated, and at times partly executed, to eliminate the inconvenience

Ms. Morgan posed to their lives. See Dkt. 12-17 at 25-27 (Stephanie

Montandon, Ms. Weidenfelder and Mr. Spaulding’s roommate, testified

about a plan to email the local news “with Rick’s story,’ and Ms.

Weidenfelder contemplated putting up fliers about Ms. Morgan), 188-189

(On October 14, 2016, Ms. Weidenfelder made a DHS referral concerning

Ms. Morgan), 211-212 (Ms. Weidenfelder asked others for help in writing

letters to the district attorney about Mr. Spaulding’s custody dispute).

On November 7, 2016, A.S. came home from school around4:00 p.m.

- 4:30 p.m. Dkt. 12-14 at 14-15. He had left his key to the back door of Ms.

Morgan’s home at Mr. Spaulding’s home and, therefore, entered the home

through the garage using the keypad to open the garage door.’ /d. at 14. Ms.

Morgan’s car was in the garage, which was unusual. /d. at 14-15. Upon

entering the home, A.S. found Ms. Morgan in her bedroom and thought she

was sleeping. /d. at 17-18. He turned on the light and when he saw her, he

“srabbed [his] bag and then just ran out and went into a house next-door and

asked them to call 911.” /d. at 18. Ms. Morgan suffered a fatal shotgun blast

to the face. Dkt. 12-18 at 26.

During their investigation, authorities learned Mr. Spaulding had

recently procured a shotgun from Patricia Nelson. Dkt. 12-18 at 8-10. Mr.

Spaulding also contemplated shortening the shotgun. Dkt. 12-18 at 179. In

October of 2016, Stephanie Montandon witnessed Ms. Weidenfelder take a

gun from the trunk of Ms. Weidenfelder’s car into the home she shared with

Mr. Spaulding. Dkt. 12-17 at 18. A shotgun was ultimately recovered from a

storm drain near Ms. Morgan’s home. /d. at 34-36. Zachary Blasdel testified

that the shotgun recovered was his shotgun he left with Ms. Nelson before

? During the investigation into Ms. Morgan’s murder, A.S.’s key was found without

a keychain in his bedroom in Mr. Spaulding and Ms. Weidenfelder’s residence. See Dkt. 12-

18 at 225-226; see also Dkt. 12-14 at 13.

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going to prison, but the barrel had been shortened. /d. at 120-122. Further,

the jury heard testimony that the wadding found at the crime scene was

consistent with a Winchester brand 12-gauge shot wad? and the gun found in

the drain was a 12 gauge. Dkt. 12-18 at 117-119, 130; see also Dkt. 12-19 at 50-

53.

Police seaerched Mr. Spaulding and Ms. Weidenfelder’s cell phones

pursuant to a search warrant. Dkt. 12-18 at 165, 167-168. Text exchanges

between Mr. Spaulding and Ms. Weidenfelder alluded to the upcoming court

dates, running out of time, and options available to the couple. See, e.g., Dkt.

12-18 at 173; Dkt. 13 (State’s Ex. 169). For instance, in one exchange, Mr.

Spaulding stated, “we don’t get to have what we want [S]onia[.] That has long

been clear[.]” Dkt. 13 (State’s Ex. 169); see also Dkt. 12-18 at 176-177. Ms.

Weidenfelder responded, “we could ... if you would stop tying my hands[.]”

Dkt. 13 (State’s Ex. 169); see also Dkt. 12-18 at 176-177. Mr. Spaulding replied,

“Sonia they’l] know. And we’d both miss out on our kids[’] future[.]” Dkt.

13 (State’s Ex. 169); see also Dkt. 12-19 at 100. At another point, Mr. Spaulding

stated to Ms. Weidenfelder, “otherwise this thing you advocate ends us both

and removes our kids forever.” Dkt. 13 (State’s Ex. 169). Mr. Spaulding and

Ms. Weidenfelder never identify a specific plan in their text communications.

Dkt. 12-18 at 177; Dkt. 13 (State’s Ex. 169).

The jury also heard an audio recording of a conversation between Mr.

Spaulding and Ms. Weidenfelder recovered from Mr. Spaulding’s phone.

During that conversation, Ms. Weidenfelder stated, “[y]ou told everybody

my plan, you took that away from me, you know, you took my choice away

from me[.]” See Dkt. 12-18 at 211; Dkt. 13 (State’s Ex. 155R); see also Dkt. 12-

18 at 181. At another point in the conversation Mr. Spaulding said, “killing

her isn’t going to do anything.” Dkt. 12-20 at 13; Dkt. 13 (State’s Ex. 155R).

Ms. Weidenfelder responded, “yes, it will. It will stop her.” Dkt. 12-20 at 13;

> The wadding is “‘a shotcup that keeps the pellets together.” Dkt. 12-18 at 113.

No. 23-cv-369

Dkt. 13 (State’s Ex. 155R). Authorities believe the audio recording took place

near the end of October 2016. Dkt. 12-18 at 210-211."

Mr. Spaulding and Ms. Weidenfelder were tried separately. Dkt. 10-11

at 3, n. 1. As noted, the jury found Ms. Weidenfelder guilty of first-degree

murder. Dkt. 12-20 at 46. Mr. Spaulding was also convicted of first-degree

murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Dkt. 10-11 at 3, n. 1.

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Ms.

Weidenfelder’s conviction. Dkt. 10-1. Ms. Weidenfelder applied for post-

conviction relief that was denied. Dkts. 10-5 and 10-7. The OCCA also

affirmed the district court’s denial of Ms. Weidenfelder’s application for

post-conviction relief. Dkt. 10-11. Ms. Weidenfelder has now initiated the

Petition here. Dkt. 2.°

II

A federal court has discretion to grant federal habeas relief to a

prisoner who is in state custody pursuant to a final criminal judgment if the

prisoner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

* Additional facts and details presented to the jury will be discussed below as

necessary.

> Ms. Weidenfelder requested “[a] full and fair evidentiary hearing as to the Petition

as a whole and in particular as to any issues which involve facts not apparent from the

existing record and to any issues which involve facts disputed by the State.” Dkt. 7 at 25-26.

But when § 2254(d)’s framework applies, as it does in this case, a federal habeas court must

consider whether the petitioner has satisfied § 2254(d)(1)’s precondition to relief only by

looking to the record that was presented in state court proceedings. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563

U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (holding “that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that

was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits”). “In all but these

extraordinary cases, AEDPA ‘bars evidentiary hearings in federal habeas proceedings

initiated by state prisoners.’” Jd. (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 395 (2013)).

For the reasons discussed next, Ms. Weidenfelder has not demonstrated, as to any claim,

that she can satisfy § 2254(d)’s preconditions to habeas relief. And Ms. Weidenfelder does

not argue, much less demonstrate, that she can make the showings necessary to obtain an

evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2). For these reasons, the Court denies Ms.

Weidenfelder’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

CS

No, 23-cy-369

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1,5

(2010) (“[I]t is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s

criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts.”). But

the federal habeas statutes, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and as interpreted by the United

States Supreme Court, significantly limits a federal court’s discretion to grant

habeas relief to a state prisoner.

“A state prisoner generally must exhaust available state-court

remedies before a federal court can consider a habeas corpus petition.” Bland

py. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1011 (10th Cir. 2006); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

When a state prisoner fairly presents a federal claim in state court and the

state court adjudicates that claim on the merits, a federal court cannot grant

habeas relief as to that claim unless the prisoner first shows that the state

court’s decision as to that claim either (1) “was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1170 (10th

Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)).

As used in § 2254(d)(1), the phrase “clearly established Federal law”

means “the governing legal principle or principles” stated by “the holdings”

of the Supreme Court’s “decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court

decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003) (quoting Williams ».

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). Thus, when § 2254(d)(1)’s framework

informs a federal court’s analysis, the first question for the court is whether

the petitioner’s claim rests on law that was clearly established by Supreme

Court precedent at the time of the relevant state-court decision. House ».

Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1015-18 (10th Cir. 2008). If such law exists, and the

state court has correctly identified that law, the only question under §

2254(d)(1) is “whether the decision ‘unreasonably applies that principle to

No. 23-cv-369

the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011)

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). To establish that the state court’s

decision unreasonably applied the law, a petitioner “must show that the state

court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington

yp. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). In other words, “a petitioner must

persuade a federal court that no ‘fairminded juris[t]’ could reach the state

court’s conclusion under [the Supreme] Court’s precedents.” Brown ».

Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 135 (2022) (quoting Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 269

(2015)).

Under § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must show that the state court’s

decision rests on an unreasonable determination of the facts. But “‘a state-

court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal

habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”

Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). Instead, the reasonableness of a state

court’s factual determination also is measured by Richter’s fairminded-

disagreement standard. Dunn v. Madison, 583 U.S. 10, 13-14 (2017). And “if

[Richier’s] rule means anything, it is that a federal court must carefully

consider all the reasons and evidence supporting the state court’s decision”

and that the federal court may not disturb the state court’s decision “without

identifying —let alone rebutting—all of the justifications” that may support

that decision. Mays v. Hines, 592 U.S. 385, 391-92 (2021) (per curiam). In

addition, when § 2254(d) applies, the federal court’s review is limited to the

same record that was presented in state court unless and until the petitioner

satisfies § 2254(d)’s demanding preconditions to relief, Pznholster, 563 U.S. at

185, and the federal court must presume the correctness of any state-court

factual findings unless the petitioner presents clear and convincing evidence

to rebut that presumption, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

No. 23-cv-369

If a petitioner satisfies § 2254(d)’s preconditions to relief, the federal

court may then review the petitioner’s federal claim de novo. Milton v. Miller,

744 F.3d 660, 670-71 (10th Cir. 2014). But even on de novo review, a federal

court must apply § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of correctness to any state-court

factual findings relevant to the federal claim. Sumpter v. Kansas, 61 F.4th 729,

750 (10th Cir. 2023). Moreover, even if the federal court determines that a

constitutional error occurred, the court may not grant federal habeas relief

unless the petitioner also “show|s] that the error had a ‘“‘substantial and

injurious effect or influence”’ on the outcome of his trial.” Davenport, 596

USS. at 126 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).

II]

As noted, Ms. Weidenfelder points to two instances of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel. Dkt. 2 at 5; see also Dkt. 7 at 13-25. The Court

will address each sub-claim. First, Ms. Weidenfelder argues her appellate

counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise a claim challenging the trial

court’s denial of Ms. Weidenfelder’s request to admit Mr. Spaulding’s

statement regarding the location of the murder weapon. Dkt. 2 at 13. Ms.

Weidenfelder presented this sub-claim to the OCCA when she appealed the

denial of her application for post-conviction relief. Dkt. 10-8 at 14-21.

In rejecting Ms. Weidenfelder’s first claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel, the OCCA reasoned as follows:

Claims challenging appellate counsel’s effectiveness are

appropriate in an original post-conviction application. See

Logan v. State, 2013 OK CR 2, 5, 293 P.3d 969, 973. As set

forth in Logan, post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel are reviewed under the two-prong standard

set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Jd.

Under Strickland, a petitioner must show both (1) deficient

performance, by demonstrating that counsel’s conduct was

objectively unreasonable, and (2) resulting prejudice, by

No. 23-cv-369

demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89. “A court

considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must

apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation was

within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

Petitioner first argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise a claim on direct appeal challenging the trial

court’s exclusion of a statement made by her co-defendant,

Rick Spaulding,’ directing police to the location of the murder

weapon. Petitioner contends the statement was admissible as a

statement against penal interest, see 12 O.S. Supp. 2014, §

2804(B)(3), or alternatively under the exceptional

circumstances exception to hearsay, see 12 O.S.2011, § 2804.1,

and that its exclusion deprived her of her due process right to

present a full defense. The trial judge denied the defense’s

request to introduce evidence of Spaulding’s statement upon

finding it was not reliable because it was made in the context of

Spaulding attempting to exculpate himself and shift all blame

for the murder to Petitioner.’

It is unnecessary to decide whether the statement at issue was

admissible. Even assuming for argument’s sake the trial court

abused its discretion in disallowing its admission, Petitioner has

not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of her

appeal would have been different had appellate counsel raised

the issue. Upon thorough review of the record, we find

exclusion of Spaulding’s statement relaying the location of the

murder weapon did not have a substantial influence on the

outcome of the trial, nor did it deny Petitioner the ability to

present a defense that Spaulding alone committed the murder.

See Jones vp. State, 2009 OK CR 1, J 42, 201 P.3d 869, 882.

The State presented ample evidence that Petitioner and

Spaulding— motivated by a protracted and contentious child

custody battle over Spaulding’s child and a well-founded belief

that Spaulding was imminently going to jail for unpaid child

No. 23-cv-369

support—conspired to murder his child’s mother before the

next scheduled court date. Such evidence included, but was not

limited to, incriminating text messages between Spaulding and

Petitioner, an audio recorded conversation between Spaulding

and Petitioner discussing a plot to murder the victim,

Petitioner’s internet search history using search terms such as

“fatal shotgun wound to the face” and “shotgun wound

deaths” a few weeks before the victim was killed by a shotgun

wound to the head, and Petitioner’s repeated internet searches

for “Broken Arrow breaking news” beginning the afternoon

after the murder was committed but hours before the victim’s

body was discovered.

The State also presented compelling evidence of Spaulding’s

participation in the murder, which included, among other

things, evidence establishing that he was the one who obtained

the murder weapon shortly before the murder and modified it

by sawing down the barrel. The trial evidence established, and

the parties agreed, that Spaulding was a principle [sic] to the

murder. Petitioner has not shown that Spaulding’s statement

evincing knowledge of the murder weapon’s location, had it

been admitted at trial, would have negated her own culpability

for the murder or otherwise affected the outcome of the trial.

We therefore find that exclusion of the statement did not have

a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial.

Because this claim would not have prevailed, Petitioner has

failed to demonstrate appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to assert it on direct appeal. See Logan, 2013 OK CR 2, J]

11, 293 P.3d at 975 (“The omission of a meritless claim, i.e., a

claim that was destined to lose, cannot constitute deficient

performance; nor can it have been prejudicial.”). Therefore,

Proposition I is denied.

' Petitioner and Spaulding were charged conjointly in this matter for

the murder of Debra Morgan, the mother of Spaulding’s child.

Spaulding was convicted of Murder in the First Degree in a separate

jury trial and sentenced to life imprisonment. This Court affirmed his

judgment and sentence. Spaulding v. State, No. F-2018-668 (Okl. Cr.

October 31, 2019) (not for publication),

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No. 23-cv-369

* The record reflects that unbeknownst to Spaulding, law enforcement

had already recovered the shotgun believed to be the murder weapon

from a storm drain prior to his statement to detectives. The weapon

was in fact found in a location where Spaulding suggested Petitioner

may have disposed of it.

Dkt. 10-11 at 1-6. Ms. Weidenfelder argues the OCCA’s denial of this claim

was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and an

unreasonable application of the facts. Dkt. 2 at 13-14.

The OCCA correctly identified the Strickland test. See Dkt. 10-11 at 2-

3; see also Malicoat v. Mullin, 426 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting

Strickland is the appropriate test to apply to an ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim). The OCCA then determined Ms. Weidenfelder’s

claim was meritless. See Dkt. No. 10-11 at 3-6. Thus, Ms. Weidenfelder must

establish the OCCA unreasonably applied Strickland. See Upchurch v. Bruce,

333 F.3d 1158, 1167 (10th Cir. 2003).

Typically, a defendant alleging constitutionally deficient

representation must show: (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) “that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. “A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” Jd. at 694.

Strickland’s analytical framework also informs a court’s adjudication

of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims alleging deficiencies in

appellate briefing. Smith »v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). Ordinarily, a

court evaluating whether appellate counsel performed deficiently either by

omitting or failing to adequately present an issue must “look to the merits of

the omitted issue.” Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Neill »v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1057 (10th Cir. 2001)). And, in this

context, an appellant must establish prejudice by “show[ing] a reasonable

No. 23-cv-369

probability that, but for his counsel’s unreasonable failure to file a merits

brief, he would have prevailed on his appeal.” Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285.

In framing this as a two-part inquiry, the Strickland Court did “not

establish mechanical rules.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. Rather, Strickland

emphasized that while the two-part inquiry “should guide” courts

adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, “the ultimate focus of

inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result

is being challenged.” Jd. Strickland also recognized that courts may adjudicate

these claims without addressing both components of the two-part inquiry,

stating,

there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance

claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to

address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes

an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court need not

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of

the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim

is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose

of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should

be followed.

Id. at 697.

As set out above, the OCCA only considered the prejudice prong of

the Strickland test. See Dkt. 10-11 at 4. Ms. Weidenfelder challenges in this

petition the OCCA’s adjudication of the prejudice prong and argues “[t]here

is a reasonable probability that had the jury heard the fact that Spaulding,

when questioned by police, divulged the exact location where the shotgun

was recovered, the outcome of the trial as to /Ms. Weidenfelder] would have

been different.” Dkt. 7 at 23 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court

declines to conduct a de novo review of the performance prong and, in

12

No. 23-cv-369

conformity with the OCCA’s analysis and Ms. Weidenfelder’s present

argument, addresses only the prejudice prong.

As noted during trial and in the briefing here by Ms. Weidenfelder, the

issue of the identity of Ms. Morgan’s killer was central. Evidence was

presented that Ms. Weidenfelder and Mr. Spaulding were in a relationship.

Dkt. 12-14 at 9. Mr. Spaulding was part of lengthy custody battle with Ms.

Morgan and was facing significant financial obligations and jail time as a

result. Dkt. 12-16 at 56-59. Mr. Spaulding was troubled by this looming

consequence. See, e.g., Dkt. 12-16 at 82-83, 85; see also Dkt. 12-17 at 1-3 and

Dkt. 12-18 at 174, 226-227. Mr. Spaulding and Ms. Weidenfelder discussed

plans to aid Mr. Spaulding in evading responsibility for his financial failures

and eliminate the inconvenience Ms. Morgan presented to both of their lives.

See Dkt. 12-18 at 176-178. Evidence was presented that Ms. Weidenfelder had

contemplated, and partly executed, several plans to accomplish this,

including making a DHS referral, contacting the district attorney’s office,

contacting the news, and posting fliers around Broken Arrow. Dkt. 12-17 at

25-27; Dkt. 12-18 at 185, 188-189, 211-212; Dkt. 12-19 at 98-99. In October of

2016, Ms. Weidenfelder conducted Google searches for “shotgun wound to

the face.” Dkt. 12-18 at 216; see also id. at 216-217; Dkt. 13 (State’s Ex. 170).

The jury also considered a recorded conversation between Mr. Spaulding and

Ms. Weidenfelder and inculpatory text messages between the two. See Dkt.

12-18 at 176-178, 181-182, 211; see also Dkt. 12-19 at 100; Dkt. 12-20 at 13 and

Dkt. 13 (State’s Exs. 155R, 169).

The jury also heard testimony of Mr. Spaulding’s acquisition of a

shotgun from Ms. Nelson. Dkt. 12-18 at 8-9. Further, Mr. Spaulding had

communicated he was learning the shotgun, and he could shorten it to make

it a better home defense weapon. Dkt. 12-18 at 179; Dkt. 13 (State’s Ex. 169).

Ms. Montandon testified that, at the beginning of October 2016, she

witnessed Ms. Weidenfelder take a gun from the trunk of a car into Ms.

Weidenfelder’s garage. Dkt. 12-17 at 18.

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No. 23-cv-369

Ms. Morgan was ultimately discovered on the afternoon of November

7, 2016, lying in her bed with a fatal shotgun blast to her face. Dkt. 12-14 at 13-

14, 17-18; see also Dkt. 12-18 at 26. The afternoon of November 7, 2016, before

authorities notified Mr. Spaulding of Ms. Morgan’s death, Ms. Weidenfelder

uncharacteristically searched on her phone for “breaking news” in Broken

Arrow. Dkt. 12-18 at 219-221; Dkt. 13 (State’s Ex. 172). Investigators were

unable to develop fingerprints from the crime scene. Dkt. 12-17 at 100.

The main issue for the jury to resolve at trial was whether Mr.

Spaulding acted alone or if Mr. Spaulding and Ms. Weidenfelder acted

together. Dkt. 12-19 at 133. Compare Dkt. 12-20 at 6 (During closing argument

the prosecution argued Mr. Spaulding and Ms. Weidenfelder committed the

crime together) with id. at 18 and 23 (The defense argued in closing that Mr.

Spaulding perpetrated the crime alone.). The state court instructed the jury

as follows:

All persons concerned in the commission of a crime are

regarded by the law as principals and are equally guilty thereof.

A person concerned in the commission of a crime as a principal

is one who directly and actively commits the act(s) constituting

the offense/knowingly and with criminal intent aids and abets

in the commission of the offense.

Dkt. 12-34 at 36. The jury convicted Ms. Weidenfelder of first-degree murder.

Dkt. 12-20 at 46. Accordingly, the jury concluded Ms. Weidenfelder, beyond

a reasonable doubt, acted as a principal in the murder of Ms. Morgan.

Ms. Weidenfelder now argues that if the jury had only heard that Mr.

Spaulding, during an in-custody statement while trying to shift blame from

himself, provided the exact location of the shotgun to authorities, the jury

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would have concluded that Mr. Spaulding acted alone and exonerated Ms.

Weidenfelder. See Dkt. 7 at 21-23.°

The Court disagrees. The jury concluded that the circumstantial

evidence presented was sufficient to convict Ms. Weidenfelder. If the jury was

aware of this piece of evidence, it would have only bolstered the fact that Mr.

Spaulding was involved. But his knowledge of the weapon’s location did not

establish Mr. Spaulding “was the actual murderer and had committed the

crime alone.” Dkt. 7 at 22. Mr. Spaulding could have known the location of

the murder weapon if he acted alone or if he and Ms. Weidenfelder acted

together to perpetrate the crime. There is no reasonable probability that this

evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial, and it follows, after

reviewing the record, Ms. Weidenfelder cannot demonstrate the result of her

appeal would have been different had the omitted claim been included. The

OCCA’s decision was therefore well within the range of reasonable

applications of Strickland. Habeas relief as to this sub-claim is denied.

IV

Next, Ms. Weidenfelder argues her appellate counsel was ineffective

for failing to raise a claim challenging the trial court’s admission of an audio

recording from Mr. Spaulding’s cellphone as violating her Sixth Amendment

right to confrontation. Dkt. 2 at 5; Dkt. 7 at 13-14, 23-25. Ms. Weidenfelder

6 Ms. Weidenfelder also argues the OCCA incorrectly analyzed the prejudice

inquiry “under a legal theory of conspiracy that was neither charged by the State nor argued

by any party at trial” and, therefore, the OCCA’s adjudication was unreasonable. Dkt. 7 at

21. The OCCA did state there was “ample evidence that [Ms. Weidenfelder] and Spaulding

... conspired to murder his child’s mother|.]” Dkt. 10-11 at 4. However, the Court does not

find support for the notion that the OCCA misapprehended the charged crime. See #d. at 1

(noting Ms. Weidenfelder was convicted of murder in the first degree); see also id. at 4, n.1

(noting Ms. Weidenfelder and Mr. Spaulding “were charged conjointly in this matter for

the murder of Debra Morgan.”). Accordingly, as outlined, the Court does not find the

OCCA unreasonably applied Strickland.

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No. 23-cv-369

also presented this sub-claim to the OCCA when she appealed the denial of

her application for post-conviction relief. Dkt. 10-8 at 21-25.

The OCCA rejected this claim and held:

Petitioner additionally claims ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel for failing to raise a Confrontation Clause challenge to

the statements made by Spaulding on the audio recording. The

trial court overruled the defense’s objection on this ground, as

well. Because the challenged statements were nontestimonial,

they were not subject to the Confrontation Clause. Crawford ».

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); Davis ». Washington, 547

U.S. 813, 821-22 (2006); of, Tryon v. State, 2018 OK CR 20, 14

41-42, 423 P.3d 617, 633. Petitioner therefore fails to

demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion. See Spruzll,

2018 OK CR 25, J 10, 425 P.3d at 756. Likewise, she fails to

demonstrate appellate counsel was ineffective for omitting this

meritless claim on direct appeal. Logan, 2013 OK CR 2, 4 11,

293 P.3d at 967. This proposition is denied.

Dkt. 10-11 at 8-9.

Ms. Weidenfelder argues that it was “unreasonable” for the OCCA to

conclude that Crawford did not apply to the recording. Dkt. 7 at 25.

Once again, because the OCCA correctly identified the Strickland test,

Ms. Weidenfelder must establish that the OCCA unreasonably applied

Strickland. See Upchurch, 333 F.3d at 1167.

Turning to the merits of the omitted claim, Ms. Weidenfelder’s

position is that Mr. Spaulding’s statements in the audio recording were

testimonial and appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the trial court’s ruling

to the contrary rendered appellate counsel ineffective. Dkt. 7 at 25.

The Sixth Amendment “provides that ‘in all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against

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No. 23-cv-369

him.’ This right of confrontation has been applied to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680, 682 (10th Cir.

1990) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)). The Supreme Court

has held that testimonial hearsay violates a defendant’s right to confront and

cross-examine under the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v. Washington,

541 USS. 36, 54 (2004). But “a statement cannot fall within the Confrontation

Clause unless its primary purpose was testimonial.” Ozo ». Clark, 576 U.S.

237, 245 (2015). [T]he question is whether, in light of all the circumstances,

viewed objectively, the ‘primary purpose’ of the conversation was to ‘create

an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” /d. (citations and internal

brackets omitted). Finally, the Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of

testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the

matter asserted.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9.

The audio recording at issue here was retrieved from Mr. Spaulding’s

phone, and the recording captured approximately forty-nine minutes of

dialogue between Mr. Spaulding and Ms. Weidenfelder. See Dkt. 12-18 at 205.

The exact date of the recording was unknown, but authorities believed it

occurred near the end of October. Dkt. 12-18 at 210-211; see also Dkt. 12-34 at

20. The recording appeared to have been created while both Mr. Spaulding

and Ms. Weidenfelder were in their home. See Dkt. 12-18 at 193. The trial

court admitted the recording to give “context to the responses given” by Ms.

Weidenfelder and not for “the truth of the matter[.]” Dkt. 12-18 at 208. As

noted above, the recording contained various inculpatory statements by Ms.

Weidenfelder. See Dkt. 12-18 at 211; Dkt. 12-20 at 13; Dkt. 13 (State’s Ex.

155R.

The jury was provided the following instruction:

Statements of Richard Spaulding during the purported

conversation with the defendant may not be considered by you

as to the truth of the matter asserted and may not be considered

by you as to proof of the guilt or innocence of the defendant of

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No, 23-cy-369

the specific offense charged in the information. These

statements have been given to you solely for the limited

purpose of providing context to the responses given.

Dkt. 12-34 at 21.

The statements by Mr. Spaulding “were made informally and out of

court or custody to an acquaintance. Therefore, the hearsay statements were

nontestimonial, and under Davis the Confrontation Clause does not apply.”

Weedman ». Hartley, 396 F. App’x 556, 563 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Desai v.

Booker, 732 F.3d 628, 630 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that with Crawford, “the

Confrontation Clause no longer applied to non-testimonial hearsay such as

[a] friend-to-friend confession”); Barnes v. Davis, No. 11-cv-02760-REB,

2012 WL 3869019, at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 6, 2012) (unpublished)’ (holding a

state appellate court’s conclusion that a statement made “during a private,

informal conversation between two friends” was non-testimonial was a

reasonable application of Crawford and Davis), certificate of appealability

denied, 513 F. App’x. 803 (10th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, Ms. Weidenfelder’s

sub-claim is meritless, and Ms. Weidenfelder has not demonstrated her

appellate counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to raise this claim. It

follows, therefore, that the OCCA’s decision was well within the range of

reasonable applications of Strickland. Habeas relief as to this sub-claim is

denied.

The Court finds and concludes that Ms. Weidenfelder has not made

the necessary showings to obtain federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The Court therefore denies the Petition. The Court further concludes

that no certificate of appealability shall issue because reasonable jurists would

not debate the correctness of this Court’s assessment of Ms. Weidenfelder’s

” The Court cites all unpublished decisions herein as persuasive authority. Fed. R.

App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

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constitutional claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack ». McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Petition [Dkt. 2] is

denied; a Certificate of Appealability is denied; and a separate Judgment shall

be entered in this matter.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall note

on the record the substitution of Justin Farris, Director, in place of Tamika

White as party Respondent.

DATED this 27th day of April 2026.

John D. Russell

United States District Judge

190