The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1243-24
MICHELLE JONES, Individually
and on Behalf of Others
Similarly Situated Individuals,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMPLETE CARE AT
COURT HOUSE, LLC,
Defendant-Respondent.
____________________________
Submitted November 6, 2025 – Decided April 27, 2026
Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-1151-24.
Costello & Silverman, LLC, attorneys for appellant
(Miriam S. Edelstein, of counsel and on the brief).
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, attorneys for
respondent (Melissa J. Brown, Jonathan R. Stuckel,
and Peyton M. Miller, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Michelle Jones appeals from the Law Division's November 22,
2024, order dismissing plaintiff's class action suit seeking wages under the
New Jersey Wage Payment Law ("NJWPL"), N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1 to -15. In
reviewing the record de novo, we conclude the motion court did not err in
granting defendant Complete Care at Court House, LLC's motion to dismiss.
Therefore, we affirm.
I.
In June 2024, plaintiff, a Certified Nursing Assistant ("CNA"), filed a
putative class action complaint alleging that defendant violated the NJWPL by
deducting thirty minutes of pay for lunch breaks that she and other CNAs were
unable to take due to understaffing. Plaintiff asserts that she and other hourly
employees were scheduled for these breaks but were often unable to take them
because of their workloads. Nevertheless, defendant deducted thirty minutes
from their paychecks.
The collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between defendant and
Amalgamated Local 1931, Eastern States Joint Board ("the Union") governed
terms, wages, hours of work, and dispute resolution procedures for specific job
titles, including CNAs. The CBA recognizes the Union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent regarding rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and
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other conditions of employment for all full-time service employees. Article V
establishes standards for the work week and break periods: "The normal work
day shall consist of eight hours . . . [and] the normal work week shall consist
of forty hours," with full-time employees entitled to "one-half hour unpaid
lunch period." Article V also provides that "the Employer shall schedule the
employee's luncheon period" and reserves to the employer the right to establish
and modify shifts as necessary for facility operations.
Article XVII of the CBA outlines the grievance procedure for disputes
"arising out of interpretation, construction, or application of any provision of
the [CBA]." Employees wishing to grieve any action relating to wages,
discipline, or working conditions are required to do so in writing. If the
grievance involves multiple employees, it must begin with a union
representative, the shop steward, the impacted employee, and the employer's
representative—all who must meet to address the grievance. The employer is
required to issue a decision within four working days. If the grievance remains
unresolved, either the Union or the employer may submit the matter to binding
arbitration within ten working days.
In pursuing her rights under the CBA, plaintiff did not follow this
procedure. Rather, she sought relief directly in the Superior Court.
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Consequently, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule
4:6-2(e), arguing plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies set
forth in the CBA and her claim was preempted by federal law. The trial court
granted the motion, finding that the claims implicated Article V of the CBA,
which relates to breaks and employee scheduling. The court determined that
"[a]ny determination as to [defendant]'s staffing practices or break policies and
whether they violated [ ] plaintiff's rights . . . require[s] analyzing the scope of
the employer's rights and obligations under . . . the CBA." The court
concluded that plaintiff's claims were subject to the CBA's exclusive grievance
and arbitration provisions and were also preempted by the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
This appeal followed.
II.
We review Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted de novo. Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Sons,
LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021). In considering a Rule 4:6-2(e) decision, we
must examine "'the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the
complaint,' giving the plaintiff the benefit of 'every reasonable inference of
fact.'" Ibid. (quoting Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Golding, Foley, Vigmuolo,
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4
Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 107 (2019)). Additionally, because the
motion court's decision consists of interpretation and construction of a contract
as a matter of law, that aspect of our review is also de novo. Kaur v. Assured
Lending Corp., 405 N.J. Super. 468, 474 (App. Div. 2009).
We conclude, as the motion judge did, plaintiff's complaint was properly
dismissed. We "'search[] the complaint in depth and with liberality to
ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even
from an obscure statement of claim,'" and give plaintiff an opportunity to
amend if necessary. Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J.
739, 746 (1989) (quoting DiCristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 43 N.J.
Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)).
Plaintiff points to no compelling reason in law nor in equity that would
allow her to seek relief under the NJWPL and subvert the well-established
doctrine of the exhaustion of remedies. Because plaintiff cannot amend her
complaint "to articulate a legal basis entitling [her] to relief," it should remain
dismissed with prejudice. Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106
(App. Div. 2005).
It is well-settled that "an employee seeking to bring a contract grievance
'must attempt [the] use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by
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[the] employer and union as the mode of redress.'" Thompson v. Joseph Cory
Warehouses, 215 N.J. Super. 217, 220 (App. Div. 1987) (quoting Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965)).
According to the language of the CBA, the parties agreed to resolve any
issue "arising out of the interpretation, construction, or application of any
provision of the" CBA as well as "disputes relating to 'terms and conditions of
employment'" through the grievance and arbitration procedures outlined in
Article XVII. Article I of the CBA designates the Union as the "sole and
exclusive bargaining agent with respect to rates of pay, hours of work, and
other conditions of employment for all full-time service employees," including
plaintiff. Article V establishes work schedules and carves out time for a
designated break or a "one-half hour lunch period" that may be scheduled at
the employer's discretion. Accordingly, we conclude plaintiff's dispute falls
squarely within the ambit of the grievance procedure. Similarly, we are
persuaded by defendant's observation that "[p]ermitting [plaintiff] to litigate
these claims in court despite the existence of a controlling CBA [erodes] the
collective bargaining process and contravene[s] long-standing public policy
favoring arbitration and internal resolution of labor disputes."
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We also reject plaintiff's argument that the motion court erred by failing
to search the complaint sufficiently for a cause of action. The existence of a
cause of action is secondary to the determination of the dispute. Robertelli v.
N.J. Off. of Att'y Ethics, 224 N.J. 240, 482 (2016) (quoting Gilbert v. Gladden,
87 N.J. 275, 280-81 (1981)). Plaintiff's complaint pertaining to the wages
question is encompassed within the terms of the CBA and resolvable solely by
the grievance process it contains. The motion court appropriately declined to
determine whether a cause of action existed in the Superior Court and
dismissed the case with prejudice. See Big Smoke LLC v. Twp. of W.
Milford, 478 N.J. Super. 203, 226 (App. Div. 2024) (holding that dismissal
with prejudice is mandated when the facts are insufficient to support a claim
and when discovery will not reveal a successful claim.).
To the extent we have not expressly or impliedly addressed any of
arguments posed in this appeal, it is because we find them to have insufficient
merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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