Reynolds

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT March 30, 2026

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

VALERIE REYNOLDS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-00182

§

KURARAY AMERICA, INC., §

§

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Valerie Reynolds has worked as a process operator at the same chemical plant in

La Porte, Texas, for nearly 20 years. She is one of two openly homosexual women at the

plant and one of only a few women among the facility’s 50 operators. While many of her

colleagues—mostly heterosexual men—advanced into supervisory roles or received

supervisory training, Reynolds’s career stagnated. Reynolds alleges that her employer,

Defendant Kuraray America, Inc. (“Kuraray”), discriminated against her based on her

sex and sexual orientation. She also claims that Kuraray retaliated against her after she

sought relief.

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt.

No. 34). For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the

Motion.

I. BACKGROUND1

Reynolds began working at the LaPorte plant in 2005. (Dkt. No. 41 at 6); (see also

Dkt. No. 34-4 at 23). Kuraray purchased the plant in 2014. (Dkt. No. 34-2 at 2). In July

2019, Reynolds told her supervisor, Daniel Clark, (Dkt. No. 34-2 at 1), that she was

interested in training for a supervisory position, (Dkt. No. 41-1 at 1). Reynolds renewed

her request in May 2020 after learning that a second employee had received the training

before her despite being hired later. (Id. at 12). Clark responded with steps Reynolds

could take to get the training. (Id. at 13).

Reynolds applied for another supervisory position in September 2019. (Dkt. No.

34-5). Kuraray received Reynolds’s application but did not promote or interview her

because she did not meet the “minimum requirements for the position.” (Dkt. No. 34-8

at 2–3). Joseph Waddell, who worked in human resources for the La Porte site, (Dkt. No.

34-4 at 50), and Clark contacted Reynolds to help with future promotion opportunities,

(Dkt. No. 34-2 at 2). Reynolds did not follow up with Clark or Waddell. (Id.); (see also

Dkt. No. 34-9 at 1–2). In June 2021, Reynolds applied for a second supervisory position.

(Dkt. No. 34-4 at 112). Kuraray denied Reynolds’s application the next month for the

same reason as in 2019. (Dkt. No. 34-11).

Reynolds filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge

against Kuraray in August 2020. (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 75). Reynolds alleged that Kuraray

1 Except where noted, this section contains only undisputed facts, and all facts and

reasonable inferences have been construed in favor of the nonmovant. Renfroe v. Parker, 974 F.3d

594, 599 (5th Cir. 2020). The Court has not weighed evidence or made credibility findings. Id.

discriminated against her based on her sex and sexual orientation by passing her over for

promotions, denying her advancement opportunities, and treating her differently than

her colleagues. (Dkt. No. 41-5 at 4). Since then, Reynolds has been disciplined three times

by Kuraray. (Dkt. No. 34-12). In July 2021, Kuraray issued Reynolds a “Note to File” for

an operational error. (Id. at 1); (see also Dkt. No. 34-2 at 2). The next month, it placed

Reynolds on special review for unsatisfactory performance. (Dkt. No. 34-12 at 2–4); (see

also Dkt. No. 34-2 at 2). And in March 2022, it put Reynolds on probation for her role in

an overpressure event that allegedly cost Kuraray $10 million. (Dkt. No. 34-12 at 5–7);

(see also Dkt. No. 34-2 at 2). Kuraray disciplined six other employees for the same event.

(Dkt. No. 34-10 at 90–91).

Reynolds sued Kuraray on January 18, 2022, alleging sex discrimination and

retaliation under Title VII. (Dkt. No. 1). Kuraray answered, (Dkt. No. 5), and moved for

summary judgment on February 17, 2025, (Dkt. No. 34).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A fact is material if it could affect the suit’s outcome under governing law. Renwick

v. PNK Lake Charles, LLC, 901 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). And “[a] dispute about

a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the non-moving party.” TIG Ins. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir.

2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510). The moving party “always

bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion”

and identifying the record evidence that “it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548,

2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “If the moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the

motion [for summary judgment] must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s

response.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per

curiam).

If the movant meets this burden, the nonmovant must come forward with specific

facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355–56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

The nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings and by [the nonmovant’s] own affidavits,

or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Nola Spice Designs, LLC v.

Haydel Enters., 783 F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d

688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014)). “The nonmovant must ‘identify specific evidence in the record

and . . . articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim.’”

Carr v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 866 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting

Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998)), as revised (July 14, 2017).

If evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment is

appropriate. Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2019)

(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the district court views the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Carr, 866 F.3d at 601. This means

that courts must resolve factual controversies in the nonmovant’s favor, “but only

when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at

1075.

III. DISCUSSION

Kuraray argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on all of Reynolds’s claims.

(Dkt. No. 34 at 7). For Reynolds’s discrimination claim, Kuraray argues that (1) Reynolds

has failed to produce direct evidence of discrimination, (id. at 15); (2) Reynolds cannot

establish a prima facie case of discrimination, (id. at 15–17); and (3) in the alternative,

Kuraray has produced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged adverse

action, (id. at 15). For Reynolds’s retaliation claim, Kuraray argues that (1) Reynolds

cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she did not suffer a materially

adverse employment action and (2) she cannot show a causal connection between her

protected activity and Kuraray’s actions. (Id. at 19–25). The Court holds that Kuraray

has not met its summary-judgment burden as to Reynolds’s discrimination claim but that

summary judgment is appropriate as to Reynolds’s retaliation claim.

A. DISCRIMINATION

Reynolds alleges that Kuraray discriminated against her because of her sex. (Dkt.

No. 1 at 2).2 “In employment discrimination cases, a plaintiff may present his case by

2 While Reynolds asserts that she was discriminated against both because of her sex and

sexual orientation, both allegations constitute a single sex discrimination claim under Title VII.

(continue)

direct or circumstantial evidence, or both.” Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 340 (5th

Cir. 2019) (quoting Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 2002)).

Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, proves discriminatory motive “without

inference or presumption.” Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir.

1993). Circumstantial evidence uses the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.3

Salazar v. Lubbock Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 982 F.3d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 2020). Reynolds has not

offered direct evidence of sex discrimination, so the Court applies the McDonnell Douglas

analysis. (Dkt. No. 34 at 15); (Dkt. No. 41 at 25–27 (discussing McDonnell Douglas

framework)).

Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie case of

discrimination. To do that, a plaintiff must show (1) she is a member of a protected

group; (2) she was qualified for the position at issue; (3) her employer took an adverse

employment action; and (4) her employer treated her less favorably than other similarly

situated employees outside the protected group. Hassen v. Ruston La. Hosp. Comp., L.L.C.,

932 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised (Aug. 1, 2019) (citing Morris v. Town of

Independence, 827 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2016)). If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case of

discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. (quoting Morris, 827

F.3d at 400). If the employer does, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “produce

See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 662, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1743, 207 L.Ed.2d 218 (2020) (“For an

employer to discriminate against employees for being homosexual or transgender, the employer

must intentionally discriminate against individual men and women in part because of sex.”).

3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

evidence from which a jury could conclude that [the employer’s] articulated reason is

pretextual.” Nall, 917 F.3d at 342 (citing Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs. N. Am., Inc., 813 F.3d

586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016)).

1. Prima Facie Case of Discrimination

The Parties do not dispute that Reynolds, a homosexual woman, is a member of a

protected class. (Dkt. No. 34 at 15). Kuraray also does not contest that Reynolds suffered

an adverse employment action, (see generally Dkt. No. 34 at 13–19), or that employees

outside her protected class received training and promotions, (Dkt. No. 34 at 10–11); (Dkt.

No. 34-4 at 64). The Parties disagree only on whether Reynolds was qualified for the

positions she sought in 2019 and 2021. (Compare Dkt. No. 34 at 15–17); with (Dkt. No. 41

at 22–25).

Kuraray argues that Reynolds was not qualified for the supervisory positions

because she did not meet the minimum experience requirements. (Dkt. No. 34 at 18).

Reynolds argues that she was qualified because the positions required only three or more

years of supervisory experience. (Dkt. No. 41 at 7–9, 15); (see also Dkt. No. 41-4). Reynolds

supports this claim with an internal Kuraray career-development guide from 2019. (Dkt.

No. 41-4). The guide states that three or more years of supervisory experience is sufficient

to be qualified for the supervisor role. (Id.) Kuraray argues that Reynolds’s argument

fails because she relies on a career development guide, rather than a job posting or

application. (Dkt. No. 42 at 2). However, the career development guide, as an official

Kuraray document, creates a fact issue as to whether Reynolds was qualified for the 2019

and 2021 positions. Reynolds testified to having between two and four years of

supervisory experience. (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 114). If the positions required only three or

more years of experience, Reynolds could have been qualified for either position. In

reaching this conclusion, the Court recognizes that the burden on plaintiffs at the prima

facie stage is “not onerous.” Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 228, 135 S.Ct.

1338, 1354, 191 L.Ed.2d 279 (2015) (quoting Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S.

248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). Therefore, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Reynolds has successfully made out a prima

facie case of discrimination.

2. Kuraray’s Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason

Because Reynolds has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Kuraray to

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Hassen, 932 F.3d

353 at 356. “The employer’s burden is only one of production, not persuasion, and

involves no credibility assessment.” McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th

Cir. 2007) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494

(5th Cir. 2023) (en banc).

Kuraray’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to promote Reynolds is

that she was not qualified. (Dkt. No. 34 at 15–17). That is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 383

F.3d 309, 317–18 (5th Cir. 2004). Therefore, Kuraray has met its burden of production.

3. Pretext for Discrimination

Because Kuraray has provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the burden

now shifts to Reynolds to “produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that [the

employer’s] articulated reason is pretextual.” Nall, 917 F.3d at 342. A pretext in this

context is a “coverup” for a discriminatory decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 805, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1826, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); see also Godfrey v. Katy Indep.

Sch. Dist., 395 F.App’x 88, 91 (5th Cir. 2010).

Kuraray’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason mirrors its argument against

Reynolds’s prima facie case—i.e., she was not qualified for the position. The Fifth Circuit

has held that when an employer puts the employee’s qualifications at issue in both the

prima facie and the pretext stage, the objective hiring criteria is dealt with at the prima

facie stage and the subjective criteria is dealt with at the pretext stage. Medina v. Ramsey

Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d

344, 350–51 (5th Cir. 2007). Kuraray only disputes Reynolds’s objective qualifications.

The career development guide states that three or more years of supervisory experience

is the objective minimum. (Dkt. No. 41-4). The job posting states five or more years of

supervisory experience is the objective minimum. (Dkt No. 41-6 at 2). The conflicting

evidence creates a jury question regarding what the objective qualifications are.

Even if objective qualifications were part of the pretext analysis, Kuraray’s

summary-judgment motion still fails. The Fifth Circuit recently clarified that the failure

to provide “a roughly similar opportunity to access the necessary components of a

training program” can support a discrimination claim based on the adverse employment

action that comes from the lack of training. Rahman v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 56 F.4th 1041,

1046 (5th Cir. 2023); see also Gupta v. Qwest Gov. Servs., Inc., No. 3:20-CV-03560, 2023 WL

2025056, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2023) (“[T]he court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently

presented competent summary judgment evidence that she suffered an adverse

employment action when she was denied training opportunity . . . .); Thomas v. Burrows,

No. 2:22-CV-03511, 2023 WL 1783694, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2023) (“Allegations regarding

disparate mentoring and training may qualify as an adverse employment action when

same is directly tied to the worker’s job duties, compensation, or benefits . . . .” (citing

Rahman, 56 F.4th at 1046)). Accordingly, Reynolds can meet her burden by showing that

her lack of supervisory experience resulted from discrimination and that inadequate

training affected her job duties, compensation, or benefits.

The record indicates that Reynolds’s supervisory experience and promotion

potential was constrained by Kuraray’s control over training opportunities—

opportunities that Reynolds was allegedly denied. Kuraray provides supervisory

experience to employees through a process called “detailing” or “step-up.” (Dkt. No. 41-

12 at 51, 80). This process trains employees to become temporary supervisors, or “detail

supervisors,” whenever a supervisor is out. (Id.); (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 34–35). Being a detail

supervisor helps meet the minimum supervisory experience requirements for becoming

a shift supervisor, (Dkt. No. 41-10 at 56), which is one of the roles Reynolds applied for,

(id. at 54). Similar supervisory experience opportunities are also offered during

shutdowns via random selection. (Id. at 77). Detail supervisors are chosen by shift

supervisors. (Id. at 68, 73); (see also Dkt. No. 34-4 at 96). There is no record evidence

indicating other ways to obtain supervisory experience. (Cf. Dkt. No. 41-12 at 82–83).

Reynolds attempted to obtain supervisory experience through detailing or

overseeing shutdowns. (See Dkt. No. 41-1 at 4, 11–12, 17–20); (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 34–35, 44–

45, 67–68). While Kuraray gave Reynolds some supervisory training and experience, (see

Dkt. No. 41-1 at 11–12, 17–19); (Dkt. No. 41-10 at 83); (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 63), the record

reflects a pattern of Reynolds’s less-tenured male colleagues obtaining more supervisory

training and experience than her. (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 59–60). Keaton Bowland, one of

Reynolds’s male colleagues, began detail-supervisor training only two years after he was

hired. (Dkt. No. 41-10 at 72). Chris Aguero, another male colleague hired after Reynolds,

began training for the same role. (Dkt. No. 41-1 at 12). Reynolds also testified that two

other male colleagues were training for the detail-supervisor position, despite being

newer hires. (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 59–60); (see also Dkt. No. 41-10 at 74–75).

Although the summary-judgment record reflects that Reynolds has received some

supervisory experience and has failed to follow up on some opportunities to discuss her

career trajectory, this does not fully account for the faster career progressions of her

heterosexual male counterparts. Career discussions were only offered after Reynolds

complained about discrimination. (Dkt. No. 41-1 at 2). By that point, Reynolds had been

employed with Kuraray for five years but was still not training her to be a detail

supervisor. (See Dkt. No. 41-11 at 34–35). Yet, Bowland reached that point in two years.

(Dkt. No. 41-10 at 72). This record creates a jury question regarding whether Reynolds’s

access to supervisory experience, and thus to promotion possibilities, was prevented by

Kuraray for discriminatory reasons. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is a genuine

issue of material fact regarding Reynolds’s discrimination claim.

B. RETALIATION

Reynolds also alleges that Kuraray retaliated against her because she filed an

EEOC charge and later filed this action. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2); (see Dkt. No. 41 at 28–29). Like

employment discrimination, Title VII retaliation claims are subject to the McDonnell

Douglas framework. Jones v. Gulf Coast Rest. Grp, Inc., 8 F.4th 363, 368 (5th Cir. 2021). After

following the burden-shifting framework, the Court holds that Reynolds’s retaliation

claim does not survive summary judgment.

1. Prima Facie Case of Retaliation

To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under Title VII Reynolds must show

that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) Kuraray took an adverse employment

action against her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and

the adverse employment action. Feist v. Louisiana, 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013).

Kuraray does not dispute that Reynolds engaged in protected activity by filing her EEOC

charge. (Dkt. No. 34 at 20). The Parties disagree on whether Reynolds showed that she

suffered an adverse employment action and whether there is a causal connection.

a. Adverse employment action

Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision “applies only when the retaliatory action is

‘materially adverse,’ meaning that it causes ‘significant’ harm.” Muldrow v. City of St.

Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 357, 144 S.Ct. 967, 976, 218 L.Ed.2d 322 (2024) (quoting Burlington

Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415, 165 L.Ed.2d 345

(2005)). The Court considers only actions occurring after Reynolds’s earliest protected

activity—filing her EEOC charge—because no causal link can exist between protected

activity and events that predate it. See Stone v. La. Dept. of Revenue, 590 F.App’x 332, 341

(5th Cir. 2014).

Reynolds filed an EEOC charge in August 2020. Kuraray denied Reynolds’s shift-

supervisor application in July 2021. (Dkt. No. 34-11). Kuraray also disciplined Reynolds

three times; specifically, in July 2021, August 2021, and March 2022.4 (Dkt. No. 34-12).

“Failure to promote is clearly an adverse employment action.” Haire v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La.

State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 719 F.3d 356, 364 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Breaux v. City of

Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000)). So too a “formal reprimand is an adverse

employment action.” Lubbe v. Milanovich, No. A-18-CV-1011-RP, 2022 WL 3129106 (W.D.

Tex. Feb. 25, 2022); see also Breaux, 205 F.3d at 157. Therefore, Reynolds has suffered an

adverse employment action.5

b. Causal connection to protected activity

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Reynolds must show a “causal

connection” between the adverse employment actions and her protected activity.

Reynolds argues that the causal connection is proved by the close timing between the

filing of both her EEOC charge and this lawsuit and the adverse actions. (Dkt. No. 41 at

4 Reynolds states that she was disciplined in January 2022. (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 82). She was

placed on probation in March 2022, but the event happened in January 2022. (Dkt. 34-12 at 5–7).

The Court’s analysis of the prima facie retaliation claim is the same using either date.

5 Reynolds also alleges that Kuraray assigned her to “undesirable shifts.” (Dkt. No. 34-4

at 101–10). However, what makes these shifts undesirable is that they have supervisors that

Reynolds considers more strict. (Id. at 102). Furthermore, the record shows that Kuraray

employees “get rotated around all the time. . . . There[] [are] certain supervisors that [Reynolds]

prefer[s] not to work for.” (Id.). Kuraray has not changed the terms, conditions, or privileges of

Reynolds’s employment; nor is Reynolds treated any differently from other Kuraray employees.

Accordingly, these “undesirable shifts” are not materially adverse employment actions.

28–29). Close timing may satisfy the causal-connection element, Feist, 730 F.3d at 454

(quoting McCoy, 492 F.3d at 562), but the “temporal proximity must generally be ‘very

close,’” id. (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74, 121 S.Ct. 1508,

1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (per curiam)). “[A] time lapse of up to four months may be

sufficiently close,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Evans v. Houston, 246

F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001)), but a five-month lapse is insufficient, absent other evidence

of retaliation, id. (citing Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 472 (5th Cir. 2022)).

The only causal connection that Reynolds can establish through close timing (her

only causal evidence) is between her probation and the filing of this action.6 Reynolds

filed suit in January 2022. (Dkt. No. 1). Kuraray placed Reynolds on probation in March

2022. (Dkt No. 34-12 at 5–7). The two-month gap is sufficiently close. See Feist, 730 F.3d

at 454. Reynolds has thus shown a prima facie case of retaliation as to the January 2022

probation but not the other alleged retaliatory acts.

2. Kuraray’s Legitimate, Nonretaliatory Reason

Because Reynolds has met her burden of showing a prima facie case, Kuraray must

articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for placing Reynolds on probation. “This

burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’”

Shahrashoob v. Tex. A&M Univ., 125 F.4th 641, 653 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105

6 While Kuraray does not concede that the filing of a lawsuit constitutes a protected

activity, the Fifth Circuit has held that it does. Casarez v. Burlington Northern/Santa Fe Co., 193 F.3d

334, 339 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Casarez’s complaint to the EEOC and subsequent suit are protected

activity . . . .”).

(2000)). Kuraray’s reason for placing Reynolds on probation is for “failing to follow

Operating Procedures,” (Dkt. No. 34-12 at 5), which allegedly contributed to an

overpressure incident that cost Kuraray millions of dollars, (Dkt No. 41-10 at 90).

Workplace errors are a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discipline. See, e.g.,

Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 231–33 (5th Cir. 2015). Kuraray has

thus produced a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for placing Kuraray on probation.

3. Pretext for Retaliation

Reynolds now has the burden of showing that Kuraray’s reasons are a pretext for

retaliation. To meet that burden, Reynolds must show “that the adverse action would

not have occurred ‘but for’ the employer’s retaliatory motive.” Shahrashoob, 125 F.4th at

653 (quoting Feist, 730 F.3d at 454).

Reynolds has produced no evidence that Kuraray’s reasons are a pretext for

retaliation. Reynolds’s retaliation allegation relies solely on the temporal proximity of

the probation to the filing of this action. (See Dkt. No. 41 at 27–29). Temporal proximity

is not enough at the pretext stage. Garcia v. Pro. Cont. Servs., Inc., 938 F.3d 236, 243 (5th

Cir. 2019). Reynolds has failed to produce evidence that suggests that the “employer’s

explanation is false.” Saketkoo v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 1002 (5th Cir.

2022)). Nothing in her Response, (Dkt. No. 41), rebuts Kuraray’s assertion that she was

disciplined because “she did not completely empty all of the final acetate from . . . the

column and associated equipment,” which contributed to the overpressure incident that

cost Kuraray over $10 million,7 (Dkt. No. 41-10 at 91). Reynolds also fails to distinguish

herself from the six other individuals that were disciplined for the same incident. (See

Dkt. No. 41-10 at 91). On the other hand, Kuraray’s action complied with their

progressive discipline policy. (Dkt. No. 41-10 at 38–39). Playing a role in causing the

company millions of dollars reasonably comes with disciplinary consequences.

Reynolds has not shown that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding

whether Kuraray’s reasons for disciplining her were pretextual. As a result, Reynolds’s

Title VII retaliation claim fails.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Kuraray’s

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 34). The Court GRANTS summary judgment

on Reynolds’s retaliation claims under Title VII and DENIES summary judgment on

Reynolds’s discrimination claims. This action will be set for trial in short order.

It is SO ORDERED.

7 Reynolds does assert that “[t]he most obvious problems with the discipline imposed

[related to the incident] are that: (1) Reynolds was simply complying with instructions and (2) it

happened while Reynolds was at home, off-duty and asleep.” (Dkt. No. 41 at 11 (emphasis in

original)); (see also Dkt. No. 34-4 at 82–88 (Reynolds’s deposition testimony in which she disputes

the discipline she received for the January 2022 incident)). However, this assertion is supported

only by her self-serving testimony. Such testimony does not constitute competent summary

judgment evidence. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Fitch, 801 F.Supp.2d 555, 565 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citing In re

Hinsley, 201 F.3d 638, 643 (5th Cir. 2000)).

Signed on March 30, 2026.

DREW B. TIPTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17