EVERY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

MADILYNN MARY ELLEN EVERY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:25cv560

)

MGM TRUCKING LLC, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the Court on “Plaintiff’s Motion for

Leave to Amend Complaint and Add New Party” (Docket Entry 9) (the

“Motion”), which Defendants oppose (see Docket Entry 10). For the

reasons that follow, the Court should grant the Motion and remand

the case to the state court in which it originated.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Madilynn Mary Ellen Every (the “Plaintiff”), a North

Carolina resident (see Docket Entry 2 (the “Original Complaint”) at

1),1 initiated the instant action in state court against Defendants

MGM Trucking LLC (“MGM”) and Santo Miguel (“Defendant Miguel”)

(collectively, the “Defendants”). Defendants, Texas and Florida

residents, respectively (see Docket Entry 1 at 2),2 removed the

1 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s

pagination.

2 “For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of

a limited liability company is determined by the citizenship of all

of its members.” Central W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State

(continued...)

case during discovery (see id. at 3), pursuant to this Court’s

diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441 (b).

Following removal and continued discovery (see Docket Entry 9 at 2-

3), Plaintiff filed the Motion and attached a proposed amended

complaint (see Docket Entry 9-2 (the “Amended Complaint”)) seeking

to add DW Express, Inc. (“DW Express”), a North Carolina

corporation (id. at 3), as a defendant and to “assert[] allegations

and claims against it” (Docket Entry 9 at 1).

Those allegations and claims relate to a 2023 automobile

collision between Plaintiff’s vehicle and an MGM-owned truck driven

by its employee, Defendant Miguel (see Docket Entry 2 at 2), from

which Plaintiff allegedly “suffered serious personal injuries” (id.

at 3). According to the Motion, “Plaintiff filed [the O]riginal

Complaint . . . believ[ing MGM] to be the owner of the tractor-

trailer involved” in the collision (Docket Entry 9 at 1), but

“Defendants [later] revealed [in discovery] that another company,

[ ] *DW Express,’ owned the trailer” (id. at 2). (See also Docket

Entry 10-1 at 5 (stating in answer to interrogatory that “DW

Express is the company who [sic] owns the trailer”).)

As compared to the Original Complaint, the Amended Complaint

adds a claim for negligence and negligence per se against DW

2(...continued)

Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 103 (4th Cir. 2011) (parentheticals

omitted). Here, MGM “has one member named Mirian Valdez, who isa

citizen of Texas.” (Docket Entry 1 at 2.)

Express (see Docket Entry 9-2 at 7-9), adds DW Express to

Plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim against MGM (see id. at 6-7;

Docket Entry 2 at 4-5), and retains the Original Complaint’s

negligence claim against Defendant Miguel (compare Docket Entry 9-2

at 5-6, with Docket Entry 2 at 3-4). The Amended Complaint also

alleges that DW Express owned the trailer (see Docket Entry 9-2 at

4), entered into an “agreement with [ ] MGM . . . [regarding]

aspects of the [relevant] transportation” (id. at 8), and shared

control with MGM over Defendant Miguel’s actions (see id. at 4).

Opposing the Motion (see Docket Entry 10), Defendants contend

that the “add[ition of] a nondiverse defendant to the case[ would]

effectively destroy diversity jurisdiction” (id. at 1) and require

remand (see id.). In their view, the Court should deny the Motion

and maintain jurisdiction (A) because, for “four months prior to

the filing of t[{he [MJotion[,] . . . [P]laintiff knew the identity

of the trailer owner” (id. at 2; see also id. (“[O]n March 27,

2025, [ ] MGM served its discovery responses, confirming that the

owner of the trailer was DW Express.”)) and (B) because the record

lacks “evidence [that denial would] prejudice [ P]Jlaintiff” (id.).

Conversely, Plaintiff contends that “Defendants did not

disclose sufficient information for Plaintiff to identify which one

of five possible ‘DW Express’ entities was the correct one” (Docket

Entry 11 at 1; see also Docket Entry 11-1 at 2 (listing search

results of similarly named entities in U.S. Department of

Transportation database)), “despite the fact that [the

i]nterrogatory [ ] requested Defendants ‘give the full name(s) and

addresses(es) for the owner(s)’ of the trailer” (Docket Entry 11 at

1 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Docket Entry 10-1 at 5)).

(See also id. at 1-2 (“[Another, separate i]nterrogatory [ ] asked

that[,] if the trailer was leased, that the name, address, and

telephone number be provided . . . . Again, only the name of ‘DW

Express’ was provided in Defendants’ response.”).) According to

Plaintiff, “nothing in [ ] Defendants’ production of documents to

[ ] Plaintiff supporting those [answers] included . . . information

about ‘DW Express.’” (Docket Entry 11 at 2.) Plaintiff represents

that she gained sufficient information regarding DW Express’s

identity only after one of MGM’s employees “further identified [ ]

DW Express [as an] entity in Salisbury, NC [and] as the owner of

the trailer” (Docket Entry 9 at 3), during a deposition on July 8,

2025 (see id.), and that she filed the Motion one month later (see

Docket Entry 11 at 3).

Plaintiff further contends that “[t]here is no undue delay,

bad faith, or dilatory motive on [her] part [ ], and [that] no

undue prejudice will result to [ ] Defendants from the proposed

amendment.” (Docket Entry 9 at 3). Elaborating, Plaintiff

disputes Defendants’ assertion that she knew of DW Express’s

identity “four months prior to the filing of t[he [M]otion” (Docket

Entry 10 at 2) and instead posits that “the Motion was made [ ] one

4

month after [the] deposition in which [MGM’s employee] identified

[DW Express as a] North Carolina company” (Docket Entry 11 at 3).

Moreover, Plaintiff reasons that “there can be no prejudice to [ ]

Defendant[s]” (id.), “given the recency of the information as well

as the potential for shar[ed] liability [between MGM and DW

Express]” (id.), and that denial of the Motion would force her to

proceed “against DW Express in state court while prosecuting this

action in federal court against Defendants” (id.). Maintaining

those parallel suits, in her view, “[would] be inefficient, costly,

and a waste of judicial resources[ and ] could result in

inconsistent procedural and substantive rulings . . . even on

identical issues.” (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff therefore requests

that the Court grant the Motion and “remand[ the case] to the

[North Carolina] Superior Court of Cabarrus County” (id. at 4).

DISCUSSION

“When a plaintiff seeks to join a nondiverse defendant after

the case has been removed, the district court’s analysis begins

with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (‘Section 1447(e)’) . . . .” =Mayes v.

Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 1999).° “Section 1447 □□□

provides the district court with two options: ‘If after removal the

3 “[T]his decision is not controlled by a [Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure (the ‘Rules’)] Rule 19 analysis.” Mayes, 198 F.3d

at 462; see also Gum_v. General Elec. Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 412, 414

(S.D. W. Va. 1998) (“[VJirtually every court to address the joinder

question since the enactment of § 1447(e) views the statute as

signaling a departure from a strict Rule 19 analysis ... .”

(italics and internal quotation marks omitted)).

plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would

destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or

permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.’” Graves

v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:14cv398, 2015 WL 12911637, at *1

(M.D.N.C. June 11, 2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e)). “These

are the only two options for a district court faced with a

post-removal attempt to join a nondiverse defendant; the statute

does not allow a district court to retain jurisdiction once it

permits a nondiverse defendant to be joined in the case.” Mayes,

198 F.3d at 462.4

Section 1447(e) gives “flexible, broad discretion[]” to the

district court, id. at 463 (internal quotation marks omitted),

which may “consider all relevant factors, including: (1) the extent

to which the purpose of the amendment is to defeat federal

jurisdiction, (2) whether the plaintiff has been dilatory in asking

for amendment, (3) whether the plaintiff will be significantly

injured if amendment is not allowed, and (4) any other factors

bearing on the equities,” id. at 462 (internal quotation marks

omitted) (parentheticals added). “The district court, with input

4 “State law claims can be brought in federal court [or

removed from state court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441,] if diversity

jurisdiction exists pursuant to [Section] 1332(a), which requires

complete diversity of parties in a case. Complete diversity of

parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the

same State as any party on the other side.” Williams v. Glover,

Civ. Action No. 6:10-1591, 2010 WL 6872297, at *4 n.7 (D.S.C. July

12, 2010), recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 2682170 (D.S.C. July 11,

2011), aff’d, 461 F. App’x 315 (4th Cir. 2012).

6

from the parties, should balance the equities in deciding whether

the plaintiff should be permitted to join a nondiverse defendant.”

Id. at 463.

As to the first factor — whether the plaintiff requests

joinder to defeat federal jurisdiction — “if the defendant[] can

carry the heavy burden of proving fraudulent joinder, that fact

should be a factor — and perhaps the dispositive factor — [in] the

court[’s] consider[ation],” id. at 463.5 “[T]he absence of

fraudulent joinder[, however,] does not require acceptance of an

amendment to the complaint that would result in remand.” Copley v.

Argus Energy, LLC, Civ. Action No. 3:13-25305, 2014 WL 12692294, at

*3 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 21, 2014) (internal brackets and quotation

marks omitted). Instead, “courts often consider the chronology of

events and the timing of the plaintiff’s request . . . [ and have]

suggested caution where no attempt was made to add the nondiverse

defendant until after removal although the relevant facts . . .

were in the [plaintiff’s] possession [ ] well before suit was

filed.” Sour Grapes, LLC v. Vinum USA, Inc., No. 1:22cv203, 2023

WL 9775788, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 2023) (internal quotation

5 “Th[e fraudulent joinder] doctrine effectively permits a

district court to disregard, for jurisdictional purposes, the

citizenship of certain nondiverse defendants, assume jurisdiction

over a case, dismiss the nondiverse defendants, and thereby retain

jurisdiction,” Mayes, 198 F.3d at 461, so long as the defendant

“show[s] that the plaintiff cannot establish a claim against the

nondiverse defendant even after resolving all issues of fact and

law in the plaintiff’s favor,” id. at 464 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

7

marks and ellipses omitted). “Conversely, courts have allowed

amendments to add nondiverse defendants where the plaintiff could

not have identified all the defendants without discovery.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Defendants do not assert fraudulent joinder (see Docket

Entry 10 at 1-2), and, given “the chronology of events and the

timing of [ P]laintiff’s request,” Sour Grapes, LLC, 2023 WL

9775788, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court should

conclude that Plaintiff pursues the Motion for reasons unrelated to

defeating jurisdiction. Most notably, the record indicates that

“Plaintiff[] seek[s] the amendment based upon new information

uncovered during discovery,” Plemmons v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., Civ. Action No. 7:12-495, 2012 WL 13008154, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug.

14, 2012), namely, that “DW Express[] owned the trailer” involved

in the collision (Docket Entry 9 at 2 (internal quotation marks

omitted)) and that the relevant “DW Express entity [exists] in

Salisbury, NC” (id. at 3). Those facts “were [not] in

[Plaintiff’s] possession [ ] well before [she filed] suit,” Sour

Grapes, LLC, 2023 WL 9775788, at *4 (internal quotation marks

omitted), as the Original Complaint alleged “[u]pon information and

belief[ that ] MGM owned the [ ] tractor trailer” (Docket Entry 2

at 2; see also Docket Entry 9 at 1 (“[Plaintiff] believed [MGM] to

be the owner of the tractor-trailer . . . .”). “This new

information is a legitimate reason for Plaintiff now to seek

8

amendment of [the O]riginal [C]omplaint and joinder of [DW Express]

as a co-defendant.” Boatwright v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., No.

4:09cv1268, 2009 WL 4808586, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 9, 2009).

Additionally (as documented in the Background section), the Amended

Complaint “claims that [MGM] and [DW Express] were joint venturers

and therefore share liability. This is a[nother] valid reason to

join [DW Express] as a defendant.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.

Johns Manville Int’l, Inc., No. 1:00cv673, 2001 WL 823604, at *3

(M.D.N.C. July 3, 2001) (parenthetical omitted).

As to the second factor, “[t]o determine whether a plaintiff

has been dilatory in asking for amendment, courts consider [the]

plaintiff[’]s actions between the time [she became] aware of

information potentially subjecting the [nondiverse] defendant to

liability and the filing of a motion to amend.” Curry v. Omni

Hotel Mgmt. Corp., Civ. Action No. 9:21-3587, 2022 WL 4481506, at

*3 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2022); see also 4 Suns Ranch, LLC v. Buckeye

Oil Producing Co., No. 5:12cv110, 2014 WL 1017907, at *5 (N.D. W.

Va. Mar. 17, 2014) (“[D]ilatory is defined as ‘tending to cause

delay or to gain time or to put off a decision.’” (internal

brackets omitted) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 522 (9th ed.

2009))). Pertinent actions include, among others, the plaintiff’s

“diligent efforts to determine the identities of the proper

[defendants] to name in an amended complaint as well as significant

difficulty encountered in obtaining from [d]efendant[s] th[ose]

9

identities,” Williams v. Walmart Stores E., LP, No. 5:20cv1090,

2021 WL 1616174, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 2021).

Defendants contend that, “four months prior to the filing of

th[e M]otion . . . , [P]laintiff knew the identity of the trailer

owner.” (Docket Entry 10 at 2; see also Docket Entry 9 at 5

(certifying the Motion’s filing on August 8, 2025); Docket Entry 10

at 2 (“[O]n March 27, 2025, [ ] MGM served its discovery responses,

confirming that the owner of the trailer was DW Express.”).) For

her part, Plaintiff insists that the March 27 discovery responses

“did not disclose sufficient information for Plaintiff to identify

which one of five possible ‘DW Express’ entities was the correct

one” (Docket Entry 11 at 1), and that Defendants’ subsequent

document productions did not fully identify DW Express (see id. at

2), as well as that “[i]t was not until [the July 8] deposition

that [MGM’s employee] confirmed that the relevant ‘DW Express’

entity leasing the trailer to [ ] MGM was the one in Salisbury,

North Carolina” (id.), after which Plaintiff filed the Motion on

August 8 (see id. at 3).

Upon “stud[ying P]laintiff’s road to the eventual discovery of

[DW Express, the Court should] find[ Plaintiff] was reasonably

prompt.” Estate of King v. McElroy Coal Co., No. 5:16cv1, 2016 WL

1241506, at *5 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 24, 2016). To begin, after

alleging “[u]pon information and belief[ that ] MGM owned the [ ]

tractor trailer” (Docket Entry 2 at 2), Plaintiff requested

10

information regarding its ownership, including “the full name(s)

and addresses(es) of the owner(s)” (Docket Entry 10-1 at 5) “and

the name, address, and telephone number” of any lessor (id.). When

Defendants (who do not contend otherwise (see Docket Entry 10 at 1-

2)) failed to provide identifying information beyond DW Express’s

name, “Plaintiff then researched the matter,” Correa v. Caliber

Bodyworks of Va., LLC, No. 3:23cv578, 2024 WL 37207, at *5 (E.D.

Va. Jan. 3, 2024). (See Docket Entry 11-1 at 2 (indicating

electronic records search resulting in list of multiple “DW

Express” entities).) When review of Defendants’ document

productions failed to reveal clarifying details (see Docket Entry

11 at 2), Plaintiff used the July 8 deposition “to further

investigate [DW Express’s] involvement [and identity],” Boykin v.

Spectrum Lubricants Corp., No. 3:13cv417, 2014 WL 12631658, at *5

(D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2014). (See Docket Entry 9-1 at 6.) As such,

“Defendant[s’] assertion that Plaintiff has been dilatory in

amending the [Original] Complaint to add [an entity] Defendant[s]

previously [failed] to identify [fully] is without merit. The

Court [should] find[] that [ ] Plaintiff has not been dilatory in

asking for amendment.” Williams, 2021 WL 1616174, at *3 (emphasis

added) .°

6 Moreover, for analogous amendment requests governed by the

Rules (rather than Section 1447(e)), “[d]elay alone . . . should

not suffice as reason for denial,” Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,

615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). That includes delays similar to

(continued...)

11

As to the third factor — whether a plaintiff will be

significantly injured if the court denies the request for amendment

— “courts consider the extent to which the proposed claims are

intertwined with claims already in the case and whether a plaintiff

could maintain a separate suit against the proposed nondiverse

defendant.” Burnette v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 1:19cv320, 2020

WL 3066641, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 22, 2020), recommendation adopted,

2020 WL 3063919 (W.D.N.C. June 8, 2020).

While Defendants insist on the existence of “no evidence of

prejudice to [ P]laintiff” (Docket Entry 10 at 2), Plaintiff

forecasts that a separate, state court suit against DW Express

would prove “inefficient, costly, and . . . could result in

inconsistent procedural and substantive rulings . . . even on

identical issues” (Docket Entry 11 at 3-4). To that latter point,

“Plaintiff’s proposed claims against [DW Express] arise out of the

6(...continued)

the “four[-]month[]” period (Docket Entry 10 at 2) of which

Defendants complain. See, e.g., Ransom v. Aspen Med. Prods., LLC,

No. 2:23cv407, 2024 WL 6468950, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2024)

(“Although [plaintiff] filed for leave to amend . . . [over three

months] after [learning of the relevant information,] . . .

discovery has not been completed. . . . [Defendant] thus has ample

time to address the few paragraphs added to the complaint which

should not have been a surprise in any event.”); Allegis Grp., Inc.

v. Bero, 689 F. Supp. 3d 81, 105 (D. Md. 2023) (“I do not consider

the [nearly three-month] delay so egregious as to justify denial of

leave to amend.”), aff’d, No. 23-2023, 2025 WL 2141298 (4th Cir.

July 29, 2025); GSS Props., Inc. v. Kendale Shopping Ctr., Inc.,

119 F.R.D. 379, 380-81 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (finding delay of “only

three months” not “extreme” but denying amendment due to “blatant

delay, in combination with the showing of plaintiff’s bad faith in

submitting the amendment”).

12

same set of facts on which Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant

are based,” Modlin v. United Grocery Outlet, Inc., No. 1:21cvl19,

2021 WL 9816247, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2021), recommendation

adopted in part, 2021 WL 3721446 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2021); the

Amended Complaint’s factual allegations differ negligibly from

those in the Original Complaint, save new allegations regarding DW

Express’s ownership of the trailer (see Docket Entry 9-2 at 4) and

partial control over Defendant Miguel’s actions (see id.).

Similarly, the Amended Complaint’s respondeat superior claim

against MGM and DW Express (see id. at 6-7) “seeks to bring [a]

claim[] against [DW Express] under the same theor[y] of liability,”

Modlin, 2021 WL 9816247, at *7, that Plaintiff pursued in the

Original Complaint (see Docket Entry 2 at 4-5). Denial, therefore,

would significantly prejudice Plaintiff by requiring her “to

maintain litigation in multiple forums regarding the same events,”

Modlin, 2021 WL 9816247, at *7.

Fourth and finally, the Court considers “any other factors

bearing on the equities,” Mayes, 198 F.3d at 462 (internal

quotation marks omitted), including “prejudice” to the non-movant,

C.A. ex rel. Achumba v. American Honda Motor Co., No. O9cv2159,

2009 WL 4730506, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2009), and “judicial

efficiencies,” Burnette, 2020 WL 3006641, at *7.

“Whether an amendment is prejudicial [ ] often [depends on]

. . . the nature of the amendment and its timing. A common example

13

is one that raises a new legal theory that would require the

gathering and analysis of facts not already considered by the

defendant, and is offered shortly before or during

trial.” Colavita v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 3:11cv585, 2012 WL

2577086, at *3 (W.D.N.C. July 3, 2012) (internal brackets,

citation, and quotation marks omitted). Here, nothing in the

record indicates that adding DW Express and remanding the case

would prejudice Defendants.7 “[T]he case has not developed fully.

While some discovery was conducted prior to [and shortly after]

removal, no scheduling order has been issued or trial date set,”

Modlin, 2021 WL 9816247, at *7, nor has any of the parties

submitted a “motion[] for summary judgment . . . [to] suggest[]

that [they] view the case as ripe for dispositive resolution,”

Mansaray v. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., Civ. Action No. 17-98, 2017 WL

2778824, at *5 (D. Md. June 26, 2017). (See Docket Entry 11 at 1-

3; Docket Entries dated July 3, 2025, to present.)

Moreover, even if Defendants had raised concerns regarding

unfair prejudice, “[i]t would have been foreseeable to

7 Of course, “[D]efendants have a fundamental interest in

retaining a federal forum.” Woods v. AlliedBarton Sec. Servs. LLC,

Civ. No. 11-2831, 2012 WL 439694, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2012); see

also McKinney v. Board of Trs. of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d

924, 927 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[B]y providing for removal in the first

place, Congress seems to believe that the defendant’s right to

remove a case that could be heard in federal court is at least as

important as the plaintiff’s right to the forum of his

choice.”). But neither the record nor Defendants’ pleadings raise

concerns beyond that basic interest, which arises in every case of

this sort.

14

Defendant[s ] from the outset of this action, based on the nature

of Plaintiff[’s] lawsuit originally filed in state court and

involving only state law claims[,] that federal jurisdiction

premised on diversity might be destroyed with the addition of other

defendants.” Plemmons, 2012 WL 13008154, at *3. Therefore, “[t]he

Court [should] not [find any basis to] believe Defendant[s ] will

be unduly prejudiced by a remand to state court.” Id.

“Courts also consider issues of judicial economy . . . when

analyzing a request to add a non-diverse defendant,” Modlin, 2021

WL 9816247, at *7, including the “costs of litigating the same

accident in both federal and state court,” Martin v. Leacock, No.

1:05cv218, 2005 WL 2587940, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2005).

Invoking similar concerns (see Docket Entry 11 at 3 (“[T]wo suits

[would] . . . waste [ ] judicial resources . . . .”)), Plaintiff

adds that “[her] claims against DW Express remain unbarred by the

[applicable] statute of limitations” (id.; accord Docket Entry 9 at

3). “Though this reduces somewhat the injury to [P]laintiff[’s]

interest from a denial of joinder, the result would be the kind of

parallel litigation the Fourth Circuit has cautioned against.”

Woods v. AlliedBarton Sec. Servs. LLC, Civ. No. 11-2831, 2012 WL

439694, at *5 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2012); see also Mayes, 198 F.3d at

463 (noting “danger of parallel lawsuits in federal and state

court, which may spawn . . . inefficient use of judicial resources”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Considering the particular

15

weight courts have afforded judicial economy in this context, see,

e.g., Jolley ex rel. Ferree v. United Parcel Serv., No. 1:06cv357,

2006 WL 3531621, at *1, 2-3 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 6, 2006) (allowing

joinder despite plaintiff’s knowledge of nondiverse defendant’s

identity prior to removal and despite the motion’s purpose of

defeating jurisdiction because of, in part, “the clear waste of

federal and state judicial resources”), that concern also counsels

in favor of remand here.

“[On] balance[,] the equities [favor] . . . permitt[ing

Plaintiff] to join a nondiverse defendant.” Mayes, 198 F.3d at

463. As noted above, (i) Plaintiff brings the Motion pursuant to

new information, not to defeat jurisdiction; (ii) Plaintiff filed

the Motion reasonably promptly after fully learning of DW Express’s

identity; (iii) maintaining a parallel suit against DW Express in

state court would unnecessarily subject Plaintiff to added costs

and potentially inconsistent rulings on intertwined claims; and

(iv) granting the Motion would conserve judicial resources without

unfairly prejudicing Defendants.

CONCLUSION

All relevant factors support allowing Plaintiff’s joinder of

DW Express.

16

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion (Docket Entry 9)

be granted and the case remanded to the North Carolina Superior

Court of Cabarrus County.

This 26th day of March, 2026.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

17