Sims

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

TERRELL SIMS, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:26-cv-03029-SEM

)

STEVEN CAMBELL, )

Defendant. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 by Plaintiff Terrell Sims, an inmate at Graham Correctional

Center (“Graham”). Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Status (Doc.

9).

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s pleading for failure to state a

claim for relief, which renders moot his status request.

I. SCREENING STANDARD

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the Court

accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing

them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649

(7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721

F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

II. ALLEGED FACTS

On December 8, 2024, Plaintiff called for assistance for his

cellmate, who was having trouble breathing. Less than one minute

later, Plaintiff’s cellmate died. Plaintiff claimed that his cellmate had

earlier told Plaintiff he had six months to live. An hour later,

Plaintiff was escorted to investigative segregation. Plaintiff claims

that a mandatory mental health evaluation is required before being

transferred to restrictive housing, which did not occur. (Pl. Compl.,

Doc 1 at 5-6:1-2.)

Five days later, Plaintiff was transported to SSM Health Saint

Mary’s Hospital in Centralia, where he received a blood transfusion.

Upon his release four days later, Plaintiff returned to investigative

segregation pending the results of an autopsy on his deceased

cellmate, who Plaintiff asserted was terminally ill. Plaintiff asserts

he must receive notice and a hearing before a transfer to restrictive

housing can occur. (Id. at 6-7:3-4.)

III. ANALYSIS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must

contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This

requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in

sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that

the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level.” Bravo v.

Midland Credit Mgmt., 812 F.3d 599, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

Additionally, “[f]or a defendant to be liable under section 1983,

she must be personally responsible for the alleged deprivation of the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492,

498 (7th Cir. 2018). Despite naming Defendant Cambell, the former

Graham warden, Plaintiff does not mention Cambell again in his

pleading. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A

plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant by including the

defendant’s name in the caption.”).

To the extent Plaintiff names Defendant Cambell based on his

supervisory responsibility, this is also inadequate to impose § 1983

liability. See Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 495 (7th Cir.

1997) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be used to

impose § 1983 liability on a supervisor for the conduct of a

subordinate violating a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”); see also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting that because

vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, “a plaintiff must

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s

own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).

Plaintiff also does not have a constitutional right to a mental

health evaluation before being placed in investigative segregation.

See Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2017);

Glisson v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir. 2017)

(stating that a failure to follow departmental guidelines “in itself . . .

does not describe an Eighth Amendment violation”); see also Brown

v. Randle, 847 F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2017) (“42 U.S.C. §1983 does

not authorize federal courts to order state officials to pay damages

for violations of state law; remedies in §1983 suits are for violations

of federal law only.”).

Furthermore, “inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding

transfer to discretionary segregation—that is, segregation imposed

for administrative, protective, or investigative purposes.” Townsend

v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that plaintiff

did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding

placement in administrative segregation pending an investigation

because this type of segregation is considered “discretionary

segregation,” which inmates have “no liberty interest avoiding,” and

also because plaintiff’s placement in segregation “neither was

indefinite, nor affected his parole eligibility”); see also Thomas v.

Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Both temporary

confinement and investigative status have been determined to be

discretionary segregation, and do not implicate a liberty interest.”).

Consequently, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed. However, if

Plaintiff believes he can revise his pleading to state a cause of

action, he may file a Motion for Leave to File an Amended

Complaint. If Plaintiff elects to file an amended pleading, it must be

attached to his motion for leave.

The Court does not accept piecemeal amendments. Plaintiff’s

claims must stand independently without reference to his initial

filing and contain all claims against all defendants. Plaintiff must

specify the constitutional violation, when it occurred, and the

Defendant or Defendants personally involved. See Gentry v.

Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (“To recover damages

under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was

personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional

right.”).

The Court informs Plaintiff that any attempt to join unrelated

claims and defendants is not permitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).

In other words, multiple claims against a single defendant are

allowed, but “Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined

with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507

F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s Motion for Status (Doc. 9) is moot with the entry of

the Court’s Merit Review Order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Status (Doc. 9) is MOOT.

2) Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED for failure to

state a federal claim on which relief may be granted as

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

3) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file an Amended

Complaint within thirty days of the entry of this order and

in compliance with the Court’s guidance. If Plaintiff does

not submit an amendment on or before the thirty-day

deadline, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s case without

prejudice.

ENTERED April 24, 2026.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

_______________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE