Kathryne Tillett v. State of Indiana

FILED

Apr 24 2026, 1:07 pm

CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 25S-CR-231

Kathryne Tillett,

Appellant-Defendant

–v–

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

Argued: December 4, 2025 | Decided: April 24, 2026

Appeal from the Floyd Circuit Court

No. 22C01-2202-F1-212

The Honorable Justin B. Brown, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals

No. 24A-CR-01413

Opinion by Justice Massa

Chief Justice Rush and Justices Slaughter and Molter concur.

Justice Goff concurs in parts II and III and dissents in part I with

separate opinion.

Massa, Justice.

A state statute sets a deadline for filing a notice of insanity as a defense

in a criminal case. A court may, however, upon a showing of good cause,

allow a defendant to file a late notice.

The appellant in this case asks the Court to find the trial court abused

its discretion by denying her belated insanity defense request. As she

failed to provide good cause for her extensive delay, we decline to do so.

We also reject her arguments that the evidence presented was unreliable

and inadmissible under the Protected Person Statute and that her sentence

is inappropriate in light of the nature of the crime and character of the

offender. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

Kathryne Tillett was charged with two counts of child molesting for

alleged conduct with her two young children E.W. and I.B. In January

2022, then seven-year-old E.W. approached her first-grade teacher and

asked her to write a note to her mother, Tillett. E.W. said, “I need you to

tell my mom to quit hurting me.” Tr. Vol. III at 105–06. When asked what

she meant, E.W. stated that “she hurts me down there.” Id. at 107. E.W.

then explained “she puts her finger inside of me and makes me bleed.” Id.

Her teacher was aware that E.W. had a younger sister, who was three

years old at the time, so she asked whether her mother did the same thing

to I.B. E.W. responded that Tillett “touches her too, but she doesn’t make

her bleed.” Id. E.W. told her teacher that this was occurring on a daily

basis before the children would take a bath or shower.

Tillett was arrested and charged with two counts of child molestation

as Level 1 felonies. The trial court held a hearing and set the omnibus date

(the procedural deadline for any pretrial proceedings) for April 26, 2022.

On two occasions the trial court granted a continuance after Tillett’s

counsel said that he was awaiting the results of a psychological

evaluation.

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In February 2023, in Tillett’s related Child in Need of Services (CHINS)

case, Dr. Amanda Pfeffer diagnosed Tillett with schizophrenia, stimulant

use disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, and a personal history of

childhood sexual abuse.

Then again, in April 2023, Dr. James Anderson filed a forensic

evaluation which concluded that Tillett had a mental illness. He observed

her engaging in behaviors typical of psychosis, in particular “she

appeared to have a difficult time sustaining attention to [his] questions, as

if distracted by internal stimuli.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 71. He

diagnosed her with “Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other

Psychotic Disorder and Methamphetamine Use Disorder.” Id. at 72. He

opined that she could understand the proceedings against her but was not

“presently capable of assisting in the preparation of her defense.” Id. at 73.

His report concluded that there was a good chance she could be restored

to competency with treatment.

However, in July 2023, a different doctor, Dr. Heather Henderson,

concluded that Tillett could assist and participate in her defense, had basic

understanding of the court proceedings, and was “clearly competent to

stand trial.” Id. at 86.

In September 2023, at a competency hearing, Tillett presented

testimony of Drs. Anderson and Henderson. Dr. Anderson stated that

Tillett had difficulty paying attention to her questions, and that she was

distracted by “internal stimuli,” which can include “voices in the head”

and “intrusive thoughts.” Id. at 46. Finding Tillett lacked the ability to

understand the proceedings and to assist in the preparation of a defense,

the trial court continued the trial date. Tillett was committed to the

Indiana Division of Mental Health and Addiction for competency

restoration services.

In January 2024, the Superintendent of the Indiana Neurodiagnostic

Institute and Advanced Treatment Center filed a letter based on a report

by Dr. Anjum Ara, concluding Tillett had gained competency and “can

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now understand the court proceedings and assist in preparing her

defense.” Id. at 108.

Based on this report, the court scheduled a final pretrial conference date

and set a jury trial for April 15, 2024. However, on April 3, 2024, just

twelve days before trial, Tillett’s counsel filed a Motion to Permit a Belated

Notice of Insanity Defense arguing that though he had concerns about her

mental state, “it was not until [Tillett] completed a psychological

evaluation through a related CHINS case[s] that the reality of her severe

mental health needs and their potential impact on this case began to take

focus” and she only “completed that psychological evaluation through a

provider selected by the [DCS] . . . on December 2, 2022, with the report

completed on February 25, 2023.” Id. at 139–40.

Tillett’s counsel also notified the court that he served as her counsel on

the CHINS cases and was “unable to have a logical, coherent conversation

with [Tillett] at any point in 2023.” Id. at 140. He stated that even following

her commitment and return to Floyd County Jail, Tillett “is still incapable

of having a meaningful, substantive conversation about the facts,

evidence, and legal issues in this case.” Id. at 140–41.

The trial court entered an order denying Tillett’s motion. The court

mentioned “the lack of evidence presented regarding [Tillett’s] mental

health history and diagnoses,” “the extremely belated timing of the

request,” “the absence of an acceptable explanation for the timing,” and

“the risks of [Tillett] again decompensating while in custody.” Id. at 202.

A jury found Tillett guilty of Level 1 felony molest of both children. At

sentencing, the caseworker testified that during a clinical interview and

assessment in Tillett’s CHINS case, Tillett was also diagnosed with

schizoaffective disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and “other

stimulant use disorder in remission.” Tr. Vol. VI at 16. The court

sentenced Tillett to forty years for each offense to be served consecutively

for an aggregate sentence of eighty years.

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In a split decision, a majority of the Court of Appeals reversed and

remanded, finding the trial court abused its discretion in denying Tillett’s

motion to permit the belated notice of insanity defense. Tillett v. State, 255

N.E.3d 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Chief Judge Altice dissented, finding no

abuse of discretion and no showing of good cause. Id. at 1241 (Altice, C.J.,

dissenting). The State sought transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating

the Court of Appeal’s decision. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision to deny a belated motion to assert an

insanity defense for an abuse of discretion. Zamani v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1130,

1135, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its

discretion only if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the

facts and circumstances before it. Nicolson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1096, 1099

(Ind. 2012).

Discussion and Decision

I. Tillett Made No Showing of Good Cause for her

Delayed Insanity Defense

Tillett argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her

belated request to assert an insanity defense. Under Indiana Code Section

35-36-2-1, a defendant in a felony case must file a notice of intent to assert

an insanity defense no later than 20 days before the omnibus date, or 10

days before the omnibus date for misdemeanor charges. “However, in the

interest of justice and upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit

the filing to be made at any time before commencement of the trial.” Id.

(Emphasis added).

While the statute grants a trial court discretion to permit filing of a

notice of insanity defense at any time before commencement of a trial,

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“such discretion is exercisable upon a showing of good cause by a

defendant who has missed the deadline.” Eveler v. State, 524 N.E.2d 9, 11

(Ind. 1988). The statute itself does not define “good cause,” leaving the

term to judicial interpretation.

In this case, no good cause was presented. As Tillett was charged with a

felony, and the omnibus date in this case was set for April 26, 2022, by

statute she was required to file her notice of an insanity defense by April

6, 2022. Tillett sought leave to file belated notice nearly two years after the

omnibus date and twelve days before trial commenced. Having missed

the deadline, she was required to show good cause for the delay.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her belated

motion. While we agree there was good cause for her missing the original

statutory deadline, as she had not been psychologically evaluated at that

point, we find no good cause for the significant delay after she had been

seen. There were at least two doctors who testified to possible bases for

the insanity defense that were known to defendant and her counsel which

were not acted upon in reasonable time. Tillett obtained psychological

evaluations in February 2023 and April 2023, yet despite this, she still

waited until April 2024 before filing her motion. By the time the belated

motion was filed, the case had been pending for more than two years, trial

had been re-scheduled, and the first schizophrenia diagnoses were more

than a year old. Both medical reports indicated Tillett may have met the

criteria for schizophrenia as well as other psychotic disorders. These

documented reports clearly provided “defense counsel adequate time to

prepare a notice of intent to assert an insanity defense if it were desired

and merited.” Zamani, 33 N.E.3d at 1141. Yet Tillett’s motion to assert an

insanity defense was only filed two weeks prior to trial. With no

“acceptable explanation for the timing,” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at

71–72, we cannot disagree with the trial court’s findings.

The trial court rejected the defense on the grounds that the defense was

not timely filed, that there was no good cause for the extensive delay, and

that it would not be in the interest of justice to allow it. We agree.

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Therefore, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Tillett’s motion.

II. The Children’s Statements were Reliable and

Admissible

The general rule against hearsay only excludes hearsay “unless these

rules or other law provides otherwise.” Indiana Evidence Rule 802. The

Protected Person Statute provides otherwise. Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6. The

statute establishes a framework for admitting out-of-court statements by

certain people, including children under fourteen years of age, in criminal

prosecutions for certain offenses. Id. at § -(a)(2),(5),(c)(1).

A victim’s otherwise inadmissible statement “concern[ing] ... a material

element of [the] offense,” id. § - (e)(2), may be admitted for its truth

against the accused if certain conditions are satisfied: if the trial court

finds the child is unavailable to testify at trial because testifying would

cause the child serious emotional distress such that the child cannot

reasonably communicate; id. § (f)(2)(B)(i); if the trial court finds the child's

statement sufficiently reliable after a hearing attended by the child; id. §

(f)(1)(B); and if the child was available for cross-examination at the

hearing. Id. § (g).

As a predicate for admission under the Protected Person Statute, the

trial court is required to find in a hearing that “the time, content, and

circumstances of the statement . . . provide sufficient indications of

reliability.” Id. § (f)(1). This reliability determination is critical because it

serves as "the sole basis for finding the trustworthiness that permits

introduction of otherwise inadmissible hearsay.” Pierce v. State, 677 N.E.2d

39, 44 (Ind. 1997). In the end, however, “the decision to admit or exclude

evidence is within a trial court’s sound discretion and is afforded great

deference on appeal.” Carpenter v. State, 786 N.E.2d 696, 702 (Ind. 2003).

The trial court abuses its discretion by ruling in a way clearly against the

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logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or by

misinterpreting the law. Id. at 703.

In evaluating the time, content, and circumstances of the statement for

sufficient reliability, the trial court should consider:

whether there was significant opportunity for coaching, the

nature of the questioning, whether there was a motive to

fabricate, use of age[-]appropriate terminology, and spontaneity

and repetition. Lengthy and stressful interviews or examinations

preceding the statement ... may cast doubt on [its] reliability ...

sufficient to preclude its admission. There are undoubtedly

many other factors in individual cases. However, this list is non-

exhaustive and courts have emphasized “there are undoubtedly

many other factors in individual cases.”

Pierce, 677 N.E.2d at 44. (internal citations omitted). Tillett contends the

trial court abused its discretion by admitting her children’s forensic

interviews into evidence under the Protected Person Statute. More

specifically, she argues the children’s statements made during their

forensic interviews are inadmissible because they lacked sufficient indicia

of reliability under subsection 6(f)(1) (requiring “that the time, content,

and circumstances of the statement or videotape provide sufficient

indications of reliability”). We disagree.

The allegations originated with E.W., who was interviewed first by a

qualified forensic interviewer with no prior knowledge of the allegations

of abuse at issue. E.W. was interviewed less than twenty-four hours after

she had made her spontaneous disclosure to her first-grade teacher that

Tillett had been hurting her. The time between the initial disclosure and

the interview was not significant enough to create an opportunity for

coaching. The delay was not long enough to likely create the potential for

an adult to plant a story or cleanse one. Pierce, 677 N.E.2d at 45.

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Moreover, there has been no suggestion of any motive to fabricate.

Between telling her teacher about the abuse and her forensic interview at

the Child Advocacy Center, E.W. spent the night with her maternal

grandmother who was told, as part of a safety plan, not to discuss the

allegations with the children. Their maternal grandmother did not speak

to them about the matter prior to the children being interviewed. At their

interviews, both children used age-appropriate language which shows

their statements were less likely to have been fabricated or coached. Their

maternal grandmother also later testified at trial that E.W. was seven years

old and able to differentiate between a truth and a lie. While I.B. has had

some learning difficulties, during interviews she was able to demonstrate

physically how she was molested. The children’s disclosures were

consistent with the spontaneous disclosure E.W made to her teacher,

which weighs in favor of it being accurately repeated. Prior to each

interview, the children did not have any lengthy or stressful interviews on

this matter; their conversations with other adults at most lasted a few

minutes.

The testimony of E.W.’s first-grade teacher recounting her statements

and the videotape interview exhibited sufficient indications of reliability

required by the Protected Person Statute. Based on the record before us,

we do not find the trial court abused its discretion by finding the

statements of these children reliable and therefore, admissible under the

statute.

III. Tillett’s Eighty-Year Sentence is Not

Inappropriate

Tillett further argues that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the

nature of the offense and her character. She asks us to revise her sentence.

We decline to do so.

The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a

trial court’s sentencing decision. See Ind. Const. art. VII, §§ 4, 6. Indiana

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Appellate Rule 7(B) establishes a standard of review intended to guide

appellate courts when reviewing a defendant’s sentence. Cramer v. State,

240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024). Appellate Rule 7(B) empowers appellate

courts to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due

consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence

is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of

the offender.” App. R. 7(B).

Determining a sentence’s appropriateness “turns on our sense of the

culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to

others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.”

McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). We generally defer to the

trial court's decision, and our goal is to determine whether the defendant's

sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be

more appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “Our

role is to ‘leaven the outliers,’ which means we exercise our authority only

in ‘exceptional cases.’” Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 856 (Ind. 2025)

(quoting Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019)), cert. denied, 145 S.

Ct. 424 (2024). It is up to the defendant to “persuade the appellate court

that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of

review.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). And given

that sentencing “is principally a discretionary function in which the trial

court’s judgment should receive considerable deference[,]” a trial court’s

sentencing decision will generally prevail “unless overcome by

compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the

offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality)

and the defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or

persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111,

122 (Ind. 2015).

Tillett argues that the imposition of the “maximum possible sentence”

was inappropriate in light of her character. Appellant’s Brief at 25. In

considering the nature of the offense, we first look at the advisory

sentence for the crime. McHenry v. State, 152 N.E.3d 41, 46 (Ind. Ct. App.

2020). The advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected

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as appropriate for the crime committed. When a sentence deviates from

the advisory sentence, “we consider whether there is anything more or

less egregious about the offense as committed by the defendant that

distinguishes it from the typical offense accounted for by our legislature

when it set the advisory sentence.” Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564

(Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

The sentence for a Level 1 felony typically ranges from twenty to forty

years, with an advisory sentence of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-

4(b). But the maximum aggregate sentence Tillett faced for her two Level 1

felony convictions was 100 years. See id. at § -4(c) (“A person who commits

a Level 1 felony child molesting offense described in I.C. 35-42-4-3(a)(1)

shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20) and fifty (50)

years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years.”). Here, the trial

court did not impose the maximum sentence. The court imposed forty-

year, consecutive sentences, instead of fifty. Therefore, Tillett is wrong

that she received the “maximum possible sentence.” Appellant’s Brief at

25.

Tillett also contends the nature of her offenses were “not egregious in a

manner not already inherent in the nature of such child molesting

offenses.” Id. “But crimes against children are particularly contemptible.”

Pierce v. State, 949 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. 2011). Tillett here was digitally

penetrating her very young daughters every day before bathtime. E.W.

even described hearing her younger sister cry and stated Tillett “pokes

[I.B.] a lot, a lot, and a lot,” when changing her diaper. Tr. Vol. IV at 139.

E.W. also described pain and bleeding from both her vagina and anus.

Her teacher testified that on occasion, E.W. would say she was bleeding at

school after using the bathroom. Tr. Vol. III at 105. None of this would

have been revealed if E.W. did not have the courage to speak up to her

first-grade teacher and ask her to write a note to Tillett to “quit hurting

me.” Id. at 107. Tillett abused her position of trust by molesting her seven-

and three-year-old daughters. See Monroe v. State, 886 N.E.2d 578, 580 (Ind.

2008) (considering the violation of position of trust between a defendant

and a victim when weighing the nature of the offense). The abuse these

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children suffered at the hand of their own mother is abhorrent and we

cannot say it is undeserving of the aggravated and consecutive sentences

given.

As for the character of the offender, Tillett’s argument rests on her

mental health. While there is enough evidence to persuade us that Tillett

suffers from some mental illness, it is not clear that it motivated her

offenses. Tillett appears to have shown a complete lack of remorse

throughout these proceedings, she also appears to lack empathy towards

her children and even goes as far as blaming E.W. (Tillett told her

probation officer that she believes E.W. was the one inappropriately

touching her younger sister). That she is blaming her daughter for the

conduct shows she understands the charges against her, and we do not

find that Tillett’s mental health issues significantly lessen her moral

culpability. Moreover, Tillett has not provided evidence to support a

virtuous character or established a nexus between her mental health issues

and the crimes committed.

Tillett has failed to demonstrate that her sentence is inappropriate in

light of the specific factors considered by the trial court that distinguished

her offenses from those committed by defendants in other cases. In short,

her sentence is not inappropriate and should not be revised.

Conclusion

Tillett has shown no good cause for her belated insanity defense motion

and no error in the admission of evidence or inappropriateness of her

sentence. We therefore affirm the trial court.

Rush, C.J., and Slaughter and Molter, JJ., concur.

Goff, J., concurs in parts II and III and dissents in part I with

separate opinion.

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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Matthew J. McGovern

Fishers, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Indiana Attorney General

George P. Sherman

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

Kelly A. Loy

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

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Goff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I take no issue with, and thus concur in, the Court’s holdings in Parts II

and III of its opinion. However, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s

holding that Tillett failed to show good cause to justify her belated

insanity defense.

When a defendant charged with a felony seeks to raise an insanity

defense, she must first file a notice of intent with the trial court no later

than twenty days before the omnibus date. Ind. Code § 35-36-2-1. Despite

this filing deadline, the trial court may, “in the interest of justice and upon

a showing of good cause,” permit the filing “at any time” before trial

begins. Id. Although Tillett showed “good cause” for having missed the

“original statutory deadline,” due to the lack of psychological evaluations

“at that point” in the proceedings, the Court finds “no good cause for the

significant delay after” her evaluations in February and April 2023. Ante, at

6. Both evaluations, the Court explains, indicate that “Tillett may have met

the criteria for schizophrenia as well as other psychotic disorders” and

both were filed more than a year before defense counsel filed a belated

notice, ostensibly giving him ample time to evaluate Tillett. Id.

But even if defense counsel had known of Tillett’s mental-health

problems early on, he had little opportunity to thoroughly gauge whether

she suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time she committed the

offenses, as the insanity statute requires. See I.C. § 35-41-3-6(a) (specifying

that a “person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct

if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the

wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense”) (emphasis added).

The competency proceedings, which consumed nearly a year of the case,

focused not on Tillett’s “mental soundness at the time of the events” for

which she stood charged, but, rather, on her “mental condition at the time

of trial.” See 12 Robert Lowell Miller, Jr., Ind. Practice § 601.104, at 760 (4th

ed. 2016) (emphasis added); see also Grecco v. State, 240 Ind. 584, 589 (1960)

(stressing that “a person affected with insanity or mental illness” may still

act as a “competent witness depending entirely on his or her mental

condition as determined by the court at the time of trial”) (emphasis

added). And the State itself, at the hearing on Tillett’s belated motion,

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acknowledged that the trial court had “not appointed evaluators to look

specifically at her ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct at

the time of the offense.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 68.

To be sure, defense counsel admitted to having developed a “concrete

understanding” of Tillett’s mental condition when—more than a year

before trial—DCS issued its psychological evaluation diagnosing Tillett

with schizophrenia in the related CHINS case. Id. at 65. But even then,

defense counsel was “unable to have a logical, coherent conversation with

[Tillett] at any point in 2023.” App. Vol. 2, p. 140. And even after she was

deemed to have regained competency in late January 2024, Tillett was, as

defense counsel stressed in his motion, “still incapable of having a

meaningful, substantive conversation” about the case, effectively

preventing him from “adequately and properly determin[ing] the

appropriateness of seeking a modification of [Tillett’s] plea.” Id. at 140–41.

Indeed, until “steps were taken to address whether [Tillett] could even

stand trial from a basic competency standpoint,” the motion argued,

defense counsel lacked the ability to determine “whether an insanity

defense was appropriate” or whether it was a “misread caused by

untreated symptoms in need of intervention.” Id. at 141.

The State itself acknowledges that Tillett may “not have [had] enough

information to consider pursuing an insanity defense until the final

competency report was filed in January 2024.” Pet. to Trans. at 15–16. And

while the State insists that defense counsel had “multiple opportunities

after competency restoration to address the issue with Tillett and the trial

court well in advance of the trial date,” id. at 16, the fact is that defense

counsel had made clear his intentions of raising an insanity defense several

weeks prior to filing the belated notice, App. Vol 2, p. 201 (acknowledging

that counsel “had made the State and the Court aware” of the pending

motion “sometime [in] the weeks prior” to filing). So, it’s not as if the trial

court was exercising its discretion to eliminate the “element of surprise,”

as the State suggests. See Reply in Support of Pet. to Trans. at 5.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Tillett’s mental health was

clearly an issue from the outset of her prosecution. As such, the “assertion

of an insanity defense could not have come as a shock to the State,” and

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any prejudice it may have sustained would have been minimal, especially

given the children’s exemption from testifying as witnesses under the

Protected Persons Statute. See Zamani v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1130, 1144 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2015) (Robb, J., dissenting), trans. denied.

For the reasons above, I concur in the Court’s holdings in Parts II and

III of its opinion but dissent from the Court’s holding in Part I that Tillett

failed to show good cause to justify her belated insanity defense.

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