State of Tennessee v. John Collin Kilpatrick

04/24/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

February 11, 2026 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOHN COLLIN KILPATRICK

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lewis County

No. 2023-CR-23 Michael E. Spitzer, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2024-01649-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, John Collin Kilpatrick, was convicted by a Lewis County Circuit Court

jury of possession of drug paraphernalia and two counts of possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of eight years at

85% release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the State violated Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding exculpatory information of addresses on

file with the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (“Board” or “Board of Probation

and Parole”); that the trial court erred by refusing to conduct an in camera review of the

Board’s records that were in the possession of the State, by denying the Defendant’s request

for a special jury instruction on possession, and by denying the Defendant’s motion for a

mistrial based on the State’s discovery violations; and that the cumulative effect of the

errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments

of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L.

EASTER and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

David Christensen, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellant, John Collin Kilpatrick.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy E. Wilber, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; and Hans Schwendimann, District Attorney General, for the appellee,

State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

This case arises out of the September 1, 2022 discovery by Lewis County Sheriff’s

Department (“LCSD”) officers of shotguns, methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia

inside a mobile home located at 151 Longbranch Road in Hohenwald. The sheriff’s

department officers, accompanied by Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”)

Probation and Parole Officer Fredericka Gildersleeve and her partner, were there to

participate in a home visit and to serve an arrest warrant on William Atkinson, a probationer

under Officer Gildersleeve’s supervision.

When the officers arrived, the Defendant was sitting on the front porch of the home

and Mr. Atkinson was fleeing into the woods. Officer Gildersleeve recognized the

Defendant, who was a parolee under her supervision and on her list for a home visit later

that day at 109 Yates Road in Hohenwald. When she asked the Defendant what he was

doing at the home, the Defendant told her that he had signed a lease on the home and had

been living there for about a week and that Mr. Atkinson had moved out three weeks earlier

but came back to pack up some belongings. After receiving permission from her supervisor

to conduct her home visit of the Defendant at the Longbranch Road address, Officer

Gildersleeve and the other officers followed the Defendant inside, where the Defendant sat

in a living room recliner.

Officers found a loaded sawed-off shotgun beside the front door, an unloaded

shotgun underneath a living room bench, two plastic bags of methamphetamine in a

bedroom, a set of scales underneath a mattress in that bedroom, and assorted drug

paraphernalia at different locations throughout the home. The Defendant was arrested and

subsequently charged by the Lewis County Grand Jury in a five-count indictment with

possession of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver, two counts of possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a

dangerous felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

The State presented four witnesses at the Defendant’s February 22-23, 2024 jury

trial: TDOC Officer Gildersleeve; LCSD Deputy Chrisitan Pelkey, who participated in the

search; LCSD Investigator Brad Lawson, who participated in the search and interviewed

the Defendant; and Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Forensic Scientist

Isabella Sanders, the chemist who analyzed the drugs found in the home. The State also

introduced Deputy Pelkey and Investigator Lawson’s body camera video recordings, which

corroborated witness testimony that the Defendant told the officers that he had lived at the

home for about a week, that Mr. Atkinson had moved out approximately three weeks earlier

but came back that day to get some of his belongings, and that he was aware of the firearms

in the home but that they did not belong to him. The Defendant elected not to testify and

did not present any witnesses in his defense. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury

convicted the Defendant of two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and

possession of drug paraphernalia as charged in the indictment. The jury acquitted the

Defendant of the remaining counts of the indictment.

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ANALYSIS

I. Brady Violation

As his first issue, the Defendant contends that the State committed a Brady violation

by willfully failing to comply with the trial court’s orders to produce the Board of Probation

and Parole’s records of the addresses it had on file for the Defendant and Mr. Atkinson on

September 1, 2022. The Defendant argues that the State’s failure to provide documentation

that his address on file on September 1 was not 151 Longbranch Road, and that Mr.

Atkinson’s address on file was 151 Longbranch Road, constituted a Brady violation

because the information was within the control of the State and was material to his defense.

The State argues that the State did not violate Brady because the Defendant had the

information he requested, and, further, that the Defendant cannot show that the information

was material. We agree with the State.

To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that: (1) he or she requested

the information (unless the evidence is obviously exculpatory, in which case the State is

obligated to release such evidence regardless of whether or not it was requested); (2) the

State suppressed the information; (3) the information was favorable to the defendant; and

(4) the information was material. State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 594 (Tenn. 2014)

(citing Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tenn. 2001)). Also, the defendant must show

that the material that was allegedly withheld was not already in his possession or could not

have been obtained by other means. Anderson v. State, 726 S.W.3d 170, 181 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 2025); State v. Marshall, 845 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Tenn. Crim. App.1992); State v.

Caldwell, 656 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tenn. Crim. App.1983); Banks v. State, 556 S.W.2d 88,

90 (Tenn. Crim. App.1977); Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 344 (6th Cir. 1998). Evidence is

favorable if it “provides some significant aid to the defendant’s case, whether it furnishes

corroboration of the defendant’s story, calls into question a material, although not

indispensable, element of the prosecution’s version of the events, or challenges the

credibility of a key prosecution witness.” Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 56-57 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, “[e]vidence is deemed to be material when

there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 58 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “All of the Brady requirements must be met in order to show a

Brady violation.” Watson v. State, No. W2019-00489-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 7786957,

at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2020), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 23, 2021).

Whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon a Brady violation “presents

a mixed question of law and fact.” Cauthern v. State, 145 S.W.3d 571, 599 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 2004).

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The lower court’s findings of fact, such as whether the defendant

requested the information or whether the state withheld the information, are

reviewed on appeal de novo with a presumption that the findings are correct

unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. The lower court’s conclusions

of law, however, such as whether the information was favorable or material,

are reviewed under a purely de novo standard with no presumption of

correctness.

Id.

This issue must be viewed in the context of what occurred at a pretrial hearing on

the Defendant’s motion for a reduction in bond, at pretrial hearings on the Defendant’s

discovery motions, at a jury-out conference toward the end of the trial, and at the hearing

on the Defendant’s motion for new trial.

Bond Reduction Hearing

Officer Gildersleeve, called as a witness by the Defendant at the October 13, 2023

bond reduction hearing, testified that she had been the Defendant’s parole officer from the

Defendant’s release from prison until the Defendant’s arrest in the instant case. She stated

that she performed a home visit of the Defendant at his aunt’s home in Hohenwald, which

was the Defendant’s initial address upon his release on parole. She could not recall the

address. On August 10, 2022, she performed a home visit of the Defendant at 109 Yates

Road in Hohenwald. No drugs or guns were found during the August 10 visit at 109 Yates

Road. However, drug paraphernalia and drug residue were found during that visit, and the

Defendant was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia as a result.

Officer Gildersleeve testified that her purpose in going to 151 Longbranch Road on

September 1, 2022, was to conduct a home visit of Mr. Atkinson, who was another one of

the offenders she supervised. She said that 151 Longbranch Road was Mr. Atkinson’s

registered address with her at that time, and that the Defendant’s registered address with

her at that time was 109 Yates Road. In fact, she had the Defendant on her list for a home

visit later that day at 109 Yates Road. She was, therefore, surprised to see the Defendant

at 151 Longbranch Road. She stated that she asked the Defendant what he was doing there,

and the Defendant replied that he had moved to the residence and been living there for

about a week. When she asked why the Defendant had not informed her of his change of

address, the Defendant responded that he had just signed the lease and moved in a week

ago.

-4-

Officer Gildersleeve testified that she asked the Defendant if they could “go ahead

and do his home visit” and he agreed.1 The Defendant opened the front door and led the

way inside, followed by Officer Gildersleeve, Officer Gildersleeve’s partner, Deputy

Pelkey, and Investigator Lawson. Upon entering the home, the Defendant sat in a recliner

on the left, and the officers looked to their right and immediately saw the loaded shotgun

beside the door. The Defendant acknowledged that he was aware of the existence of both

shotguns that were found in the home. The Defendant also acknowledged that he knew

that the shotgun beside the door was loaded. The Defendant denied ownership of the guns.

Officer Gildersleeve testified that the methamphetamine was found in the first

bedroom, which was the bedroom that Mr. Atkinson used when she conducted home visits

of Mr. Atkinson at the home. She said she had no idea which bedroom the Defendant

claimed but that the Defendant told her that the first bedroom was not his bedroom.2

Officer Gildersleeve recalled that a woman may have been inside when she and the other

officers entered the home. However, to her understanding, the Defendant was the only

individual living in the home on September 1, 2022.

On cross-examination, Officer Gildersleeve testified that the Defendant’s mother

came to 151 Longbranch Road during the September 1, 2022 search and informed Officer

Gildersleeve that the Defendant had moved into the home a week earlier.

The Defendant’s mother, Dianne Carroll, testified that she lived at 157 Longbranch

Road, and that 151 Longbranch Road was “right up the hill” behind her. She said she

talked to Officer Gildersleeve during the September 1, 2022 search of 151 Longbranch

Road but denied having told her that the Defendant was living at 151 Longbranch Road.

She could not remember her entire conversation with Officer Gildersleeve but recalled

having suggested where the officers could find Mr. Atkinson and giving Officer

Gildersleeve a note to that effect.

On cross-examination, Ms. Carroll testified that on September 1, 2022, the

Defendant lived on “Yates Road with a girl.” Ms. Carroll acknowledged that she had

felony drug convictions and a felony conviction for writing a worthless check, and that she

had been charged with shoplifting. On redirect examination, she testified that, at the time

the Defendant was being questioned, he had just used drugs and was vomiting and, in her

opinion, “was out of his mind.”

1

At trial, Officer Gildersleeve testified that she first sought and received permission from her

supervisor to conduct the Defendant’s home visit at the Longbranch Road address.

2

Investigator Lawson testified at trial that the Defendant identified the middle bedroom, not the

first bedroom, as his bedroom.

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LCSD Investigator Brad Lawson testified that the Defendant acknowledged on

September 1, 2022, that he had been living at 151 Longbranch Road for approximately a

week, that he was aware of the two firearms in the home, and that he knew he was not

supposed to be in possession of firearms. Investigator Lawson stated that during his

transport to the jail, the Defendant told Investigator Lawson a story about the previous

tenant, Mr. Atkinson, having “bought bunk dope (indiscernible) that was rock salt.”

Pretrial Hearings on Defendant’s Discovery Motions

At a December 5, 2023 pretrial hearing, the prosecutor expressed his opinion that

the information the Defendant requested about the address the Board of Probation and

Parole had on file for the Defendant on September 1, 2022, “was satisfied during the bond

hearing” by Officer Gildersleeve’s testimony. The prosecutor also informed the trial court

that he had “tendered everything [he had] at [the] moment” and would immediately turn

over any further documents he received.

Defense counsel responded that his understanding was that there was in the State’s

possession “documentation” from the Board of Probation and Parole that the Defendant

was not living at 151 Longbranch Road on September 1, and it was that documentation that

he was seeking. The trial court asked Officer Gildersleeve whether she had documents that

indicated the Defendant’s address, and Officer Gildersleeve replied: “I have been directed

by my supervisor that (indiscernible due to location across the courtroom).” The trial court

then stated that it would enter an order directing Officer Gildersleeve to tender that

information to defense counsel and to the prosecutor.

At a February 13, 2024 pretrial hearing, defense counsel informed the trial court

that the only form he had received from the Board was “a form that says [the Defendant’s]

last known address was 109 Yates Road.” Defense counsel said that there was no

information about the Defendant’s address at the time he was placed on parole, how the

Defendant’s address was updated, or a list of the Defendant’s updated addresses. Defense

counsel argued that “there ha[d] to be a more specific form for that from the [B]oard of

[P]robation and [P]arole about a parolee’s on-file address.”

The prosecutor informed the trial court that Officer Gildersleeve had provided an

initial response, which was unsatisfactory to defense counsel. The prosecutor stated that

he then reached out to Officer Gildersleeve and her supervisor and “they sent an additional

four or five pages of records that they could locate which do[] have an address of 109 Yates

Road in Hohenwald as pertaining to [the Defendant].” The prosecutor said that the

additional pages with the reference to 109 Yates Road consisted of Officer Gildersleeve’s

report dated August 22, 2022, approximately nine days before the incident in the instant

case. The prosecutor stated that Officer Gildersleeve and her supervisor did not “know

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what else they c[ould] provide in this case” and pointed out that there was body camera

video from the date of the incident in which the Defendant could be heard informing the

officers that he had been living at the Longbranch Road home for about a week.

Defense counsel asserted that there should be an intake form with the date that the

Defendant moved into the Yates Road address, arguing that the Board could not state that

109 Yates Road was the Defendant’s “last known address” without having “something to

establish” their prior knowledge of 109 Yates Road as the Defendant’s address.

The trial court stated that, to be clear, it would issue a new order to reflect that

defense counsel was “entitled to the intake form that indicates the address of [the

Defendant] and any subsequent form that shows a change of address.” The prosecutor

responded that he had specifically asked the Board for that information, and it was unable

“to produce this mythical document.” The trial court inquired of an unidentified probation

officer present in the courtroom if the Board had an intake form with the Defendant’s

address. The probation officer replied that there was a questionnaire but not an intake form.

The trial court then stated that its order would reflect that defense counsel was entitled to

the intake form or the questionnaire, if it indicated an address.

Defense counsel’s second discovery request was for the same information with

respect to Mr. Atkinson. The prosecutor pointed out that the Defendant’s discovery motion

requested all the Board’s records relating to Mr. Atkinson’s residence on file, the history

of the Board’s home visits of Mr. Atkinson at the Longbranch Road address, and the details

of previous searches at the residence during the period of Mr. Atkinson’s occupancy. The

trial court replied that it would order production of only “any intake or questionnaire form

that lists [the Longbranch Road home] as his address[.]”

Based on the trial court’s ruling with respect to the record of Mr. Atkinson’s address,

the prosecutor requested a continuance to allow him time to have Mr. Atkinson,

incarcerated in a prison in West Tennessee, brought in as a witness. The trial court denied

the request. The prosecutor argued that admitting a document that showed the Longbranch

Road home as Mr. Atkinson’s address at the time of the incident would “point the finger

at someone [that the prosecutor did not] have the opportunity to get here.” The trial court

noted that the prosecutor already knew that Mr. Atkinson’s registered address on

September 1, 2022, was 151 Longbranch Road and that the information would be elicited

by defense counsel on cross-examination. The prosecutor protested that such information,

introduced in an exhibit, would be “a game changer[,]” because “now the jury, Judge, is

going to have an exhibit, potentially, that shows somebody else’s address on there as of

September 1st and I’m going to need that person to testify that they were not living there.”

The trial court again denied the request for a continuance, stating, “Well, you just need to

bring them in. Denied.”

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Jury-Out Trial Conference on Discovery Issues

The technical record contains the trial court’s February 21, 2024 order granting in

part and denying in part the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole’s February 21, 2024

Motion to Quash the Defendant’s Subpoena Duces Tecum for Officer Gildersleeve to bring

her computer with her to trial. In the order, the trial court references a hearing held that

day. The transcript of that hearing is not included in the record on appeal. However, in

the order, the trial court rejected the Board’s argument that the information sought through

the computer could have been provided in discovery, noting that Officer Gildersleeve

testified at the hearing that the documents “simply did not exist and could only be found in

the [E] T[OMIS] network.” The trial court, therefore, ordered that Officer Gildersleeve, if

called as a trial witness, was “required to bring her work computer” but that “the only

matter to which [she] shall be required to testify to, based on her computer information, is

the current address listed on her computer for [the Defendant] and a third party, who is not

on trial.”

In the jury-out conference that followed the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial based

on the State’s discovery violations, the trial court expressed its displeasure in Officer

Gildersleeve’s not having printed out and produced the page from the Defendant’s E

TOMIS records that showed the Defendant’s address on file, stating:

[S]he indicated to me today because I asked her, do you mean to tell

me, because I had that in my order when I . . . I mentioned it to the AG[’]s

office, do you mean to tell me that your probation and parole officers in the

field cannot push a single button and print a document, because one of the

arguments . . . from [Officer Gildersleeve], was I don’t have a document that

shows the address. In fact, she did have a document in it that showed an

address if she just pressed print. And that’s all she had to do, and it was my

understanding until today that’s she couldn’t print it for some reason off the

[E] TOMIS system. She [] can print a page. She should have done it on day

one. And AG’s office shouldn’t have to get involved in it.

The prosecutor stated that it was his understanding that printing from E TOMIS was

“essentially just a screen shot” from the computer and not “any kind of official document.”

The trial court responded that that was all that defense counsel “wanted from day one . . .

[something t]hat he could trace back to an official document so that when she got on the

stand, he could cross examine her about it.” The trial court noted, however, that defense

counsel did not ask Officer Gildersleeve for the information when she was on the witness

stand. The trial court concluded, therefore, that “it didn’t really matter and the issue was

worked out.”

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Hearing on Defendant’s Motion for New Trial

At the hearing on the Defendant’s motion for a new trial, Officer Gildersleeve

testified that she forwarded to her district director the trial court’s order that the

Defendant’s address on file be turned over to the defense, the subpoenas she received, and

“everything that [she] had in [her] file” on the Defendant. Her district director, in turn,

forwarded the information to the TDOC attorneys for their approval as to which documents

she could submit. Officer Gildersleeve stated that she printed off “[w]hat they told [her]

to submit” and filed it with the court. She later forwarded the same documents to the

prosecutor. When asked if the ten to twelve pages that defense counsel received was

everything that was in her file, she replied that she thought her file contained more than

twelve pages. She did not recall having submitted any documentation with respect to Mr.

Atkinson and testified that she had only recently received a subpoena for Mr. Atkinson’s

information.

When questioned why the only information about the Defendant’s address in the

documents turned over to the defense was the August 22, 2022, report of the Defendant’s

technical violation, she replied:

Oh, you - - okay. So the Yates Road, that would have been - -okay.

So in this file, that address wouldn’t be in the file because, at that point, I

submitted - - when he gave me the change of address to the Yates Road, I put

that information in our system which is E TOMIS. So it wouldn’t be any

documentation in his file with that Yates address. Now, as far as his 150 - -

151 Long[b]ranch, that date - - that contact note should have been in the file

for September 1st when we did the - - when we did the home visit. So in that

contact note, it would have said that we changed his - - he changed his

address on that date. But as far as that address being on file in his case file,

it wouldn’t be there because that’s not the contact information he gave when

he first was on parole, when he was paroled in - -

Officer Gildersleeve explained that there was no record of an offender’s current

address in an offender’s physical file:

A. It is in E TOMIS. It’s not in his physical file. So when an offender

comes to me and reports to me, when they report their change of address

either in person or on the phone, the only thing that I do - - I go into our

system, which would be TOMIS, E TOMIS, I put in there the change of

address, the code and then I change it in our system to that address. As far

as a paper trail being created, it’s no paper trail for that.

-9-

Q. Right, but it’s in E TOMIS.

A. Yes, it would have been in - - the contact note would be in there. Now,

as far as when it is changed in our system, there’s not a track record to show

when addresses are changed, the dates on it. You just go in. You put the

address in on that date that he tells me that he changed his address.

Officer Gildersleeve testified that there was “not even a history of the [Defendant’s]

addresses” in E TOMIS, but just her contact note stating that the Defendant reported a new

address on a certain date, along with the date that she entered the contact note. When she

stated that she could print out from E TOMIS the contact note she entered when the

Defendant changed his address to 109 Yates, defense counsel responded: “Okay. And

Judge, that’s what we requested and that’s what the Court ordered. And I personally never

received that.”

During Officer Gildersleeve’s cross-examination testimony, the prosecutor

introduced two collective exhibits: the additional discovery documents the prosecutor

forwarded to defense counsel on February 5, 2024, and the Defendant and Mr. Atkinson’s

respective questionnaires, which the prosecutor attached to a February 16, 2024 email to

defense counsel. Officer Gildersleeve testified that the Defendant reported in his

questionnaire that his address in October 2024 was 110 Ford Street in Hohenwald.3 She

agreed that, at some point, she entered a new address for the Defendant in the E TOMIS

system, in effect erasing or overriding the previous Ford Street address. She further agreed

that E TOMIS did not keep a record of an offender’s address on a specific date and that she

could not, therefore, have pulled up the Defendant’s address as of a specific date or time.

Nor could she simply “push a button” to generate and print everything in an offender’s E

TOMIS file. She could, however, “go in and print individual stuff[.]” She testified that E

TOMIS was a “faulty” system that was “difficult and frustrating” to use, and that there

were times when it would not “even save all contact notes.”

Officer Gildersleeve testified that the Defendant’s address on file on September 1,

2022, “that [they] knew of [,]” was 109 Yates Road and agreed that she testified to that fact

at both the bond hearing and at trial. She stated that, in addition to the subpoenas for

documents, she received a subpoena for her computer. She said she had her laptop with

her at trial, and that defense counsel never asked her to look up anything in E TOMIS. She

agreed, however, that there was nothing she “could have done . . . to generate a document

showing [the Defendant’s] address on file as of September 1st, 2022.”

3

Officer Gildersleeve either misspoke or misread the Defendant’s handwriting. The actual date

on the questionnaire is October 2021.

- 10 -

On redirect and recross examination, Officer Gildersleeve testified that, although

she could not produce a document showing the Defendant’s address on September 1, 2022,

she could have printed from E TOMIS and produced “the contact note of [the Defendant]

calling [her] or in person changing his address to the 109 Yates [Road.]” She said that the

contact notes she entered into E TOMIS were not in “the address portion of E TOMIS” and

were not official documents that were placed in an offender’s physical file, and that she

did not print out contact notes unless needed.

Upon questioning by the trial court, Officer Gildersleeve testified that the contact

note she entered after the Defendant’s September 1, 2022, arrest “basically explain[ed] . .

. the events that happened [that day]” and that the Defendant “provided a new address [to

her] on that date of 151 Long Branch [sic] Road.”

On September 5, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying the Defendant’s

motion for new trial/judgment of acquittal. In addressing the Defendant’s claim of a Brady

violation, the trial court noted, among other things: the Defendant’s unequivocal statement

to Officer Gildersleeve on September 1, 2022, that he had moved into the Longbranch Road

home; Officer Gildersleeve’s testimony that the Defendant’s last known address with her

was Yates Road, that she had no record of the Defendant’s changes in address in her

physical file but could access her contact notes in E TOMIS in which she recorded the

Defendant’s reported changes of address, and that she could not produce any document

that provided the Defendant’s address on a specified date, other than the Defendant’s

address on the date of his arrest; and defense counsel’s failure to ask Officer Gildersleeve

to access her E TOMIS contact notes from her computer during his cross-examination at

trial.

As the trial court noted, Officer Gildersleeve testified at both the bond hearing and

at trial that the Defendant’s address on file with her on September 1, 2022, was 109 Yates

Road. The defense, therefore, had knowledge from the time of the bond hearing that the

Defendant’s address on file with the Board on September 1, 2022, was the Yates Road

residence. As for documentary evidence of the Defendant’s address with the Board, we

note that Officer Gildersleeve’s August 22, 2022 parole violation report with the

Defendant’s “Last Known Address” listed at the bottom as 109 Yates Road, which was

provided to the defense on February 5, 2024, includes the following sentence: “On or about

08/10/2022, Probation/Parole Officers along with local law enforcement conducted a home

compliance check at the parolee’s reported address on file.” Thus, in addition to Officer

Gildersleeve’s testimony that the Defendant’s address on file with her was 109 Yates Road,

the defense had documentation that the Defendant’s address on file with the Board as of

August 22, 2022, was the Yates Road address.

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As for documentation of the Defendant’s address on file with the Board on the

specific date of the incident, Officer Gildersleeve explained at the hearing on the motion

for new trial that neither the Defendant’s physical file nor his electronic file in E TOMIS

contained a record of the Defendant’s address as of a specific date and time, and that she

could not, therefore, provide documentation of the Defendant’s address on file as of

September 1, 2022. She could, however, print out and provide the contact note she entered

at the time the Defendant reported his move to the Yates Road address. However, she had

her laptop with her at trial, and defense counsel never asked her to access that information.

Based on the record, the Defendant cannot show that he did not already possess the

evidence he sought or that the State withheld the evidence from him.

Moreover, the Defendant cannot show that the information was material. To be

material, “the nondisclosure of evidence must be so serious that it creates a reasonable

probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” State

v. Thomas, 687 S.W.3d 223, 254 (Tenn. 2024) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). “[T]he omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record.” State v.

Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tenn. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In support of his contention that the evidence was material, the Defendant cites the

prosecutor’s characterization of any potential exhibit showing Mr. Atkinson’s address on

file with the Board on September 1, 2022, as 151 Longbranch Road as “a game changer,”

arguing that the prosecutor “himself stated that the addresses would be proof to the jury

that [the Defendant] lived at 109 Yates Road and not 151 Longbranch Road.”

In our view, the prosecutor’s choice of the term “game changer” was hyperbole used

to support his motion for a continuance. However, regardless of the opinions of respective

counsel, the exclusion of an exhibit or exhibits showing that the Defendant’s address on

file with the Board on September 1, 2022, was 109 Yates Road, and that Mr. Atkinson’s

address on file with the Board on that same date was 151 Longbranch Road, was not so

serious as to create a reasonable probability that the evidence introduced at trial would have

produced a different verdict. See Thomas, 687 S.W.3d at 254. On this point, we note that,

according to Officer Gildersleeve’s testimony at the motion for new trial, she entered a

contact note into E TOMIS following the Defendant’s arrest that showed he reported his

change of address to 151 Longbranch Road that day. The officer’s testimony suggests that

any documentation the Board could have produced showing the Defendant’s address on

the date of the incident would have reflected 151 Longbranch Road rather than 109 Yates

Road.

Regardless of which address the Board had on file for the Defendant on that day,

the jurors heard Officer Gildersleeve’s testimony that she expected to find the Defendant

at 109 Yates Road on September 1, 2022. The jurors also saw the body camera footage in

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which the Defendant informed the officers that he had moved to 151 Longbranch Road

about a week earlier. This information had been known by the defense since the bond

hearing and was exploited by the defense at trial. The defense also had access to the body

camera footage. Furthermore, the jury returned a verdict that was indicative that they

accepted the argument of the defense that the drugs found in the home were Mr. Atkinson’s

and not the Defendant’s. We, therefore, conclude that the Defendant has not established a

Brady violation.

II. In Camera Review of Board’s Records

The Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for an

in camera review of the Board’s records. The State argues that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in denying the motion because the Defendant has failed to show that such a

review would have provided him with exculpatory information. We agree with the State.

On February 20, 2024, two days before trial, the Defendant filed a motion for in

camera inspection of the Board’s records based on the State’s failure to “satisfy the orders

of the Court” that the State provide the Defendant’s and Mr. Atkinson’s addresses on file

with the Board at the time of the Defendant’s arrest. The Defendant asserted that there was

“clearly a discovery dispute regarding the court-order[ed] Board of Probation and Parole

Records,” and requested that the trial court conduct “an in camera review of the parole files

for both [the Defendant] and Mr. Attkisson (sic) to determine if there is evidence the State

breached its duties under either Rule 16 or Brady.” The trial court denied the motion in an

order entered nunc pro tunc on February 20, 2024, which states: “After consideration of

the defense’s request, the Court directed defense counsel to subpoena the computer of the

probation and parole officer for review & use at trial[.]”

In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the United States Supreme Court

upheld the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s remand order in a case in which the trial court,

without having examined the entire file, refused to order disclosure of a protective service

agency’s confidential investigative file pertaining to allegations of child abuse. Id. at 58.

The Ritchie Court concluded that the defendant was “entitled to have the CYS file reviewed

by the trial court to determine whether it contains information that probably would have

changed the outcome of his trial.” Id. The Court noted, however, that the defendant could

“not require the trial court to search through the CYS file without first establishing a basis

for his claim that it contains material evidence.” Id., at n.15 (citing United States v.

Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (“He must at least make some plausible

showing of how their testimony would have been both material and favorable to his

defense.”)).

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We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion.

The Defendant argues that, because the State failed to provide the Board’s addresses on

file of the Defendant and Mr. Atkinson, the trial court should have granted his motion “to

determine what the District Attorney would not disclose.” However, as the State points

out, the Defendant failed to show how an in camera review of the Board’s records would

have provided him with any exculpatory evidence that he did not already possess.

III. Special Jury Instruction on Possession

The Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for a

special jury instruction on possession. The State argues that the Defendant has waived

consideration of this issue by his failure to provide any argument or citations to the record.

We agree with the State. The argument section of the Defendant’s brief contains nothing

other than a citation to an unpublished case and an assertion that the trial court erred in

denying his requested special jury instruction. A defendant who fails to make an argument

on an issue or appropriate citations to the record waives the issue on appellate review. See

Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7); Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). We, therefore, conclude that the

Defendant has waived this issue on appeal.

IV. Motion for Mistrial

The Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his “motion for a

mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct for repeated discovery violations.” During

Investigator Lawson’s direct examination, the prosecutor attempted to admit an

incriminating “chirp” or jail text message sent by the Defendant on September 1, 2022,

which was not provided to the defense until the Saturday before trial. In an offer of proof,

Investigator Lawson testified that he read the text when it was first sent but did not think

anything about it until it recently came back up during trial preparation.

The trial court had initially ruled the text message admissible but changed its ruling

after the offer of proof when it became clear that the prosecutor had access to the “chirp”

or “CPC” system that recorded jail text messages and that it was the prosecutor who had

brought the text message to Investigator Lawson’s attention. Defense counsel moved for

a mistrial, arguing that the case was “a total mess” due to the “multiple discovery violations

that have been documented on the record.” In support, defense counsel cited the

prosecutor’s having led the trial court to believe that the chirp evidence came from

Investigator Lawson, as well as the State’s failure to provide the address information he

sought in repeated discovery motions. The trial court responded: “[Defense counsel], I

asked you earlier if you wanted to continue the case based on [R]ule 16 issues that you

were raising, and you said, no.” Later, the trial court cautioned defense counsel to “be

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cautious about derogatory comments towards what potentially would be unlawful acts that

the State[’]s committed.”

The next day, the trial court issued the following ruling:

I wanted to note on the record that yesterday we concluded with a very

dramatic presentation by [defense counsel] concerning that this was a

mistrial case and in light of that, I reviewed all the evidence that came in and

note for the record that I don’t think there was a single objection to evidence

that was not granted to [defense counsel] and I cannot find any prejudice in

the case at this point or anything that was v[io]lative of the rules, Rule 16 or

otherwise, and the evidence that has come in appears to be fair and just based

on knowledge of both parties.

The Defendant asserts that the above ruling effectively denied him the right to a fair

trial.

The decision to grant a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court,

and this court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent clear abuse

appearing on the face of the record. See State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 147 (Tenn. 1998)

(citing State v. Adkins, 786 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tenn. 1990)). The burden of establishing the

necessity for mistrial lies with the party seeking it. State v. Williams, 929 S.W.2d 385, 388

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). “Generally a mistrial will be declared in a criminal case only

when there is a ‘manifest necessity’ requiring such action by the trial judge.” State v.

Millbrooks, 819 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (quoting Arnold v. State, 563

S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977)). A manifest necessity exists when there is “no

feasible alternative to halting the proceedings.” State v. Knight, 616 S.W.2d 593, 596

(Tenn. 1981).

We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in declining to declare a

mistrial. The trial court ruled the jail text message inadmissible, and there is nothing in the

record to show that anything occurred to necessitate a mistrial or to prevent the Defendant

from receiving a fair trial.

V. Cumulative Error

Lastly, the Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the numerous errors

prevented him from receiving a fair trial. “The cumulative error doctrine is a judicial

recognition that there may be multiple errors committed in trial proceedings, each of which

in isolation constitutes mere harmless error, but which when aggregated, have a cumulative

effect on the proceedings so great as to require reversal in order to preserve a defendant’s

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right to a fair trial.” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 76-77 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted).

The cumulative error doctrine only applies when there has been more than one error

committed during the trial proceedings. Id. at 77. We conclude that the Defendant is not

entitled to relief under the doctrine of cumulative error.

CONCLUSION

Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

s/ JOHN W. CAMPBELL

JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JUDGE

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