Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

WESTERN DIVISION

No. 5:23-CV-743-BO

SHEILA LEE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

V. ) ORDER

)

OFFICER MOLLY O’HARA, in her )

individual capacity, OFFICER RICHARD _ )

J. RODRIGUEZ, in his individual capacity, )

OFFICER DON BELL, in his individual )

capacity, and KRISTA ZENTNER, in her _)

individual capacity, )

)

Defendants. )

This cause comes before the Court on defendants’ motion for summary judgment

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has responded, defendants

have replied, and the motion is ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, defendants’

motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action in December 2023 alleging claims arising from her

encounter with City of Fayetteville police officers on December 25, 2020. [DE 1]. Plaintiff filed

an amended complaint on March 5, 2024. [DE 24]. By order entered June 20, 2024, the Court

dismissed several of plaintiff's claims and defendants. [DE 57].' Remaining at this stage for

disposition are plaintiff's claims against Officer Molly O’Hara, Officer Richard Rodriguez,

Officer Don Bell, and Krista Zentner.

'This action was originally assigned to United States District Judge Louise Wood Flanagan and

reassigned to the undersigned on November 14, 2025. [DE 83].

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. See [DE 67]; [DE 77];

Local Civil Rule 56.1(a). Plaintiff was involved in a disturbance with the residents of 404 Rodie

Avenue in Fayetteville, North Carolina on the evening of December 25, 2020. The residents of

404 Rodie Avenue called the police due to plaintiff's behavior. Defendants Officer O’ Hara and

Officer Rodriguez were dispatched to the scene. Officer O’ Hara and Officer Rodriguez arrived to

discover plaintiff standing beside a parked vehicle in front of 404 Rodie Avenue and several

people yelling at her. Plaintiff told Officer O’ Hara and Officer Rodriguez that she was looking

for someone named George, that she believed George had robbed her home, and that the

residents of 404 Rodie Avenue had threated plaintiff with a knife and a hammer. Officer O° Hara

asked plaintiff to leave the scene and plaintiff got into her vehicle and drove away.

Because Officer O’Hara and Officer Rodriguez had not been told plaintiff's name during

the investigation, Officer Rodriguez ran plaintiffs license plate number through his computer

DMV database. Plaintiff's license plate did not match the year, make, and model of plaintiff's

vehicle and Officer Rodriguez elected to conduct a traffic stop of plaintiff's vehicle to investigate

further. Officer Rodriguez began to follow plaintiff while activating his blue lights and siren.

Although plaintiff disputes that she ignored Officer Rodriguez's blue lights and siren, Officer

Rodriguez’s dashboard camera reflects that plaintiff continued to drive for several blocks while

Officer Rodriguez was behind her with blue lights activated and using his siren. See [DE 75]

(Rodriguez dash cam video :30 — 2:00).

Plaintiff stopped and exited her vehicle in front of 216 Faison Avenue and Officer

Rodriguez exited his patrol vehicle to make contact with plaintiff. Plaintiff was standing by her

vehicle door dancing and singing to music as Officer Rodriguez approached. Officer Rodriguez

explained to plaintiff that the traffic stop was related to a fictitious tag on plaintiff's vehicle.

During their initial exchange, plaintiff told Officer Rodriguez that she did not live at 216 Faison

Avenue and that she did not have her driver's license, she refused to tell Officer Rodriguez her

name, and she was generally uncooperative and sarcastic. Officer Rodriguez informed plaintiff

that he would put her in handcuffs based on her failure to stop when he tried to pull her vehicle

over and that he would go ahead and arrest her; Officer O’Hara, who had arrived on scene,

approached and told plaintiff she could either give them her name or be arrested for “RDO” and

fictitious tags. See [DE 75] Rodriguez (2) BWC at 4:20 — 4:45. Plaintiff then stated “That’s not

an arrest,” and disputed whether she could be arrested for having a fictitious tag. /d. at 4:43 —

4:46. Plaintiff was instructed by Officer O'Hara to put her hands behind her back. [DE 75]

O’Hara (2) at 1:38 — 1:40.

Officer Rodriguez and Officer O'Hara secured one handcuff on plaintiff's right wrist

while plaintiff held up her cell phone with the other hand and called to a bystander to come and

get her phone. /d. at 1:58 — 2:15. Officers Rodriguez and O’Hara attempted to secure the

handcuffs on plaintiff's other wrist; both officers instructed plaintiff to stop resisting and plaintiff

stated that she was not resisting, that her hands were behind her back, that if the officers would

let go of her hand she would put it in the front, and that she had had shoulder surgery which

prevented her hands from going behind her back. Rodriguez (2) BWC at 5:23 — 5:55. Officer

Rodriguez informed plaintiff that they would not handcuff her in the front but that they could use

“double cuffs.” O’ Hara (2) at 3:40 — 3:46. Plaintiff then sat down in the front seat of her car,

grabbed the seatbelt with her free hand, and refused to exit her car. Officer Rodriguez called for

backup.

> According to defendants, “double cuffs” refers to two handcuffs joined together to make a

longer set of handcuffs. See [DE 69] at 4.

While waiting for backup to arrive, Officer Rodriguez went to the passenger side of

plaintiff's vehicle to attempt to remove plaintiff's arm from the seat. Officer Rodriguez contends

that plaintiff attempted to bite him, but plaintiff denies this assertion. Officers Don Bell, Krista

Zentner, and Kevin Rodriguez arrived at the scene; plaintiff was still seated in the front driver's

seat of her vehicle and refusing to leave the vehicle or provide her hands to be handcuffed.

Plaintiff also had her seatbelt wrapped around her arm and was grabbing her seat. The officers

were eventually able to get plaintiff into double handcuffs in front of her body.

The officers requested that plaintiff exit her vehicle multiple times but plaintiff refused.

Plaintiff was then physically removed from her vehicle and placed on the ground outside the

front driver's side door. Officer Kevin Rodriguez removed plaintiff from her vehicle while

Officer O’ Hara held plaintiff's arm. While she was being removed, plaintiff's handcuff caught in

the seatbelt. Officer Zentner approached with a knife to cut the seatbelt and contends that

plaintiff attempted to grab the knife. Plaintiff disputes that she reached for the knife. Plaintiff's

seatbelt was cut and plaintiff's handcuff was freed. Defendants contend that plaintiff bit the

seatbelt and that it cut her mouth as it was stretched to its farthest point while plaintiff was being

removed to the ground. Plaintiff disputes that she placed her seatbelt in her mouth and contends

that one of the officers punched her in the mouth while she was being pulled from the vehicle.

Plaintiff's double handcuffs were removed and leg shackles were used to secure

plaintiff's hands behind her back in order to relieve pressure on her shoulders. Plaintiff was

asked if she wanted to get off the ground where it was cold, and plaintiff responded that the

officers had put her there and that she wanted to see their sergeant. See O’Hara (2) at 9:33 —

9:40. While on the ground in restraints, plaintiff spit blood out of her mouth — plaintiff contends

that she did not intentionally spit on anyone, but Officer Bell contends that plaintiff spit on him.

Plaintiff was placed in a spit mask to prevent her from spitting on any of the officers.

Paramedics were called by the officers to address any injuries plaintiff may have

sustained to her mouth. Plaintiff was placed in the recovery position until the ambulance arrived.

Once the paramedics arrived, plaintiff resisted the medical personnel and screamed that she

thought the paramedics intended to kill her. Plaintiff was ultimately transported to the hospital.

Plaintiff did not receive any treatment for a shoulder injury, imaging of her wrist and ankle

revealed no fractures or other injuries, and plaintiff remained at the hospital for several days

receiving treatment for suspected hallucinations and delusions.

Following the incident, officers appeared before a Cumberland County Magistrate who

determined there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff for resisting, delaying, and obstructing an

officer and assault on a law enforcement officer. Plaintiff was also issued a citation for having a

fictitious tag.

DISCUSSION

A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless there are no genuine issues

of material fact for trial and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If that burden has been met,

the non-moving party must then come forward and establish the specific material facts in dispute

to survive summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

588 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial, a trial court

views the evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence”

supporting the nonmoving party’s position is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary

judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). “A dispute is genuine if a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. A fact is material if it might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718

F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Speculative or

conclusory allegations will not suffice. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645,

649 (4th Cir. 2002).

Defendants seek entry of summary judgment in their favor on plaintiff's remaining

claims for relief: a Fourth Amendment unlawful detention and false arrest claim brought under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, state law claims for false arrest/imprisonment and malicious prosecution, a §

1983 Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment excessive

force claim, and state law claims for assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and

gross negligence. Plaintiff has failed to respond to defendants’ arguments as to her Fourth

Amendment unlawful detention and false arrest claim and as to her state law claims for false

arrest/imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Plaintiff has therefore conceded that summary judgment on these claims is appropriate. See, e.g.,

Feldman v. L. Enf’t Assocs. Corp., 955 F. Supp. 2d 528, 536 (E.D.N.C. 2013).

Defendants have raised the defense of qualified immunity as to plaintiff's claims for use

of excessive force in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Qualified

immunity shields government officials from liability for statutory or constitutional violations so

long as they can reasonably believe that their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Harlow vy. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A court employs a two-step procedure for

determining whether qualified immunity applies “that asks first whether a constitutional

violation occurred and second whether the right violated was clearly established.” Melgar v.

Greene, 593 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2010). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986). Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two

prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances

in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). When a court’s

decision on one step is dispositive, it need not reach the other. See Raub v. Campbell, 785 F.3d

876, 881 (4th Cir. 2015).

Where qualified immunity has been raised, viewing the facts and drawing the reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff generally means adopting the plaintiff's

version of the facts. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378: see also Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir.

2008). A court “dof[es] not make credibility determinations in resolving the first prong of the

[qualified immunity] analysis.” Wilson v. Prince George's Cty., Maryland, 893 F.3d 213, 220

(4th Cir. 2018). However, a court need not adopt plaintiff's version of a fact when that fact is

discredited by a videotape of undisputed authenticity. “When opposing parties tell two different

stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could

believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

A clearly established right requires existing precedent which places “the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (noting

that a case on point is not required). “Clearly established means that, at the time of the officer’s

conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what

he is doing is unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (internal

quotations and citation omitted). In making this determination, a court must identify the specific

rights the plaintiff alleges were violated at a high level of particularity. /d. A court considers both

rights that have been specifically adjudicated as well as ‘those manifestly included within more

general applications of the core constitutional principles invoked.’ Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of

Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Additionally, the right need not be

defined “in accordance with the very actions in question.” Tarashuk v. Givens, 53 F.4th 154, 164

(4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up, citation omitted). The determination of whether a right is clearly

established is a legal question always answerable at summary judgment. Pritchett v. Alford, 973

F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1992).

A. Fourth Amendment excessive force

Law enforcement officers violate an individual's Fourth Amendment rights when they

effect a seizure using excessive force. Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 476 (4th Cir. 2006). “/A//

claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of

an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard[.]* Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395

(1989) (emphasis in original). This standard is objective, and thus without regard to the officer’s

subjective intention or motivation. Schultz, 455 F.3d at 477.

A court does consider, however, the facts and circumstances confronting the officer, and

it must focus its attention on the moment the force was employed. Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d

524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Specific factors to be considered are the severity of

the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat, and whether the suspect is

actively resisting or attempting to flee. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Whether the officer’s conduct

was reasonable is a question of law to be decided after determining “the relevant set of facts and

draw[ing] all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable by the record.”

Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8 (emphasis omitted).

Plaintiff identifies three uses of allegedly excessive force in violation of the Fourth

Amendment in her opposition memorandum: attempting to handcuff plaintiff behind her back,

plaintiff's removal from her vehicle, and striking or punching plaintiff in the mouth. Defendants

argue that, at the time of this incident, a reasonable police officer would have believed that he

had probable cause to arrest plaintiff and that he could use standard law enforcement techniques,

such as applying handcuffs and removing plaintiff from her vehicle, to effectuate the arrest of

someone who was resisting arrest. Defendants further contend that none of the officers struck or

punched plaintiff and that her mouth was injured because she was biting her seatbelt. Plaintiff

contends that a long line of cases regarding nonviolent, misdemeanor suspects who were offering

minimal resistance to being handcuffed demonstrate that plaintiff's rights were clearly

established, and that material facts are in dispute as whether the alleged conduct occurred.

(1) Handcuffing plaintiff

Plaintiff argues first that the officers used excessive force when they spent more than

three minutes grabbing, shoving, and pulling plaintiffs arms in order to handcuff them behind

her back, despite having been told by plaintiff that her arms would not reach behind her back due

to prior shoulder surgery.

The Supreme Court has long recognized that “the right to make an arrest or investigatory

stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof

to effect it.” Giraham, 490 U.S. at 396. Whe “a standard procedure such as handcuffing ‘would

rarely constitute excessive force where the officers were justified, as here, in effecting the

underlying arrest[,]” Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 369 (4th Cir. 2002), the Fourth Circuit has

“has never held that using handcuffs is per se reasonable.” E.W. by & through T.W. v. Dolgos,

884 F.3d 172, 180 (4th Cir. 2018). A court must thus examine the circumstances to determine

whether the officer’s actions in handcuffing the plaintiff were reasonable. /d.

Here, it is undisputed, and the body camera video supports, that plaintiff was

uncooperative and refusing to comply with officer commands. Defendants were attempting to

place plaintiff in handcuffs behind her back to effectuate her arrest. The officers suggested to

plaintiff that she could be put in “double cuffs” to accommodate any shoulder limitation, but that

they would not handcuff her in the front as she preferred. “[H]andcuffing an arrestee with his

arms behind his back can constitute a constitutional violation if such handcuffing causes pain and

injury as a result of a known medical condition.” Stutzman v. Krenik, 350 F. Supp. 3d 366, 382

(D. Md. 2018). In Stutzman, the plaintiff had a physically disabling spine condition, was

cooperative with law enforcement and did not resist arrest, and screamed in pain when

handcuffed behind his back. /d. Despite the plaintiff's obvious pain due to being handcuffed, the

officers in Stutzman did not alter the position of plaintiff's handcuffs during the entire period at

issue. Id.

Here, plaintiff has proffered no evidence of any shoulder condition or injury prior to the

incident, nor has she proffered medical evidence that being handcuffed caused any injury to her

shoulder. The body camera footage supports that plaintiff did not scream in pain once

handcuffed, and it is further undisputed that plaintiff was ultimately “double cuffed” behind her

back and that defendants later used leg irons in order to relieve any strain on plaintiffs

shoulders. There is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether excessive force was used,

and defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

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(2) Removing plaintiff from her vehicle

Plaintiff next contends that Officer O’Hara used excessive force when she assisted in

pulling plaintiff out of her vehicle. First, and importantly, Officer Kevin Rodriguez, who plaintiff

admits is the officer who physically removed her from her vehicle and placed her on the ground,

is not a named defendant in this case. Taking plaintiff's version of events as true, Officer O’ Hara

was holding plaintiff's arm while plaintiff was removed from her car. The Court is unaware of

any case which would support that it was clearly established in December 2020 that holding an

arrestee’s arm while they are removed from a vehicle, even in light of all of these facts and

circumstances, amounts to a violation of the arrestee’s constitutional rights.

As plaintiff correctly argues, [s]ince at least 1994, when [the Fourth Circuit] decided

Rowland vy. Perry, 4\ F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 1994), it has been clear that serious physical force —

there, a wrestling maneuver that cracked a suspect’s knee — is constitutionally excessive when

used against an individual suspected, at most, of a minor crime, who is unarmed, and who does

not attempt to flee or physically attack the officer — even if the suspect offers passive resistance,

struggling with the officer after an initial use of force against the suspect.” Livingston v.

Kehagias, 803 F. App’x 673, 684 (4"" Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (further noting that refusing

to give up one’s hands to be handcuffed amounts to passive resistance). Plaintiff here was

suspected of only a minor crime, there is no evidence that she was armed or that any of the

officers believed her to be armed, and plaintiff did not attempt to flee. Taking plaintiff's version

of events as true, she did not attempt to bite any of the officers or take the knife from Officer

Zentner. But the record evidence simply does not support the use of serious physical force

against plaintiff. No weapons of any kind were utilized by the officers when they removed

plaintiff from the car. Compare Est. of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810

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F.3d 892, 901 (4th Cir. 2016) (excessive force where individual who had committed no crime but

refused to let go of pole in a public area was tased five times). And the body camera footage does

not show any of the officers throwing plaintiff to the ground, driving their knee into plaintiff, or

wrenching her arm. See Livingston, 803 F. App’x at 684; Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 102-03 (4th

Cir. 2015). There is thus no genuine issue of material fact as to whether a constitutional violation

occurred when plaintiff was removed from her vehicle.

Nor was the right clearly established. Here, as discussed above, there is no evidence of

serious physical force being used against plaintiff in removing her from her vehicle. In 2023, a

Western District of North Carolina court, in a case on which plaintiff relies, held that “passively

resisting misdemeanor suspects do not have a clearly established Fourth Amendment right not to

be taken to the ground during their arrest[.]” Gunn v. Padgett, No. 1:21-CV-166-MOC, 2023 WL

6307956, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 27, 2023). Accordingly, to the extent any constitutional

violation did occur while removing plaintiff from her vehicle without the use of serious physical

force, the Court determines that the right was not clearly established.

(3) Plaintiff's mouth injury

Plaintiff also alleges that she was punched in the mouth while she was being removed

from her vehicle, resulting in two teeth being knocked out; plaintiff later testified that her teeth

were loosened, not knocked out. See [DE 68-3] at The body camera video capturing

plaintiff's removal from her vehicle does not show that plaintiff was punched in the mouth in the

moments prior to plaintiff stating to the officers “you punched me.” See, e.g., [DE 75] Rodriguez

(2) 12.00 — 12:27; Zentner BWC 1:00 — 1:20. And while the video fostagge defendants contend

captures plaintiff with the seatbelt in her mouth is unclear, see also [DE 77] § 18, the medical

> The Court relies on CM/ECF pagination when citing to page numbers of documents filed with

the Court.

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records that plaintiff has provided do not support her contention that she was punched in the

mouth by one of the officers. Once at the emergency department, plaintiff denied any injury to

her teeth. See [DE 68-8] at 3. The dental record from plaintiff's visit shortly after she was

released from the hospital describes plaintiff complaining of her seatbelt having been forced

across her face causing her mouth to bleed on the night of the incident. [DE 68-10] at |. In

plaintiff's deposition testimony, plaintiff states that she was hit with someone’s fist and that due

to “all of that shaking me, pulling me, tuggling me, my teeth are no longer in the spot that they

were before.” [DE 68-3] at 44; 49-50. Plaintiff further testified that she was hit by one of the

officers, she cannot say which one, with force, but not necessarily with a fist, during the struggle

to remove her from the vehicle and further that she cannot see any of the officers hit her with

their fist on the body camera footage. /d. at 120. Accordingly, the Court finds there to be no

genuine dispute of fact as to whether plaintiff was punched in the mouth by any of the officers,

and thus, no excessive force was deployed as regards plaintiff being punched. See Judd vy.

Langford, No. 1:19-CV-I58-FDW, 2019 WL 4859061, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2019)

(accidental or negligent conduct does not support excessive force claim).

In sum, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment

excessive force claim. Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

constitutionally excessive force was used when she was handcuffed, removed from her vehicle,

or struck in the mouth. Additionally, as to her claim based on her removal from her vehicle,

plaintiff has failed to establish that the specific right she alleges was violated was clearly

established.

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B. Fourteenth Amendment excessive force

Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim fails as a matter of Jaw. This

claim is based on plaintiff being put into a spit mask once she was handcuffed and in custody.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s “Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of

excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10. Generally, only

conduct which “shocks the conscience” will support a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Parrish ex

rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004).

Defendants argue that a reasonable officer would have believed that he could use a spit

mask on a person who had spit blood on or near an officer in furtherance of officer safety.

Though plaintiff disputes Officer Bell’s statement that she spit blood on him, the body camera

video supports that plaintiff was spitting blood. See, e.g., [DE 75] Bell 2:50-3:00. Plaintiff has

cited no case which would support that it was clearly established at the time of this incident that

utilizing a spit mask on a pretrial detainee who was spitting blood shocks the conscience or

otherwise would violate the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. To the contrary, use of a

spit mask has been found not to amount to excessive force. See, e.g., Est. of May by & through

Myrick v. Naphcare, Inc., No. 1:19-CV-2440-TWT, 2022 WL 327206, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 3,

2022). Accordingly, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's Fourteenth

Amendment excessive force claim.

C. State law claims

As plaintiff has recognized, the survival of her remaining state law claims for assault and

gross negligence is tied to her federal claims. See, e.g., Rowland, 41 F.3d at 174; Thomas v.

Holly, 533 F. App’x 208, 223 (4th Cir. 2013). “In North Carolina, official immunity protects a

public official performing discretionary acts in the course of his official duties from suit in his

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individual capacity, so long as the public official acted without malice or corruption or outside

the scope of his official duties.” Thomas, 533 F. App’x at 223. Plaintiff has not proffered any

evidence which would support that any of the defendants acted with malice, corruption, or

outside the scope of his or her duties. See Caraway v. City of Pineville, 639 F. Supp. 3d 560, 587

(W.D.N.C. 2022). Defendants are entitled to public official immunity and summary judgment in

their favor on plaintiff's remaining state law claims.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment [DE

66] is GRANTED. The clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in defendants’ favor and close the

case.

SO ORDERED, this lb day of March 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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