Debra Nevins v. DCH Health Systems

USCA11 Case: 25-12124 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2026 Page: 1 of 17

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 25-12124

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

DEBRA NEVINS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DCH HEALTH SYSTEMS,

The DCH Health Care Authority,

REBECCA BOUTWELL,

COURTNEY WINGO,

FELICIA ELLISON,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 7:23-cv-01037-RDP

____________________

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

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2 Opinion of the Court 25-12124

PER CURIAM:

Debra Nevins appeals the district court’s order granting the

defendants’ motions for summary judgment on her claims for ra-

cial discrimination, retaliation, and harassment under Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a), and

42 U.S.C. § 1981. First, she argues that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment on her racial discrimination claim be-

cause she presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a

reasonable inference that she was terminated at least partly because

of her race instead of her failure to comply with the flu vaccine

policy. Second, she argues that the district court erred in granting

summary judgment on her retaliation claim because she estab-

lished that her relocation to a different workspace and appeal of

her award of unemployment benefits were retaliatory to her email

alleging discrimination or her Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) charge. Finally, she argues that the district

court erred in granting summary judgment on her harassment

claim because she demonstrated sufficiently severe or pervasive

harassment to support a claim of a hostile work environment.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo. Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752, 758 (11th Cir. 2025). In do-

ing so, we view all evidence and factual inferences reasonably

drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party. Id.

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25-12124 Opinion of the Court 3

A court may grant summary judgment “if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). There is no genuine issue of material fact

when a rational trier of fact cannot find for the non-moving party

based on the record. Id.

B. Racial Discrimination

Title VII forbids employment discrimination against any

person on the basis of their race or color. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 1981 also prohibits race discrimination in the making and

enforcement of public and private contracts, including employ-

ment contracts. Ferril v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir.

1999). Discrimination claims under § 1981 and Title VII are subject

to the same analysis. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1296 n.20 (11th

Cir. 2009). However, Title VII does not allow for individual liability.

Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006).

In evaluating claims of discrimination based on circumstan-

tial evidence, courts may use the burden-shifting evidentiary

framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973). See Ismael, 161 F.4th at 759-60, 764. Under McDonnell

Douglas, the plaintiff first may show a prima facie case by demon-

strating “(1) that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she was

subject to an adverse employment action, (3) that she was qualified

to perform the job in question, and (4) that her employer treated

‘similarly situated’ employees outside her class more favorably.”

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Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga. 918 F.3d 1213, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 2019)

(en banc) (quotation marks omitted). A comparator must be “sim-

ilarly situated in all material respects,” meaning that the plaintiff

and the comparator are “sufficiently similar, in an objective sense”

and “cannot reasonably be distinguished.” Id. at 1218, 1228 (quo-

tation marks omitted). This standard requires a case-by-case anal-

ysis, and minor differences in job functions between a plaintiff and

a comparator are not dispositive as to whether they are similarly

situated. Id. at 1227. However, a similarly situated comparator will

ordinarily have engaged in the same basic conduct as the plaintiff,

will have had the same supervisor, and will share the plaintiff’s em-

ployment or disciplinary history. Id. at 1227-28.

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “she is entitled

to a rebuttable presumption of illicit intent.” Ismael, 161 F.4th at

764. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legiti-

mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment ac-

tion. Id. at 759. If “the defendant comes forth with evidence and

successfully rebuts the presumption, ‘the McDonnell Douglas frame-

work—with its presumptions and burdens—is no longer relevant.’

It ‘simply drops out of the picture.’” Id. at 764 (citations omitted)

(quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993)).

In that case, “the court must proceed to ask whether ‘the record,

viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convinc-

ing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to

infer intentional discrimination . . . by the decisionmaker.’” Id.

(quoting Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th

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25-12124 Opinion of the Court 5

Cir. 2011)). The “convincing mosaic” is a metaphor for the sum-

mary judgment standard by which a plaintiff may overcome a mo-

tion for summary judgment by presenting circumstantial evidence

of any form that creates a triable issue of the employer’s discrimi-

natory intent. McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1335-37

(11th Cir. 2024). Evidence that an employer’s nondiscriminatory

reason is pretext for discrimination is relevant to this inquiry, but “a

plaintiff’s inability to disprove the defendant’s rationale cannot be

the sole grounds for summary judgment.” Ismael, 161 F.4th at 764.

To establish pretext, the plaintiff “must demonstrate ‘such weak-

nesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contra-

dictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action

that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of cre-

dence.’” Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1136

(11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. State of Alabama State

Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005)).

If, on the other hand, the plaintiff does not establish a prima

facie case, “the consequence is that the plaintiff must produce

enough evidence, on her own and without any helpful evidentiary

burdens or presumptions, to demonstrate a material issue of triable

fact.” Ismael, 161 F.4th at 765. In other words, “the court should

advance directly to the convincing mosaic inquiry.” Id.

A § 1981 discrimination claim requires proof that race was

the but-for cause of an adverse employment action. Ossmann v.

Meredith Corp., 82 F.4th 1007, 1014 (11th Cir. 2023). Likewise, a sin-

gle-motive theory of Title VII discrimination requires proof that

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illegal discrimination was the but-for cause of an adverse employ-

ment action. McCreight, 117 F.4th at 1330-31. On the other hand, a

mixed-motive theory of Title VII discrimination, by which a plain-

tiff alleges that a protected characteristic was a “motivating factor”

for an employment practice, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), requires proof

“that an illegal reason played a part in the decision—not that it had

a dispositive role,” McCreight, 117 F.4th at 1331. Mixed-motive and

single-motive are not distinct claim types, but instead “offer alter-

native theories of causation for proving discrimination under Title

VII.” Id. Therefore, the plaintiff need not allege a mixed-motive

theory in her complaint, but she still must raise the mixed-motive

theory for the district court to consider it at summary judgment.

Id. at 1331-32; see id. at 1333 (evaluating discrimination claim under

single-motive theory on appeal because the plaintiff only cited one

mixed-motive case to the district court and never argued to the dis-

trict court “that a mix of legitimate and illegitimate motives played

a role in her firing”). The McDonnell Douglas framework is not ap-

propriate for evaluating mixed-motive theories of discrimination at

summary judgment. Qui v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227,

1238 (11th Cir. 2016). Instead, a court must evaluate whether there

is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that a pro-

tected characteristic was a motivating factor for an adverse employ-

ment action. Id. at 1239.

As initial matters, first, the district court correctly entered

summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants as to the

Title VII claims because Title VII does not provide individual liabil-

ity, though the race discrimination claims may be considered

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against the individual defendants under § 1981. Dearth, 441 F.3d at

933. Second, though DCH argues that Nevins did not raise a

mixed-motive theory of causation to the district court to preserve

it for appeal, the district court nevertheless explained the difference

between the single-motive and mixed-motive theories of causation

that could support discrimination claims and it substantively eval-

uated whether the record showed that race played any role in any

employment decision. Though Nevins focuses her appellate argu-

ments primarily on but-for causation, she also argues that her race

was a motivating factor in her termination and reports ample

caselaw on the mixed-motive theory, so this Court may consider

whether any evidence shows that her race played any part in an

adverse employment decision for purposes of her Title VII claims.

Qui, 814 F.3d at 1239. Third, to the extent Nevins advances a

mixed-motive theory of causation as to her § 1981 claims, that is

not appropriate because § 1981 requires proof of but-for causation.

Ossmann, 82 F.4th at 1014.

Here, the district court correctly concluded that Nevins

could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination against any

of the defendants and, even if she had, the defendants rebutted the

inference of discrimination, and the record did not contain a con-

vincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence showing discrimination

played any part in her termination. T.W. was not a valid compara-

tor and was not similarly situated to Nevins in all material respects

because she applied for, and obtained, a religious exemption based

on her professed sincerely held religious belief, in line with DCH

policy. Nevins, on the other hand, only submitted a note from her

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8 Opinion of the Court 25-12124

physician that said, “Patient is exempt for religious purposes,”

without professing any particular religious belief. Indeed, Nevins

explicitly testified that she did not have a particular religious belief

that prevented her from receiving the flu vaccine and that she did

not want a “religious” note from her physician because it would be

a “lie.” Further, Nevins suggests that the district court misinter-

preted “similarly situated in all material respects,” but, because

Nevins’s allegation is that the defendants wrongly denied her med-

ical exemption requests, 1 the type of exemption request submitted

1 Nor is there any genuine dispute that the notes from Nevins’s physician failed

to satisfy the proof that the DCH policy required for an exemption. The policy

provided:

Exemption to immunization may be granted for medical con-

traindications after Employee Health receives appropriate

proof. Ex: letter from primary care physician including medical

contraindication[.]

[. . .]

If an employee requests a religious belief exemption, they

must provide this in writing to Employee Health

With respect to Nevins’s medical exemption request, her physician’s

first note merely stated that Nevins desired an exemption, and that the physi-

cian had advised her of the risks of not getting the vaccination. The note did

not satisfy the critical requirement of the policy—i.e. the doctor’s statement

that the vaccination was medically contraindicated for Nevins. The physician’s

second note was identical, adding only that Nevins had a history of Lupus, but

with no indication that the flu vaccination was contraindicated. Indeed, one of

the DCH doctors testified that the flu vaccination was not contraindicated for

a person with a history of Lupus, and there was no contrary evidence.

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by a purported comparator is necessarily material. Lewis, 918 F.3d

at 1218, 1227-28. Thus, T.W. and Nevins cannot be considered valid

comparators, and the different treatment between the two is not

circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Id.

Even if Nevins had established a prima facie case of racial

discrimination, the defendants rebutted it with evidence that DCH

terminated her for non-compliance with the vaccine policy, and

Nevins did not present any evidence showing that race played any

part in her termination. See Ismael, 161 F.4th at 764. As to whether

the defendants’ explanation is pretext, Nevins merely disagreed

with the defendants about their choice not to accept her flu vaccine

exemption, which demonstrates neither that the reason was false

nor that discrimination was the real reason. Gogel, 967 F.3d at 1136.

Nevins’s requests for medical exemption and religious exemption

were non-compliant because Lupus was not a contraindication to

the flu vaccine, and she never explained to her employer how her

religious belief prevented her from getting the vaccine.

In addition to not disputing DCH’s race-neutral reason for

her termination, the evidence does not create a triable issue of dis-

criminatory intent under either a single-motive or mixed-motive

theory. Each alleged racial incident to which Nevins points was

With respect to a religious exemption—and wholly aside from

Nevins’s testimony disavowing the same—the third note from Nevins’s phy-

sician contained a merely conclusory assertion that Nevins is exempt for reli-

gious purposes, with no attempt to satisfy the requirement that employee

seeking a religious exemption had to describe their sincerely held religious be-

liefs on DCH’s religious exemption request form.

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isolated and happened in the years prior to the vaccine policy

change. For example, Boutwell’s comments about hair burning

and the hoodie were sometime in 2019. The blackface doll incident

occurred in December 2019, almost a year before her termination.

The incidents, at most, involved Boutwell, who had no discretion

when it came to the zero-tolerance vaccine policy. Nevins’s prior

years of compliance with the policy were unrelated to the new vac-

cine policy that created new rules for compliance and created a

zero-tolerance policy. Further, the email sent months prior to her

termination only vaguely suggested racial discrimination and there

is no evidence of race factoring into DCH’s response to the email.

Additionally, the data and testimony from Human Resources

showed that race was not relevant in considering who was termi-

nated for failure to comply with the vaccine policy. Rather, every

employee who failed to comply either quit, came into compliance,

or was terminated. Nevins’s disagreement with the defendants’ de-

cision regarding her exemption request does not suggest that she

was fired for any reason other than non-compliance with the flu

vaccine policy, and does not create a triable issue as to her em-

ployer’s intent. McCreight, 117 F.4th at 1335-37.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court on this claim.

C. Retaliation

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against

any individual because she “has opposed any practice made an un-

lawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [s]he has

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made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in

an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Section 1981 also encompasses claims of retal-

iation. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008). The

same analytical framework applies to retaliation claims brought

under Title VII and § 1981. Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th

1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2023).

Like discrimination claims, retaliation claims are ordinarily

analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Ismael, 161 F.4th at 759. The prima facie case of retaliation requires

the plaintiff to show: “(i) that she engaged in a protected activity,

like filing a complaint for discrimination; (ii) that she suffered a ma-

terial adverse action; and (iii) that there was a causal connection

between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Id. If the

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and the employer rebuts it

with a nonretaliatory reason, then the court must evaluate whether

the record presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence

that would allow a jury to infer intentional retaliation, an inquiry

to which evidence of pretext is relevant. Id. at 764. If the plaintiff

does not establish a prima facie case, then the court proceeds di-

rectly to the convincing-mosaic inquiry. Id. at 765. “Whatever

form the evidence takes, ‘so long as it raises a reasonable inference’

that the employer retaliated against the employee, ‘summary judg-

ment is improper.’” Berry, 84 F.4th at 1311 (alteration adopted)

(quoting Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328).

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A material adverse action, as required to state a prima facie

case of retaliation, is an action that “well might have dissuaded a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrim-

ination.” Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 861 (11th Cir.

2020) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,

68 (2006)).

As to the causation element of the prima facie case, where

temporal proximity is the only evidence of causation, that proxim-

ity must be “very close.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d

1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden,

532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)). We have held that a gap of three months

or longer between the two events, without more, is insufficient to

infer causation. Id.

Here, the district court correctly granted summary judg-

ment on Nevins’s retaliation claim because Nevins could not estab-

lish a prima facie retaliation claim and, even if she had, the defend-

ants rebutted it and there was no circumstantial evidence of retali-

atory intent. First, her 2014 EEOC charge, which was six years be-

fore her termination, is clearly too remote to be considered. Thus,

Nevins’ April 3, 2020, email is her only relevant protected activity.

And that April 3, 2020, email only broadly alleged discrimination

and that she had been “singled out,” which is insufficient to support

a claim of retaliation based on participation in any protected inves-

tigation or proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). It is also only weak

support for a claim of retaliation based on opposing an unlawful

employment practice because it is only a conclusory assertion that

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her employer had engaged in an unlawful practice, or that her com-

plained-of treatment was in any way based on her protected char-

acteristics. Id.

Second, it is not clear whether Nevins established that she

had been subject to any material adverse action. Assuming, ar-

guendo, that she could establish that both the relocation of her

workspace and DCH’s appeal of her unemployment benefits were

materially adverse, and that the April 3, 2020, email was protected

conduct, she still did not establish any causal connection between

the email and the adverse actions. Ismael, 161 F.4th at 759. The

time gap between her email and her termination was seven

months, which is insufficient to establish causation on its own.

Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. Nevins never testified as to when her

workspace was relocated, so it cannot be established as temporally

proximate to her email, and she provided nothing more to establish

causation.

Further, though DCH correctly points out Nevins did not

explicitly classify the interference with unemployment benefits as a

material adverse action for purposes of a retaliation claim, she did

still raise it as an alleged act of harassment that took place after she

allegedly engaged in protected activity, so this Court may consider

it. Even so, Nevins cannot establish any causal connection between

the appeal and her April 3, 2020, email. Ismael, 161 F.4th at 759.

The time gap between the email and her appeal of unemployment

benefits was at least seven months, which is insufficient to establish

causation on its own. Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. Additionally,

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14 Opinion of the Court 25-12124

Nevins provided nothing more to establish causation, and DCH

withdrew its appeal. Thus, Nevins did not establish a prima facie

retaliation claim. See Ismael, 161 F.4th at 759.

Nevins also fails to establish a convincing mosaic of circum-

stantial evidence to create a triable issue as to DCH’s intent.

McCreight, 117 F.4th at 1335-37. None of the evidence Nevins con-

tends supports her claim suggests that DCH terminated her em-

ployment for any reason other than her failure to comply with the

mandatory flu vaccine policy or took any other action in retaliation

for protected activity. Even if her April 2020 email was a protected

complaint about unlawful activity, between the time she made that

complaint and her termination seven months later, she failed to

comply with a mandatory vaccine policy that resulted in the termi-

nation of any employee who failed to comply. She failed to

demonstrate that she actually did comply with that policy, that an-

yone else who failed to comply with the policy was not fired, or

that DCH found her noncompliant for any reason other than her

failing to receive the vaccine or provide a sufficient exemption to

the vaccine. And, as explained, no circumstantial evidence would

suggest a retaliatory motive behind the workspace relocation that

occurred at some unknown time. Thus, there is no evidence that

would allow a jury to infer intentional retaliation by DCH. Ismael,

161 F.4th at 764.

Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

D. Hostile Work Environment

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We apply the same standards to evaluate racially hostile

work environment claims under § 1981 and Title VII. Melton v. I-10

Truck Ctr. Inc, 166 F.4th 905, 916 (11th Cir. 2026). To establish a

racially hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must prove

that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected

to “unwelcome” harassment; (3) the harassment was “based on

[her] race”; (4) the harassment “was severe or pervasive enough to

alter the terms and conditions of [her] employment”; and (5) “the

employer is responsible for the environment.” Id. at 918 (quoting

Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1248-49 (11th Cir.

2014)).

Either severity or pervasiveness suffices to establish the

fourth element. Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d

798, 808 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Additionally, the fourth element

of the hostile-work-environment test contains both a subjective

and objective component. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238,

1246 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The employee must “subjectively

perceive” the harassment as severe or pervasive enough to change

the terms or conditions of employment, and the district court must

find that this perception was objectively reasonable. Id. (quoting

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). The objective

component is fact intensive, and in making the determination, the

following factors should be considered: “(1) the frequency of the

conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utter-

ance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the

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employee’s job performance.” Id. We examine “conduct in con-

text, not as isolated acts, and determine under the totality of the

circumstances whether the harassing conduct is sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s em-

ployment and create a hostile or abusive working environment.”

Id. An environment may be unlawfully hostile even if racial re-

marks are not directed at the employee. Melton, 166 F.4th at 918.

Here, the district court did not err in granting defendants

summary judgment on Nevins’s harassment claim because Nevins

did not establish severe or pervasive harassment or that the alleged

harassment was based on a protected trait. Nevins identified a va-

riety of incidents of purported harassment, but DCH was correct

that only three were arguably based on race—the blackface doll in-

cident and the burning hair and hoodie comments. The other three

incidents—revealing that Nevins reported a coworker for a dress

code violation, her supervisor’s remark about someone else’s

chicken order, and her supervisor monitoring her—are not based

on race and thus cannot support a claim of hostile environment.

Melton, 166 F.4th at 918.

Even if the doll incident and the two comments were racial

in nature, they were not sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the

terms of Nevins’s employment. To be clear, an unknown em-

ployee hanging a blackface doll by a noose in Nevins’s desk area—

which disputed evidence supports and is accepted for purposes of

summary judgment—is repugnant and racially hostile. However,

considering the totality of the circumstances, there is no genuine

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issue of objective severity or pervasiveness for a hostile work envi-

ronment claim. The racial incidents were only three in number

over a two-year period, two of which were comments not made in

Nevins’s presence, and none of which unreasonably interfered with

Nevins’s job performance. Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246. Further,

Boutwell took prompt remedial action by telling Nevins to throw

the doll away. Thus, Nevins has not established sufficiently severe

or pervasive harassment to support a claim of hostile work envi-

ronment.

Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is

AFFIRMED.