setting forth standard of review and stating documents available at time of opposition to summary judgment were not “newly discovered evidence” warranting reconsideration
How later courts described this case
- setting forth standard of review and stating documents available at time of opposition to summary judgment were not “newly discovered evidence” warranting reconsideration
- describing exhaustion requirements for Title VII claims
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 23 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHANNON FARAZI, No. 24-7239
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:24-cv-01133-GJL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ORACLE OF AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Grady J. Leupold, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted April 22, 2026***
Before: LEE, DESAI, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.
Shannon Farazi appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her employment action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
de novo the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012).
We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed for failure to timely exhaust Farazi’s
claims under Title VII because Farazi failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
she timely filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (providing that a charge of
discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the allegedly
unlawful practice where the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings
with a State agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice); Scott
v. Gino Morena Enters., LLC, 888 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2018) (describing
exhaustion requirements for Title VII claims).
The district court properly dismissed Farazi’s claims under the Immigration
and Nationality Act, as amended by Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
because Farazi’s charges were based on the same set of facts as her claim under
Title VII. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(b)(2) (prohibiting charges “based on the same set
of facts [as a claim] filed with the [EEOC] under title VII”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Farazi’s motion for
reconsideration because Farazi failed to show any basis for relief. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b); Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,
2 24-7239
1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and stating documents
available at time of opposition to summary judgment were not “newly discovered
evidence” warranting reconsideration).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 24-7239