Opinion

Shear Development Co. v. Cal. Coastal Com.

Court: California Supreme Court
Filed: Apr 23, 2026
Status: Published
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 40.3%

The opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

SHEAR DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION,

Defendant and Respondent.

S284378

Second Appellate District, Division Six

B319895

San Luis Obispo County Superior Court

20CV-0431

April 23, 2026

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in

which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Evans, and

Stone* concurred.

Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate

District, Division Seven, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

SHEAR DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC v. CALIFORNIA

COASTAL COMMISSION

S284378

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

In 2017, Shear Development Co., LLC (Shear), applied to

the County of San Luis Obispo (County) for a coastal

development permit to build single family homes in a developed

part of Los Osos, an unincorporated town in the County. The

County ultimately granted the permit in 2019. The California

Coastal Commission (Commission) appealed the County’s

decision to itself and denied the permit in 2020. The

Commission concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction because

the proposed development was in a sensitive coastal resource

area (SCRA) under the County’s local coastal program (LCP)

and because there was more than one principal permitted use of

the proposed development site under the County’s LCP. Shear

filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in superior

court, arguing that the Commission had no appellate

jurisdiction on either basis. The trial court denied the petition,

finding for the Commission on the SCRA issue. Shear appealed,

and the County, as amicus curiae, agreed with Shear’s positions.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

We granted review to decide the standard of review a court

should apply when determining whether the Commission’s

exercise of appellate jurisdiction over a coastal development

permit was proper and, when the Commission and a local

government offer conflicting interpretations of an LCP, whether

deference is due to either entity’s interpretation. To clarify how

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

these principles should be applied, we further decide whether

the proposed development is in an SCRA based on the LCP.

After argument, we requested supplemental briefing on the

Commission’s alternative asserted basis for jurisdiction;

namely, whether the Commission has appellate jurisdiction over

a development that is not designated as the only principal

permitted use in a county’s LCP.

We hold, first, that a court should exercise its independent

judgment in determining the Commission’s appellate

jurisdiction when that jurisdiction depends primarily on

interpretation of an LCP rather than factual matters. An LCP

is enacted law, and the independent judgment standard is well

established as the standard of review for an agency’s

interpretation of the law. Second, where two entities offer

incompatible interpretations of a law that both administer, a

court should apply the traditional Yamaha factors regarding

agency deference to each entity’s interpretation. (See Yamaha

Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th

1, 12–13 (Yamaha).) When the factors do not clearly favor either

interpretation, as here, no deference is due to either. Third, the

proposed development is not in an SCRA because the LCP does

not designate it so. The Commission relies primarily on a single

figure in the LCP, captioned “Figure 6-3” (see pt. II.E.1., post),

but this figure does not support the Commission’s reading, and

the LCP as a whole supports the opposite reading. The

Commission does not have appellate jurisdiction on this basis.

Fourth, and finally, the Commission does not have appellate

jurisdiction solely because a site has multiple principal

permitted uses. Rather, the Commission has appellate

jurisdiction when the proposed development is not designated

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

as the principal permitted use — or one of several principal

permitted uses — of the site under the local government’s LCP.

Since Shear’s proposed development is for one of several

principal permitted uses, the Commission does not have

appellate jurisdiction on this basis. Thus, we conclude that the

Commission does not have appellate jurisdiction over Shear’s

permit application and therefore reverse the judgment of the

Court of Appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The California Coastal Act

In 1972, due to “[g]rowing public consciousness of the

finite quantity and fragile nature of the coastal environment,”

California voters passed Proposition 20 (as approved by voters,

Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972)), which “created the California Coastal

Zone Conservation Commission and directed it to oversee the

orderly process of planning for the future development of the

California coastline.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California

Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 162.) The Legislature then

passed the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act) (Pub.

Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.),1 which created the current

Commission as the successor to the California Coastal Zone

Conservation Commission. (Pacific Legal Foundation, at

pp. 162–163.) The Legislature declared that the basic goals for

the coastal zone were, among other things, to: “(a) Protect,

maintain, and, where feasible, enhance and restore the overall

quality of the coastal zone environment and its natural and

artificial resources. [¶] (b) Ensure orderly, balanced utilization

Further statutory references are to the Public Resources

Code unless otherwise noted.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

and conservation of coastal zone resources taking into account

the social and economic needs of the people of the state. [¶]

public recreational opportunities in the coastal zone consistent

with sound resources conservation principles and

constitutionally protected rights of private property owners.”

(§ 30001.5, subds. (a)–(c).)

The Commission and local governments share

responsibility for planning coastal development. Every city and

county in the coastal zone must “prepare a local coastal program

for that portion of the coastal zone within its jurisdiction” or ask

the Commission to prepare one. (§ 30500, subd. (a).) “The

precise content of each local coastal program shall be

determined by the local government . . . in full consultation with

the commission and with full public participation.” (Id.,

subd. (c).) The city or county must then submit the LCP to the

Commission, which will certify the LCP if it complies with

statutory requirements. (See § 30512.) Once an LCP is

certified, the city or county generally has responsibility for

reviewing coastal development permit applications to ensure

consistency with the LCP. (See ibid.) However, in certain

instances specified by statute, the Commission may exercise

appellate jurisdiction over the city’s or county’s permit decisions.

(§ 30603, subd. (a).)2

The Commission’s statutory appellate jurisdiction is

limited to five types of developments, which may be briefly

summarized as those: (1) between the sea and the first public

road paralleling the sea or near the inland extent of any beach

or of the mean high tideline of the sea where there is no beach;

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B. The Adoption of the Los Osos LCP and Other

Environmental Efforts

Los Osos is an unincorporated coastal community of about

15,000 residents located in central San Luis Obispo County near

the south end of Morro Bay, which is connected to the much

larger Estero Bay. Since at least the early 1970’s, state

environmental agencies have raised health and safety concerns

regarding septic tank discharges adversely affecting ground and

surface water in Los Osos.

After the Coastal Act was passed in 1976, the County

began to draft its LCP. The Commission certified the LCP in

pieces in the 1980’s. One portion of the LCP is the “Estero Area

Plan,” which covers the region of Estero Bay, including Los

Osos, and was certified in 1984.

The County’s LCP designates certain areas as sensitive

resource areas (SRA), which are defined as “areas with special

environmental qualities, or areas containing unique or

endangered vegetation or habitat resources.” (San Luis Obispo

County Code, § 23.07.160.) The LCP also defines an

environmentally sensitive habitat or environmentally sensitive

habitat area (ESHA) as “[a] type of Sensitive Resource Area

where plant or animal life or their habitats are either rare or

(2) in tidelands, submerged lands, or public trust lands or near

wetlands, estuaries, streams, or the top of the seaward face of

any coastal bluff; (3) in an SCRA; (4) for a use that is not the

principal permitted use under applicable zoning laws; or (5) a

major public works project or a major energy facility. (§ 30603,

subd. (a).) Even in these five instances, the Commission will not

exercise jurisdiction unless the potential appeal raises a

“substantial issue.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13115,

subds. (b)–(c).)

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

especially valuable because of their special nature or role in an

ecosystem and which could easily [be] disturbed or degraded by

human activities and development.” (San Luis Obispo County

Code, § 23.11.030; see also Pub. Resources Code, § 30107.5

[defining “ ‘[e]nvironmentally sensitive area’ ”].) The Estero

Area Plan does not use the term SCRA. The parties dispute the

relationship between an SRA and an SCRA, but they agree that

at least some SRAs, particularly those that contain an ESHA,

are also SCRAs.

In 1988, in response to the water quality issues in Los

Osos, the Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board

established a discharge moratorium that effectively halted most

construction and expansions of existing development in Los

Osos until the problem of septic tank discharges was solved.

C. Shear’s Initial Development

In 2003, Shear purchased eight residential lots in Los

Osos. The lots were zoned as “Residential Single-Family,” for

which there are three principal permitted uses, including

“Single-Family Dwellings.” The lots were in an existing

developed area that was bound on three sides by residential

development.

In 2004, the County approved a coastal development

permit authorizing Shear to build one residence on each lot in

two phases. In the first phase, Shear could build a total of four

homes on lots 2, 4, 6, and 8, and in the second, which would occur

only after completion of the Los Osos community sewer, the

remaining residences could be built. The Regional Water

Quality Control Board exempted the project from the existing

septic system prohibition because, as the Commission later

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summarized, “the phasing allows the project to maintain one-

acre minimums for septic tank disposals.”

Two members of the Commission appealed Shear’s

application to the Commission. At the time, the Commission

justified its appellate jurisdiction on the basis that the proposed

development was “between the first public road and the sea.”

(See § 30603, subd. (a)(1).) The Commission approved the first

phase of development and denied approval of the second phase

because it was “uncertain when a community sewer system will

be online” and “the details of anticipated community buildout,

treatment plant capacity, and schedules of service remain

uncertain.” Shear built the residences approved for the first

phase.

D. Changes to Los Osos’s LCP and Wastewater

Facilities

In 2008, the Commission certified an amendment to the

County’s LCP. Among other things, this amendment added the

SRA at issue here, the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat.3

In 2010, the Commission approved a coastal development

permit for the Los Osos Wastewater Project, an infrastructure

project consisting of “[c]onstruction and operation of a

community sewer system, including a treatment plant,

collection/disposal/reuse facilities, and all associated

development and infrastructure.” This approval included nine

special conditions, of which only Special Condition 6 is pertinent

For clarity, we refer to the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat

SRA as the “Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat” or the “LODS SRA”

and to the geographical feature of dune sands near Los Osos and

Morro Bay as the “Los Osos dune sands.”

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here. It provides: “Wastewater service to undeveloped

properties within the service area shall be prohibited unless and

until the Estero Area Plan is amended to identify appropriate

and sustainable buildout limits,” including proof that “adequate

water is available to support development.” The Los Osos

Wastewater Project was completed in 2016.

E. Shear’s Second Permit Application

In August 2017, Shear applied for a coastal development

permit to build the four homes planned for the second phase of

development. These homes would be located between the homes

built during the first phase of development. In December 2017,

the San Luis Obispo County department hearing officer denied

the application because the homes were not eligible to connect

to the Los Osos wastewater treatment plant, and they were

located within an area where a prohibition on new septic

systems was in place. Shear appealed that decision to the San

Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors (Board). At a hearing

on July 10, 2018, the Board considered the appeal, including

Special Condition 6, and voted to tentatively uphold the appeal.

The Board directed staff to return to the Board with an

environmental determination, findings for approval, and

conditions for approval.

Related to the environmental determination, then-

endangered (now reclassified as threatened) Morro

shoulderband snails were found on one lot, so Shear modified its

application to seek approval of residences only on the other

three lots. After a further hearing in July 2019, the Board

upheld Shear’s appeal as to the three lots where no Morro

shoulderband snails were found. The Board found that “[t]he

capacities of available water supply and sewage disposal

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services are sufficient to accommodate both existing

development and allowed development” because Shear was

required to retrofit existing development to save more water

than the new homes were expected to consume.

In August 2019, two members of the Commission appealed

the Board’s determination to the Commission for de novo

review. Shear not only defended the County’s decision on the

merits but also challenged the Commission’s jurisdiction. After

a hearing in July 2020, the Commission denied the permit. The

Commission identified two bases for the Commission’s appellate

jurisdiction. First, the Commission concluded that the proposed

residences were in an SCRA based on Figure 6-3 in the Estero

Area Plan. (See § 30603, subd. (a)(3).) Second, the Commission

found that the proposed development was not for the (sole)

principal permitted use for the area; it was for one of several

principal permitted uses.4 (See § 30603, subd. (a)(4).) On the

merits, the Commission concluded that no adequate wastewater

service was available due to Special Condition 6, and the

development did not adequately protect the ESHA and thus

violated ESHA policies.

In February 2021, Shear filed a petition for a writ of

administrative mandate in superior court. Shear argued that

As mentioned above, for the first phase of development in

2004, the Commission based its jurisdiction on section 30603,

subdivision (a)(1), which provides the Commission appellate

jurisdiction over “[d]evelopments approved by the local

government between the sea and the first public road

paralleling the sea.” For the second phase of development, the

Commission expressly concluded, “This project is not located

between the nearest public road and the sea,” and it has not

relied on subdivision (a)(1) in this case.

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the Commission lacked appellate jurisdiction and abused its

discretion in denying the coastal development permit. In

November 2021, the trial court denied the petition. The trial

court concluded that the Commission had appellate jurisdiction

because the proposed development was in an SCRA based on

Figure 6-3, but it rejected the Commission’s argument that

appellate jurisdiction was proper because the development was

not for the sole principal permitted use. On the merits, the trial

court found that there was not substantial evidence to support

the Commission’s denial of the permit based on ESHA policies,

but the court upheld the Commission’s denial of the permit

because there was substantial evidence to support the

Commission’s finding that the lots did not have sufficient access

to water and wastewater disposal.

Shear and the Commission both appealed. The County

submitted an amicus curiae brief arguing that the Commission

did not have appellate jurisdiction because, under the County’s

reading of the LCP, the proposed development site was not in an

SCRA. In an unpublished opinion filed in February 2024, the

Court of Appeal affirmed. It “concluded that the Commission

properly exercised appellate jurisdiction based on the project’s

location in an SCRA” and thus it was “not necessary for [the

court] to consider whether, as the Commission contends in its

cross-appeal, it also has appellate jurisdiction because the

project does not fall within the principal permitted use for its

zoning category.” (Shear Development Co., LLC v. California

Coastal Commission (Feb. 21, 2024, B319895) [nonpub. opn.]

(Shear).) The Court of Appeal also held that, on the merits, “the

Commission did not abuse its discretion because its factual

findings relating to water and wastewater access are supported

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by substantial evidence.” Shear filed a petition for rehearing,

which was denied.

We granted Shear’s petition for review in June 2024. On

December 11, 2024, the day before the Commission’s answer

brief was due, a new San Luis Obispo County LCP became

effective. According to the Commission, “Shear could apply for

and likely obtain a development permit” under the new LCP.

Specifically, the Commission reasons that there is no longer any

obstacle to Shear connecting its properties to the Los Osos sewer

system, and Shear can satisfy the LCP’s environmental

conditions by paying a mitigation fee. Also, the Commission

concedes that the proposed development is not within an SCRA

under the new LCP.

After oral argument, we requested supplemental briefing

on whether the Commission properly exercised appellate

jurisdiction over Shear’s coastal development permit on the

ground that the development was not designated as the

principal permitted use, both under the LCP in effect at the time

the Commission exercised appellate jurisdiction and under the

current LCP.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The New LCP

As an initial matter, the parties dispute the impact of the

new LCP on the issues in this case. Shear argues that the LCP

in place at the time the County approved the development

permit in 2019 governs here. The Commission argues that the

new LCP applies.

We need not resolve this dispute because the result is the

same either way. The parties agree that under the new LCP,

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the Commission cannot exercise jurisdiction on the basis that

the proposed development is in an SCRA. The parties dispute

whether the same was true under the LCP in place in 2019, but

for the reasons that follow, we conclude that the old LCP also

did not designate the development site as an SCRA. Thus,

regardless of whether the LCP in place now or in 2019 governs,

the Commission did not and cannot properly exercise

jurisdiction on this basis.

Also, regarding the issue of whether the proposed

development is for the principal permitted use under the LCP,

the parties have not identified, and we have not found, any

pertinent changes in law between 2019 and now. Thus, whether

we apply the LCP from 2019 or the current LCP does not affect

our analysis.

B. The Applicable Standard of Review

Shear claims that the Commission “has proceeded

without, or in excess of, jurisdiction.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5,

subd. (b).) For such a claim, the standard of review depends on

whether the issue is legal, factual, or both. Here, the only

disputed issue is legal. Shear claims that the Commission

misinterpreted the old LCP’s provisions regarding whether the

proposed development site is in an SCRA. Interpretation of an

LCP is a legal issue, not a factual one, because it concerns

interpretation of enacted law rather than “the establishment of

historical or physical facts.” (Crocker National Bank v. City and

County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888 (Crocker

National Bank); see also Schneider v. California Coastal

Com. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1343–1344 [“Where

jurisdiction involves the interpretation of a statute, regulation,

or ordinance, the issue of whether the agency proceeded in

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excess of its jurisdiction is a question of law”].) A court exercises

its independent judgment reviewing an agency’s interpretation

of the law, applying any appropriate deference to the agency’s

legal interpretation. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 8.)

Therefore, the independent judgment standard applies to

Shear’s claim that the Commission misread the LCP.5

The Commission argues that its decision should be

reviewed for substantial evidence because whether the site is in

an SCRA is predominantly factual and the Commission

“weighed site-specific factual evidence relevant to the SCRA

determination.” For example, the Commission contends that

the fact that a specific type of sandy soil, called “Baywood Fine

Sands,” lies under the development site supports the conclusion

that the site is in an SCRA. But Shear does not dispute any of

this site-specific factual evidence. Shear does not argue that the

ground characteristics of the development site differ from the

Commission’s description. Nor is any other relevant factual

dispute apparent from the record or briefing. When “the

material facts in the present case are largely undisputed,” the

disputed issue is likely to be legal. (Connerly v. State Personnel

Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175; Boling v. Public Employment

Relations Bd. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 912 [“the application of law

to undisputed facts ordinarily presents a legal question that is

We emphasize that we apply independent judgment

because the dispute is legal, not because the dispute concerns

jurisdiction. Jurisdictional issues may involve disputed facts.

(See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Eureka v. California Coastal

Com. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1583–1584 (Citizens for a

Better Eureka).) For such disputes, a different standard of

review may apply.

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reviewed de novo”]; see also Skidgel v. California Unemployment

Ins. Appeals Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 10 [“ ‘[S]tatutory

construction is a matter of law’ ”].) The disputed issue here is

the interpretation of the LCP, a legal issue. (Cf. Hirschfield v.

Cohen (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 648, 660 [treating statutory

construction as a question of law while considering extrinsic

evidence].) For Shear’s jurisdictional claim, then, the proper

standard is the court’s independent judgment.

The Commission relies on four cases applying a

deferential standard of review to an agency determination. But

all four cases concerned predominantly factual questions. (See

Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 516;

Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015)

60 Cal.4th 1086, 1114; Crocker National Bank, supra, 49 Cal.3d

at p. 889; Citizens for a Better Eureka, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th

at p. 1584.) These cases did not apply substantial evidence

review to a pure question of law.

The Commission also relies on Charles A. Pratt

Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008)

162 Cal.App.4th 1068. In Pratt, the Court of Appeal treated

whether the plaintiff’s land was designated as an ESHA as a

question of fact to which substantial evidence review applied.

(Id. at pp. 1076–1077.) Pratt was mistaken on this point

because, as discussed above, whether an LCP designates land as

an ESHA is a question of law. This error may not have affected

the outcome in Pratt because the vast majority of the property

at issue in that case was designated as a “ ‘terrestrial habitat,’ ”

which the LCP explicitly designated as an ESHA. (Id. at

p. 1077.) Such an unambiguous designation may have led to the

same result under any standard. Nonetheless, we hold that the

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correct standard here is the court’s independent judgment and

disapprove Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., Inc. v. California

Coastal Com., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 1068 to the extent its

analysis is inconsistent with our opinion.6

C. Deference When Agencies Disagree

The next question before us is whether a court should

afford any deference to the County’s or the Commission’s view

of the law. The County contends that its interpretation of its

LCP is entitled to deference and the Commission’s

interpretation is not, while the Commission argues the reverse.

We hold that neither is entitled to any deference here.

In general, when an agency “interpret[s] a statute within

its administrative jurisdiction,” a court may defer to the

agency’s interpretation of the law. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th

at p. 11.) Similar deference applies to “a city’s interpretation of

its own ordinance.” (Harrington v. City of Davis (2017)

16 Cal.App.5th 420, 434.) But deference is not automatic.

“Whether judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation is

appropriate and, if so, its extent — the ‘weight’ it should be

given — is . . . fundamentally situational.” (Yamaha, at p. 12.)

The deference due to agency interpretations “turns on a legally

informed, commonsense assessment of their contextual merit.”

(Id. at p. 14.) In Yamaha, we articulated several factors

relevant to such an assessment. (Id. at p. 12.) Those factors,

explored at greater length below, generally assess whether “ ‘the

Pratt was decided by the same division of the same district

as decided the present appeal. The parties have not cited, and

we have not found, any other Court of Appeal opinion that has

applied the substantial evidence standard of review to an agency

determination in the absence of disputed questions of fact.

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agency has a comparative interpretive advantage over the

courts’ ” and whether “ ‘the interpretation in question is

probably correct.’ ” (Ibid.)7

When multiple agencies that administer a statute have

provided conflicting interpretations, a court should apply the

Yamaha factors to each agency to determine not only whether

either would be entitled to deference, but also whether either

has a stronger claim to deference than the other. If one agency

is better situated than the other to provide a definitive statutory

interpretation to which a court should defer, then the court may

assign greater weight to that agency’s interpretation. If not, and

the agencies offer incompatible interpretations, then the court

should perform its interpretive task without deference to either

agency.

This approach is consistent with the rationales underlying

Yamaha. An agency interpreting a statute that it administers

“may possess special familiarity with satellite legal and

regulatory issues.” (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 11.) An

agency may have “expertise and technical knowledge, especially

where the legal text to be interpreted is technical, obscure,

complex, open-ended, or entwined with issues of fact, policy, and

discretion.” (Id. at p. 12.) An agency may have followed

procedures that “enhance the accuracy and reliability of the

resulting administrative ‘product.’ ” (Id. at p. 13.) These

considerations may give the agency’s interpretation

Yamaha also discussed quasi-legislative rules, which are

generally afforded a greater degree of deference. (Yamaha,

supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.) Here, we are analyzing agency

interpretations, not quasi-legislative rules.

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“presumptive value.” (Id. at p. 11.) If they apply to only one

agency — for example, if only one of the agencies has pertinent

expertise, or only one of the agencies has followed reliable

procedures to develop its interpretation — that agency’s

interpretation is likely to have more weight. But if both

agencies are on equal footing, “the fact that the two agencies”

that share roughly equal responsibility to administer the same

statute “fundamentally disagree on its interpretation argues

against the existence of any consistent administrative

construction to which we should defer.” (Department of

Industrial Relations v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals

Bd. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 93, 106, fn. 6.) Applying the Yamaha

factors to both agencies that have offered conflicting

interpretations thus provides an appropriate means to

determine whether either agency’s interpretation should receive

any deference.8

We are not confronted here with a situation in which more

than one agency administers a statute, but not all pertinent

agencies have provided an interpretation. (See, e.g., California

Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 488,

501; Purifoy v. Howell (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 166, 182–183.)

“Absent agency” cases involve different considerations, such as

the risk of “a regulatory regime in which either the same statute

is interpreted differently by the several agencies or the one

agency that happens to reach the courthouse first is allowed to

fix the meaning of the text for all.” (Rapaport v. U.S. Dept. of

Treasury (D.C. Cir. 1995) 59 F.3d 212, 216–217; see also Chao v.

Community Trust Co. (3d Cir. 2007) 474 F.3d 75, 85; U.S. Dept.

of the Interior v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com. (1st Cir. 2015)

876 F.3d 360, 364–366.)

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D. Applying the Yamaha Factors

There are “two broad categories of factors relevant to a

court’s assessment of the weight due an agency’s interpretation:

Those ‘indicating that the agency has a comparative interpretive

advantage over the courts,’ and those ‘indicating that the

interpretation in question is probably correct.’ ” (Yamaha,

supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 12.) When two entities disagree, the

questions are whether either entity has a comparative

interpretive advantage not only over the courts but also over the

other entity, and whether the factors indicating correctness are

stronger for one entity than for the other.9

1. Comparative interpretive advantage

The factors relevant to an agency’s interpretive advantage

include whether (1) the agency has relevant “expertise and

Also, we do not face a situation in which agencies

administer different statutes and disagree about their interplay.

For example, in Department of Finance v. Commission on State

Mandates (2016) 1 Cal.5th 749, a regional water quality control

board disagreed with a legal interpretation by the Commission

on State Mandates. Each agency administered different

statutory schemes, and one question presented was whether to

classify an issue as falling into one agency’s purview such that

deference might be appropriate. (Id. at pp. 768–769; see also id.

at pp. 777–778 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) In contrast,

here we are concerned with two agencies that administer the

same statutory scheme.

Courts have deferred to the Commission’s interpretation

of law and to a county’s when there was no disagreement. (See,

e.g., Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th

1281, 1289 [deferring to a county’s interpretation]; Alberstone v.

California Coastal Com. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 859, 866

[deferring to the Commission’s interpretation].) We express no

opinion about the analyses in those cases.

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technical knowledge”; (2) “the legal text to be interpreted is

technical, obscure, complex, open-ended, or entwined with

issues of fact, policy, and discretion”; and (3) the agency

authored and enforces the language in dispute. (Yamaha,

supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 12.) The parties focus on the first and

third factors, addressing them in an order that reflects their

relative importance in this case. We do the same and conclude

that these factors do not weigh in favor of deference to either the

County’s or the Commission’s interpretation.

First, regarding authorship and enforcement, an “ ‘agency

is likely to be intimately familiar with regulations it authored

and sensitive to the practical implications of one interpretation

over another.’ ” (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 12.)

Ordinarily, we “ ‘accord significant weight and respect to the

long-standing construction of a law by the agency charged with

its enforcement.’ ” (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural

Labor Relations Bd. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1118, 1155.)

Here, the County and the Commission both engage in

extensive work to draft, edit, and enforce the County’s LCP. In

accordance with the Coastal Act, the County “prepare[d] a local

coastal program for that portion of the coastal zone within its

jurisdiction” and determined “[t]he precise content” of the LCP

“in full consultation” with the Commission. (§ 30500, subds. (a),

(c).) According to the County, its Board’s agenda included

“approximately 179 separate agenda items concerning the LCP

between 1978 and 2009.” The Commission reviewed the

County’s LCP and amendments, held public hearings, and

suggested edits, as it does with LCPs statewide. (§§ 30500,

30512, 30513, 30514.)

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The County argues that it has a higher claim to

authorship because there are restrictions on the Commission’s

review of a proposed LCP. For example, regarding land use

plans, the Commission’s review is “limited to its administrative

determination that the land use plan submitted by the local

government does, or does not, conform with the requirements of”

the Coastal Act. (§ 30512.2, subd. (a); see also § 30513,

subds. (b)–(c) [similar restrictions apply to review of zoning

ordinances, zoning district maps, and other implementing

actions].) This provision expressly preserves local authority by

providing, “In making this review, the commission is not

authorized by any provision of this division to diminish or

abridge the authority of a local government to adopt and

establish, by ordinance, the precise content of its land use plan.”

(§ 30512.2, subd. (a).) Nonetheless, the Commission retains the

ability to disapprove and, in effect, to edit land use plans

proposed by local governments because the Commission can

decline to approve a land use plan without a particular

component or provision. This framework provides for a division

of authority between the County and the Commission, with

neither having the unilateral ability to decide the content of the

LCP. The County authored the initial text of the LCP, but the

Commission’s comprehensive reviewing and editing

responsibilities are sufficiently comparable to authorship for

deference purposes to put the two entities on equal footing here.

The Commission’s and the County’s responsibilities

continue to be divided similarly after an LCP is certified. The

County may propose amendments to be submitted to the

Commission for certification. (§ 30514.) As mentioned ante, the

LODS SRA was added to the County’s LCP by such an

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amendment in 2008. The Commission reviews amendments

following similar procedures to those for reviewing a new LCP,

namely that it may approve or disapprove and may suggest

edits, but it does not edit the LCP directly. (§ 30514, subd. (b).)

The Commission also reviews LCP implementation and may

recommend corrective actions to the local government or

legislative action to the Legislature, but it cannot change a

certified LCP without the involvement of the County.

(§ 30519.5.) Again, the amendment and review processes

suggest that both the County and the Commission are authors

of the LCP.10

Also, the County and the Commission both work to

administer the LCP. The County makes initial decisions

regarding permit applications and handles appeals. (San Luis

Obispo County Code, §§ 23.01.042, 23.01.043.) The Commission

handles appeals for a subset of permitting decisions, as

discussed ante. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30603, subd. (a); see

also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13115, subds. (b)–(c).) For all

other permitting decisions, there is no provision allowing appeal

from the County’s determination to any other agency; the

County’s determination is final, unless mandamus is sought.11

Until 1977, the Commission had the power to designate

SCRAs unilaterally. (See § 30502, subd. (a).) It did not do so for

the LODS SRA, and it no longer has that power. Thus, whether

an area is an SCRA is no longer an issue committed solely to the

Commission.

Our conclusion might be different if the Commission had

plenary authority to review everything the County did to

implement the LCP, for example by handling appeals from any

permitting decision by the County. But here, the Commission’s

reviewing authority is limited.

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Second, regarding the agency’s expertise and technical

knowledge, the County states that its planning department,

which handles local land use issues, includes 115 positions

allocated countywide. The Commission asserts that its staff

consists of about 182 people, including environmental scientists,

geologists, engineers, and planning managers. Assuming

without deciding that we may consider these facts,12 they

suggest that both the County and the Commission have

expertise and technical knowledge beyond those ordinarily

possessed by a court, but not clearly greater than the other.

None of the foregoing suggests that either entity has a

clear interpretive advantage over the other regarding the LCP.

Overall, these factors do not weigh in favor of deference to either

interpretation in these circumstances.

2. Indications of correctness

The factors relating to correctness include:

(1) “indications of careful consideration by senior agency

officials” such as “ ‘an interpretation of a statute contained in a

regulation adopted after public notice and comment’ ”;

(2) “evidence that the agency ‘has consistently maintained the

interpretation in question, especially if [it] is long-standing’ ”;

and (3) “indications that the agency’s interpretation was

contemporaneous with legislative enactment of the statute

being interpreted.” (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 13.) The

principal factor that the parties address is whether either the

These facts do not appear in the record, and the parties

have not cited a basis for this court to consider them, such as

judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 452.) If we disregarded these

assertions as unsupported by record facts, we would come to the

same conclusions.

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County’s or the Commission’s interpretation is long standing

and consistent. We hold that this factor does not weigh in favor

of either party because the support they have provided is murky

at best.

The Commission points to three purported examples of the

Commission interpreting urban Los Osos to fall within an

SCRA: (1) a comment in a staff report on an appeal of a coastal

development permit from 1999, (2) a 2001 memorandum from

the executive director of the Commission, and (3) a 2004 staff

report. (Cal. Coastal Com., Staff Report: Regular Calendar

Coastal Development Permit (Aug. 30, 1999) <https://

tinyurl.com/7xc2j6mm> [as of Apr. 23, 2026] (1999 Staff

Report); Cal. Coastal Com., San Luis Obispo County LCP 13569

Determination: Schoenfield Certificates of Compliance (May 30,

2001) p. 12 <https://tinyurl.com/4ckfyevx> [as of Apr. 23, 2026];

Cal. Coastal Com., Appeal Staff Report — Substantial Issue

Determination (Mar. 5, 2004) p. 3 <https://tinyurl.com/

3htdw25h> [as of Apr. 23, 2026].)13 Based on these examples,

the Commission asserts that it has held a consistent

interpretation of the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat for two

decades.

However, the first example does not purport to interpret

whether the pertinent part of Los Osos is within an SRA, SCRA,

or ESHA and ultimately finds jurisdiction on another basis.

(1999 Staff Report, supra, at pp. 14–15.) The second and third

examples conclude that parts of urban Los Osos were part of

All internet citations in this opinion are archived by year,

docket number, and case name at <https://courts.ca.gov/opinion/

cited-supreme-court-opinions>.

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different SRAs than the one at issue here. These areas were

designated as SRAs in 1984, but the LODS SRA was not

designated until 2008. (See San Luis Obispo County Planning

Dept., Land Use Element and Local Coastal Plan, Estero

Planning Area, South Bay Combining Designation (Apr. 12,

1984) p. 039364 <https://tinyurl.com/mvu4vmp8> [as of Apr. 23,

2026].)

There is also some evidence that the Commission’s current

interpretation may be inconsistent with its interpretation at the

time the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat was created in 2008. At

that time, the Commission recognized that the Estero Area Plan

amendment that added the SRA “does not change existing

standards or programs applicable to the urban area of Los Osos”

and “leaves in place the existing Area Plan language applicable

to the Los Osos urban area.” (Cal. Coastal Com., San Luis

Obispo County Local Coastal Program Major Amendment No. 2-

04 (Part 2) Estero Area Plan (June 27, 2008) pp. A20-10, A20-29

<https://tinyurl.com/5esae4nh> [as of Apr. 23, 2026]; see also id.

at p. A20-32 [“the urban area of Los Osos was bifurcated from

this submittal and the urban area development standards for

Los Osos are not proposed to be changed”].) Because the urban

area of Los Osos was outside the scope of the amendment, the

Commission rejected portions of the amendment that would

apply to the Los Osos urban area. (See id. at p. A20-43.) These

comments suggest that when the SRA was originally adopted in

2008, the Commission interpreted the SRA as not including the

urban part of Los Osos.

Thus, the Commission has not cited anything

demonstrating that it considered urban Los Osos to be part of

the LODS SRA at any time before the Commission took the

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appeal of Shear’s development permit, and there is evidence it

viewed the LODS SRA differently in 2008. We cannot conclude

on this record that the Commission’s view is long standing or

consistent.

The County also argues that its view is long standing and

consistent, but its evidence is similarly inconclusive. Planning

Commission meeting minutes from 2004 show that a staff

member explained that “outside the U[rban] R[eserve] L[ine] is

almost exactly the same boundary as the Los Osos Dune Sands

ESHA.” (San Luis Obispo County Planning Com., Draft

Minutes for Commissioner Review of Estero Plan Update

(May 13, 2004) p. 2 <https://tinyurl.com/mr9tzssn> [as of

Apr. 23, 2026].) Later in 2004, a staff member stated that the

Los Osos Dune Sands ESHA “generally applies to the periphery

of Los Osos, not the entire community.” (San Luis Obispo

County Dept. of Planning and Building, Continued Hearing on

Estero Area Plan Update: Response to Comments on Chapter 7

and Land Use Changes (Oct. 19, 2004) p. 7 <https://tinyurl.com/

4wbn3764> [as of Apr. 23, 2026].) It is not clear that these

comments represent the view of the County rather than those of

individual staff. Also, these comments concern a Los Osos Dune

Sands ESHA, but the parties agree that the proposed

development site is not in ESHA. These comments do not

explicitly interpret the boundaries of the SRA at issue here and

thus are not directly on point.

Bearing in mind that the County and the Commission

disagree, we explained ante, that the pertinent question for

deference is whether either entity’s position bears clearly

superior indicia of being correct compared to the other. Here,

neither does.

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3. Other considerations

The goal of the Yamaha analysis is to arrive at a “legally

informed, commonsense assessment of [the] contextual merit” of

an agency’s interpretation of law. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th

at p. 14.) In support of their respective positions, the County

and the Commission also both suggest that courts should

consider the overarching goals of the Coastal Act. Individual

provisions of the Coastal Act alternately favor the County and

the Commission, depending on which portion is quoted. We

conclude that the stated goals of the Coastal Act, considered as

a whole, do not favor either the County or the Commission.

For example, the County relies on the Legislature’s

declaration, “To achieve maximum responsiveness to local

conditions, accountability, and public accessibility, it is

necessary to rely heavily on local government and local land use

planning procedures and enforcement.” (§ 30004, subd. (a),

italics added.) This provision emphasizes local control and could

be read to favor the County.

But, as the Commission points out, the Legislature also

declared that for other goals, including “to provide maximum

state involvement in federal activities allowable under federal

law or regulations or the United States Constitution which

affect California’s coastal resources,” “it is necessary to provide

for continued state coastal planning and management through a

state coastal commission.” (§ 30004, subd. (b), italics added.)

This provision emphasizes state control and could be read to

favor the Commission.

To determine legislative intent, however, we do not read

isolated provisions. (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th

183, 190.) Read as a whole, the Coastal Act communicates that

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both local and state goals are important, and neither the County

nor the Commission, as local and state entities respectively,

should have greater deference accorded to their interpretations

of the Coastal Act. For example, the Legislature also declared

that one “basic goal[] of the state for the coastal zone” is to

“[e]ncourage state and local initiatives and cooperation in

preparing procedures to implement coordinated planning and

development for mutually beneficial uses, including educational

uses, in the coastal zone.” (§ 30001.5, subd. (e), italics added.)

This provision is consistent with the overall structure of the

Coastal Act, which encourages both state and local involvement.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that neither the

County’s nor the Commission’s interpretation is entitled to

deference here. Neither entity has demonstrated a clear

interpretive advantage over the other, a significantly stronger

showing of factors indicating rightness, or any other reason for

deference. The Commission concedes that “de novo judicial

review of legal questions without deference to any party’s

interpretation would also be a defensible approach,” and we

conclude that this approach is appropriate in this situation.

E. The Proposed Development Is Not in the Los

Osos Dune Sands Habitat

The Court of Appeal correctly stated, “We independently

review the question whether the Commission’s exercise of

jurisdiction here is consistent with the Coastal Act.” (Shear,

supra, B319895.) But the Court of Appeal described Figure 6-3

in the Estero Area Plan as “substantial evidence” supporting the

Commission and affirmed without more. (Ibid.) The Court of

Appeal’s opinion reflects substantial evidence review, not the

court’s independent judgment. To clarify, we conduct

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independent judgment review and conclude that the proposed

development is not in an SCRA under the old LCP.

The Commission argues that the proposed development is

in an SCRA because it is in an SRA — specifically, the Los Osos

Dune Sands Habitat.14 Determining whether this is so requires

construing the LCP’s description of the LODS SRA. Many parts

of the LCP are relevant to this issue, so we must construe the

text “ ‘in context, keeping in mind [its] purpose, and . . . sections

relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both

internally and with each other, to the extent possible.’ ” (People

v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357.)

1. The text of the LCP

The Estero Area Plan mentions the Los Osos Dune Sands

Habitat in chapters 6 and 7. The only explicit description of the

boundaries of the LODS SRA in chapter 6 states, “The areas

underlain by these sands outside of Los Osos are included in the

Sensitive Resource Area combining designation.” This sentence

does not clarify whether the proposed development site is part

of the LODS SRA. It states that the LODS SRA includes the

dune sands outside of Los Osos, but the proposed development

is in Los Osos, and the term “included,” by itself, is ambiguous

Shear contends that “this argument represents a

significant departure from the Commission’s position during the

administrative proceedings, where it relied exclusively on the

assertion that the project site was in ‘mapped and designated

ESHA.’ ” It is true that the Commission originally argued that

the site was mapped ESHA and has now abandoned that

argument. But the Commission also has consistently, albeit

sometimes with less than perfect clarity, taken the position that

it had appellate jurisdiction because the development site is in

the LODS SRA.

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about whether the enumerated item or items are exhaustive.

(Compare Flanagan v. Flanagan (2002) 27 Cal.4th 766, 774

[“The ‘statutory definition of a thing as “including” certain

things does not necessarily place thereon a meaning limited to

the inclusions’ ”] with Television Transmission v. Public Util.

Com. (1956) 47 Cal.2d 82, 85 [“a legislative declaration that

‘public utility’ includes those performing certain enumerated

services is not a declaration that those performing other

services, not encompassed by the services enumerated, are

public utilities”].) Hence, we must look elsewhere to determine

whether urban Los Osos is part of the LODS SRA.

The rest of chapter 6 is suggestive, though not definitive.

The text states, “The southern shore of the Morro Bay estuary,

extending to the southern slopes of the first range of the Irish

Hills and to Los Osos Creek, is comprised of sandy soils —

primarily ‘Baywood fine sands,’ as identified by the Natural

Resources Conservation Service in the Soil Survey of San Luis

Obispo County, Coastal Part (see Figure 6-3). These sands also

underlie some areas outside of Los Osos, and occur in the city of

Morro Bay.” These two sentences explain where “sandy soils”

are found, summarizing the results of a soil survey by the

Natural Resources Conservation Service (a federal agency

within the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture). The area described

includes urban Los Osos, rural Los Osos, and other locations

entirely, such as the City of Morro Bay.15 Figure 6-3 (see below),

The description of the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat SRA

appears in the section related to “Cayucos and Vicinity,” not

“Los Osos and Vicinity.” No compelling explanation of this

placement is apparent from the record.

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with the title “LOHCP Area and Los Osos Dune Sands”16 and

the caption “Los Osos Dune Sands,” matches this description,

showing the Los Osos dune sands as present in rural Los Osos,

urban Los Osos, and elsewhere, including Morro Bay. But the

text acknowledges that “the most valuable habitat surrounds

the more developed portion of Los Osos,” suggesting that the

dune sands may not be coextensive with the Los Osos Dune

Sands Habitat.

LOHCP refers to the Los Osos Habitat Conservation Plan,

a separate Los Osos planning document. It is unclear why

Figure 6-3 bears a title from another document.

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The Commission argues that the phrase, “southern shore

of the Morro Bay estuary, extending to the southern slopes of

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the first range of the Irish Hills and to Los Osos Creek,”

describes the location of the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat, but

the sentence does not mention an SRA. This sentence

immediately follows the section title, which is “Los Osos Dune

Sands Habitat (SRA),” but this placement is inconclusive. Much

of the text after the title provides background information, such

as the sentence, “Coastal foredune communities usually occur

adjacent to open, sandy beaches and barren active dunes near

the coast.” This sentence does not designate all coastal foredune

communities (or all land adjacent to open, sandy beaches) as an

SRA. The only part of this text that directly states where an

SRA is found says that it includes the dune sands “outside of Los

Osos.”

Overall, the pertinent excerpts from chapter 6 do not

squarely answer whether urban Los Osos is part of the LODS

SRA, but they suggest that it is not. Next, we consider

chapter 7, which chapter 6 cross-references by saying, “In order

to protect the Los Osos Dune Sands, planning area standards

are included in Chapter 7 of this plan.”

The primary discussion of the Los Osos dune sands in

chapter 7 appears in a portion titled “Los Osos Dune Sands

Habitat (SRA).” Notably, this discussion is within the section of

chapter 7 describing planning area standards for rural areas,

not the section describing standards for the Los Osos urban

area. This placement suggests that the LODS SRA is located in

or at least primarily focused on the rural areas, not urban Los

Osos.

The textual description of the Los Osos Dune Sands

Habitat is as follows: “In order to ensure the long-term

preservation of the rare and sensitive Los Osos Dune Sands

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habitat in the rural areas (an Environmentally Sensitive

Habitat), new development within this SRA (see Figure 6-3 for

location) shall comply with” certain standards that follow. The

reference to “the rural areas” again suggests that the LODS SRA

is not in urban Los Osos.

The parenthetical remark “see Figure 6-3 for location” is

ambiguous. This phrasing suggests that Figure 6-3 depicts the

location of the LODS SRA, but it does not explain exactly how

Figure 6-3 depicts the LODS SRA. Figure 6-3 depicts the Los

Osos dune sands and shows a Los Osos urban reserve line

(which it does not otherwise describe). All of urban Los Osos,

including the proposed development, is within the urban reserve

line. Under Shear and the County’s interpretation, Figure 6-3

depicts the LODS SRA as primarily the dune sands outside the

urban reserve line. The Commission, on the other hand, argues

that Figure 6-3 depicts the LODS SRA as the entire dune sands,

without regard to the urban reserve line. Both interpretations

are consistent with chapter 7 because under either

interpretation, Figure 6-3 depicts the location of the LODS SRA.

We again must look elsewhere to choose between the two

interpretations.

While Figure 6-3 does not define the Los Osos urban

reserve line, the Estero Area Plan does elsewhere, and other

uses of the phrase also provide useful context. The primary

function of an urban reserve line is to divide land between rural

and urban. Appendix C to the Estero Area Plan contains a

glossary of terms that defines an “Urban reserve line (URL)” as

follows: “The boundary around an urban area that separates

urban land uses from the adjacent rural area, defining land that

is planned for urban growth within the next 20 years.” Other

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uses of the term are consistent with this definition. Similarly,

for the “South Bay” area, which includes Los Osos and the

proposed development area, the Estero Area Plan provides, “The

urban reserve line encompasses approximately 2,590 acres (four

square miles) and allows for future growth through in-filling of

existing developed areas and expansion onto adjacent vacant

lands.”17 Designating land for urban growth in the near future

does not seem consistent with designating it as an SRA — which

the LCP defines as an area “with special environmental

qualities, or areas containing unique or endangered vegetation

or habitat.”

Taken together, these definitions and uses of the term

“urban reserve line” suggest that the Los Osos Dune Sands

Habitat SRA is more likely outside the urban reserve line than

both outside and in. Thus, Figure 6-3 illustrates the location of

the LODS SRA as primarily the portion of the dune sands

outside the urban reserve line.

Text appearing later in chapter 7 is consistent with this

interpretation. It provides, “The following provisions are

intended to ensure the long-term preservation of the rare and

sensitive Los Osos Dune Sands habitat (which is an

Environmentally Sensitive Habitat). Such habitat is of relative

high quality compared to that on smaller, isolated, undeveloped

lots.” This description equates the Los Osos Dune Sands habitat

with an ESHA, which again suggests that the habitat in

The proposed development here is infill, which the LCP

defines as “[d]evelopment of vacant land (usually individual lots

or left-over properties) within areas which are already largely

developed.”

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question is not in urban Los Osos because not all of urban Los

Osos is an ESHA. While this portion of chapter 7 does not

explicitly say that the “habitat” to which it refers is coextensive

with the LODS SRA, the identity of words between “Los Osos

Dune Sands habitat” (a recurring phrase in the rest of this

portion of the Estero Area Plan) and the name of the LODS SRA

(“Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat”) suggests that they are the

same. Similarly, the requirement that private owners of land in

the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat enter into an agreement that

provides for the “ongoing maintenance of remaining Los Osos

Dune Sands habitat in a natural state” tends to suggest that the

habitat is not already developed and thus does not include urban

Los Osos.

The LCP also includes combining designation maps, which

depict areas designated as SRAs. Both the rural and urban

combining designation maps for the Estero planning area have

some ambiguities. The maps do not label the individual SRAs,

and the SRAs abut each other without clear boundaries.

Nonetheless, some conclusions can be drawn. First, the entire

Los Osos dune sands area outside of the developed part of Los

Osos is depicted as an SRA. But the maps do not depict all of

urban Los Osos as an SRA. In other words, they support the

conclusion that Figure 6-3 should be interpreted to depict the

Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat as the portion of the Los Osos

dune sands outside the Los Osos urban reserve line.18

A small area of dune sands mapped as SRA lies within the

urban reserve line. The proposed development is not within or

near this area. We need not decide here whether the Los Osos

Dune Sands Habitat extends within the urban reserve line to

this small area (or, perhaps, whether this is some other SRA).

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The Commission argues that these maps are not

dispositive because SRAs can be designated outside these

official maps. Assuming that the Commission is correct,

something still must designate them. The Commission has not

cited anything in the LCP that designates the proposed

development site as part of the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat.

2. Extrinsic evidence

Beyond the text, the Commission invokes extrinsic

evidence about the dune sands. Such considerations may be

relevant to the interpretation of an LCP. (See, e.g., People v.

Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 975 (Prudholme) [explaining

that extrinsic aids may provide insight into the intent behind an

ambiguous law].) While the text of the LCP suggests that the

proposed development is not in the LODS SRA, the text is also

sufficiently ambiguous that considering extrinsic evidence is

appropriate.

The Commission notes that the proposed development

contains Baywood fine sands and that then-endangered Morro

shoulderband snails were found nearby. According to the LCP,

Baywood fine sands and other sandy soils “provide the soil

characteristics that support globally rare habitat” and “support

a diversity of native plant species and a number of rare,

endangered or threatened species of plants and animals,

including the Morro manzanita, Indian Knob mountainbalm,

Morro shoulderband snail, and perhaps the last known

population of the endangered Morro Bay kangaroo rat.” Morro

shoulderband snails were found on a nearby lot that is not part

of this permit application. Based on the properties of the land,

the United States Fish and Wildlife Service inferred that the

lots on which Shear seeks to develop “likely” support the Morro

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shoulderband snail as well, though site visits have not actually

found any. In short, record evidence suggests that some

undeveloped spaces in urban Los Osos, particularly the more

open spaces, provide habitat for some native species.

But the Commission is not arguing that only these lots, or

the open spaces inside the urban reserve line, are designated as

an SRA. Rather, the Commission is arguing that all of urban

Los Osos is part of the LODS SRA. However, much of urban Los

Osos is developed. It seems unlikely that all of it is “of vital

interest and sensitivity.” (§ 30116 [defining SCRAs].) The

Estero Area Plan says that “the most valuable habitat

surrounds the more developed portion of Los Osos.” The purpose

of the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat is “to ensure the long-term

preservation of the rare and sensitive Los Osos Dune Sands

habitat in the rural areas.” The fact that a few parts, but not

all, of urban Los Osos provide habitat for rare species does not

clearly weigh in favor of concluding that all of urban Los Osos is

included in the LODS SRA.

Finally, extrinsic evidence includes not only the facts

about the land, but also the legislative history of the Estero Area

Plan. (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 975.) As described

ante, in 2008, when the County proposed amendments to the

Estero Area Plan that included adding the Los Osos Dune Sands

Habitat, the Commission recognized that the amendments did

not affect urban Los Osos. This history suggests that the

contemporaneous intent of the enactors of the LCP was that the

LODS SRA would not include much, if any, of urban Los Osos.

Overall, the extrinsic evidence suggests that some of

urban Los Osos may provide a habitat for rare, local species, but

the most valuable habitat is in the rural areas. Also, the

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legislative history suggests that at the time that the Los Osos

Dune Sands Habitat was added to the LCP, neither the County

nor the Commission intended for the LODS SRA to include

urban Los Osos. Both of these points tend to confirm the likely

meaning of the LCP’s text: the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat

does not include the proposed development. Thus, the proposed

development is not in an SCRA.19

We conclude that the proposed development is not in an

SCRA under the old LCP, and the parties agree that the

proposed development is not in an SCRA under the new LCP.

Under either LCP, the Commission did not properly exercise

appellate jurisdiction under subdivision (a)(3) of section 30603.

F. Principal Permitted Use

The Commission also asserted a second basis for its

appellate jurisdiction: its appellate jurisdiction over “[a]ny

development approved by a coastal county that is not designated

as the principal permitted use.” (§ 30603, subd. (a)(4)(A).) The

County designates three principal permitted uses for the

proposed development site: passive recreation, coastal

accessways, and single-family dwellings. Shear proposed to

build single-family dwellings, one of the three principal

permitted uses. The Commission argues, however, that this is

not “the” principal permitted use — that is, the sole principal

The parties dispute whether all SRAs are SCRAs and thus

all permits for development in SRAs are within the

Commission’s appellate jurisdiction, but we need not express an

opinion on this point because the proposed development is not

within an SRA.

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permitted use — so the Commission has appellate jurisdiction

under subdivision (a)(4)(A).20

We apply well-established principles to this question of

statutory interpretation. “ ‘ “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur

fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so

as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the

statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense

meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts must generally

follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would

result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If

the statutory language permits more than one reasonable

interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the

statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’

[Citation.] ‘Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in

the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of

which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase,

sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative

purpose.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 989–

990.)

1. Statutory text

The statute is framed in the singular: “[a]ny development

approved by a coastal county that is not designated as the

principal permitted use.” (§ 30603, subd. (a)(4)(A).) But, as

mentioned ante, we read this subdivision in the context of the

entire statutory scheme. Thus, in construing section 30603, we

Section 30603, subdivision (a)(4)(B) exempts a “residential

development project,” which is defined as “a multifamily

housing project that consists exclusively of residential uses and

includes four or more units.” (§ 30114.5.) This exemption does

not apply to Shear’s proposed development.

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must bear in mind that another provision of the Public

Resources Code provides, “The singular number includes the

plural, and the plural the singular.” (§ 13.) For convenience, we

refer to this and similar provisions as “number inclusivity”

provisions.

Many other codes contain number inclusivity provisions.

(See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 14, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 7, subd. (a);

Code Civ. Proc., § 17, subd. (a); Evid. Code, § 10; Welf. & Inst.

Code, § 13; Veh. Code, § 14.) We have held that a number

inclusivity provision “is no mere rubric — it is the law.” (People

v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 593.) For over a century, we have

applied such provisions to avoid overly wooden interpretations

of statutes. For example, when an ordinance’s text allowed

construction of a tunnel “ ‘for public uses,’ ” we held that this

ordinance also allowed construction of a tunnel for a single

public use. (Larsen v. San Francisco (1920) 182 Cal. 1, 10

(Larsen).) When an ordinance declared it unlawful for “ ‘any

person’ ” to keep goats within specified distances of some houses,

we held that the ordinance “cover[s] a case where the goats are

owned by several persons in common.” (In re Mathews (1923)

191 Cal. 35, 37, 43 (Mathews).) In the former case, the plural

included the singular. In the latter, the singular included the

plural, even in the absence of an express provision about

number inclusivity. (Id. at p. 43.)

The Courts of Appeal have applied number inclusivity

provisions similarly. (See, e.g., People v. Killian (2024)

100 Cal.App.5th 191, 211 [“We decide that notwithstanding the

plural language stated in [Vehicle Code] section 10802, that

section may be violated by tampering with a single VIN”]; Del

Cerro Mobile Estates v. City of Placentia (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th

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173, 183 [rejecting the argument that “because the terms ‘grade

crossing’ and ‘grade separation’ are singular, the CEQA

exemption in section 21080.13 does not apply to projects

eliminating more than one grade crossing or reconstructing

more than one existing grade separation”]; Hurley v.

Rubis (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 95, 97 [“[T]he mere use of the

singular does not of itself indicate an intent to restrict the School

Boards and County Superintendents power to calling but one

election on the subject”].)

As a Court of Appeal has explained, the use of only one

number in statutory text, whether singular or plural, may

“simply [be] ascribable to a means for simplifying legislative

drafting rather than a substantive numerical restriction.”

(River Trails Ranch Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d

562, 565.) The alternative is to litter the codes with language

like “any person or persons,” which would diminish readability.

Together with the number inclusivity provision, the plain

text suggests that the Commission has jurisdiction over a

development that is not designated as the principal permitted

use or uses. (§ 30603, subd. (a)(4)(A); see also § 13.) That is, if

a local government designates several uses, the Commission has

appellate jurisdiction under section 30603, subdivision (a)(4)(A)

only when the development is not for any of them. This

conclusion is consistent with the only Court of Appeal decision

of which we are aware that has addressed this issue, albeit in

dicta. (DeCicco v. California Coastal Com. (2011)

199 Cal.App.4th 947, 951.)

The Commission also relies on the use of the word “the”

preceding the phrase “principal permitted use.” (§ 30603,

subd. (a)(4)(A).) The Commission notes that we have said,

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“[U]se of the definite article ‘the’ . . . refers to a specific person,

place, or thing.” (Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010)

50 Cal.4th 1389, 1396.) Thus, the Commission argues that the

phrase “the principal permitted use” (§ 30603, subd. (a)(4)(A)),

means that there must be only one principal permitted use,

whereas “a principal permitted use” would have indicated that

there could be several.

Notably, the appellate court in People v. Watson (2021)

64 Cal.App.5th 474 has rejected substantially the same

argument as the Commission makes here. In another context,

the court held, “[T]he statute’s use of ‘the’ . . . does not mandate

the singular.” (Id. at p. 485.) In general, we agree that a

statute’s use of “the” does not mandate the singular. The

County’s LCP designates three specific things as principal

permitted uses for the proposed development site, and referring

to “the” principal permitted use invokes those three specific

things. We need not strain to read the text as only singular

because the word “the” particularizes; “the” can particularize to

three specific things just as well as to one.21 The plain text

suggests that the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction is limited

Nor does the word “principal” necessarily imply the

singular. The Legislature has used the word “principal” to

modify plural nouns in the Public Resources Code. (E.g., §§ 2740

[“principal mineral commodities”], 520, subd. (a)(2) [“principal

purposes”], 32310, subd. (f) [“principal charitable purposes”];

see also Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) p. 1444, col. 1

[defining “principal” as “[c]hief; primary; most important”];

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2012) p. 987, col. 2

[defining “principal” as, among other things, “a matter or thing

of primary importance”].)

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to developments that are not designated as any of the principal

permitted uses.

2. Extratextual considerations

The parties make arguments regarding indicia of

legislative intent beyond the plain text of the statute. To the

extent that we consider these other indicia, we are not

persuaded that they should change our interpretation of section

30603, subdivision (a)(4)(A).

The Commission relies on the legislative history of section

30603 and its own interpretation now, which it claims is entitled

to deference.22 But we conclude that the legislative history does

not clearly support the Commission’s argument, and even giving

the Commission’s interpretation its due weight, the statutory

text, which is contrary to the Commission’s interpretation,

controls here.

Regarding the legislative history, the text that became

subdivision (a)(4)(A) of section 30603 was originally drafted to

refer to “a principal permitted use” and later amended to refer

to “the principal permitted use.” (See Assem. Amend. to Sen.

Bill. No. 1277 (1975–1976 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 5, 1976, p. 59

(August 5, 1976 Amendment to Senate Bill No. 1277).) The

Commission has not cited, and we have not identified, anything

in the legislative history that explains this change, but the

committee analysis accompanying the change describes the

We afforded no weight to the Commission’s interpretation

of the County’s LCP ante, because of the conflict between the

County and the Commission. However, the County does not

argue that it directly administers the Coastal Act (unlike the

LCP). Hence, there is no pertinent conflict for the Coastal Act.

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provision as follows: “After certification, only the following

actions are appealable to the Commission: [¶] . . . [¶] 4. Coastal

county approved development not shown as principal permitted

use in local coastal program.” (Assem. Com. on Resources, Land

Use, and Energy, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1277 (1975–1976 Reg.

Sess.) as amended Aug. 5, 1976, p. 8.) It seems less likely that

the Legislature intended the change from “a” to “the” in the bill

text to have significant meaning when the committee analysis

accompanying this change uses neither.

Moreover, in 1976, section 13 was already part of the

Public Resources Code, and settled law established our

interpretation of number inclusivity provisions. (E.g., Larsen,

supra, 182 Cal. at p. 10; Mathews, supra, 191 Cal. at pp. 37, 43.)

We generally assume that the Legislature is aware of pertinent

judicial decisions when it drafts and amends statutes. (In re

Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 588.) Changing “a”

to “the,” given the background of section 13 and our decisions,

would be a remarkably obscure and unlikely way of restricting

the number of principal permitted uses.

Viewed in context, we interpret the change from “a” to

“the” as stylistic rather than substantive. Before August 5,

1976, section 30603 did not specify whether one or all the

subdivisions must be satisfied before the Commission has

appellate jurisdiction. The August 5 amendment clarified that

the Commission has appellate jurisdiction “for any of the

following,” referring to the subdivisions of section 30603.

(Aug. 5, 1976 Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1277, supra, at p. 59.) As

part of that change, the sentence structure of the subdivisions

was changed from “if: [¶] . . . [¶] [t]he development is approved”

to “Any development approved” (id., at pp. 58–59), which

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necessitated various conforming edits. The change from “a” to

“the” appears to be an editorial modification made as part of this

set of edits.

The Commission also notes that the Legislature recently

considered a bill that, as initially drafted, would have changed

the phrase “the principal permitted use” to “a principal

permitted use.” (Sen. Bill No. 951 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as

introduced Jan. 18, 2024, § 3.) The bill was later amended to

keep the phrase “the principal permitted use” and, instead,

exempt “a local government that is both a city and county”

(currently only San Francisco) from the Commission’s appellate

jurisdiction under subdivision (a)(4)(A) of section 30603. (Sen.

Bill No. 951 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 3, 2024,

§ 2.) That form of the bill passed. (See § 30603, subd. (a)(4)(C),

as amended by Stats. 2024, ch. 775, § 1.)23 The Commission

describes this history as ratifying the Commission’s

interpretation, but we would not go quite so far.

The Commission also cites various statements made by

the bill’s author. But “We have frequently stated . . . that the

statements of an individual legislator, including the author of a

bill, are generally not considered in construing a statute, as the

court’s task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature as a

whole in adopting a piece of legislation.” (Quintano v. Mercury

Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062.) Various exceptions

exist, such as, “ ‘[S]tatements about pending legislation are

entitled to consideration to the extent they constitute “a

reiteration of legislative discussion and events leading to

adoption of proposed amendments rather than merely an

expression of personal opinion.” ’ ” (Naranjo v. Spectrum

Security Services, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056, 1085.) But the

cited statements do not fit within any exception.

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The Commission is correct that we may afford more

weight to the Commission’s interpretation because of the

Legislature’s recent actions. We “particularly” give weight to an

agency interpretation of a statute “when the Legislature,

presumably aware of the established administrative

construction, has implied its acquiescence therein by amending

the governing statute in ways that do not disturb the agency’s

policy.” (In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1082.)

Hence, we may give additional weight to the Commission’s

interpretation because the Legislature amended section 30603

without changing the phrase “the principal permitted use” in a

way that affects the Commission’s interpretation.

However, the Commission’s view has not been consistent,

which reduces its weight. (See Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at

p. 13 [“ ‘[A] vacillating position . . . is entitled to no deference’ ”].)

The Commission cites examples in which it has interpreted the

phrase “the principal permitted use” as meaning only a single

use, but these examples start in 2003. In contrast, in the late

1980’s, the Commission certified the County’s LCP. To do so, it

had to find that the County’s LCP conformed to the policies of

the Coastal Act. (See § 30512, subd. (a).) The County’s LCP

provides that “[a]ny approved development not listed in Coastal

Table O, Part I of the Land Use Element as a Principal

Permitted (P) Use” is appealable to the Commission. (San Luis

Obispo County Code, § 23.01.043, subd. (c)(4).) This provision

refers to a principal permitted use, not the principal permitted

use. Therefore, in the late 1980’s, the Commission seems to

have interpreted “the” in subdivision (a)(4)(A) of Public

Resources Code section 30603 as consistent with “a” in

subdivision (c)(4) of San Luis Obispo County Code section

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23.01.043. The Commission’s interpretations from 2003 and

later only show that the Commission changed its interpretation

of section 30603 at some point between the late 1980’s and 2003.

As explained ante, we agree with the Commission’s former

position: the LCP, which refers to “a principal permitted use,”

is consistent with the Coastal Act, which refers to “the principal

permitted use.”24 (§ 30603, subd. (a)(4)(C).) After examining

the legislative history and affording the Commission’s

interpretation its due weight, we adhere to our interpretation of

the plain text.

3. Policy arguments

Finally, the parties make policy arguments. The

Commission argues that it must have appellate jurisdiction over

developments in the primarily rural counties along the coast

unless they designate a single principal permitted use because

a wider range of uses increases the likelihood that any given

development will cause environmental harm. The County notes

that its entire coastal zone is designated for more than one

principal permitted use, meaning that all development near the

coast in the County would be subject to the Commission’s

appellate review. The County argues that this result would be

practically absurd. Also, while the other provisions regarding

the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction would not be solely

surplusage, they would not have any significance in entire

counties in the coastal zone, a result the Legislature likely did

The parties dispute whether the LCP or the Coastal Act

defines the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction, but because we

read them as consistent, we need not express any opinion on this

point.

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not intend. (Cf. Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v.

Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1038 [“It is a maxim of

statutory interpretation that courts should give meaning to

every word of a statute and should avoid constructions that

would render any word or provision surplusage”].) And to the

extent the Commission is concerned about a county’s over-

designation of principal permitted uses, it may express those

concerns in its review of the county’s LCP and make

recommendations to the local government or the Legislature.

(§ 30519.5.)

The Commission also points out that most local

governments have acquiesced to the Commission’s

interpretation and designated only one principal permitted use

for each zoning type in their LCPs, though it concedes that some

have not. This fact provides little support for the Commission’s

position, though, because local governments need the

Commission’s approval to amend their LCPs. Hence, they may

have acquiesced to the Commission’s interpretation simply out

of expediency. No record evidence suggests that environmental

harm followed from any local government’s choice to acquiesce

or not acquiesce to the Commission’s interpretation, so we find

this point inconclusive.

Ultimately, the policy arguments that the parties make

are not so decisive that we are persuaded to deviate from the

plain text. Under the plain text, the Commission has appellate

jurisdiction under subdivision (a)(4)(A) of section 30603 only

when the development is not designated as the principal

permitted use — or uses — under the local government’s LCP.

Shear’s proposed development is for one of the principal

permitted uses of the site. The Commission has no appellate

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jurisdiction over Shear’s permit application under

subdivision (a)(4)(A) of section 30603.

III. DISPOSITION

We conclude that: (1) a court must exercise its

independent judgment to decide whether the Commission

properly exercised jurisdiction on the ground that the

development is in an SCRA; (2) no deference to the

Commission’s or the County’s interpretation of the LCP is

warranted on this record; (3) the proposed development is not in

an SCRA; and (4) the Commission does not have appellate

jurisdiction on the ground that the site is designated with

several principal permitted uses. Consistent with these

conclusions, we hold that the Commission had no appellate

jurisdiction over Shear’s permit application. Accordingly, we

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with

directions. The Court of Appeal is directed to reverse the order

of the trial court denying the petition for writ of administrative

mandate and remand with directions to issue the writ of

administrative mandate. The writ shall direct the Commission

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to vacate its decision and dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction.

GUERRERO, C. J.

We Concur:

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

EVANS, J.

STONE, J.*

Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate

District, Division Seven, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Shear Development Company, LLC v. California

Coastal Commission

__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published)

Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 2/21/24 – 2d Dist.,

Div. 6

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S284378

Date Filed: April 23, 2026

__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: San Luis Obispo

Judge: Rita Federman

__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

FisherBroyles, Pierson Ferdinand, Paul J. Beard II; Pacific Legal

Foundation, Jeremy Talcott and Lawrence Salzman for Plaintiff and

Appellant.

Jon Ansolabehere and Rita L. Neal, County Counsel (San Luis Obispo),

and Daniel P. Solish, Chief Deputy County Counsel, for the County of

San Luis Obispo as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Best Best & Krieger, Amy E. Hoyt, Gregg W. Kettles, Trevor L. Rusin,

Patrick T. Donegan and Antoinette Ranit-Mauro for the League of

California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Matthew Gelfand, Allyson Richman; and Brian A. Manson for

Californians for Homeownership and the California Association of

REALTORS® as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Samuel T. Harbourt and Michael J.

Mongan, State Solicitors General, Daniel A. Olivas, Assistant Attorney

General, Cara M. Newlon and Joshua Patashnik, Deputy State

Solicitors General, Hallie E. Kutak, Christina Bull Arndt and Mitchell

E. Rishe, Deputy Attorneys General, and Helen H. Hong, Principal

Deputy State Solicitor General, for Defendant and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Jeremy Talcott

Pacific Legal Foundation

555 Capitol Mall, Suite 1290

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 419-7111

Cara M. Newlon

Deputy State Solicitor General

300 Spring Street, Suite 7500

Los Angeles, CA 90013

(213) 269-6529

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.