State v. McCarthy

No. 19 April 23, 2026 157

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

Respondent on Review,

v.

CRAIG ABE ALAN McCARTHY,

aka Craig McCarthy, aka Craig Abe Alen McCarthy,

aka Craig Abe Aln McCarthy,

Petitioner on Review.

(CC 20CR35674, 20CR49451, 20CR61735, 20CR53577)

(CA A178739 (Control), A178470, A178741, A178742)

(SC S071140)

En Banc

On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Argued and submitted April 23, 2025, at Eastern Oregon

University, La Grande, Oregon.

Joshua B. Crowther, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon

Public Defense Commission, Salem, argued the cause and

filed the brief for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs

was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate

Section.

Peenesh Shah, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,

argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.

Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and

Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

GARRETT, J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The

cases are remanded to the circuit court for further proceed-

ings consistent with the Court of Appeals’ decision.

______________

* Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Heather Karabeika, Judge.

332 Or App 447 (2024) (nonprecedential memorandum opinion).

158 State v. McCarthy

Cite as 375 Or 157 (2026) 159

GARRETT, J.

This case requires us to decide whether a trailer is

a “vehicle” for purposes of ORS 164.135, which defines the

offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV). Defendant

was charged with two counts of UUV based on evidence that

he knowingly took two utility trailers without the consent

of either owner. At trial, defendant moved for judgment of

acquittal, arguing that a trailer is not a “vehicle” within the

meaning of the statute. The trial court denied the motion

and convicted defendant on both counts. The Court of

Appeals affirmed that ruling.

On review, defendant urges us to hold that a “vehi-

cle” under the statute refers to “driver-operated and self-

propelled vehicles.” Defendant further argues that the

statute should be interpreted in light of its historical pur-

pose, which, defendant contends, was to prevent “joyriding.”

The state responds that the definition of “vehicle” is broad

enough to cover trailers, and it points to legislative history

showing an intent to do so. As explained below, we conclude

that the legislature intended for ORS 164.135 to apply to

trailers. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of

Appeals.1

I. BACKGROUND

Because this case reaches us in the posture of defen-

dant’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion for

judgment of acquittal, we state the facts in the light most

favorable to the state. State v. Sierra, 349 Or 506, 508, 254

P3d 149 (2010), adh’d to as modified on recons, 349 Or 604,

247 P3d 759 (2011).

The charges in this case arise from two separate

incidents in which defendant took a utility trailer that did not

belong to him, without the consent of either owner. Based on

those incidents, the state charged defendant with two counts

of unauthorized use of a vehicle under ORS 164.135(1)(a).

For each count, the state alleged that defendant had

1

In the consolidated appeal, defendant had appealed from judgments of con-

viction in four trial court cases. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded

two convictions in one of the underlying cases, remanded for resentencing, and

otherwise affirmed. Our decision here does not affect that disposition.

160 State v. McCarthy

unlawfully and knowingly taken a “vehicle,” i.e., a utility

trailer, without the owner’s consent.2

Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on

both counts, arguing that a utility trailer is not a “vehicle”

for purposes of ORS 164.135. Defendant argued that “vehi-

cle” under the statute means “motor vehicle” or, at mini-

mum, a “propulsive device,” and, therefore, the two utility

trailers did not qualify as “vehicles.” In response, the state

relied on a Court of Appeals case holding that a trailer is a

“vehicle” for purposes of that statute. State v. Phillips, 315

Or App 178, 187, 501 P3d 537 (2021). Based on the stipulated

facts and applicable case law, including Phillips, the trial

court denied defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal

and found him guilty on both counts of UUV.

On appeal, defendant argued that the legislature

did not intend “vehicle” to include a utility trailer, and that

Phillips had been wrongly decided. Defendant argued that

“vehicle” should be interpreted within the historical context

that gave rise to ORS 164.135 and its predecessors, which,

according to defendant, was the advent of the automobile

and, with it, the phenomenon of “joyriding.” The Court of

Appeals rejected that argument and affirmed defendant’s

UUV convictions. In doing so, the court relied on its con-

struction of the statute in Phillips and declined defendant’s

request to overrule that case. We allowed defendant’s peti-

tion for review.

II. ANALYSIS

ORS 164.135(1)(a)(A) provides, in relevant part,

that a person commits the crime of unauthorized use of a

vehicle when the person “knowingly takes, operates, exer-

cises control over or otherwise uses another’s vehicle, boat or

aircraft[.]” Although the statute contains several elements,

the only one at issue in this case is whether the objects

2

The stipulated facts describe the two items as “a black utility trailer” and

a “4x8 utility trailer,” respectively. The indictments refer to a “trailer” in both

counts. Whether there is a distinction between “trailer” and “utility trailer”

appears immaterial under either party’s theory of the case. Defendant makes no

argument that the statute might apply to some types of trailers but not others.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals appear to have used “trailer” and

“utility trailer” interchangeably, as do we.

Cite as 375 Or 157 (2026) 161

that defendant knowingly took—trailers—are “vehicles.”

Defendant argues that “vehicle” should be understood to

mean “self-propelling and driver-operated property capable

of transporting goods or people on the highway.” Applying

that definition, defendant contends that a trailer is not a

“vehicle.” The state, in contrast, argues that “vehicle” refers

to “something designed or primarily used for transporting

people or goods in a manner involving mechanical operation

on public roads,” a definition that captures trailers.

The parties’ dispute regarding the meaning of

“vehicle” in ORS 164.135 is a matter of statutory interpreta-

tion, which we resolve by considering the text of the statute

in context, as well as any helpful legislative history. State

v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). This

court has construed ORS 164.135 in two previous cases—

State v. Macomber, 269 Or 58, 523 P2d 560 (1974), and State

v. Eastep, 361 Or 746, 399 P3d 979 (2017)—which, together,

provide detailed analysis of the text and context of the stat-

ute. Nonetheless, for reasons explained below, that analysis

is of little help in resolving whether a trailer is a vehicle. As

will be explained, this case ultimately turns more on legis-

lative history, which specifically addresses the question on

review. And, as indicated above, we conclude that the legis-

lature intended for ORS 164.135 to apply to trailers.

A. Text and Context

As noted, ORS 164.135(1) provides, in relevant part:

“A person commits the crime of unauthorized use of a

vehicle when:

“(a)(A) The person knowingly takes, operates, exer-

cises control over or otherwise uses another’s vehicle, boat

or aircraft[.]”

The statute does not define “vehicle,” so, in the absence of

indicators to the contrary, we assume that the legislature

intended to give the term its “plain, natural, and ordinary

meaning.” State v. Eggers, 372 Or 789, 798, 558 P3d 830

(2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, as

we often do, we “turn to dictionaries as a starting point in

our analysis because they provide a range of possible mean-

ings that a given word could reasonably have.” Id. at 746.

162 State v. McCarthy

Consistent with that methodology, in this court’s

previous analysis of ORS 164.135, we noted the following

definition of “vehicle”:

“5 : a means of carrying or transporting something :

conveyance: as a : a carrier of goods or passengers ***

specif : motor vehicle *** b : a container in which some-

thing is conveyed *** c : a piece of mechanized equipment

*** d : a propulsive device.

Eastep, 361 Or at 751 (quoting Webster’s Third New Int’l

Dictionary 2538 (unabridged ed 2002)). We explained that

dictionary definitions suggested that a “vehicle” is “defined

in terms of its function, namely, transportation.” Id. at 752.

On that, the parties agree. Both parties incorporate trans-

portation of people or goods in their respective definitions.

The parties also agree, however, that the ordinary, dictio-

nary definitions do not resolve the issue before us. Defendant

argues that dictionary definitions are inconclusive because

they could lead to absurd results, such as criminal charges

for the unlawful use of a shopping cart or a wheelbarrow,

both of which are vehicles under the broad dictionary defi-

nitions. The state agrees that the dictionary definitions are

inconclusive, noting that the dictionary definitions could

apply equally to the overly broad examples cited by defen-

dant and to what the state views as defendant’s overly nar-

row definition.

The parties also agree that the triad in which the

term “vehicle” appears throughout the statute—“vehicle,

boat or aircraft”—offers some insight into the legislature’s

intent. Both parties invoke the principle of noscitur a sociis,

“an old maxim which summarizes the rule both of language

and of law that the meaning of words may be indicated or

controlled by those with which they are associated.” State v.

Walker, 356 Or 4, 15 n 5, 333 P3d 316 (2014) (internal quota-

tion marks omitted). Applying that maxim to “vehicle, boat

or aircraft,” defendant contends that what unites the three

is that they are all “self-propelled transportation devices”

and “distinct from the property items that [they] might tow

or pull.” The state, applying the same maxim, argues that

what unites the three is something more general: They

are all designed to transport goods and people. The state

Cite as 375 Or 157 (2026) 163

counters defendant’s argument by pointing out that many

boats and some aircraft, including gliders, are not self-

propelled, and that the legislative history indicates that the

legislature intended to include some of those vehicles.

The verbs in the statute also inform the context in

which the legislature used the term “vehicle.” As noted above,

the crime of UUV requires that a person knowingly “takes,

operates, exercises control over or otherwise uses another’s

vehicle, boat or aircraft.” The range of verbs indicates that

the statute can be violated by a person who uses but neither

takes, operates, nor rides in the vehicle. Similarly, a person

can “take” or “exercise control over” a vehicle in violation

of the statute, neither of which would seem to require that

the vehicle be self-propelled or driver-operated. The range of

verbs, therefore, suggests that the statute covers more than

“joyriding.” And, as this court has previously recognized,

by its use of verbs the statute “suggests that the interest

that is designed to be protected is not only the owner’s abil-

ity to use a vehicle for transport, but for other purposes, as

well.” Eastep, 361 Or at 753, 755 (citing sleeping and storage

as examples of “other purposes”). In short, both defendant

and the state propose plausible interpretations of the text

and context, although the legislature’s choice of wording

suggests a purpose broader than to prohibit “joyriding,” as

defendant urges.

We first construed ORS 164.135 in Macomber, 269 Or

at 60, concluding that the statute is “broad enough to include

situations in which the exercise of control over an operable

vehicle consists of something less than the operation of the

vehicle.” The defendant in that case had possessed numerous

parts of a partially disassembled stolen truck. Id. at 59. On

those facts, we noted that the defendant had possessed at

most “a wrecked truck, which would not constitute a vehicle

capable of operation.” Id. at 61 n 2. Macomber, therefore,—in

concluding that ORS 164.135 does not require “operation of

the vehicle”—established an outer limit at which an other-

wise operable vehicle is so disassembled or in such a state

of disrepair that it ceases to be “operable” and, therefore, no

longer qualifies as a vehicle under the statute.

164 State v. McCarthy

In Eastep, this court again considered whether the

statute applied to a truck in significant disrepair. 361 Or

at 748, 750. The truck did not run, and the owner had used

it primarily for storage. Id. at 748. After it was returned

to her, the owner sold it for scrap. Id. The mechanic who

examined the truck concluded that it was “not capable of

moving under its own power,” “not operable,” and “strictly

just scrap.” Id. at 749 (internal quotation marks omit-

ted). On those facts, the defendant argued that, under

Macomber, the truck was not a vehicle. We agreed. In doing

so, we explained that a “vehicle” need not “currently be in

operating condition” and, under the express terms of the

statute, may require “maintenance” or “repairs.”3 Id. at

757. A truck that requires “reasonable repairs” to be made

operable is, we concluded, still a “vehicle.” Id. at 757. In

contrast, a “wrecked” truck—one that could not be put in

operating condition even with reasonable repairs, as was

the case in Macomber—did not qualify as a “vehicle.” Id.

Whether a vehicle falls on one side of that line or another,

we explained, is generally “a question for the trier of fact.”

Id. at 758. On the facts of that case, however, we concluded

that a rational factfinder could not have found that the

truck could be put in operable condition even with reason-

able repairs. Id. at 759.

Neither Macomber nor Eastep is of much assistance

in resolving whether a trailer is a vehicle. They establish

that an otherwise operable vehicle may be so disassembled

or be in such a state of disrepair that, even with reasonable

repairs, it no longer qualifies as a vehicle under the statute.

But those cases both involved a truck, which undisputedly

3

The current version of ORS 164.135(1)(c) provides:

“(1) A person commits the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle when:

“* * * * *

“(c) Having custody of a vehicle, boat or aircraft pursuant to an agree-

ment between the person or another and the owner thereof whereby the per-

son or another is to perform for compensation a specific service for the owner

involving the maintenance, repair or use of such vehicle, boat or aircraft, the

person intentionally uses or operates it, without consent of the owner, for the

person’s own purpose in a manner constituting a gross deviation from the

agreed purpose[.]”

(Emphases added.). Thus, the statute presumes that a “vehicle” may be in a con-

dition of temporary inoperability.

Cite as 375 Or 157 (2026) 165

would have been a vehicle if operable, and therefore do not

help us understand the scope of the term.

Defendant nonetheless relies on Eastep, arguing

that the truck in that case—because it was “just scrap,” used

as storage, not capable of moving under its own power, but

capable of being towed—was effectively a trailer. Defendant’s

argument, however, does not take into account that operat-

ing a trailer differs from operating a truck. A truck that is

incapable of moving under its own power, must be towed,

and requires extensive repairs may be inoperable—”strictly

just scrap,” as the mechanic in Eastep described it—and,

therefore, not a “vehicle” for purposes of ORS 164.135. But,

given the different purposes and functions of a trailer, it

does not follow that an inoperable truck that must be towed

and cannot be made operable with reasonable repairs is

the same thing as a trailer. Nor does it follow that a trailer

that is incapable of moving under its own power and must

be towed is “inoperable.” Such a truck may be “strictly just

scrap”; the trailer, however, remains operable. Indeed, that

is precisely how people use trailers.4

As additional context, the state argues that other

paragraphs of the statute support its argument that the leg-

islature did not intend “vehicle” to require self-propulsion.

In Eastep, this court drew support for its conclusion that

ORS 164.135 does not require a “vehicle” to be currently

operable from two paragraphs of the statute, which have

since been renumbered but otherwise remain the same.5

ORS 164.135(1)(c) makes it a crime to use or operate a vehi-

cle entrusted to a person for maintenance or repairs in gross

deviation of the service agreement. ORS 164.135(1)(d) makes

it a crime to retain or withhold a vehicle entrusted to a per-

son after the specified return date in gross deviation of the

agreement. This court explained that neither of those para-

graphs required the vehicle to be currently operable. Id. at

4

The dictionary defines “trailer,” as relevant here, as “3: a vehicle or one in

a succession of vehicles hauled usu. by some other vehicle: as * * * c: a nonauto-

motive highway or industrial-plant vehicle designed to be hauled (as by a tractor,

motort ruck [sic], or passenger vehicle.” Webster’s at 2424.

5

In 2019, the legislature amended ORS 164.135, adding paragraph (1)(b)

and therefore moving the remaining two paragraphs to (1)(c) and (1)(d) respec-

tively. Or. Laws 2019, ch 530, § 1.

166 State v. McCarthy

753-4. Based on that observation, the state concludes that,

if the statute does not require current operability, it cannot

require the capacity for self-propulsion. But, as this court

recognized in Eastep, a vehicle that is not currently operable

may still have the capacity for self-propulsion and may, with

reasonable repairs, be put back in operable condition. Id. at

757. Eastep, therefore, undercuts the state’s argument that

the capacity for self-propulsion is not required.

Finally, the state argues that related statutes fur-

ther support its argument that, for the purposes of ORS

164.135, a “vehicle” need not be driver-operated or self-

propelled. Former ORS 482.030(4) (1969), repealed by Or

Laws 1983, ch 338, § 978 defined vehicle as “every device

in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be

transported or drawn upon a public highway, except devices

moved by human power or used exclusively upon station-

ary rails or tracks.” Former ORS 486.011(11) (1969), repealed

by Or Laws 1983, ch 338, § 978 provided, “ ‘Vehicle’ means

every trailer or semitrailer, and every device which is self-

propelled or propelled by electric power from overhead trol-

ley wires, but not operated upon rails.”6 Two of the three

statutes that were the precursors of ORS 164.135—former

ORS 164.650 and former ORS 164.660 but not former ORS

164.670, all three repealed by Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 432—

incorporated by reference definitions from the Motor Vehicle

Code. In drafting ORS 164.135, however, the subcommittee

chose not to incorporate any of those definitions. As the sub-

committee explained, it wanted to avoid the possibility that

a change in the Motor Vehicle Code could alter the Criminal

Code. Tape Recording, Criminal Law Revision Commission,

Subcommittee No. 1, Apr 6, 1968, Tape 11, Side 1. Under

those circumstances, the definitions in existing law cannot

bear much weight.

Defendant, by contrast, urges us to interpret the

statute in light of its historical context, which he character-

izes as the development of cars and “joyriding.” The problem

is that, even if defendant were correct about that original

6

Former ORS 482.030 (1969) was included in the chapter on “Operators’ and

Chauffeurs’ Licenses.” Former ORS 486.011 (1969) was included in the chapter on

“Financial Responsibility Law.”

Cite as 375 Or 157 (2026) 167

purpose, the scope of the statute has expanded. The origi-

nal 1911 law—a predecessor to ORS 164.135(1)(a)—applied

to “[e]very person who takes or uses without authority any

vehicle without intent to steal.” Or Laws 1911, ch 174 § 24.

Current ORS 164.135(1)(a) applies when a “person know-

ingly takes, operates, exercises control over or otherwise

uses another’s vehicle, boat or aircraft[.]” Thus, the current

statute expressly covers more property and more conduct

than the original version. And, as the state points out, not

all boats and aircraft are self-propelled.

In sum, the dictionary definitions of “vehicle” and

the verbs in the statute suggest, as we emphasized in Eastep,

that the legislature was mindful of the variety of ways that

people use vehicles, including for sleeping and storage.

Defendant’s argument that the statute was intended only

to cover joyriding is difficult to square with the text, which,

as noted, provides that a person can violate the statute by

“using” the vehicle without taking, operating, or riding in it.

B. Legislative History

ORS 164.135 was enacted in 1971 as part of the

complete revision of the Oregon Criminal Code. Or Laws

1971, ch 743 § 134; see also Eastep, 361 Or at 756. In 1967,

the legislature created the Oregon Criminal Law Revision

Commission—a body consisting of legislators and nonlegis-

lators—to revise the criminal laws of the state. See State v.

Garcia, 288 Or 413, 416, 605 P2d 671 (1980) (describing the

history of the commission). The commission based much of

its project on the Model Penal Code (MPC), developed by the

American Law Institute. Proposed Oregon Criminal Code,

Final Draft and Report, Foreword, XXII (July 1970). As

defendant emphasizes, the MPC version of the UUV statute

expressly limited its application to “motor-propelled vehi-

cles.” The subcommittee charged with drafting the statutes

on theft and related offenses was chaired by Senator John

D. Burns and included Project Director Don Paillette as a

member. In drafting the UUV statute, the subcommittee was

consolidating three existing statutes—former ORS 164.670,

former ORS 164.650, and part of former ORS164.660. See

Eastep, 361 Or at 754-56. In its first preliminary draft, the

subcommittee initially followed the MPC version of UUV.

168 State v. McCarthy

As Director Paillette explained in presenting his

first preliminary draft to the subcommittee, he had expressly

limited the draft to “motor-propelled vehicles” because, in

his view, that was the type of property that the statute was

designed to protect. Tape Recording, Criminal Law Revision

Commission, Subcommittee No. 1, Apr 6, 1968, Tape 11,

Side 1. Paillette noted, though, that the draft’s limitation to

“motor-propelled vehicles” departed from the existing stat-

ute, former ORS 164.670, which covered “any vehicle, water-

craft or aircraft”7 and, he explained, could be interpreted

broadly to include “other types of property, other than motor

vehicles.” Id. On the other hand, he cited a 1963 decision by

this court, which had characterized a previous version of

the statute as “the ‘joy-riding’ statute” and described it as

“ ‘designed to condemn the acts of a person who takes anoth-

er’s automobile without permission[.]’ ” Id. (quoting State v.

Eyle, 236 Or 199, 201, 388 P2d 110 (1963)).

In that meeting, however, the subcommittee decided

to remove “motor-propelled” from the draft statute and to

replace it with the phrase “vehicle, boat or aircraft,” closely

tracking the existing statute. Tape Recording, Criminal

Law Revision Commission, Subcommittee No. 1, Apr 6, 1968,

Tape 12, Side 1; see also Minutes, Criminal Law Revision

Commission, Subcommittee No. 1, Apr 6, 1968, 14 (“It was

then moved that the preliminary draft on unauthorized use

of a vehicle be approved as amended and this motion also

carried without opposition.”). Thus, to the extent that the

first preliminary draft relied on Eyle’s characterization of a

previous version of the statute as “the ‘joy-riding’ statute,”

the subcommittee rejected that proposal and broadened the

scope of the statute. The next draft—Preliminary Draft No.

2—incorporated those changes and included the commen-

tary that, with minor modifications, was later presented to

the legislature with the commission’s final draft. In that

commentary, the subcommittee explained, “The first draft

of the section limited its coverage to ‘motor-propelled’ vehi-

cles only; however, the subcommittee felt that the proposal

should protect owners of such things as trailers, sailboats

7

In 1965, the legislature amended former ORS 164.670, broadening the stat-

ute from “any vehicle” in former ORS 164.670 (1963) to “any vehicle, watercraft or

aircraft.” Or. Laws 1965, ch 552, § 1.

Cite as 375 Or 157 (2026) 169

and gliders.” Commentary to Criminal Law Revision

Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Preliminary

Draft No. 2, 3 (Apr 1968) (emphasis added).

When Senator Burns presented the subcommittee’s

Preliminary Draft No. 2 to the full commission, he referred

the commissioners to the minutes of the subcommittee’s

meeting on April 6, 1968. Tape Recording, Criminal Law

Revision Commission, July 19, 1968, Tape 9, Side 1. The

commission unanimously approved the draft for circulation.

Id.; see also Minutes, Criminal Law Revision Commission,

July 19, 1968, 2-3. The full commission later approved the

circulated draft of the statute, see Minutes, Criminal Law

Revision Commission, May 14, 1970, 35, and the legislature

enacted it into law, Or. Laws 1971, ch 743, § 134. See also

Eastep, 361 Or at 757.

Pointing out that the audio recording of the sub-

committee meeting on April 6, 1968, makes no mention of

trailers, defendant argues that the commentary therefore

conflicts with the subcommittee hearing and that we should

“give greater weight to the actual hearing.” The state count-

ers that the commentary does not conflict with the subcom-

mittee hearing and that, even if it did, more weight should

be given to the commentary. For several reasons, we agree

with the state.

First, this court has repeatedly relied on the com-

mentary as authoritative legislative history for the 1971

revisions to the Criminal Code. See, e.g., State v. Williams,

374 Or 648, 582 P3d 637 (2025) (relying on the “official”

commentary to construe ORS 164.395); State v. Wallace, 373

Or 122, 561 P3d 602 (2024) (relying on the commentary to

construe ORS 163.305(3) and ORS 163.315(1)(b)); State ex rel

Turner v. Frankel, 322 Or 363, 908 P2d 293 (1995) (relying

on the commentary to construe ORS 131.525(1)(b)(D)). As we

recently reiterated, we “generally assume[ ] in the absence

of other legislative history that the Legislative Assembly

accepted the commission’s explanations.” Williams, 374 Or at

672 (internal quotation marks omitted). To be sure, we have

also said that, when appropriate, we will rely on the “discus-

sions that preceded the adoption of the final draft” as rele-

vant legislative history. State v. Carpenter, 365 Or 488, 497

170 State v. McCarthy

n 4, 446 P3d 1273 (2019). But we must not lose sight of the

fact that it was the written commentary, and not the earlier

subcommittee deliberations, that the legislature received as

the official record and recommendations of the commission.

We will not assume that the legislature was aware of, much

less intended to incorporate, subcommittee discussions that

may be inconsistent with or not reflected in the final com-

mentary that the commission presented. Cf., e.g., Kohring v.

Ballard, 355 Or 297, 311-12, 325 P3d 717 (2014) (evaluating

statements of nonlegislators and explaining that in some

cases “it is appropriate to give greater weight to such legis-

lative history, as when the nonlegislators were the drafters

and principal proponents of a bill, and it is clear that the

legislature relied on their explanations.” (Emphasis added.)).8

For similar reasons, we are not persuaded by defen-

dant’s argument that the commentary’s reference is “vague”

and “unhelpful” because the commentary does not further

describe what it meant by “trailer.” The question before this

court is whether the legislature intended to include “trail-

ers” within the meaning of “vehicles” for purposes of ORS

164.135. In resolving that question, the fact that the com-

mentary specifically describes an intent to include “trail-

ers” is far more meaningful than any failure to distinguish

among different types of trailers.

Second, even if we were inclined to place equal

weight on the subcommittee discussions as on what is

reflected in the commission’s final work product, we are

not persuaded by defendant’s arguments regarding those

discussions. Defendant contends that the commentary’s

inclusion of “trailers” is not supported by the audio record

8

Defendant cites authorities expressing a preference for audio recordings

over “minutes,” but those statements have been made regarding legislative

committee hearings. Wright v. Turner, 354 Or 815, 823 n 5, 322 P3d 476 (2014)

(“Because no audio recording is available, we quote from the minutes.”); Vector

Marketing Corp. v. Employment Dept., 275 Or App 999, 1008 n 6, 365 P3d 686

(2015); Jack Landau, Oregon Statutory Construction, 97 Or L Rev 583, 700 (2019)

(“The best evidence of what transpired in a committee hearing is the audio

recording.”). This case does not involve legislative committee hearings; it con-

cerns the actions of the commission, for which the written commentary is the offi-

cial record. In addition, nothing indicates that the legislature was made aware

of—much less relied on—the subcommittee’s internal deliberations preceding the

published commentary.

Cite as 375 Or 157 (2026) 171

of the subcommittee hearing. Defendant is correct that the

subcommittee discussed sailboats and gliders, but did not

mention trailers. That incongruity does not, however, sup-

port defendant’s argument that the subcommittee removed

“motor-propelled” from the definition of vehicle “only to

make it obvious that the statute would cover non-motor-

ized vehicles that could be operated and driven, such as,

sailboats and gliders[.]” (Emphasis in original.) As noted,

Director Paillette initially took the position that the stat-

ute should be limited to “motor-propelled” vehicles and that

there was not a compelling reason to include other types

of vehicles, citing sailboats as an example. Tape Recording,

Criminal Law Revision Commission, Subcommittee No. 1,

Apr 6, 1968, Tape 11, Side 1. One member pointed out that,

without “motor-propelled,” “vehicle” could be interpreted

to include a wheelbarrow. Id. Chairman Burns noted that

removing “motor-propelled” could lead to “some squirrely

cases,” citing bicycles as an example. Id. Nonetheless, after

much deliberation—which included discussion of automo-

biles, horsedrawn carriages, surreys, buckboards, yachts,

rowboats, sailboats, bicycles, wheelbarrows, hot-air ballons,

airplanes, and gliders—the subcommittee agreed to remove

“motor-propelled” and replace it with “vehicle, boat or air-

craft.” It is not possible to discern from that discussion any

clear intention to include only “non-motorized vehicles that

could be operated and driven,” as defendant contends.

Nor does the subcommittee discussion otherwise

reflect any clear intention to exclude trailers. Indeed, of the

myriad devices discussed, the subcommittee expressed a

clear intent only as to some of them. Motor-propelled vehi-

cles, sailboats, bnd gliders were clearly included. Buckboards,

surreys, and horse-drawn carriages were clearly excluded.

Bicycles proved more difficult; although the subcommittee

appeared skeptical of including them, it did not express

a clear intention one way or the other. Trailers, as noted,

were not mentioned at all. Therefore, the extent to which

the commentary’s express inclusion of trailers does or does

not conflict with the subcommittee discussion depends on

the strength of the comparisons that may be drawn between

trailers and those devices that the subcommittee clearly

intended either to include or exclude. Defendant suggests

172 State v. McCarthy

that trailers are analogous to horse-drawn carriages and,

thus, the commentary conflicts with the subcommittee hear-

ing. The state counters that trailers are analogous to gliders

and, thus, there is no conflict. In all events, this is not a case

where the commentary clearly says one thing and the record

of the subcommittee proceeding clearly says the opposite.

Rather, the commentary expressly includes trailers, and the

subcommittee deliberations were, at best, inconclusive. And

it is the commentary that was before the legislature when

the statute was passed.

For the foregoing reasons, based on the text, con-

text, and legislative history, we conclude that the legisla-

ture intended “vehicle” to include trailers for the purposes

of ORS 164.135.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

The cases are remanded to the circuit court for further pro-

ceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals’ decision.