In re Robinson

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 25-BG-0333

IN RE JEAN M. ROBINSON, PETITIONER.

A Suspended Member of the Bar

of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

(Bar Registration No. 484954)

On Exceptions to a Recommendation of the Board on

Professional Responsibility Ad Hoc Hearing Committee

(BDN: 23-BD-039; DDN: 2023-D134)

(Argued January 27, 2026 Decided April 23, 2026)

Hilary Holt LoCicero for petitioner.

Theodore (Jack) Metzler, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, with whom

Hamilton P. Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, Julia L. Porter, Deputy Disciplinary

Counsel, and Jelani C. Lowery, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, were on the brief

for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, and BECKWITH and SHANKER,

Associate Judges.

BECKWITH, Associate Judge: Jean M. Robinson, an attorney suspended by this

court in 2019 from practicing law for eighteen months, seeks reinstatement to the

Bar of the District of Columbia. Following two evidentiary hearings, an ad hoc

hearing committee recommended that we deny her reinstatement petition because

2

Ms. Robinson failed to demonstrate her fitness by clear and convincing evidence.

For the reasons that follow, we decline to adopt that recommendation and grant her

petition.

I. Facts and Procedural History

This court approved a negotiated-discipline petition that suspended Ms.

Robinson from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for eighteen months

after determining that she had “intentionally prejudic[ed] her client in the course of

the attorney-client relationship, reveal[ed] client confidences or secrets, and act[ed]

with dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” In re Robinson, 207 A.3d 169,

169 (D.C. 2019) (per curiam) (mem.). 1 Ms. Robinson was disciplined for her

conduct when she was the general counsel of SourceAmerica, a Virginia-based non-

profit that became the subject of federal criminal investigations and litigation during

her tenure. Among other transgressions, the hearing committee found that she

revealed SourceAmerica’s confidential information to an affiliate, knowing that it

would reach federal investigators. She did not violate the rules to benefit herself,

but rather because she thought that SourceAmerica would correct its wrongdoing if

1

As a result of those proceedings, Ms. Robinson was reciprocally disciplined

in Wisconsin. In 2021, her Wisconsin law license was reinstated after she showed

that she was fit to practice by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.

3

she disclosed the information.

After her suspension period elapsed, Ms. Robinson petitioned for the

reinstatement of her D.C. law license. At the first of two evidentiary hearings, Ms.

Robinson presented the testimony of two live witnesses—attorneys John Daniels,

who had known her since she was in law school, and Kelly Kramer, who represented

her in proceedings stemming from her misconduct.

Ms. Robinson also testified at that hearing. Based on her testimony and

proposed findings of fact, the hearing committee became concerned that she had

engaged in the unlicensed practice of law years prior in both D.C. and Virginia—

and that she was now being evasive about it. Prior to 2004, Ms. Robinson was

licensed only in Wisconsin, but she began providing legal services in D.C. in 1990

and in Virginia in 1996, despite not obtaining a D.C. law license until 2004 or a

Virginia corporate counsel certificate until 2008.2 To address its concerns, the

hearing committee asked Ms. Robinson to file a sworn statement “explaining

whether . . . there were applicable exceptions that allowed her to practice law in”

those jurisdictions. Ms. Robinson filed a supplemental affidavit in which she stated

that, as best she could recall, after 1990 she “served as outside general counsel for

2

This certificate allowed her to provide legal services as in-house counsel

without becoming a member of the Virginia Bar.

4

various national 501(c)(3) non-profit clients, which [she] understood was

permissible based on exceptions to the Rules of the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals and the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct[,] which allowed foreign

lawyers to represent corporate clients in federal matters.”

The hearing committee held a second evidentiary hearing focused on the

alleged unauthorized practice of law at which Ms. Robinson again testified. The

committee reassured Ms. Robinson that it was “not concerned so much with the

unauthorized practice of law,” but that instead “this [wa]s a credibility issue.” Ms.

Robinson testified that she did not initially become a member of the D.C. Bar

because her work was federal in nature and when state-law questions arose, she used

outside counsel. Though she could not recall the wording of the D.C. Bar Rule

governing the unauthorized practice of law in effect during the relevant period, she

believed it was materially different than the modern analogous rule and that it

permitted her to avoid becoming a member of the D.C. Bar so long as her practice

remained exclusively federal. She also could not remember the wording of the

Virginia rule in effect at the time but believed that rule also authorized her conduct.

She recalled that she, the D.C. firm she was employed by, and the American

Corporate Counsel Association all “looked at multijurisdictional practice issues” and

“felt like [she] was within” those rules “based on the practice of having a federal

procurement practice.”

5

Ultimately, the hearing committee issued a report recommending that we deny

Ms. Robinson’s petition for reinstatement because she had failed to meet her burden

of proving her present character to practice law by clear and convincing evidence.

II. Analysis

“Although we place great weight on the recommendation[] of the . . . Hearing

Committee, this court has the ultimate authority to decide whether to grant a petition

for reinstatement.” In re Yum, 187 A.3d 1289, 1291 (D.C. 2018) (quoting In re Sabo,

49 A.3d 1219, 1224 (D.C. 2012)). 3 An individual seeking reinstatement has the

3

At oral argument, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) suggested that

it would be unprecedented for this court to grant Ms. Robinson’s reinstatement

petition when the hearing committee recommended otherwise. First, we note that in

In re Sabo, we granted a petition for reinstatement even though the Board on

Professional Responsibility opposed the petition. 49 A.3d at 1221. Though it is true

that in that case both the Bar Counsel and the hearing committee recommended

reinstatement, id., we have been consistently clear that “this court has the ultimate

authority to decide whether to grant a petition for reinstatement,” id. at 1224; accord

In re Bettis, 644 A.2d 1023, 1027 (D.C. 1994). That is, we conduct an independent

inquiry into whether the petitioner has met the reinstatement criteria. In re Sabo, 49

A.3d at 1224. Our Bar Rules also make clear that this court is the final arbiter of

reinstatement petitions. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16(a) (“A disbarred attorney . . . shall

not resume the practice of law until reinstated by order of the Court.”); id. § 16(d)(2)

(“Within sixty days after the conclusion of its hearing on reinstatement and receipt

of the final briefs by the parties, the Hearing Committee shall submit to the Court a

report containing its findings and recommendation . . . .” (emphasis added)). Those

rules are also explicit that we need not procure the Board’s recommendation prior to

our decision, underscoring our ultimate authority in this area. Id. § 16(d)(2) (“In its

discretion, the Court may request a recommendation by the Board concerning

6

burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence (1) that she “has the moral

qualifications, competency, and learning in law required for readmission,” and

(2) that her reinstatement “will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the

Bar, or to the administration of justice, or subversive to the public interest.” Id. at

1291-92 (citation modified) (quoting D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16(d)(1)). We “defer to the

Hearing Committee’s findings of fact, including credibility determinations, unless

those findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” In re Stuart, 290 A.3d 20,

27 (D.C. 2023).

Our analysis is guided by the five Roundtree factors. See In re Yum, 187 A.3d

at 1292 (citing In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C. 1985)). First, we

examine “the nature and circumstances of the misconduct for which the attorney was

disciplined,” and where the petitioner’s conduct is closely intertwined with her role

as an attorney, we proceed to apply heightened scrutiny to the remaining factors. Id.

Second, we evaluate “whether the attorney recognizes the seriousness of the

misconduct.” Id. Third, we consider “the attorney’s conduct since discipline was

imposed, including the steps taken to remedy past wrongs and prevent future ones.”

Id. Fourth, and most important here, we look to “the attorney’s present character.”

reinstatement.” (emphasis added)). Though we afford great weight to the hearing

committee’s position, there is no barrier preventing this court from granting Ms.

Robinson’s reinstatement petition despite the committee’s contrary

recommendation.

7

Id. Fifth, we evaluate “the attorney’s present qualifications and competence to

practice law.” Id.

As to the first factor, the hearing committee noted—and Ms. Robinson now

concedes—that heightened scrutiny applies in this case because the nature of Ms.

Robinson’s violation was that she “repeatedly and intentionally betrayed her client

by violating client confidences over a long period of time,” which is closely

intertwined with the practice of law. See id. at 1292. We concur and therefore apply

heightened scrutiny to the remaining factors.

The hearing committee found that Ms. Robinson satisfied her heightened

burden as to Roundtree factors two, three, and five—and we agree. As to the second

factor, the hearing committee found that Ms. Robinson “does recognize the

seriousness of her misconduct” as reflected by the fact that “[s]he testified at length

as to her better understanding of what she had done wrong, [and] its cost to her client,

the legal community and to herself.” Further, it determined that Mr. Daniels and

Mr. Kramer had both credibly testified that “she appreciated how serious her

misconduct had been.” As to the third factor, the hearing committee concluded that

Ms. Robinson had attempted to remedy her past wrongs and was unlikely to repeat

her past misconduct, including because she cooperated with SourceAmerica after it

8

discovered her violations. 4 And as to the fifth factor, the hearing committee found

that Ms. Robinson “appears to be an intelligent person who has attempted to keep

up with her areas of interest in the law,” including by taking several continuing legal

education (CLE) courses. We discern no reason to deviate from the hearing

committee’s recommendations as to factors one, two, three, and five, and as the

Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) does not now argue that we should, we forgo

a more thorough breakdown of our reasoning.

As to the fourth Roundtree factor, the hearing committee determined that Ms.

Robinson failed to meet her burden. On this factor, she is “required to prove that

those traits that led to disbarment ‘no longer exist and, indeed, that [s]he is a changed

individual having full appreciation of the wrongfulness of h[er] conduct and a new

determination to adhere to the high standards of integrity and legal competence’”

that our Bar demands. In re Sabo, 49 A.3d at 1232 (quoting In re Turner, 915 A.2d

351, 356 (D.C. 2006) (per curiam)). As an initial matter, the hearing committee was

4

In so doing, the committee did note that “[s]ince the discipline was imposed,

[Ms. Robinson] has not practiced law, although her license in Wisconsin was

reinstated in 2021. Nor has she sought gainful employment apart from the consulting

work done in the last few years.” It further stated that although she had

“cooperate[d] with SourceAmerica in the aftermath of her betrayal[,] . . . she had

little choice in the matter” because “[h]er client sued her and she needed to cooperate

to help settle the dispute.” Nevertheless, it concluded that Ms. Robinson “is unlikely

to repeat [her] violations” and that “[i]t is fair to say that she has attempted to remedy

past wrongs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

9

troubled by what it perceived as Ms. Robinson’s “rambling and often not on point,

sometimes approaching being evasive answers” at the second evidentiary hearing,

focused on the alleged unauthorized practice of law violations, which indicated to

the committee that she “ha[d] not recognized, or at least admitted, that she did not

abide by the ethical rules.” The committee also determined that the testimony of her

live witnesses and her other evidence of present character did not rise to the

heightened clear-and-convincing standard she must meet here. We disagree on both

grounds, which we address in turn.

A. Unauthorized Practice of Law

Before our court, ODC admits that it is “not clear that [we] should defer to the

hearing committee’s findings with respect to unauthorized practice in D.C.” because

(1) “[t]he text of the rule as it stood before the overhaul is not readily available

online,” and (2) “there were several widespread misconceptions about the

unauthorized practice rule in the 1990s and early 2000s, particularly with regard to

attorneys whose work involved federal matters.” ODC similarly asserts that it is

“unclear that [we] should defer to the hearing committee’s findings with regard to

unauthorized practice in Virginia and the reasons Robinson may have determined

10

not to seek admission there.”5 We accordingly decline to defer to those

determinations. See In re Tun, 195 A.3d 65, 73 (D.C. 2018) (explaining that this

court does not defer to determinations of “ultimate facts that are really conclusions

of law” (citation omitted)).

Bolstering that conclusion is the dearth of reasoning in the hearing

committee’s report regarding its finding that Ms. Robinson had engaged in the

unauthorized practice of law—as the report did not substantively apply either the

D.C. or Virginia rule6 in place at the relevant time despite acknowledging that there

were “limited exceptions allowing for practice before certain federal agencies” and

that the D.C. rule had potentially been amended during the relevant period.

We further opt not to defer to the hearing committee’s characterization of Ms.

Robinson’s testimony on the matter—“rambling and often not on point, sometimes

approaching being evasive”—because it was infected by the hearing committee’s

belief that Ms. Robinson knew that she had engaged in the unauthorized practice of

5

The hearing committee had speculated in its report that Ms. Robinson would

have had difficulty becoming a member of the Virginia Bar because of her prior

Wisconsin discipline and because she had not yet been licensed to practice law for

five years, which the Virginia Bar required to be admitted on motion.

6

The report states that the hearing committee’s “research did not suggest that

there has ever been” a federal-matter exception in the Virginia rules, but ODC’s brief

cites to various Virginia opinions discussing such an exception.

11

law and was lying about it. The hearing committee was clear that its “concerns about

[her] character would have been assuaged had she admitted to the unauthorized

practice of law.” But given ODC’s representations to this court, there was

insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that she knowingly engaged in the

unauthorized practice of law and was lying about it. This is therefore the rare

situation where the hearing committee’s credibility determination does not warrant

the normal deference because it was based on facts unsupported by the record. See

Murray v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 765 A.2d 980, 983-85 (D.C. 2001).

We are similarly unpersuaded by the hearing committee’s criticism of Ms.

Robinson for failing to “cite the exceptions in the D.C. and Virginia Rules she

referenced,” which it took to be evidence of “her credibility and her attitude toward

the ethical rules of the legal profession.”7 As ODC now admits, no one in the hearing

7

The hearing committee also took issue with Ms. Robinson failing to “say

that she limited her work for her clients to federal matters” in her supplemental

affidavit. We agree with Ms. Robinson that her supplemental affidavit, which states

that she “served as outside general counsel for various national 501(c)(3) non-profit

clients, which [she] understood was permissible based on exceptions to” the rules

that “allowed foreign lawyers to represent corporate clients in federal matters,” is

best read to contain the implied assertion that her work during that period was, in

fact, limited to federal matters. That reading is strengthened by her testimony at the

second evidentiary hearing that her work at the D.C. law firm “was all federal,” that

her work as an outside general counsel involved handling issues that arose “on the

federal level,” and that when state-law issues arose during her position as an outside

general counsel, she “used outside counsel.”

12

had a copy of the D.C. rule and it was not freely available online, and so we do not

see it as evidence that she was being evasive. 8

B. Present Character

We turn next to whether Ms. Robinson proved by clear and convincing

evidence her present fit character to practice law. A petitioner seeking reinstatement

is required to “put on live witnesses familiar with the underlying misconduct who

can provide credible evidence of [her] present good character.” In re Yum, 187 A.3d

at 1292 (quoting Sabo, 49 A.3d at 1232). Citing In re Yum, the hearing committee—

despite crediting the testimony of both of Ms. Robinson’s live witnesses—concluded

that Ms. Robinson “offered [it] very little with which to work” given that (1) neither

of the witnesses had “had regular contact with [her] since her suspension,” and

(2) the witnesses’ “acquaintance with her was largely professional and not personal.”

Mr. Daniels, a Wisconsin attorney, told the committee that he had known Ms.

Robinson since she was a law student, tried to recruit her to work for his firm

multiple times, and served on the SourceAmerica board of directors for a portion of

8

As a result, we need not reach the question whether the hearing committee

appropriately inquired into the alleged uncharged conduct, including whether it gave

Ms. Robinson proper notice, because we assign no weight to the hearing committee’s

conclusions and determinations stemming from that inquiry.

13

the time that she was general counsel. Over the past five years, he remembered

speaking with Ms. Robinson fewer than twenty times. He “had a chance to observe

[Ms. Robinson] in her career from the time of being a law student to observing her

in her roles as general counsel for two organizations,” and he felt he “had a fairly

good ability to observe her temperament and her abilities.” Regarding her work at

SourceAmerica, he personally observed her legal work, which he thought was

“superior in a very, very complicated environment.” He also stated that he “was

aware of the general nature of [Ms. Robinson’s] violation” of the ethical rules that

led to her suspension and that she had been “open and candid with [him] regarding

the circumstances of her discipline by the D.C. Bar.” His impression of Ms.

Robinson was that she had “[a]bsolutely, absolutely” expressed her remorse to him

about her unethical conduct and that she presently “clearly understands” that she is

“bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct, no matter what [her] personal feelings

may be as to fairness or unfairness.” Based on his “observation” of her “work to get

readmitted to the Wisconsin Bar, to continue to be effective in knowing and

understanding what it means to be a lawyer, to continue the CLE,” he testified that

Ms. Robinson understood “the seriousness of what occurred” and was “commit[ed]

to practice law in a way consistent with the rules applicable to our profession.” In

summation, he remarked that there was “no question” that Ms. Robinson presently

had the requisite moral character to be a member of our Bar—“[s]he knows she made

14

a mistake, she’s been transparent about the error,” and as a result, “without hesitation

. . . she’d be a great asset to the bar.”

Ms. Robinson’s second witness, Mr. Kramer, is an attorney at Mayer Brown

LLP and a member of the D.C. Bar. Mr. Kramer represented Ms. Robinson “in a

few different matters,” including at least some related to the conduct for which she

was disciplined, and had known Ms. Robinson for approximately eight years as of

the time of the first hearing. He had the opportunity to observe her and “believe[d]

that she does have remorse about the underlying misconduct” and that she had gained

“a more complete understanding of what she did and what the problems are with the

decisions she made” over the course of their relationship. For instance, he

remembered her being “on the verge of tears and actually perhaps was in tears as she

was sort of confronting the conduct in which she engaged” while being deposed.

Based on his interactions with her, he characterized Ms. Robinson as “a kind and

conscientious person who has learned from this experience” and told the committee

“that she would be a credit to the bar.” In the years since he stopped representing

her, he acknowledged that their communication had become “sporadic”—though

they “interacted . . . a little bit professionally” and had “exchanged Christmas cards

and things like that.” He had, for instance, observed Ms. Robinson’s nonlegal work

for a human-resource compliance consulting company she founded and incorporated

after her law license was suspended, and the hearing committee found that “he

15

believed she was effective in providing meaningful information to her client and

helping them assess how to proceed.” Overall, Mr. Kramer testified that Ms.

Robinson possessed the requisite fit character to be a member of the D.C. Bar.9

We reiterate that the hearing committee was clear that it credited the testimony

of both witnesses. This is therefore not a situation in which we must exercise

deference to the hearing committee’s credibility determinations. Instead, the hearing

committee’s choice to place little weight on the witnesses’ live testimony was

predicated on its assessment of the nature of their relationships with Ms. Robinson

and how frequently they interacted with her.

9

Ms. Robinson also introduced into evidence a summary by the Wisconsin

Office of Lawyer Regulation of a letter written by Leslie Haley, an attorney whom

Ms. Robinson intended to call as a live witness, but who had a scheduling conflict

that prevented her from appearing. The letter was submitted in support of Ms.

Robinson’s petition for reinstatement to the Wisconsin Bar, which was granted. See

supra note 1. The summary indicated that Ms. Haley “strongly supported

Robinson’s reinstatement, stating that she had known Robinson quite well over the

last six years; that Robinson has exhibited honesty and integrity; and that Robinson

will never repeat any of her past behaviors or in any way prejudice or harm any of

her future clients.” In its post-hearing brief, ODC argued that because Ms. Haley

“was not subjected to cross-examination or questioning by the Hearing Committee,

her opinion about Ms. Robinson’s present character should not be given any weight.”

We note that petitioners are not limited to live testimony, see In re Kleppin, 768

A.2d 1010, 1017 (D.C. 2001) (petitioner also offered letters and affidavits in addition

to live testimony to show good character), though we assign less weight to non-live

testimony.

16

But we have never held that a petitioner’s live witnesses must know her in a

personal (as opposed to professional) capacity, nor have we previously given

dispositive weight to the frequency of their interactions—and we decline to take

either step in this case. Doing so would place too high a burden on a petitioner to

find a unicorn witness who has known her for a sufficiently long time, is aware of

the details of her misconduct, speaks with her a certain number of times per year,

and knows her in a personal capacity (in addition to or instead of in a professional

capacity). We are instead concerned with the quality and nature of a witness’s

interaction with the petitioner, as that is what bears on that witness’s ability to speak

to the petitioner’s present character. Cf. In re Yum, 187 A.3d at 1292-93 & n.2

(stating that a petitioner’s live witnesses were insufficient to prove present character

because they “were unfamiliar with the details of his misconduct”). Here, there can

be no suggestion that Ms. Robinson’s “character witnesses knew too few details of

[the] misconduct to give their testimony much weight.” In re Alamgir, 282 A.3d 81,

86 (D.C. 2022). In fact, here, the hearing committee determined that both witnesses

were knowledgeable about the specific contours of Ms. Robinson’s misconduct.

And although neither witness was speaking with Ms. Robinson on a weekly or

monthly basis at the time of their testimony, both witnesses were able to testify to

Ms. Robinson’s present character and represent that they did not believe she would

violate the rules in the future, that she was a changed person who understood her

17

past transgressions, and that she would make a positive contribution to our Bar. That

is enough for us to give weight to their testimony.

So too, Ms. Robinson offered other evidence of her post-discipline conduct

showing her personal growth. She testified to her remorse, and the hearing

committee credited that testimony. The hearing committee found that she had

“completed numerous [CLE] courses focused on attorney ethics during the

suspension period” in addition to “familiariz[ing] herself with attorney ethics

societies and groups that can provide ongoing support to her.” She introduced

evidence showing that while suspended, she founded and incorporated the

aforementioned consulting business and “fully disclosed her disciplinary history to

[her consulting] clients”—alongside performing limited community service work,

helping her teenage daughter with remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic,

and caring for her elderly mother. Though ODC points us to the hearing committee’s

characterization of her volunteer work as “sporadic and of a nature done by many

people,” both ODC and the hearing committee failed to consider the other evidence

put forth by Ms. Robinson that bolsters our conclusion that she possesses the

requisite “new determination to adhere to the high standards of integrity and legal

competence.” In re Sabo, 49 A.3d at 1232 (citation omitted).

18

Because we determine that the hearing committee’s reasons for giving little

weight to Mr. Daniels and Mr. Kramer’s present-character testimony were legally

erroneous, and because we conclude that their testimony showed her present fit

character—strengthened by Ms. Robinson’s own testimony and other evidence of

her post-discipline conduct—we hold that she has met her burden on the present-

character Roundtree factor. 10

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we decline to adopt the hearing committee’s

recommendation and instead grant Ms. Robinson’s reinstatement petition.

So ordered.

10

That she met a similar burden in getting her Wisconsin license reinstated

reinforces our determination. See supra note 1.