Kilgore

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

KATY KILGORE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:24-cv-04145-SLD-RLH

)

ROCK ISLAND COUNTY FOREST )

PRESERVE, d/b/a NIABI ZOO, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 27, from Defendant Rock

Island County Forest Preserve, doing business as Niabi Zoo (“the Zoo”). For the reasons that

follow, the Zoo’s motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND1

The Zoo’s season typically spans from March through October each year, so it fills many

of its roles with temporary seasonal employees. These temporary seasonal positions are always

terminated at the end of the season and, if employees want to return for the following season,

they must reapply. Hannah Stockton, the Zoo’s office manager, interviewed, hired, trained, and

supervised Plaintiff Katy Kilgore in her role as a receptionist, a temporary seasonal position, at

the Zoo for the 2023 season. Receptionist job duties include accurately answering phone

inquiries from guests, responding to voicemails and guest emails with correct information, and,

when their phone and correspondence tasks are minimal, filling food bags.

1 At summary judgment, a court “constru[es] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and avoid[s]

the temptation to decide which party’s version of the facts is more likely true.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770

(7th Cir. 2003). The facts related here are, unless otherwise noted, taken from the Zoo’s statement of undisputed

material facts, Mot. Summ. J. 3–9; Kilgore’s response thereto and statement of additional material facts, Resp. 2–8,

ECF No. 28; the Zoo’s reply to Kilgore’s additional material facts, Reply 1–2, ECF No. 29; and the exhibits to the

motion.

Kilgore has paralysis on one side due to a stroke. Her disability is visible—she walks

with a cane and struggles with certain physical acts, such as standing or walking for over thirty

minutes. That Kilgore is physically disabled was apparent to Stockton when Kilgore arrived for

her in-person interview. When she filled out her employment paperwork, Kilgore said she would

not need any accommodations. However, while on a tour on her first day at work, Kilgore saw

that the breakroom had one table and one set of chairs, both of which were taller than regular

tables and chairs. Kilgore can sit in some of these tall chairs and not others, so she realized she

needed to test them. When Kilgore attempted to sit in the chairs, she confirmed that because of

her disability, she could not get as high as necessary to sit in the chairs.

Kilgore began eating her lunch on a bench in the hallway by the breakroom (“the

bench”). The bench was directly across from bathrooms used by employees and the public and

near the public entrance to an animal exhibit. Fellow temporary seasonal employee Cara

Chamberlain occasionally sat and ate lunch on the bench with Kilgore. The Zoo director, Lee

Jackson, saw Kilgore eating at the bench alone and directed her supervisor, Stockton, to tell

Kilgore not to eat there because it did not look appropriate. When Stockton conveyed Jackson’s

instructions to Kilgore, Kilgore told Stockton that the table and chairs in the breakroom were

unusable because of her disability. This conversation humiliated, upset, and embarrassed

Kilgore, who already felt singled out by her inability to eat with everyone else. Stockton offered

to move a regular height chair into the breakroom for Kilgore to sit in, but Kilgore felt this was

not a viable option because the table would still be tall.

The conservation classroom was also near the breakroom and the bench. This classroom

was reserved for birthday parties and other guest events, during which time employees were not

allowed to use it. Because the door was usually closed, no one besides managers and supervisors

ever went into the classroom. During her deposition, Kilgore testified that the classroom would

have been a suitable alternative had it been offered to her, but that it was never given as an

option. Kilgore Dep. 82:16–83:2, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1, ECF No. 27-1. But during Stockton’s

deposition, she testified that she did offer the classroom as an option for Kilgore, Stockton Dep.

21:12–14, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 6, ECF No. 27-6, and in response, Kilgore gave her a “look of

disgust,” id. 22:16–23:3 (describing the look as “raised eyebrows”). Based on that look,

Stockton offered the final accommodation. Id.

This final accommodation was for Kilgore to eat at assistant registrar Jan Williams’s

desk—but only while Williams was not working. Williams’s shift usually started at 12:00 p.m.

and Kilgore’s lunch break typically ran from 12:00 p.m. to 12:30 p.m. Williams frequently

arrived at work late, so Stockton believed that Kilgore’s inability to eat at Williams’s desk while

Williams was present would not frequently interfere with Kilgore’s lunch break. Stockton Dep.

24:2–15. Kilgore said she was not humiliated to eat at someone else’s desk, Kilgore Dep. 84:2–

3, but that she “[a]bsolutely” felt embarrassed and humiliated when Williams would arrive while

Kilgore was still sitting and eating at the desk, id. 92:3–6, which would happen frequently, id.

86:10–20. When this happened, Kilgore said she threw out her lunch and returned to work early.

Sometimes, especially in the beginning of the season, Kilgore returned to work early but did not

clock back in until her entire thirty minute lunch break had elapsed. Stockton never followed up

with Kilgore to determine if eating at Williams’s desk was satisfactory for Kilgore, and Kilgore

never informed anyone at the Zoo that she could not take a full lunch break at Williams’s desk.

Like all other temporary seasonal employees, Kilgore was terminated at the end of the

2023 season and encouraged to reapply for the 2024 season. Kilgore anticipated being rehired;

she never received any negative feedback, Kilgore Dep. 111:4–5, 112:18–21; always showed up

on time, id.; offered to help Stockton, id. 112:22–113:4; was told she did “awesome” at the end

of the season by Stockton, id. 111:10–13; and believed that most temporary seasonal employees

were rehired, id. 100:1–4. But when Kilgore reapplied for the 2024 season, she was not rehired,

despite Stockton’s preference for rehiring, Stockton Dep. 32:17–20.

Stockton informed Kilgore that the receptionists hired for the 2024 season were better

qualified than Kilgore. Contrary to Kilgore’s testimony of her performance at work, Stockton

discussed finding typos and incorrect information in Kilgore’s work, id. 40:2–21; providing

Kilgore with verbal corrections, id. 41:3–4; and frequently explaining and re-explaining tasks

that Kilgore never quite performed as expected, id. 61:3–17, 74:1–17 (“[I]t was the same thing,

same few things that she just couldn’t catch on to.”). She also described Kilgore as lacking

computer confidence. See, e.g., id. 73:20–74:14. Stockton acknowledged that she did not

document any of her concerns with Kilgore’s work, id. 41:18–20; did not discuss them with

anyone present besides Kilgore, id. 42:10–12; was unsure if she ever issued a formal reprimand,

id. 58:1–59:2 (after being asked if she was “unsure as to whether or not the discussions

[Stockton] had with . . . Kilgore fall underneath the verbal warning in this policy,” Stockton

agreed it would be considered a verbal warning but that she never informed Kilgore because she

“did not think of it at the time”); did not believe that Kilgore’s errors were significant enough to

warrant termination or formal, recorded discipline, id. 99:4–15; and never actually engaged in

the Zoo’s evaluation and feedback policy, id. 59:3–14. According to Stockton, this lack of

procedure was not unique to Kilgore—she never engaged in these formal processes or recorded

performance issues with temporary seasonal employees. When asked how the receptionists hired

for the 2024 season were more qualified than Kilgore, Stockton pointed to their higher self-

identified computer confidence, id. 66:10–14, 69:15–70:1, which Stockton never verified, id.

70:2–12 (saying she asked the 2024 receptionists “what [computer programs] they were familiar

with and confident using” without giving them any type of test).

Kilgore received her right to sue letter and brought this action against the Zoo alleging

eight counts of discrimination: failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”) and Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) (Counts III & IV); disparate treatment

under the ADA and IHRA (Counts I & II);2 retaliation under the ADA and IHRA (Counts VII &

VIII); and hostile work environment under the ADA and IHRA (Counts V & VI).3 Second Am.

Compl. 5–12, ECF No. 23. The Zoo moves for summary judgment on all counts.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). At the summary judgment stage, the court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial—that

is, whether there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a factfinder to return a

verdict in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Patel v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 1997). The court must view the evidence “in the light most

2 Kilgore characterizes her disparate treatment claims as disability discrimination, Second Am. Compl. 5–6, ECF

No. 23. “Disability discrimination” under the ADA includes failure to accommodate, which she clearly alleges in

Counts I and II, and disparate treatment. Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 2019). ADA disparate

treatment claims require a plaintiff to prove that (1) she was disabled; (2) she was qualified to perform essential

functions with or without accommodation; and (3) disability was the but for cause of the adverse employment

action, id., and Kilgore’s filings articulate the same elements, see Second Am. Compl. 5–6; Resp. 9, ECF No. 28.

Accordingly, the Court construes Kilgore’s claims as disparate treatment.

3 Kilgore also characterizes her hostile work environment claims as disability-based harassment. Second Am.

Compl. 9–10, ECF No. 23. But hostile work environment claims seek to remedy harassment in the workplace, see,

e.g., Ford v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 942 F.3d 839, 852 (7th Cir. 2019) (discussing discriminatory harassment as

a factor in a hostile work environment claim), and the parties refer to her claims as hostile work environment claims

in the filings, see Mot. Summ. J. 21–22; Resp. 14–16, ECF No. 28. As such, the Court treats Kilgore’s claims as

hostile work environment.

favorable to the non-moving party, and draw[] all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”

McCann v. Iroquois Mem’l Hosp., 622 F.3d 745, 752 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 255). “A genuine issue for trial exists only when a reasonable jury could find for the party

opposing the motion based on the record as a whole.” Pipitone v. United States, 180 F.3d 859,

861 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). The moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law” when the nonmovant has failed to put forth sufficient evidence to satisfy the

essential elements of her case as to which she has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (quotation marks omitted). In other words, if the nonmovant fails to make a

showing of fact sufficient to establish an essential element of her case, summary judgment will

be issued against her. Id. at 322–23.

II. Analysis4

The ADA prohibits discrimination against “a qualified individual on the basis of

disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of

employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of

employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). This is commonly termed a disparate treatment claim. An

employer must also make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,

unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue

hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The

ADA also prohibits employers from retaliating against an individual for opposing an act or

practice made unlawful by the ADA. Id. § 12203(a). Protection from a hostile work

4 Throughout its analysis, the Court also cites to cases involving other antidiscrimination laws, such as Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17, because the statutes are similar. See Miranda v. Wis.

Power & Light Co., 91 F.3d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[I]n analyzing claims under the ADA, it is appropriate to

borrow from our approach to the respective analog under Title VII.”).

environment is also cognizable under the ADA, providing a cause of action against a workplace

“permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal citations omitted).

“Because Illinois courts analyze IHRA claims under a framework that is practically

indistinguishable from the ADA framework, [the court will] focus on the federal ADA claims.”

Tate v. Dart, 51 F.4th 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2022).

a. Failure to Accommodate

Kilgore brings failure to accommodate claims under the ADA and IHRA alleging that the

Zoo did not properly accommodate her disability. Compl. 7–9. The ADA provides that covered

employers may not discriminate against qualified individuals on the basis of disability. 42

U.S.C. § 12112(a). “Discrimination” includes the failure “to mak[e] reasonable accommodations

to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability

who is an applicant or employee.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To prevail on a failure to accommodate

claim, “a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the

employer was aware of her disability; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate

the disability.” E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 2005). The Zoo

does not dispute that Kilgore can establish both that she is a qualified individual with a disability

and that the Zoo was aware of that disability. Zoo Mot. Summ. J. 19 n.4. Instead, the Zoo

argues it is entitled to summary judgment on Kilgore’s failure to accommodate claims because

“(1) the Zoo provided reasonable accommodation and (2) Plaintiff failed to uphold her end of the

interactive process by notifying the Zoo if accommodations offered were not acceptable.” Id. at

18–21. Kilgore in turn argues that the Zoo is not entitled to summary judgment because a

reasonable jury could find that it failed to provide Kilgore with a reasonable accommodation and

violated its duty to engage in the interactive process. Resp. 12–14, ECF No. 28.

To determine a reasonable accommodation, an employer and employee should “engage in

an interactive process.” Sears, 417 F.3d at 797 (quotation marks omitted). “If a disabled

employee shows that her disability was not reasonably accommodated, the employer will be

liable only if it bears responsibility for the breakdown of the interactive process.” Id.

Reasonable accommodations may include “making existing facilities used by employees readily

accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities” and “job restructuring, part-time or

modified work schedules, . . . acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate

adjustment or modifications of . . . policies, . . . and other similar accommodations.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12111(9). “It is the employer’s prerogative to choose a reasonable accommodation; an

employer is not required to provide the particular accommodation that an employee requests.”

Jay v. Intermet Wagner Inc., 233 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, “the employer

is obliged to provide an accommodation that effectively accommodates the disabled employee’s

limitations.” Sears, 417 F.3d at 802. An employer has satisfied its duty of reasonable

accommodation when “the employer does what is necessary to enable the disabled worker to

work in reasonable comfort,” Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 546

(7th Cir. 1995), and “[a]n ineffective ‘modification’ or ‘adjustment’ will not accommodate a

disabled individual’s limitations.” US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002)

(emphasis omitted). Employers “must be willing to consider making changes in . . . ordinary

work rules, facilities, terms, and conditions in order to enable a disabled individual to work.”

Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542.

The Zoo asserts that Stockton’s offering of “(1) bringing a regular height chair into the

breakroom; [and] (2) eating at an employee’s desk near the breakroom” constituted reasonable

accommodation and that Kilgore “cannot meet her burden of providing evidence that the Zoo’s

accommodation was unreasonable.” Mot. Summ. J. 19. Kilgore argues that “an arrangement

that forces [a mobility-impaired employee] into a coworker’s desk space subject to disruption

and early termination of her lunch break, while denying her access to a safely usable bench and

never offering an admittedly accessible classroom, does not constitute an effective or comparable

accommodation.” Resp. 14. A reasonable jury could find that the offers to bring a regular height

chair into the breakroom or eat at another employee’s desk failed to accommodate Kilgore, and

that a genuine dispute of material fact remains as to whether the conservation classroom was

offered as an option.

A jury could reasonably find that providing Kilgore with a chair significantly lower than

the table was not a reasonable accommodation. Kilgore testified that without a table roughly at

or below waist level, Kilgore Dep. 60:24–61:14, “it would be difficult” to manage the height

difference between the regular chair and high table, id. 53:2–13. She would need an alternative

place to set her food—food would fall off her lap due to her disability.5 Id. As such, a

reasonable jury could find that the regular height chair with the tall table would not resolve the

underlying issue of providing Kilgore with a space in which she could eat her lunch.

Additionally, a jury could reasonably conclude that the use of another employee’s desk

only when the employee, who was typically scheduled to work the entirety of Kilgore’s lunch

break, was not present, was not a reasonable accommodation. E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.

5 Although the bench Kilgore originally sat at did not have a table, she was able to place her lunch on the empty

portion of the bench next to her. Kilgore Dep. 52:17–53:1. This option was not available when sitting in a regular

height chair at a tall table.

is instructive. In that case, when a plaintiff struggled to walk long distances but was otherwise

able to perform her job duties, her employer allowed her to eat lunch in a stockroom and

temporarily use a shortcut. Sears, 417 F.3d at 803. The Sears court determined these were not

reasonable accommodations when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff—“a jury

could conclude that these did not make the facility accessible to [the plaintiff] because the

accommodations were either rescinded or [she] faced reprimand when she tried to use them.” Id.

Similar to Sears, the offer of Williams’s desk was not a stable or consistent alternative.

Although she did not face reprimand for using an offered alternative, Kilgore could not use

Williams’s desk if Williams was present, and Williams was typically scheduled to be present for

the entirety of Kilgore’s usual lunch break. As a direct result of their disability-based mobility

limitations, neither Kilgore nor the plaintiff in Sears had a reliable place to eat lunch.

A reasonable jury could conclude that use of Williams’s desk for lunch was not a

reasonable accommodation. If Williams’s shift generally began at 12:00 p.m., Kilgore’s lunch

regularly began at 12:00 p.m., and Kilgore was told that she could not eat at Williams’s desk

while Williams was present, the Court does not see how this constitutes a reasonable, equivalent

accommodation as a matter of law. A jury could reasonably conclude that relying on one

employee’s late arrival to ensure the accommodation of a disabled employee is not a reasonable

solution. As such, ascertaining the exact number of times that Kilgore’s lunch break was cut

short by Williams’s arrival is a somewhat moot point—either way, Williams’s shift began at

12:00 and Kilgore’s break began at 12:00, rendering Williams’s desk a possibly unreasonable

alternative. Nevertheless, the Zoo provides its own analysis of the data provided by Williams

and Kilgore’s timesheets. Mot. Summ. J. 7 (compiling information on Kilgore’s sixty-five lunch

breaks and comparing it to Williams’s shifts). To the extent this is an effort to highlight that

Kilgore’s lunch was interrupted just a few times, the data at best presents a genuine dispute of

material fact.

Based on the Court’s review of Williams’s and Kilgore’s timesheets, there were at least

fourteen instances in which Williams was clocked in while Kilgore was clocked out on her lunch

break.

Date Kilgore Kilgore Returned Williams Duration of

Began Lunch from Lunch Clocked in Kilgore’s Break

April 21, 2023 12:31 1:01 12:20 30 minutes

April 28, 2023 12:02 12:32 12:20 30 minutes

May 3, 2023 12:08 12:38 12:31 30 minutes

May 10, 2023 12:05 12:35 12:09 30 minutes

May 17, 2023 12:05 12:38 12:37 33 minutes

May 19, 2023 12:03 12:38 12:24 35 minutes

May 24, 2023 12:00 12:30 12:17 30 minutes

May 26, 2023 12:02 12:34 12:28 32 minutes

June 14, 2023 12:43 1:13 12:37 30 minutes

July 19, 2023 12:32 12:54 12:38 22 minutes

July 31, 2023 12:05 12:36 12:24 31 minutes

September 27, 2023 12:20 12:54 12:43 34 minutes

October 13, 2023 12:15 12:43 12:29 28 minutes

October 18, 2023 12:13 12:43 12:42 30 minutes

Compare Kilgore Timesheets, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 18, ECF No. 27-18, with Williams Timesheets,

Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 19, ECF No. 27-19.

Kilgore also testified that she frequently returned to work early but waited until thirty

minutes elapsed to clock in. Kilgore Dep. 86:23–87:16. The Court does not see anything in the

record contradicting this testimony; therefore, a jury could reasonably find that the logged

duration of her lunch break, be it thirty minutes or twenty-one, is not a true reflection of how

long Kilgore was on break. In this case, it is helpful to also consider the instances in which

Williams clocked in shortly after Kilgore ended her lunch break. A review of the timesheets

reveals another six instances in which Williams clocked in within ten minutes of Kilgore

returning to work.

Date Kilgore Kilgore Returned Williams Duration of

Began Lunch from Lunch Clocked in Kilgore’s Break

April 26, 2023 12:13 12:34 12:37 21 minutes

June 2, 2023 12:04 12:36 12:36 32 minutes

July 3, 2023 12:16 12:44 12:45 28 minutes

July 12, 2023 12:04 12:30 12:39 26 minutes

August 14, 2023 12:07 12:40 12:41 33 minutes

September 13, 2023 12:12 12:45 12:46 33 minutes

Compare Kilgore Timesheets, with Williams Timesheets.

This totals as many as twenty instances in which Kilgore’s lunch break overlapped with

Williams’s arrival. It is difficult to discern the actual percentage of Kilgore’s lunch breaks and

Williams’s work shifts that overlap because there is no indication of when Kilgore was offered

Williams’s desk as an alternative. See, e.g., Kilgore Dep. 84:19–22. As such, the Court does not

find the Zoo’s calculations, Mot. Summ. J. 7, to be particularly conclusive given the lack of

clarity as to how many times this could have happened. The Zoo points out that, on days in

which both Kilgore and Williams worked, Kilgore’s lunch breaks were shortened only four

times. Mot. Summ. J. 7. The Court’s review of the record likewise reveals four shortened lunch

breaks where Williams was either clocked in during Kilgore’s break or clocked in within minutes

of Kilgore returning from her lunch (April 26, 2023; July 3, 2023; July 19, 2023; October 13,

2023) and one shortened lunch break where Williams clocked in nine minutes after Kilgore

returned to work (July 12, 2023). But the Court again notes that, according to Kilgore, the mere

fact that she was clocked out for thirty minutes does not necessarily mean she was on break the

entire allotted time.

Because a reasonable jury could find that the shorter chair and Williams’s desk were not

reasonable accommodations, whether the Zoo fulfilled its duty to reasonably accommodate

Kilgore hinges on whether the conservation classroom was offered as an option. No one disputes

that the classroom would have been a reasonable accommodation, but Kilgore testified she was

never given the option, Kilgore Dep. 82:16–83:2, while Stockton testified she offered it and

Kilgore seemed disgusted, Stockton Dep. 21:12–23:3. This establishes a genuine dispute of

material fact for the jury to decide.

In any case, the Zoo argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Kilgore

“failed to uphold her end of the interactive process by notifying the Zoo if accommodations

offered were not acceptable.” Mot. Summ. J. 19; see also Reply 5–6, ECF No. 29. Kilgore

argues that the Zoo “prematurely closed the interactive process, failed to offer [her] a

comparable and accessible break location despite knowing of her mobility impairment, and

impermissibly shifted the burden onto her to endure an inadequate arrangement rather than

continuing to work collaboratively to identify a reasonable accommodation.” Resp. 14. Because

the determination of who was responsible for a breakdown in the interactive process, if anyone,

requires resolution of whether the Zoo offered the conservation classroom to Kilgore, the Zoo’s

argument must fail.

“If a reasonable accommodation was available but the employer prevented its

identification by failing to engage in the interactive process, that failure is actionable.” Brown v.

Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2017). “Because the interactive process

is not an end in itself,” an employee “must show that the result of the inadequate interactive was

the failure of [the employer] to fulfill its role in determining what specific actions must be taken

. . . to provide the qualified individual a reasonable accommodation.” Rehling v. City of

Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). The process is

triggered when an employee “notif[ies] her employer of her disability.” Spurling v. C & M Fine

Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 2014).

The Zoo asserts that “this is a textbook case of an employee not providing the employer

with sufficient information to determine the necessary accommodation,” analogizing Kilgore’s

claims to that of the plaintiff in Graham v. Arctic Zone Iceplex, LLC, 930 F.3d 926 (7th Cir.

2019). Mot. Summ. J. 21. This is not convincing. The Graham plaintiff, after a work injury,

had several medical restrictions, including that he needed to work sitting down. Graham, 930

F.3d at 928. His employer assigned him to skate sharpening, which it asserts could be performed

while seated. Id. Even though the plaintiff argued that he could only complete skate sharpening

while standing and thus that his employer did not comply with his medical restrictions, the Court

found that the plaintiff was responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process because he

failed to inform his employer that the offered accommodation, which the employer thought

complied with his medical restrictions, was inadequate. Id. at 928–29. While the Graham

employer did not know that the plaintiff needed to stand for skate sharpening, the Zoo knew that

Kilgore could not sit in the taller chair, needed somewhere to eat her lunch, and that Williams’s

shift began at the same time as Kilgore’s lunch began. In other words, where the Graham

employer lacked requisite information to realize that the offered accommodation did not actually

meet the plaintiff’s needs, the Zoo had all the requisite information to understand that Williams’s

desk may not have accommodated Kilgore. That Kilgore never communicated the inadequacy of

Williams’s desk as an alternative does not mean she was responsible for a breakdown of the

interactive process; the interactive process does not require Kilgore, as an employee who put her

employer on notice of her need for an accommodation, to inform the Zoo that an

accommodation, which a reasonable jury could deem obviously inadequate, was not working.

Cf. Sears, 417 F.3d at 808 (“A reasonable jury could find that [the employer’s] only

communication to [the plaintiff] . . . was the suggestion that she use [an alternative] which [her

supervisor] knew would do nothing to facilitate [her] access to her work area. This is not

meaningful participation in the interactive process.”).

Furthermore, a reasonable jury viewing the undisputed facts could find that the Zoo did

not adequately engage in the interactive process with Kilgore. When an employee has a “blanket

nature” restriction, there is a greater burden placed on her to communicate and clarify the

nuances of what could reasonably accommodate her. Brown, 855 F.3d at 824 (“Given the

blanket nature of [the plaintiff’s] restriction, the obligation fell to the plaintiff to update and

further clarify the kinds of work she could do.” (quotation marks omitted)). Consideration of

Brown and Steffes v. Stepan Company, 144 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir. 1998), Seventh Circuit cases in

which the plaintiff was deemed responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process, is

instructive. Unlike the plaintiffs in Brown and Steffes, Kilgore did not have blanket restrictions

impacting her job duties. Where the Brown plaintiff was a school employee who could not be

around rowdy students, Brown, 855 F.3d at 824–25, and the Steffes plaintiff worked for a

chemical company but could not breath chemicals, Steffes, 144 F.3d at 1071–72, Kilgore merely

requested a place in which she could comfortably eat her lunch. Additionally, like the employer

in Spurling, neither Stockton nor the Zoo asked Kilgore any questions or followed up with her

about the accommodations offered, nor did they engage with any of the Zoo’s policies regarding

ADA accommodations. Cf. Spurling, 739 F.3d at 1061–62 (finding the employer liable for a

breakdown in the interactive process because, although the employer followed the appropriate

procedure for reviewing and providing accommodations initially, the employer ultimately “failed

to carry it through”). As such, the Zoo has not established as a matter of law that Kilgore was

responsible for the breakdown of the interactive process.

Also integral to the interactive process analysis is whether Stockton offered the

conservation classroom to Kilgore as an option. This is relevant to determining what steps the

Zoo took to accommodate Kilgore’s disability and how thoroughly it considered and presented

accommodation options. If the conservation classroom was provided to Kilgore, then her failure

to accommodate claims must fail because she was offered a reasonable accommodation.

Alternatively, if the conservation classroom was not offered to Kilgore, a reasonable jury could

conclude that she was not reasonably accommodated, and must then decide whether there was a

breakdown in the interactive process and, if so, which party bears responsibility. Because this

question cannot be resolved without first determining whether the conservation classroom was

offered to Kilgore, a genuine dispute of material fact remains as to the interactive process prong

of Kilgore’s failure to accommodate claim. For these reasons, the Zoo’s motion for summary

judgment as to Kilgore’s failure to accommodate claims under the ADA and IHRA is denied.

b. Disparate Treatment

Kilgore brings disparate treatment claims under the ADA and IHRA alleging that the Zoo

declined to rehire her for the 2024 season due to her disability. Compl. 5–7. To prevail on an

ADA disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [the] plaintiff was disabled; (2)

[the] plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions with or without reasonable

accommodation; and (3) [the] disability was the ‘but for’ cause of adverse employment action.”

Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 2019). Direct evidence of disability

discrimination is rare. Rowlands v. United Parcel Serv.-Fort Wayne, 901 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir.

2018). Instead, plaintiffs typically demonstrate discrimination with circumstantial evidence.6 Id.

6 Although the Seventh Circuit previously distinguished “direct” from “indirect” evidence, Andrews v. CBOCS W.,

Inc., 743 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 2014), it has subsequently abandoned this practice, Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc.,

834 F.3d 760, 763–66 (7th Cir. 2016). While the evidence in an employment discrimination case is rarely

straightforward, the Seventh Circuit has found that attempting to funnel the often factually complex cases into

This may include “(1) suspicious timing; (2) ambiguous statements or behavior towards other

employees in the protected group; (3) evidence, statistical or otherwise that similarly situated

employees outside of the protected group systematically receive[d] better treatment; and (4)

evidence that the employer offered a pretextual reason for an adverse employment action.”

Monroe v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 504 (7th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted).

“[A] subjective belief of discrimination[,] no matter how genuine, cannot be the sole basis for a

finding of discrimination.” Kizer v. Child.’s Learning Ctr., 962 F.2d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 1992)

(first alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). “The ultimate burden of persuading the

trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times

with the plaintiff.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Disparate treatment claims can be evaluated under either the McDonnell Douglas burden-

shifting framework or the Ortiz holistic review framework,7 see Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834

F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2016); however, “when the issue of satisfactory job performance lies at

the heart of the dispute and must be analyzed in detail at multiple stages of the McDonnell

Douglas test, it is often simpler to run through that analysis only once,” Khungar v. Access Cmty.

Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 573–74 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and alteration omitted).

There is no question that Kilgore, as someone dealing with paralysis on one side of her body, has

protected characteristics. Kilgore Dep. 8:10–21; Vande Zande v. Wis. Dept. of Admin., 851 F.

categories has a greater potential for creating confusion rather than simplifying the analysis. Id. at 765. This is not

to say that courts should completely abandon any acknowledgement of the difference between the types of evidence,

but they should no longer separate evidence into categories when evaluating it. See Rowlands, 901 F.3d at 801–02.

7 “In discrimination cases, when a defendant moves for summary judgment, the singular question for the district

court is whether the plaintiff has introduced evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the

plaintiff’s . . . proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Mitchell v. Exxon Mobil

Corp., 143 F.4th 800, 809 (7th Cir. 2025) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). The McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework is one way in which a plaintiff may establish her claim. Id. Alternatively, the holistic

review of Ortiz means “that a plaintiff does not have to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework to succeed.” Id.

In short, both McDonnell Douglas and Ortiz are “merely convenient ways to organize our thoughts.” Id. (quotation

marks omitted).

Supp. 353, 360 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (“[P]aralysis is clearly a disability under the ADA.”), aff’d, 44

F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995). She was not rehired, which is indisputably an adverse employment

action. Squibb v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 787 (7th Cir. 2007). The Zoo argues that

Kilgore cannot succeed under either the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework or the

Ortiz holistic review. Mot. Summ. J. 11. But because “the heart of this dispute” is “whether

[Kilgore] performed poorly and whether that poor performance caused her termination,” the

Court will “run through that analysis only once” under the Ortiz holistic review. Khungar, 985

F.3d at 574 (citing cases); see also Bommiasamy v. Galesburg Hosp. Corp., 727 F. Supp. 3d 767,

791 (C.D. Ill. 2024) (“The McDonnell Douglas framework is not as useful where, as here, the

defendant relies upon performance problems as the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the

plaintiff’s termination. The Court proceeds straight to the Ortiz inquiry and considers whether

there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that [the plaintiff] was illegally

terminated because of his [protected characteristic].” (citation omitted)). Kilgore argues that

there is sufficient evidence that the Zoo gave pretextual reasons for not rehiring her. See, e.g.,

Resp. 10.

Kilgore must show that there is sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude

that the Zoo’s cited legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not rehiring her “are pretextual,

meaning false, allowing an inference that the [Zoo’s] true intent was discriminatory.” Runkel v.

City of Springfield, 51 F.4th 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2022); see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (holding that a showing of pretext “may, together with the elements of

the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the

defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional

discrimination . . . .”). “[A]n employer’s dishonest explanation of a decision can, by itself,

support an inference that its real reason was unlawful.” Vichio v. US Foods, Inc., 88 F.4th 687,

695 (7th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted).

The Zoo avers that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not rehiring Kilgore was

that she lacked “confiden[ce] in the position” and “computer skills,” including “getting around in

[the] computer system” and making phone calls. Stockton Dep. 73:20–74:14. As a result,

Stockton “was continuously having to help her.” Id. 74:1–4. Kilgore argues that the Zoo’s

reasons are pretextual because the Zoo’s “handling of [her] alleged performance issues and the

2024 hiring decision reflects exactly the kind of inconsistency and procedural deviation the

Seventh Circuit recognizes as probative of pretext.” Resp. 10. Because Stockton did not keep

any written record of her comments or concerns with Kilgore’s performance and never engaged

in a formal disciplinary process, Stockton’s testimony is the only evidence provided that

Kilgore’s work was unsatisfactory. Stockton Dep. 38:23–41:20 (testifying to correcting typos

and miswritten phone numbers with Kilgore without documenting the conversations or

mistakes). And Kilgore’s testimony directly contradicts Stockton’s—according to Kilgore, she

never received any unsatisfactory comments and Stockton told her she did “awesome” at the end

of the season. Kilgore Dep. 111:4–13, 115:24–116:13 (testifying that she never received any

negative feedback and Stockton never spoke with her about typos or work corrections).

The Zoo argues that many of Kilgore’s arguments turn on her evaluation of her own

performance. See, e.g., Mot. Summ. J. 18 (arguing that “[h]ow Kilgore perceived her

performance . . . is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment”). In some circumstances, a

plaintiff’s assertion that her job performance was satisfactory can show that the plaintiff was

meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations. See Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161,

1171–72 (7th Cir. 1997). However, an employee’s “own evaluation of [her] work cannot be

imputed to [the employer], and is insufficient to permit [her] case to survive past summary

judgment.” Dickerson v. Bd. of Trustees of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 603 (7th Cir.

2011); see also Lauth v. Covance, Inc., 863 F.3d 708, 715–16 (7th Cir. 2017); Wyninger v. New

Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 980 (7th Cir. 2004) (“An employee’s self-evaluation cannot

create an issue of fact about an employer’s honest assessment of inadequate performance.”).

When deciding whether an employee met employer’s expectations, courts must look at the

employee’s “job performance through the eyes of her supervisors at the time. The question is not

whether the [employer’s performance] ratings were right but whether the employer’s description

of its reason is honest.” Khungar, 985 F.3d at 574 (alteration and emphasis in original)

(quotation marks omitted).

The core disagreement here is a factual one about how Stockton evaluated Kilgore’s

work—Stockton says Kilgore had repeated errors requiring frequent verbal corrections and

Kilgore says she never received any verbal corrections at all. This is different than a plaintiff

asserting he fulfilled work expectations despite at least a year’s worth of mediocre to poor

performance evaluations, Denisi v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 99 F.3d 860, 865–66 (7th Cir.

1996); a doctor-plaintiff asserting she was meeting her employer’s expectations despite

documented complaints from patients, staff, and a “final warning” about violating policies,

Khungar, 985 F.3d at 574–75; a plaintiff arguing she met her employer’s expectations while

aware that supervisors “were dissatisfied with her performance,” Wyninger, 361 F.3d at 980; or a

plaintiff asserting his performance was “at least good” in an affidavit in an attempt to overcome

performance evaluations rating his overall work as “[u]nsatisfactory,” Dickerson, 657 F.3d at

602–03. In this case, unlike the others, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether

Kilgore’s performance was truly unsatisfactory such that a reasonable jury could credit Kilgore’s

testimony that she never received verbal corrections over Stockton’s testimony that she

consistently had to manage Kilgore’s work.

The Zoo raises a few other arguments, see Mot. Summ. J. 14–15; however, because “an

employer’s dishonest explanation of a decision can, by itself, support an inference that its real

reason was unlawful,” Vichio, 88 F.4th at 695 (quotation marks omitted), and Kilgore has

established a dispute of material fact as to the honesty of the Zoo’s explanation for its decision,

her claims for disparate treatment must survive summary judgment.

c. Retaliation

Kilgore brings retaliation claims under the ADA and IHRA alleging that the Zoo declined

to rehire her for the 2024 season in retaliation for her accommodation request. Compl. 10–12.

The ADA provides that “[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such

individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such

individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,

proceeding, or hearing under [it].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To establish a prima facie case of

retaliation, a “plaintiff must prove that [she] engaged in protected activity and suffered an

adverse employment action, and that there is a causal link between the two.” Lord v. High

Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). At summary judgment, “the

plaintiff[] must produce evidence that a retaliatory motive actually influenced the decision-

maker, not merely that it could have.” Brown v. Advoc. S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1108

(7th Cir. 2012) (affirming a grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer where “the

plaintiffs’ argument for retaliatory animus relies entirely on speculation”). A plaintiff can prove

causation through either the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas or

through an evaluation of the evidence as a whole. See Dickerson, 657 F.3d at 601.

The Zoo argues that, under either framework, Kilgore’s retaliation claims fail because of

a lack of evidence. Mot. Summ. J. 15–18. Kilgore responds that she has provided sufficient

evidence that a reasonable jury could find that the Zoo’s decision not to rehire her was

retaliation. Resp. 11–12. As the Zoo argues, Kilgore’s retaliation claims cannot succeed under

the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework because she has not provided any evidence

of similarly-situated comparators. Mot. Summ. J. 16–17; see Dickerson, 657 F.3d at 601–02

(outlining that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that she “(1)

engaged in protected activity; (2) was performing [her] job satisfactorily; and (3) was singled out

for an adverse employment action that similarly situated employees who did not engage in

protected activity did not suffer”). Nevertheless, her retaliation claims survive under the Ortiz

holistic review. As such, the Court focuses its analysis on Kilgore’s retaliation claims under

Ortiz.

Under the Ortiz framework of holistic review, the Court must consider the evidence as a

whole and ask whether a reasonable jury could draw an inference of retaliation. Rowlands, 901

F.3d at 801. “[T]he mere fact that [a plaintiff] requested accommodations and was subsequently

terminated is not sufficient in itself to show causation.” Adzogble v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc.,

677 F. Supp. 3d 770, 789 (C.D. Ill. 2023). As with disparate treatment, plaintiffs often present

circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Monroe, 871 F.3d at 504. Kilgore bases her

argument on temporal proximity, “when viewed alongside the undisputed absence of any

documented performance deficiencies, the lack of written evaluations or discipline, and the

evidence that [Kilgore] had successfully performed the receptionist role and received positive

feedback.” Resp. 12. Contrary to Kilgore’s characterization, the temporal proximity in this case

is not strong—Kilgore engaged in protected activity during her employment, which ended in

October, and was not informed of the Zoo’s decision not to hire her for the 2024 season until the

following February, a few weeks after the 2024 season application reopened. See Jan. 18, 2024

Email, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 10, ECF No. 27-10 (informing several people, including Kilgore, that

the 2024 applications were open); see also Feb. 8, 2024 Email, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 20, ECF No.

27-20 (informing Kilgore that she was not selected for the 2024 season). Additionally, there is

no evidence of ambiguous statements or behavior towards other disabled employees. In fact,

Kilgore herself mentioned another disabled temporary seasonal employee who was consistently

rehired despite frequent mistakes. Kilgore Dep. 120:14–22. Kilgore presents no evidence of

similarly situated employees outside of the protected group who received better treatment. See

generally Resp.

Nevertheless, Kilgore has established a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the

Zoo’s asserted reasons for not re-hiring her for 2024 was pretextual. See supra Section II(b). As

this is sufficient to survive summary judgment, cf. Robertson v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 949 F.3d

371, 382 (7th Cir. 2020) (entering summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer

“because there is no material issue of fact as to whether its reason for not hiring [the plaintiff] is

pretext for retaliation”), the Zoo’s motion for summary judgment as to Kilgore’s retaliation

claims is denied.

d. Hostile Work Environment

Kilgore brings hostile work environment claims under the ADA and IHRA against the

Zoo. Compl. 9–10. A work environment is hostile when it “is permeated with discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions

of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21

(internal citations omitted). Hostile work environment claims are “composed of a series of

separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Nat’l R.R.

Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)).

Plaintiffs bringing a hostile work environment claim must show: “(1) the work environment was

both subjectively and objectively offensive; (2) the harassment was based on [their disability];

(3) the conduct was severe or pervasive; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.”

Trahanas v. Nw. Univ., 64 F.4th 842, 853 (7th Cir. 2023); Ford v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,

942 F.3d 839, 856 (7th Cir. 2019).

Kilgore’s hostile work environment claims cannot survive summary judgment. She has

not identified a genuine dispute of material fact as to the severity or pervasiveness of any

harassment and, based on the evidence in the record, no reasonable jury could find that the

harassment was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create a

hostile or abusive working environment. To determine whether conduct is severe or pervasive,

courts “consider the totality of the circumstances.” Scaife v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 49

F.4th 1109, 1116 (7th Cir. 2022). This includes consideration of “(1) the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; (2) how offensive a reasonable person would deem it to be; (3) whether

it is physically threatening or humiliating conduct as opposed to verbal abuse; (4) whether it

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance; and (5) whether it is directed at

the victim.” Id.

First, the discriminatory conduct—not providing Kilgore with an appropriate space to eat

her lunch—occurred every shift she worked after informing Stockton that she could not eat at the

breakroom table. Regardless of whether Kilgore’s lunch was actually interrupted by Williams’s

arrival on any given day, Kilgore’s daily experience was one of eating lunch in isolation and

frequent interruption. Cf. Hall v. City of Chicago, 713 F.3d 325, 334 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding

that isolation of a female employee in combination with occasional outbursts was sufficient to

establish a hostile work environment claim). Second, a reasonable person would find the lack of

a dependable location to eat lunch challenging and disappointing, but they would not find

Kilgore’s lunch situation to be so offensive as to constitute a hostile work environment. Third,

Kilgore did not find eating at Williams’s desk humiliating, Kilgore Dep. 84:2–5; however, she

did find it humiliating to be at the desk when Williams arrived, id. 92:3–6, and felt “very

humiliated” to learn that Jackson thought it was not appropriate for her to eat at the bench, id.

69:13–22. Fourth, Kilgore has presented no evidence at all indicating that her lack of a

consistent place to eat lunch unreasonably interfered with her performance at work—she

discussed the ways in which it took an emotional toll on her and unpredictably impacted her

lunch break, but ultimately presented nothing suggesting any sort of negative impact on her

performance. See generally, Kilgore Dep. And fifth, the conduct was directed at Kilgore.

Although some of these factors weigh slightly in Kilgore’s favor, when considering the

totality of the circumstances, she cannot establish that the conduct was sufficiently severe or

pervasive as to interfere with her work performance. Her lunch experience was isolating, but it

did not rise to the level of that in Hall, in which the plaintiff’s supervisor “assign[ed] her

unnecessary menial work and prevent[ed] others from interacting with her,” as well as

“sporadically intimidating and directing anger at her.” Hall, 713 F.3d at 331. Despite Kilgore’s

humiliation when learning of Jackson’s feelings and when Williams arrived to her desk while

Kilgore was on her lunch break, the absence of abuse or threats, as well as the lack of

humiliation for eating at Williams’s desk generally, weakens Kilgore’s claim. When comparing

these with the fact that no reasonable person would find her lack of a place to eat lunch to

constitute a hostile work environment and that she has provided no indication that it

unreasonably interfered with her work performance, a reasonable jury could not find that the

harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of her employment.

See, e.g., Milligan-Grimstad v. Stanley, 877 F.3d 705, 714 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding the claim was

not sufficiently severe or pervasive because “[t]hough [superior’s] conduct was pervasive, it was

not physically threatening, nor did it interfere with [the plaintiff’s] work performance.”); Yancick

v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 544 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[The court] will not find a hostile

work environment for mere offensive conduct that is isolated, does not interfere with the

plaintiff’s work performance, and is not physically threatening or humiliating.”). For these

reasons, the Zoo’s motion for summary judgment on Kilgore’s hostile work environment claims

is granted.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Rock Island County Forest Preserve, doing business as Niabi Zoo’s, motion

for summary judgment, ECF No. 27, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff

Katy Kilgore’s claims for hostile work environment under the ADA and IHRA are dismissed;

her claims for failure to accommodate, disparate treatment, and retaliation under the ADA and

IHRA survive. The proposed pretrial order is due on September 30, 2026, the final pretrial

conference is set for 1:30 p.m. on October 7, 2026, and the trial is set for 9:00 a.m. on November

30, 2026. The final pretrial conference and the trial will both take place in Courtroom A in the

Rock Island Federal Courthouse at 1701 4th Ave. Rock Island, Illinois 61201.

Entered this 22nd day of April, 2026.

s/ Sara Darrow

SARA DARROW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE