WING

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

ANTONIO MCKINNEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 2:25-cv-00355-SDN

)

TROOPER WING, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ANTONIO MCKINNEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 2:25-cv-00367-SDN

)

LEWISTON POLICE )

DEPARTMENT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ANTONIO MCKINNEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 2:25-cv-00368-SDN

)

ANDROSCOGGIN COUNTY )

JAIL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OMNIBUS ORDER

This order concerns three lawsuits Plaintiff Antonio McKinney has brought against

various state defendants.1 Because the factual allegations and issues largely overlap across

the cases, the Court considers them together for clarity and efficiency.

I. Background

Because Mr. McKinney proceeded without prepayment of fees, the Magistrate

Judge reviewed his complaints for dismissal by determining if he “fail[ed] to state a claim

on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Magistrate Judge

recommended dismissal of all but one of the claims across the three suits. Mr. McKinney

timely objected to all three recommended decisions. The Court reviews the Magistrate

Judge’s decisions de novo, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3), and draws all reasonable inferences

in Plaintiff’s favor, see Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.

2011).

The following encounters with law enforcement are at issue in each of Mr.

McKinney’s cases.2

1 In McKinney v. Wing, Mr. McKinney brought claims against Troopers Wing and Hink of the Maine State

Police and the Lewiston Police Department. See Dkt. No. 25-cv-355, ECF No. 1. In McKinney v. Lewiston

Police Department, Mr. McKinney brought claims against the Lewiston Police Department and the

Androscoggin County Jail. See Dkt. No. 25-cv-367, ECF No. 1. In McKinney v. Androscoggin County Jail,

Mr. McKinney brought claims against Androscoggin County, the Androscoggin County Sheriff’s

Department and three named employees, the Androscoggin County Jail (“ACJ”) and six named employees,

ACJ Corporal Litchfield, five unnamed John Doe ACJ corrections officers, the Lewiston Police Department

and two unnamed Lewiston Police officers, and unidentified subcontractors of the ACJ and sheriff’s

department. See Dkt. No. 25-cv-368, ECF Nos. 1, 7.

2 The factual allegations are drawn from the complaints and/or amended complaints in each case,

supplements to the complaints, and attachments to Mr. McKinney’s pleadings. See Flanders v. Mass

Resistance, No. 12-cv-00262, 2013 WL 2237848, at *9 (D. Me. May 21, 2013) (“The pleadings of a pro se

plaintiff may be interpreted in light of his or her supplemental submissions.”). The Magistrate Judge also

considered these documents in his recommended decisions. See Dkt. No. 25-cv-355, ECF No. 31 at 2 n.1.

A. October 5, 2020

On October 5, 2020, Maine State Police Troopers Wing and Hink stopped a car in

which Mr. McKinney was a passenger. The stop developed into a prolonged encounter,

the details of which are not relevant here. Ultimately, the officers strip searched Mr.

McKinney on the side of the highway and discovered a bag of cocaine.

As a result, Mr. McKinney was indicted in state court on three drug charges.

However, the Androscoggin County Superior Court suppressed the evidence obtained

from the strip search, finding the search violated Mr. McKinney’s Fourth Amendment

rights. Although it is not entirely clear, when interpreting Mr. McKinney’s filings liberally,

it appears the state court dismissed the charges, but the arrest remains on Mr. McKinney’s

criminal record. See Dkt. No. 25-cv-355, ECF 6-2 at 2 (noting the “defendants’ failure to

remove a dismissed charge from state systems”); id. at 3 (“No charges from that incident

resulted in a valid conviction, and any such case was dismissed.”); Dkt. No. 25-cv-355,

ECF No. 7 at 2 (“That case was never lawfully adjudicated but has remained on Plaintiff’s

record . . . .”).

B. March 29, 2023

On or about March 29, 2023, Mr. McKinney was arrested again, this time by

officers of the Lewiston Police Department. Mr. McKinney claims the arresting officers

“relied on outdated or invalid case information” and injured him during the arrest. Dkt.

No. 25-cv-355, ECF No. 6-2 at 3–4. According to a narrative report apparently written by

one of the arresting officers,3 the arresting officer believed Mr. McKinney was subject to

bail conditions based on police records. See Dkt. No. 25-cv-355, ECF No. 1-3 at 24. Those

3 Mr. McKinney attached the “Narrative for Patrol Officer Aaron Schmitz” to his complaint. Courts may

consider documents attached to a complaint in some circumstances. See Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1,

3–4 (1st Cir. 1993). The Court therefore considers the document.

conditions included that Mr. McKinney could be searched at any time without suspicion

or probable cause. Based on a tip from another police officer, the arresting officer

attempted to search Mr. McKinney, but Mr. McKinney allegedly resisted and ran away.

After eventually arresting Mr. McKinney for refusing to submit to detention and taking

him to the Androscoggin County Jail (“ACJ”), the arresting officer learned that “there was

a clerical error” in Mr. McKinney’s file and that Mr. McKinney was not subject to any bail

conditions. Id. at 25. Upon arrival at the jail, Mr. McKinney asserts he was strip searched.

Dkt. No. 25-cv-368, ECF No. 1 at 4.

C. July 21, 2023

Under circumstances not detailed in the complaints, Mr. McKinney was again

arrested and taken to the ACJ on July 21, 2023. He alleges jail officials strip-searched him

and failed to return two items of personal property—a gold chain and a diamond piece—

upon his release. Dkt. No. 25-cv-368, ECF No. 1 at 4. He further claims that ACJ Corporal

Litchfield, a supervising officer, “confirmed” no warrant existed before his arrest,

rendering his detention unconstitutional. Id.

D. July 5, 2025

On or about July 5, 2025, Lewiston Police detained and injured Mr. McKinney

under what he calls “similar circumstances” to the March 29, 2023, incident. Dkt. No.

25-cv-355, ECF No. 6-2 at 4. Nothing in the records describes the July 5th encounter in

further detail. On July 7, 2025, Mr. McKinney contacted the Internal Affairs Division of

the Lewiston Police Department regarding concerns about data the Department allegedly

kept about his cases. Dkt. No. 25-cv-355, ECF No. 1-3 at 1. He states the representative he

spoke with was “intimidating, dismissive, and retaliatory,” tried to “justify[] the

department’s actions,” and claimed to have been “watching” Mr. McKinney “all day.” Id.

at 1–2. At some point during or after this conversation, Mr. McKinney submitted requests

for public records to the Lewiston Police Department and the ACJ under the Maine

Freedom of Access Act (“FOAA”), 1 M.R.S. § 400 et seq. See Dkt. No. 25-cv-367, ECF No.

1 at 2–3. He claims he never received responses to those requests.

E. Miscellaneous Factual Assertions

Mr. McKinney describes two additional incidents, though he does not specify when

they occurred. While incarcerated at the ACJ, he alleges that several officials delayed his

emergency transport to a hospital despite a “serious medical condition.” Dkt. No.

25-cv-368, ECF No. 7 at 3. He further contends that jail staff denied him basic clothing,

including socks and underwear, and failed to conduct fire drills in compliance with safety

standards. Id.

II. Analysis

In evaluating a complaint for failure to state a claim, the Court engages in a two-

step analysis. See Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.

2012). First, the Court isolates and disregards statements that provide only legal labels,

conclusions, or rote recitations of cause-of-action elements. Id. Second, accepting the

well-pleaded factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences for the

Plaintiff, the Court decides whether the complaint plausibly states a claim for relief. See

Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (discussing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),

and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). A self-represented plaintiff remains

subject to this standard, but the Court “must construe his complaint ‘liberally’ and hold it

‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Waterman v. Paul

G. White Interior Sols., No. 2:19-cv-00032, 2019 WL 5764661, at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 5, 2019)

(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). “To allege a civil action

in federal court, it is not enough for a plaintiff merely to allege that a defendant acted

unlawfully; a plaintiff must affirmatively allege facts that identify the manner in which

the defendant subjected the plaintiff to a harm for which the law affords a remedy.”

Schiller v. Ferneld, No. 2:21-cv-00306, 2021 WL 5494517, at *1 (D. Me. Nov. 21, 2021),

report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 5815820 (D. Me. Dec. 7, 2021) (citing

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

A. Vicarious Liability

Mr. McKinney seeks to assert constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

the Lewiston Police Department, the Androscoggin County Sheriff’s Department, and the

Androscoggin County Jail. Because these law enforcement agencies are not suable entities

separate from their respective municipalities, the Court construes the claims as brought

against the City of Lewiston and Androscoggin County respectively. See Henschel v.

Worcester Police Dep’t, 445 F.2d 624, 624 (1st Cir. 1971) (affirming dismissal of § 1983

claim against police department because it was not a suable entity apart from the

municipality); Bayne v. Mills, No. 25-cv-00047, 2025 WL 1248919, at *2 (D. Me. Apr. 30,

2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2030183 (D. Me. July 21, 2025)

(same).

However, a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable for constitutional

violations committed by its employees. To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a

Plaintiff must identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused the alleged injury. Bd.

of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Mr. McKinney has not alleged any

policy or custom that could serve as a basis for liability against either the City of Lewiston

or Androscoggin County. Accordingly, to the extent any of Mr. McKinney’s constitutional

claims survive, the Court considers only the § 1983 claims brought against the individual

defendants in their personal capacities. See Canales v. Gatzunis, 979 F. Supp. 2d 164, 171

(D. Mass. 2013) (dismissing § 1983 claims against the Sheriff’s Department and against

employees in their official capacities, while allowing claims against an individual

defendant in his personal capacity to proceed). Any governmental entities named as

Defendants are accordingly entitled to dismissal.

B. Supervisory Liability

Mr. McKinney asserts two instances in which jail supervisors allegedly violated his

rights. Although a superior officer cannot be held vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

on a respondeat superior theory, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978), a supervisor may be found liable under section 1983 on the basis of the

supervisor’s own acts or omissions, see Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 20 (1st

Cir. 1992). “[A] supervisor may be held liable for what he does (or fails to do) if his

behavior demonstrates deliberate indifference to conduct that is itself violative of a

plaintiff's constitutional rights.” Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576,

582 (1st Cir. 1994). But it is not enough for the Plaintiff to show deliberate indifference;

he must also “affirmatively connect the supervisor’s conduct to the subordinate’s violative

act or omission.” Id.

First, Mr. McKinney claims that upon his arrival at the ACJ, Corporal Litchfield,

presumably in his supervisory capacity, “confirmed no warrant existed” for Mr.

McKinney’s arrest. Dkt. No. 25-cv-368, ECF No. 1 at 4. According to Mr. McKinney, this

means his detention and subsequent strip search were impermissible and without judicial

authorization. See id. Because Mr. McKinney’s claims fail to establish the requisite

causation, however, this allegation does not establish supervisory liability. Mr. McKinney

does not allege Corporal Litchfield’s actions, inactions, or policies caused unnamed police

officers to detain Mr. McKinney in the first instance—with or without a warrant—on July

21, 2023.

Second, Mr. McKinney alleges ACJ Sergeants Mason and Harts and Major

Feldman ordered corrections officers not to transport Mr. McKinney to the hospital

overnight after he alerted them to his medical needs. See Dkt. No. 25-cv-368, ECF No. 7

at 3. While a causal link between a supervisor’s actions and subsequent constitutional

violations may be established “if there exists a known history of widespread abuse

sufficient to alert a supervisor to ongoing violations,” “isolated instances of

unconstitutional activity” are insufficient to establish a supervisor’s policy, custom, or

deliberate indifference. Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 582. Even assuming Mr. McKinney

is correct that Defendants’ conduct could constitute deliberate indifference under the

Eighth Amendment, see infra, Subsection II.F (discussing the Eighth Amendment

claims), Mr. McKinney fails to plead any facts suggesting this was anything beyond an

isolated instance. He does not allege a policy at the ACJ or on the part of ACJ’s supervisors

to deny inmates medical care.

Accordingly, Mr. McKinney fails to state a plausible claim of supervisory liability

against Defendants Mason, Feldman, Harts, or Litchfield.4

C. Fourth Amendment

The Court construes Mr. McKinney’s encounters with law enforcement in October

2020, March 2023, July 2023, and July 2025 as alleged violations of his Fourth

4 Mr. McKinney names several other officers in his amended complaint in McKinney v. Androscoggin

County Jail who may or may not have held supervisory roles. He does not explain their connections to his

claims or ascribe to them any conduct. As such, he has not stated an actionable claim against any of the

other individuals joined as defendants in this case. See Dkt. No. 25-cv-368, ECF No. 7 at 1; Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 676–77 (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own

individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).

Amendment rights against the named and unnamed law enforcement officers in their

individual capacities. The allegations fall into three categories.

First, Mr. McKinney asserts unnamed officers used excessive force during his

March 2023 and July 2025 arrests. The Fourth Amendment protects against

unreasonable seizures, including the use of excessive force. See U.S. Const. amend. IV;

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989). An officer violates this protection by

employing force that exceeds what is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See

id. at 394–95. Courts evaluate the reasonableness of force by considering factors such as

the severity of the suspected offense, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat, and

whether he resisted or attempted to flee. See Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2, 11 (1st Cir.

2007). Here, however, Mr. McKinney offers no factual detail about either encounter—no

description of the force used, the context of the encounters, or the officers’ conduct.

Without such allegations, the Court cannot plausibly infer that the force was

unreasonable. His excessive force claims therefore fail.

Second, Mr. McKinney appears to allege that officers stopped or arrested him

without warrants in March 2023, July 2023, and July 2025. A warrantless arrest is

constitutional if supported by probable cause. Vargas-Badillo v. Díaz-Torres, 114 F.3d 3,

6 (1st Cir. 1997). Probable cause exists when the facts and reasonably trustworthy

information known to officers would warrant a prudent person in believing the suspect

committed or was committing an offense. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Again, Mr.

McKinney pleads no facts describing the circumstances of these arrests. Absent such

detail, he fails to allege a plausible lack of probable cause.5

Third, Mr. McKinney alleges unnamed officers subjected him to strip searches

each time he was transported to the ACJ. The First Circuit recognizes that institutional

security can justify warrantless strip searches in custodial settings, even absent

individualized suspicion in some circumstances. See Roberts v. State of R.I., 239 F.3d

107, 111 (1st Cir. 2001). At the same time, overly broad or intrusive policies may render

such searches unreasonable depending on the context. See id. at 111–13. Because Mr.

McKinney provides no facts about how these searches were conducted or why they were

unreasonable, he fails to state a viable Fourth Amendment claim on this basis.

The October 2020 encounter with Troopers Hink and Wing stands on different

footing, however. Here, Mr. McKinney alleges in detail that the troopers conducted a

public strip search along the side of a highway without reasonable suspicion that he had

committed a crime.6 Accepting these allegations as true at this stage, the Court can

plausibly infer a Fourth Amendment violation. See Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1st

Cir. 1997) (“[T]o be reasonable . . . , strip and visual body cavity searches must be justified

by at least a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing contraband or

weapons.”). Accordingly, Mr. McKinney states a viable Fourth Amendment claim against

Troopers Wing and Hink.

5 As the Magistrate Judge observes, publicly available records from Mr. McKinney’s state court

proceedings—of which the Court may take judicial notice, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 201—indicate that multiple

arrest warrants were active at the times of the challenged detentions. See Dkt. No. 25-cv-368, ECF No. 11 at

5–6. This further undercuts any inference that officers lacked probable cause.

6 Mr. McKinney attaches to his complaint a copy of the state district court order granting his motion to

suppress the results of the strip search, which found that officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion

to justify the search. See Dkt. No. 25-cv-355, ECF No. 1-3 at 9–23.

In sum, Mr. McKinney fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim for all alleged

incidents except Count I against Defendants Wing and Hink. See Dkt. No. 25-cv-355, ECF

No. 1 at 9.

D. First Amendment Retaliation

Mr. McKinney alleges unnamed defendant officers retaliated against him by

stopping and arresting him after he filed complaints and requested public records from

the Internal Affairs divisions of the ACJ and the Lewiston Police Department. To properly

assert a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege facts

sufficient to show “(1) he or she engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) he or

she was subjected to an adverse action by the defendant, and (3) the protected conduct

was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action.” D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v.

Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 43 (1st Cir. 2012).

Mr. McKinney’s own allegations belie the third factor. His pleadings establish that

the arrests at issue occurred before he filed his complaints in July 2025, making it

implausible that those complaints motivated the challenged actions. In addition, the

complaint offers no factual detail regarding the content of his Internal Affairs complaints

or the nature and scope of the Defendants’ alleged failure to respond to his FOAA

requests. These omissions further undermine any inference of retaliatory motive. Because

Mr. McKinney fails to allege facts supporting a plausible First Amendment claim,

dismissal is warranted. Accordingly, the Court therefore declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over any related state law claim. See United Mine Workers of

Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 722 (1966) (explaining that when federal claims are dismissed

before trial, state law claims ordinarily should be dismissed as well).

E. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

Mr. McKinney alleges unnamed jail officials failed to return his personal property

following his July 21, 2023, arrest and detention at the ACJ. The Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments govern the government retention of property after a lawful initial seizure.

See Denault v. Ahern, 857 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2017). Because Mr. McKinney appears to

contend jail officials acted outside of established procedures, his claim implicates the

Parratt-Hudson doctrine. Under that doctrine, a due process violation arises only if a

State fails to provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the property loss. See

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984) (“Where a loss of property is occasioned by

a random, unauthorized act by a state employee, rather than by an established state

procedure . . . it is difficult to conceive of how the State could provide a meaningful

hearing before the deprivation takes place.”) (quotation modified)); Lowe v. Scott, 959

F.2d 323, 340 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[W]hen a state official is not acting pursuant to established

state procedure, the state is not in a position to provide anything other than such

postdeprivation remedies[.]”).

Mr. McKinney alleges no facts regarding the availability or adequacy of post-

deprivation remedies, nor does he plausibly allege that he pursued such remedies beyond

simply requesting the return of his property. These omissions are fatal to his due process

claim. Accordingly, he fails to state a plausible claim for relief based on the alleged

deprivation of his property.

To the extent Mr. McKinney also asserts unnamed officers violated his due process

rights by failing to wear body-worn cameras during his arrests, that claim likewise fails.

He identifies no constitutionally protected life, liberty, or property interest in the

recording of police encounters. See, e.g., Baca v. Anderson, No. 22-cv-02461, 2022 WL

7094267, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2022) (dismissing a constitutional claim because the

plaintiff “has not shown that the asserted right to body camera footage is a

constitutionally protected life, liberty, or property interest”).

F. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

Mr. McKinney asserts ACJ officials—specifically Sergeants Mason and Harts and

Major Feldman—acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments by failing to provide timely medical care after he reported a

medical issue. Deliberate indifference requires a mental state “more blameworthy than

negligence.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). The Supreme Court has drawn

a clear distinction between “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,” which is

actionable, and mere negligence “in diagnosing or treating a medical condition,” which is

not. Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 106 (1976)).

Mr. McKinney’s allegations do not plausibly satisfy the deliberate indifference

standard. He fails to describe the nature and severity of his medical needs, the substance

of his request for care, whether the alleged condition required diagnosis or treatment, and

even the date the alleged events occurred. Without such factual content, the complaint

does not support a reasonable inference that any Defendant knowingly disregarded a

serious medical need.

Mr. McKinney’s additional claims regarding inadequate clothing and alleged

failures to follow prescribed fire safety procedures suffer from the same deficiencies. He

does not identify which Defendants were responsible for these conditions or allege facts

showing that any official acted with deliberate indifference. Courts routinely dismiss such

claims where the plaintiff fails to allege specific facts linking particular defendants to

unconstitutional conduct or to describe the resulting harm. See, e.g., Cable v. Wall, No.

CIV.A. 09-439, 2010 WL 1486494, at *5 (D.R.I. Mar. 18, 2010), report and

recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 1531374 (D.R.I. Apr. 13, 2010); Sowell v. Fair, 915

F.2d 1557, 1990 WL 152343, at *5 (1st Cir. 1990) (dismissing Eighth Amendment safety

regulations claim “where the complaint lacked detailed factual allegations identifying

what chemicals plaintiff was exposed to, what harm resulted, and what efforts plaintiff

made to bring these conditions to the attention of the authorities”). Accordingly, Mr.

McKinney fails to state a plausible claim for relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments.7

III. Conclusion

For the reasons provided herein, the Court AFFIRMS and ADOPTS the

Recommended Decisions. Dkt. No. 25-cv-355, ECF No. 31; Dkt. No. 25-cv-367, ECF No.

9; Dkt. No. 25-cv-368, ECF No. 11. Plaintiff’s complaints in Case No. 25-cv-367 and Case

No. 25-cv-368 are DISMISSED in their entirety. Plaintiff’s complaint in Case No.

25-cv-355 is DISMISSED except as to the Fourth Amendment claim against Defendants

Wing and Hink (Count I). All other Defendants in Case No. 25-cv-355 are DISMISSED.

Plaintiff’s Motions to Hold Magistrate and District Judges Accountable are DISMISSED

AS MOOT. Dkt. No. 25-cv-355, ECF No. 33; Dkt. No. 25-cv-367, ECF No. 11; Dkt. No.

25-cv-368, ECF No. 13. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Ruling is DISMISSED AS MOOT.

Dkt. No. 25-cv-355, ECF No. 35.

7 Mr. McKinney has also filed a “Motion to Hold Magistrate and District Judges Accountable” in each case,

as well as a “Motion to Compel Ruling.” See Dkt. No. 25-cv-355, ECF Nos. 33, 35; Dkt. No. 25-cv-367, ECF

No. 11; Dkt. No. 25-cv-368, ECF No. 13. In large part, the motions restate his claims for relief. To the extent

he raises any other arguments, the Court has considered them and determines they are frivolous.

SO ORDERED.

Dated this 22nd day of April, 2026.

/s/ Stacey D. Neumann

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE