Osmundson

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

SHANNON SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:25-cv-04130-JEH

KURT OSMUNDSON, et al.,

Defendants.

Order

This matter is now before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion. (Doc. 22). For the reasons stated below,

Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.

I

Plaintiff Shannon Smith, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 alleging Defendants Dr. Kurt Osmundson and Samantha Shinn were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth

Amendment while he was incarcerated at Hill Correctional Center (“Hill”).

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he was bitten by a spider on July 11, 2024, and

developed an infection. Due to a delay in medical care, Plaintiff allegedly suffered

nerve damage and a permanent hole in his leg from the infection. (Docs. 8, 9).

On March 5, 2026, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the

Issue of Exhaustion. (Doc. 22). The same day, the Clerk issued a Notice warning

Plaintiff that if he failed to respond within 21 days, the Motion would be granted,

if appropriate, and the case would be terminated without a trial. (Doc. 23).

Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was due on

March 26, 2026. To date, Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants’ Motion or

requested additional time to do so. Under Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6), “[a] failure to

respond to any numbered fact will be deemed an admission of the fact.” Id.

II

During the relevant period, Plaintiff was an inmate at Hill. Defendant Dr.

Osmundson was a physician. Defendant Shinn was a nurse practitioner.

Defendants provided medical care to the inmates at Hill.

Plaintiff alleges he was bitten by a spider in his cell on July 11, 2024. (Doc. 8

at p. 3). On July 13, 2024, Plaintiff allegedly submitted a medical request form and

was called to the Health Care Unit (“HCU”) for sick call to be examined by Nurse

Stauffer. Id. Defendant Dr. Osmundson instructed Nurse Stauffer to inform

Plaintiff to return if his condition worsened. Id.

On July 17, 2024, Plaintiff was allegedly experiencing increased swelling,

pus discharge, and pain with a numb tingling sensation up and down his right

thigh and submitted a sick call request. Id. On July 20, 2024, an unidentified

individual allegedly examined Plaintiff and advised him to continue taking

ibuprofen and keep the bite area clean. Id. at p. 4.

On July 22, 2024, an unidentified nurse noted white/green discharge

coming from the wound and the area was warm to the touch. Id. Plaintiff was

prescribed Naproxen for the pain and an antibiotic for the infection. Id.

On July 30, 2024, Defendant Shinn allegedly examined Plaintiff and

diagnosed him with a cellulite abscess infection, prescribed a course of antibiotic

injections, and admitted him to the infirmary. Id. On August 2, 2024, Nurse

Practitioner Kramer discharged Plaintiff from the infirmary. Id.

Plaintiff submitted one relevant grievance on July 22, 2024. (Doc. 22-1 at pp.

16-17). Grievance K29-0714-1522E alleges Plaintiff did not receive proper medical

care for his spider bite due to medical refusing to see him, inability to see a doctor,

and improper treatment by the nurse practitioner. Id.

On July 30, 2024, the Grievance Officer denied Plaintiff’s grievance because

Defendant Shinn confirmed that Plaintiff received treatment for the spider bite and

was prescribed antibiotics for the infection. Id. at p. 15. On August 2, 2024, the

Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) concurred with the Grievance Officer’s

finding. Id.

Plaintiff appealed the grievance to the Administrative Review Board

(“ARB”) on August 7, 2024. Id. On September 12, 2024, the ARB determined the

grievance was properly denied, as the Grievance Officer found the issue was

appropriately addressed by the facility administration. Id. at p. 14.

III

A

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322-23 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he court has one

task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there

is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp.,

24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). In making this determination, the court must

construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “Inferences that are supported by only speculation or

conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion.” McDonald v. Vill. of

Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). In order to successfully oppose a

motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must do more than raise a

“‘metaphysical doubt’ as to the material facts, and instead must present definite,

competent evidence to rebut the motion.” Michael v. St. Joseph Cnty., 259 F.3d 842,

845 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted).

B

“The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) requires prisoners with

complaints about prison conditions to exhaust available grievance procedures

before bringing suit in federal court.” Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 464 (2025).

Parties “have a right to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is

intertwined with the merits of a claim . . . .” Id. at 469. Here, the exhaustion issue

is not intertwined with the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. There is no jury issue

regarding exhaustion.

“To exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the

place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v.

McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff was required to follow

the grievance procedures described in the regulations provided by the Illinois

Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.800, et seq.

According to the grievance procedure in Illinois, offenders in the custody of the

IDOC must first try to resolve their issues through their counselor. § 504.810. If the

issue persists, the offender may file a grievance addressed to the grievance officer

within sixty days after the incident was discovered. Id.

The grievance must contain factual details, including what happened,

when, where, and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is

otherwise involved in the complaint. § 504.810(c). If the offender cannot name

specific individuals, the offender “must include as much descriptive information

about the individual as possible.” Id.

The grievance officer will then make a report of findings and

recommendations in writing to the CAO within two months, “when reasonably

feasible under the circumstances.” §§ 504.810(a), 504.830(e). The CAO will advise

the offender of the decision. Id.

If the offender is not satisfied with the outcome, he may appeal to the

Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. The appeal must be received by

the ARB within thirty days after the date of the CAO’s decision. § 504.850. The

ARB will submit a report to the Director, who will review the findings and make

a final determination within six months after receiving it “when reasonably

feasible under the circumstances.” § 504.850(e).

An inmate who fails to properly take every step of the administrative

process has failed to exhaust his remedies. Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 983 (7th

Cir. 2020). The Seventh Circuit takes a strict compliance approach to exhaustion,

requiring inmates to follow all grievance rules established by the correctional

authority. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). A lawsuit filed by an

inmate before he exhausted his administrative remedies must be dismissed

because the court lacks the discretion to resolve the claim on the merits. Perez v.

Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). Because exhaustion is an

affirmative defense, the defendants shoulder the burden of proof. Hernandez v. Lee,

128 F.4th 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2025).

IV

Defendants Osmundson and Shinn argue they are entitled to summary

judgment because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Defendants assert Grievance K29-0714-1522E fails to mention Dr. Osmundson and

Shinn and only refers to the conduct of a “NP.” (Doc. 22 at p. 8).

It is generally recognized that a grievance must contain sufficient

information so as to alert the prison to “the nature of the wrong for which redress

is sought.” Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff who does

not provide this necessary information fails to exhaust. See Ambrose v. Godinez, 510

F. App'x 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff failed to exhaust where he did not

identify defendants “by name or inference”); see also Woods v. Schmeltz, No. 13-

1477, 2014 WL 3490569, at *4 (C.D. Ill. July 14, 2014) (plaintiff must provide enough

information for “the prison to determine which of its employees were involved in

the incidents . . . .”).

Here, Grievance K29-0714-1522E requested proper medical treatment for a

spider bite Plaintiff suffered on July 11, 2024. (Doc. 22-1 at pp. 16-17). Plaintiff

stated he submitted a sick call request, was examined by nurses, and provided

with medical care. Id. at p. 17. Plaintiff alleged one of the nurses informed him the

spider bite was an emergency and recommended he “see a doctor ASAP.” Id.

Plaintiff stated the infection worsened, the bite discharged green pus, and his

“whole thigh and leg went numb all the way down to [his] toes.” Id. On July 22,

2024, Plaintiff stated he saw the “nurse practitioner,” who informed him the bite

looked infected and swollen, gave him Clindamycin and Naproxen, and told him

she would give him a shot in about a week if the bite was still infected. Id. Plaintiff

stated the nurse practitioner also “told [him] to hang on because [he] still [had] an

appointment to see the doctor on Aug. 9th.” Id. Although Plaintiff did not

specifically identify Defendants Dr. Osmundson and Shinn by name in his

grievance, Plaintiff referred to the “doctor” and the “nurse practitioner.” Id.

The Grievance Officer’s response indicates he spoke with Defendant Shinn

about the medical care Plaintiff received for his spider bite. Id. at p. 15. The

Grievance Officer’s response states:

Nurse Practitioner Shinn states, “I initially prescribed this patient

Bactrim (which is a typical antibiotic you prescribe for a skin

infection) and followed up with him after finishing it. The infection

had not improved with the Clindamycin when I followed up with

him and so I started him on Clindamycin for 10 days. I followed up

with him again today and it’s still infected, and after speaking with

Dr. Osmundson, I put him into the infirmary, he will be getting daily

Rocephin shots for 3 days, and continuing Clindamycin. He is also

acute which means he will be seen by a provider 3x weekly, and

nursing every shift.

Id. Plaintiff’s grievance contained enough information to allow the Grievance

Officer to investigate the grievance and speak with Defendant Shinn about

Plaintiff’s medical treatment. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217 (2007) (“[N]othing

in the [PLRA] imposes a ‘name all defendants’ requirement.”). The purpose of the

PLRA is to give the facility an opportunity to correct the issue before litigation.

Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948, 960 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d

990, 996 (7th Cir. 2020)). “[P]risoners must provide some identifying information

about the accused individuals. In other words, a grievance must contain enough

information about who caused the grieved of problem so that a prison can

properly investigate and resolve grievances.” Jackson, 105 F.4th at 960 (internal

citations and quotations omitted); see also Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th

Cir. 2011) (finding exhaustion as to defendants not named in grievance when the

prison was clearly on notice of the unnamed defendants who were involved). The

Court finds Plaintiff’s grievance provided sufficient notice.

After receiving the Grievance Officer’s response, there is no dispute that

Plaintiff properly completed the next steps of the grievance process. Plaintiff

submitted a timely appeal to the ARB on August 7, 2024. (Doc. 22-1 at p. 15). He

received the ARB’s response on September 12, 2024, and filed his initial Complaint

on July 15, 2025. Id. at p. 14; Doc. 1.

The Court finds Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies under the

PLRA. See Turley, 729 F.3d at 650 (explaining that “once a prison has received

notice of, and an opportunity to correct, a problem, the prisoner has satisfied the

purpose of the exhaustion requirement”). Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment is DENIED.

V

For the reasons stated, supra:

(1) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [22] is DENIED.

(2) The deadlines in the Court's Scheduling Order [20] remain in place.

Discovery closes on August 3, 2026, and dispositive motions are due by September

3, 2026.

It is so ordered.

Entered: April 21, 2026

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge