Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESTERN DIVISION

SARA F., Case No. CV 25-06001-DFM

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

v.

FRANK BISIGNANO,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Sara F. appeals the Commissioner’s decision denying her

application for supplemental security income.1 For the reasons set forth below,

the Court affirms the agency’s denial of benefits and dismisses this action with

prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income on November 7, 2022,

alleging disability beginning September 3, 2018. See Dkt. 11, Administrative

Record (“AR”) 195-204.2 The Commissioner denied the claim initially on

1 The Court partially redacts Plaintiff’s name in compliance with Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the

Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial

Conference of the United States.

2 Citations to the AR are to the record pagination. All other docket

March 2, 2023, see AR 94-99, and upon reconsideration on January 19, 2024,

see AR 101-08. Thereafter, Plaintiff requested and received a hearing before an

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on August 8, 2024. See AR 44-64. The ALJ

issued an unfavorable decision on December 30, 2024. See AR 28-43.

The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process for

determining whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). At

step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since November 7, 2022, the application date. See AR 33. At step two,

the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of “degenerative disc

disease and right shoulder strain.” AR 34. At step three, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met

or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See id.

After considering the record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20

C.F.R. § 416.967(b) except “she can only occasionally reach over head; she

can only occasionally perform postural activities.” Id. At step four, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. See AR 37. At step five,

considering Plaintiff’s documented vocational background and the opinion of a

vocational expert, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including

cashier II; sales attendant; and cleaner, housekeeping. See AR 37-38.

Consequently, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability

since November 7, 2022, the application date. See AR 38.

The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision. See AR 1-6.

Plaintiff then sought judicial review from this Court. See Dkt. 1.

citations are to the CM/ECF pagination.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

A district court will set aside a denial of benefits only if “it is either not

supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.” Luther v.

Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Under the

substantial-evidence standard, the district court looks to the existing

administrative record and determines “whether it contains sufficient evidence

to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S.

97, 102 (2019) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). “Substantial” means “more than

a mere scintilla” but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 103 (citation omitted). This

threshold “is not high” and “defers to the presiding ALJ, who has seen the

hearing up close.” Id. at 103, 108. ““Where evidence is susceptible to more than

one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

I. DISCUSSION

The parties’ sole dispute is whether the ALJ properly considered

Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony. See Dkt. 13, Plaintiff's Brief (“Pl.’s

Br.”); Dkt. 17, Defendant’s Brief (“Def.’s Br.”’).

A. Applicable Law

The ALJ applies a two-step analysis to assess a claimant’s credibility for

symptom severity. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017).

Once the claimant “has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying

impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other

symptoms alleged,” then, absent evidence of malingering, “the ALJ can reject

the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering

specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (citation omitted).

“[T]he ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722

(9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

“The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in

Social Security cases.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678 (citation omitted). The ALJ’s

findings “must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude

the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and

did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding pain.” Brown-

Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

However, “an ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain,

or else disability benefits would be available for the asking, a result plainly

contrary to the Social Security Act.” Smartt v. Kyakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th

Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The clear and

convincing “standard isn’t whether our court is convinced, but instead whether

the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Id.

B. _Plaintiff’s Testimony

The ALJ accurately summarized Plaintiff's testimony as follows.

In connection with her application for [SSI], the claimant alleged an

inability to work due to back pain resulting from a car accident. She

testified at a hearing held in August 2024, that she was in a car

accident during which she injured her back. As a result, she has

symptoms that cause her to be unable to stand long hours or lift

heavy boxes. She received treatment at Venice Family Clinic and

filed a lawsuit related to her car accident. She is able to stand a few

hours. She feels numbness and tingling when she is sitting down.

She refuses to lift heavy items and cannot pick up more than 10

pounds. She is able to do light chores around the house for a short

period of time. She is able to take care of her personal hygiene. She

is able to drive. She does her own grocery shopping. She testified

that everything is long and tedious when her back and neck hurts.

She uses heat patches. She has never received any injections or

medications for pain.

AR 35 (internal citations omitted).

C. Analysis

The ALJ partially discredited Plaintiffs allegations at the second Trevizo

step, finding that her medically determinable impairments could reasonably be

expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but that her “statements concerning

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the

reasons explained in this decision.” AR 35. Specifically, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff's statements were inconsistent with the medical evidence and her

course of treatment. See AR 35-36.

First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's allegations “are simply not

consistent with the objective clinical findings documented in the medical

records.” AR 35. “When objective medical evidence in the record 1s

inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed

weigh it as undercutting such testimony.” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 498 (emphasis

omitted).

The ALJ cited specific, clear, and convincing examples to establish that

Plaintiff's testimony was inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. To

start, the ALJ explained that despite Plaintiffs allegations that she has been

unable to work since September 2018, she submitted no evidence of medical

treatment prior to 2022. See AR 35. The ALJ further explained that the lack of

evidence was “particularly notable given the claimant’s allegations of disability

related to an automobile accident in 2018 during which she injured her back.

There is no evidence of this event.” Id. (emphasis added).

Plaintiff asserts that this is a “straw-man rationale,” as the “only relevant

date for consideration of medical evidence is November 2022 and forward.”

Br. at 9-10. Even if true, the ALJ went on to explain, “[t]here is no

evidence that the claimant reported symptoms related to back pain or shoulder

pain to any treating medical provider at any time.” AR 35. In support, the ALJ

correctly noted that the submitted medical records from Venice Urgent Care

show treatment for a cold and COVID in 2022, see AR 364-86, a urinary tract

infection in November 2022, see AR 319, a urinary tract infection and acute

vaginitis in June 2023, see AR 334-49, and similar symptoms in August 2023,

see AR 350-57, but nothing related to back or shoulder pain. See id. Like the

ALJ, the Court was unable to find any mention of Plaintiff’s principal

complaints and resulting limitations.

What’s more, the ALJ noted that “the only medical personnel the

claimant reported her allegedly disabling conditions to were those involved in

the evaluation of her disability claim.” AR 35. At the request of the State

agency, Plaintiff was seen for an orthopedic consultative evaluation with Jerry

Chuang, M.D., in January 2023. See AR 328-33. Plaintiff complained of lower

back pain radiating down both legs since a motor vehicle accident in 2018, but

acknowledged she was receiving no treatment. See AR 329. Upon

examination, Dr. Chuang reported that Plaintiff had a normal gait, no deficit

of the cervical or thoracic spine, some tenderness and weakness of the lumbar

spine, and full range of motion of both shoulders with no instability. See AR

328-33. Plaintiff was seen again for another orthopedic consultative evaluation

with Dr. Chuang in January 2024, reporting similar symptoms of back pain

and pain in her right shoulder. See AR 358-63. Upon examination, Plaintiff

presented with similar limitations as before, including some mild weakness of

the right shoulder and bilateral lower extremities. See id. Based on the above,

the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations of extreme functional limitations

were undermined by the medical evidence, “which conspicuously fails to show

a physiological basis for the extreme pain and limitation alleged.” AR 36.

Plaintiff does not refute any of these findings.

Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “course of medical treatment in

this case does not bolster the claimant’s allegations regarding the severity or

persistence of her symptoms.” AR 36. An ALJ may consider “unexplained or

inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed

course of treatment” in weighing a claimant’s credibility. Tommasetti v.

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008).

The ALJ focused on the “lack of pursuit of medical treatment” for

Plaintiff’s allegedly disabling conditions, noting that she had not been sent for

imaging, prescribed any pain medication, attended physical therapy, or been

seen by orthopedic or neurosurgical specialists. See AR 36. Additionally, the

ALJ contrasted Plaintiff’s use of urgent care centers in the area with the lack of

evidence suggesting she “ever complained of symptoms of back or shoulder

pain to treating physicians.” Id. Plaintiff does not refute the ALJ’s assessment,

which is supported by substantial evidence. Indeed, at the hearing, the ALJ

repeatedly pushed Plaintiff regarding the lack of record evidence. See, e.g., AR

52 (“So in 2022, 2023, all the visits I have are for UTIs with prescriptions for

that. There’s nothing about back pain.”), id. (“Did someone write you

prescriptions for pain medication? Have you had x-rays?”). Ultimately,

Plaintiff’s lack of treatment undermines her reports regarding the disabling

nature of her pain. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999)

(rejecting subjective pain complaints where plaintiff’s “claim that she

experienced pain approaching the highest level imaginable was inconsistent

with the ‘minimal, conservative treatment’ that she received”).

Plaintiff broadly argues that the ALJ merely summarized the evidence of

record without addressing her specific testimony. See Pl.’s Br. at 8-10. To

ensure that “appellate review is meaningful,” the ALJ is required to

“specifically identify the testimony [from a claimant] she or he finds not to be

credible and . . . explain what evidence undermines the testimony.” Treichler

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014)

(alterations in original) (citation omitted); see also Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at

493 (finding error where “the ALJ stated only that she found, based on

unspecified claimant testimony and a summary of medical evidence, that ‘the

functional limitations from the claimant’s impairments were less serious than

she has alleged’”). This argument is not persuasive. The ALJ contrasted the

specific testimony at issue—back and shoulder pain from a car accident—with

the lack of record evidence to support those limitations.

“Ultimately, the ‘clear and convincing’ standard requires an ALJ to

show his [or her] work,” which the ALJ did here. Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499.

“Not every reason need be supported by substantial evidence, but the ‘ultimate

credibility determination’ must be.” Baker v. Saul, 836 F. App’x 526, 530 (9th

Cir. 2020) (quoting Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155,

1162 (9th Cir. 2008)). Here, the ALJ gave at least two clear and convincing

reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting Plaintiff's

testimony.

Remand is not warranted on this claim of error.

IV. CONCLUSION

The agency’s denial of benefits is affirmed and this action is dismissed

with prejudice.

Date: January 21, 2026 J x ¢

DOUGLAS F. McCORMICK

United States Magistrate Judge