Dowlen

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

KIERRA LACHELLE DOWLEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:24-cv-00522

) Judge Aleta A. Trauger

THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM

Before the court is defendant City of Springfield’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

No. 65), supported by a Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 66), Statement of Undisputed Material

Facts (“SUMF”) (Doc. No. 68), and the Declarations of Jason Head, as former Chief of Police for

the Springfield Police Department (“SPD”), and Charles Bogle, a police officer with the SPD at

the time the events giving rise to the plaintiff’s claims occurred (Doc. Nos. 67-1, 67-2). The

plaintiff has not responded to the motion. For the reasons set forth herein, it will be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, any party “may move for summary judgment,

identifying each claim or defense . . . on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. The movant must

show that the material facts are not “genuinely disputed” by citing to evidence in the record,

“including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory

answers, [and] other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A genuine issue of material fact exists

when there is sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Ciminillo v.

Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2006). The court must view the facts and draw reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.

372, 378 (2007) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).

“Even when faced with an unopposed motion for summary judgment, the district court

cannot grant a motion for summary judgment without first considering supporting evidence and

determining whether the movant has met its burden.” Byrne v. CSX Transp., Inc., 541 F. App’x

672, 675 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Delphi Auto. Sys., LLC v. United Plastics, Inc., 418 F. App’x

374, 380–81 (6th Cir. 2011). But the trial court has no “duty to search the entire record to establish

that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472,

1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989). Rather, “the court may rely on the moving party’s unrebutted recitation

of the evidence, or pertinent portions thereof, in reaching a conclusion that certain evidence and

inferences from evidence demonstrate facts which are ‘uncontroverted.’” Guarino v. Brookfield

Twp. Trs., 980 F.2d 399, 410 (6th Cir. 1992). “If such evidence supports a conclusion that there is

no genuine issue of material fact,” the court should grant summary judgment for the movant. Id.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiff initiated this lawsuit through counsel by filing her original Complaint in this

court on April 28, 2024, naming as defendants only the City of Springfield (the “City”) and

“Officer Defendants John Does 1–7,” all allegedly SPD employees. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 3.) Generally,

she alleged that these police officers entered her home and conducted a search without a warrant,

in the process throwing her to the ground and handcuffing her without probable cause. She asserted

claims against the individual officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable seizure,

and excessive force, along with various state law tort claims. She also asserted a municipal liability

claim against the City.

The City answered the Complaint on June 17, 2024, asserting that the plaintiff was

“mistaken as to the identity of the officers involved in the incident described in the Complaint”

and that, in fact, the officers were employed by the Robertson County Sheriff’s Department

(“RCSD”) and the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”). (Doc. No. 9 ¶¶ 4, 6, 11, 35, 50, 61;

see also id. at 15, Affirmative Defense ¶ 1.)

The plaintiff thereafter sought and was granted leave to amend her Complaint to add the

TBI and RCSD as defendants. (See Am. Compl., Doc. No. 13.) However, those defendants’

Motions to Dismiss were granted—the TBI’s on immunity grounds and the RCSD’s on the

grounds that the claims against it were time-barred. (See Doc. Nos. 10, 11, 13, 40, 42.) The court

also denied as futile the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc.

Nos. 32, 40, 42.) The only defendants remaining after these rulings are the City of Springfield and

“John Does 1 through 7.” The only claim clearly asserted against the City is Count IV, for

“Municipal Liability.” (Id. at 9.) In addition, the plaintiff may be asserting that the City is

vicariously liable for its employees’ intentional torts (assault, battery, false imprisonment, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress) as alleged in Counts V–VIII.

The plaintiff has never identified or served the John Doe defendants, aside from asserting

that they are SPD employees. (See Doc. No. 13 ¶ 5.). The Initial Case Management Order entered

in May 2025 again put the plaintiff on notice of the City’s position that no SPD police officers

entered the plaintiff’s residence and that, “even if Plaintiff were correct about the identity of the

John Doe officers named in this case . . . , the statute of limitations has lapsed against any individual

officer.” (Doc. No. 47 at 2.) The Initial Case Management Order also set deadlines for fact

discovery, dispositive motions, and responses to dispositive motions. (Id. at 3.)

The City timely filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting documents. The

plaintiff, who is no longer represented by counsel,1 was notified by Order entered on February 2,

2026 that she needed to respond to the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment by March 2,

2026, and she was also advised of resources available upon request to the Clerk’s Office to assist

pro se litigants. (Doc. No. 69.) The plaintiff filed a document entitled “Continuance,” in which she

asked the court to continue “the hearing/trial currently scheduled for March 2nd 2026”2 based on

“lack of time of preparation.” (Doc. No. 70.) She also requested the appointment of counsel. (Id.)

The court denied the motion (Doc. No. 71), but the plaintiff never responded to the Motion for

Summary Judgment or the SUMF. Despite the plaintiff’s failure to respond, as set forth above, the

court must still determine whether the defendant has established that the relevant facts are

uncontroverted and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

III. FACTS3

In April 2023, Jason Head was the Chief of Police for the SPD. (Doc. No. 67-1, Head Decl.

¶ 2.) Charles Bogle was an SPD police officer. (Doc. No. 67-2, Bogle Decl. ¶ 2.)

1 Plaintiff’s counsel was allowed to withdraw in November and December 2025. (Doc.

Nos. 55, 61.) By Order entered on December 22, 2025, the plaintiff was given until January 26,

2026 to either have new counsel enter an appearance on her behalf or to file a notice with the court

that she would be representing herself going forward. (Doc. No. 62.) She did neither.

2 In fact, the trial is set for June 30, 2026, not March 2, 2026. (Doc. No. 48.)

3 The defendant references Judge Richardson’s opinion in McLemore v. Gumucio, 619 F.

Supp. 3d 816 (M.D. Tenn. 2021), in a footnote to its Memorandum and states that it includes

“background” facts that are not in its SUMF. (See Doc. No. 66 at 2 n.1.) The undersigned notes

that it generally agrees with Judge Richardson’s observation that legal principles are not properly

included in Rule 56.01 statements of undisputed material fact and that statements of fact should

generally be concise. See id. at 826; see also L.R. 56.01(c)(1). While unnecessarily lengthy

statements of fact may violate the Local Rule, this court has also observed that “unnecessarily

succinct ones are equally unhelpful” and that a “statement of facts should not be so concise as to

require the court to search elsewhere in the record to piece together the facts that make up the case

and whether they are disputed.” Morris v. ReVida Recovery Centers, LLC, No. 3:22-cv-00931,

2024 WL 3836083, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 15, 2024).

On April 29, 2023, a multi-jurisdiction law enforcement unit consisting of officers from

the RCSD, the TBI, the City of Greenbrier Police Department, and the SPD was responsible for

executing outstanding arrest warrants throughout Robertson County. (Head Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4.) Bogle

served on this unit and Head supervised him in that capacity. (Id. ¶¶ 4–5.) The unit was led by

“County Agent Towers” (Bogle Decl. ¶ 4), and Head rode with Robertson County Sheriff Van

Dyke to the warrant locations (Head Decl. ¶ 5).

Among the warrants scheduled for execution that day was one issued for a suspect named

Christina Dowlen; the address on the arrest warrant was 100 Southfield Drive, Apartment D8,

Springfield, Tennessee. (Bogle Decl. ¶¶ 5–6; Head Decl. ¶¶ 6–7.) The property manager for 100

Southfield Drive confirmed that Christina Dowlen resided in Apartment D8. (Bogle Decl. ¶ 7;

Head Decl. ¶ 8.)

Upon arrival at the apartments at 100 Southfield Drive, Bogle followed County Agent

Towers and TBI Agent Clay Sheley to the front door of Apartment D8, on the second floor of the

building, while Head remained on the first floor with Sheriff Van Dyke. (Bogle Decl. ¶ 8; Head

Decl. ¶ 9.) According to Head, he remained on the first floor of the Southfield Apartments

throughout the events that took place that day. (Head Decl. ¶ 9. ) Consequently, he did not speak

to or physically contact the plaintiff at any time and did not witness the events that are alleged to

have taken place. (Id. ¶¶ 10–12.)

Bogle attests that, once the group arrived at the front door of Apartment D8, Agent Towers

knocked on the door and announced police presence. (Bogle Decl. ¶ 9.) A person later identified

as plaintiff Kierra Dowlen “partially opened the door but kept the chain guard attached.” (Id. ¶ 9.)

The plaintiff fit the description of suspect Christina Dowlen. (Id.)

Agent Towers stated that he had an arrest warrant for “her.”4 (Id. ¶ 11.) The plaintiff

demanded a copy of the warrant and momentarily closed the door to retrieve her identification.

(Id. ¶ 12.) According to Bogle, when she returned, the plaintiff partially opened the door and slid

her identification card through the opening. (Id. ¶ 13.) Towers could not read the card, but the

plaintiff would not give it to him. (Id.) However, she notified Towers that she was not Christina

Dowlen. (Id. ¶ 14.)

Bogle then spoke with a neighbor who entered the breezeway where the front door to

Apartment D8 was situated and who confirmed that Christina Dowlen resided in Apartment D8.

(Id. ¶ 15.) The same neighbor told the plaintiff to “just give [the officers]” her identification card,

but the plaintiff did not. (Id. ¶ 16.) However, she removed the chain from the door and opened the

door completely. (Id. ¶ 17.) Towers ordered her to step out of the doorway, but the plaintiff did

not. (Id.) Instead, she remained in the doorway and used her cellphone to video record the event,

and she began asking each unit member’s name and badge number. (Id. ¶ 18.)

During this time, Towers and TBI Agent Sheley had a conversation that Bogle could not

hear. (Id. ¶ 19.) While the plaintiff continued to record, Sheley moved to place her in handcuffs.

The plaintiff resisted and dropped her phone on the doormat outside Apartment D8. (Id. ¶ 20.)

Bogle picked up the phone so it would not be damaged. (Id.)

After the plaintiff was handcuffed, Towers, Sheley, and a Greenbrier police officer

conducted a “protective sweep” of Apartment D8. (Id. ¶ 21.) The plaintiff remained handcuffed

for approximately five minutes. (Id. ¶ 24.) At some point, the unit confirmed that the plaintiff was

4 Bogle does not explain what he means by “her.” The court presumes, based on context,

that Towers used the term “you,” addressing the person who answered the door, whom he assumed

to be Christina Dowlen.

Kierra Dowlen, the suspect’s sister, and she was released. (Id. ¶¶ 25–26.) The plaintiff asserted

that she was staying at her sister’s residence. (Id. ¶ 25.)

According to Bogle, he did not at any point enter Apartment D8 or make physical contact

with the plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.)

IV. DISCUSSION

The City asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment, because the plaintiff presents no

evidence showing that any City employee violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and neither

alleges nor shows that a City policy was the moving force behind any alleged constitutional

violations, as required by the municipal liability doctrine first elucidated by the Supreme Court in

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). It also asserts that, because the

plaintiff’s state law tort claims arise out of alleged civil rights violations, the City is immune from

suit on those claims under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(2).

A. Municipal Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

1. Legal Standard

Generally, to prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) that she “was deprived

of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that [she] was subjected

or caused to be subjected to this deprivation by a person acting under color of state law.” Gregory

v. Shelby Cty., 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000). It is now well established that a municipality

may be liable under § 1983, but it can only be liable for its own acts. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91.

Thus, to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a municipality under Monell, “the plaintiff must prove

both that (1) [she] ‘suffered a constitutional violation’ and (2) ‘a municipal policy or custom

directly caused the violation.’” Mt. Pleasant Blacktopping Co. v. Greene Cnty., No. 21-3684, 2022

WL 1308513, at *2 (6th Cir. May 2, 2022) (quoting Hardrick v. City of Detroit, 876 F.3d 238, 243

(6th Cir. 2017)); see also Brown v. Battle Creek Police Dep’t, 844 F.3d 556, 573 (6th Cir. 2016)

(“To succeed on a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must establish that his or her constitutional

rights were violated and that a policy or custom of the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind

the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.” (quoting Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub.

Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 607 (6th Cir. 2007)).

In other words, a city cannot be liable under § 1983 where its officers or employees have

not committed any underlying constitutional violation. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 474 U.S.

796, 799 (1986) (“[N]either Monell . . . nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of damages

against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact . . . the

officer inflicted no constitutional harm.”).

2. Application

The City argues, based on the uncontroverted facts set forth above, that the plaintiff cannot

establish that any City employee involved in the April 29 incident—Bogle or Head—personally

took part in the events that allegedly violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and, therefore,

cannot establish that the City is liable. (Doc. No. 66 at 7.) The court agrees. As set forth above,

Head was on a different floor and was not involved in any of the events that took place in

Apartment D8. Bogle attests that he did not enter the apartment and did not physically contact the

plaintiff, so he did not participate in the allegedly illegal search, seizure, or arrest. Because the

plaintiff cannot establish that Bogle or Head—the only City employees involved in the incident—

violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the plaintiff cannot establish that any City policy or

custom was the moving force behind any alleged constitutional violation. For this reason alone,

the City is entitled to summary judgment.

Even if the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations that her constitutional rights were

violated by the other officers’ actions, the plaintiff must tie that violation to a specific City policy

or custom. See Kovalchuk v. City of Decherd, 95 F.4th 1035, 1038 (6th Cir. 2024) (“A plaintiff

asserting a municipal liability claim under Monell ‘must connect the employee’s conduct to a

municipal “policy” or “custom.”’” (quoting Gambrel v. Knox Cnty., 25 F.4th 391, 408 (6th Cir.

2022)). To make this showing, the plaintiff must demonstrate

(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an

official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the

existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a

custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.

Id. (quoting Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013)). In addition, the plaintiff also

must show that the City, “through its deliberate conduct,” was the “‘moving force’ behind the

injury alleged.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).

The Amended Complaint does not allege any particularized facts connecting the John Doe

defendants’ actions to an unlawful City policy or custom. Under Count IV, the plaintiff asserts, in

a wholly conclusory fashion:

70. The City of Springfield, Tennessee . . . [is] liable for the conduct

alleged herein under a theory of municipal liability for permitting, encouraging,

tolerating, and knowingly acquiescing to an official pattern, practice, and policy or

custom within the Springfield Police Department . . . of violating the rights of its

citizens.

71. The City of Springfield [is] also liable for the conduct alleged herein

for failure within the Springfield Police Department . . . to train officers regarding

their obligations under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the laws of the

State of Tennessee in order to prevent violations of the same and harm to the

citizenry as a result thereof.

(Doc. No. 13 ¶¶ 70–71.)

To be clear, these are unverified allegations, not facts supported by evidence. Even if the

pleading were verified, however, these conclusory assertions are precisely the type of “unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” that are insufficient to give a claim “facial

plausibility” or to allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

The plaintiff has presented no evidence to contradict the City’s version of events, as

embodied in the Declarations of Bogle and Head. Based on the uncontroverted facts, the City is

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the City.

B. State Law Tort Claims

Insofar as the plaintiff seeks to impose vicarious liability on the City for the intentional

torts allegedly committed by the John Doe defendants, the City asserts that the facts show that

Bogle and Head did not commit any torts for which the City could be vicariously liable and that,

even if the plaintiff had any evidence to the contrary, the City is entirely immune from liability

under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-

205(2) (2024).

Again, the court finds that the City is entitled to summary judgment. First, the

uncontroverted facts establish that Bogle and Head did not engage in the alleged acts that gave rise

to the plaintiff’s claims. While the doctrine of respondeat superior establishes that “an employer

may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by its employee within the course and scope of

his or her employment,” Heflin v. Iberiabank Corp., 571 S.W.3d 727, 735 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018),

the City cannot be liable for the acts of individuals it did not employ.

Second, under the TGTLA, a municipality retains immunity for injuries that “arise[] out

of” “false arrest, malicious prosecution, . . . infliction of mental anguish, . . . or civil rights.” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 29-20-205(2). The plaintiff’s false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional

distress explicitly fall within the scope of the City’s immunity. Moreover, her assault and battery

claims “arise[] out of” her civil rights claims for false arrest and the use of excessive force. As

such, the City is immune from the assault and battery claims as well. Accord Kelley v. Root, No.

W2022-01625-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 323320, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2024) (affirming

summary judgment for the government entity defendant on the plaintiff’s assault and battery

1]

claims “under the civil rights exception to the GTLA”); Ruiz v. City of Lafayette, No. 2:23-CV-

00023, 2024 WL 735646, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 21, 2024) (Crenshaw, J.) (dismissing assault and

battery claims under the TGTLA as “essentially companion claims” to the plaintiffs civil rights

claims); Campbell v. Anderson Cnty., 695 F. Supp. 2d 764, 777-78 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (same,

dismissing under the TGTLA the plaintiffs false imprisonment, assault and battery, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and negligence claims because they were “alleged to have been

committed solely in the context of the violation of [the plaintiffs] civil rights”).

In sum, the plaintiff cannot show that Bogle and Head committed tortious acts for which

the City could be vicariously liable; even if she could, the City is immune from claims arising from

civil rights violations. The City is therefore entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs state

law tort claims.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 65)

will be granted, and the claims against the City will be dismissed with prejudice.

The claims against the John Doe defendants remain pending. The plaintiff, however, has

never identified or served the John Doe defendants, and the claims against them are now clearly

time-barred. Through this Memorandum (and the accompanying Order), the plaintiff is placed on

notice that her claims against the John Doe defendants will be dismissed without prejudice unless

the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure to serve them within 90 days after the Complaint was

filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

An appropriate Order is filed herewith. fi

United States District Judge