Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TTA SERVICES LLC d/b/a

THUNDERBOLT SIGNS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 26-370-JWD-RLB

DEEP SOUTH SIGNS LLC,

AND MORGAN DESCANT

RULING AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc.

4) filed by Plaintiff TTA Services LLC d/b/a Thunderbolt Signs (“Plaintiff” or “TTA”).

Defendants Deep South Signs, LLC, (“Deep South”) and Morgan Descant (collectively,

“Defendants”) oppose the motion. (Doc. 9.) While Plaintiff has time remaining to file a reply,

(Doc. 7), the Court finds that a reply is not necessary. The Court has carefully considered the law,

the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule.

For the following reasons, TTA’s motion is denied.

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. TTA and Morgan Descant

TTA’s operations include bidding for the installation of commercial signs for stores and

other businesses that utilize national sign companies for the creation and installation of signs for

the businesses’ new locations as well as replacement of signs at existing locations. (Compl. ¶ 10,

Doc. 1; see also id. at 25 (verifying Complaint).) The national sign companies utilize companies

like TTA to obtain the necessary permitting for and the construction of pylon signs and building

mounted signs where the national sign companies do not have installation crews. (Id. ¶ 11.)

Defendant Morgan Descant was the principal of a company named Morgan Signs, LLC

(“Morgan Signs”). (Id. ¶ 14.) Morgan Signs was in the commercial sign design and installation

business. (Id.)

In November 2017, TTA and Morgan Signs entered into an agreement under which TTA

purchased Morgan Signs’ assets. (Id. ¶ 15.) The transaction closed March 2018. (Id. ¶ 16.) Under

the agreement, Descant agreed to remain as a paid consultant to TTA for two years after the sale.

(Id. ¶ 17.) Descant determined installation methods for numerous jobs, supervised crews, and

directed work activities, and he also agreed not to conduct any separate and independent

commercial sign operations business for a two-year period. (Id. ¶¶ 18–19.) On February 20,

2020—at the expiration of the two-year consultancy period—Descant signed an extension on the

agreement not to compete and agreed to stay on as a consultant for two more years. (Id. ¶ 20.)

But, without Plaintiff’s knowledge, in October 2019, Descant formed the company that

would become Deep South, a commercial sign business. (Id. ¶ 21.) After litigation in the 19th JDC

over the noncompete and other matters, and after settlement of that case in September 2023, TTA

and Deep South continued to operate as separate and distinct commercial sign operations. (Id. ¶¶

23–25.)

B. The Scheme

In May 2025, Plaintiff began to receive information that Descant had embarked on a

fraudulent scheme to unfairly compete in the commercial sign installation market in the state of

Louisiana and throughout the Gulf South. (Id. ¶ 26.) According to Plaintiff, these allegations are

distinct from the prior litigation and are ongoing. (Id. ¶ 27.)

Shortly after the resolution of the previous litigation, TTA began noticing that the rate of

success on bids for installation contracts of several of its primary accounts was becoming less and

less common. (Id. ¶ 28.) The decline on these accounts continued through 2024 and into 2025, and

in 2025 receipts from nine national sign company accounts, which were believed to be affected by

the fraud, were less than 10% of what they had been in 2022. (Id. ¶ 29.)

According to the Complaint, national sign companies commonly maintain a stable of local

installation companies to perform their installations. (Id. ¶ 30.) In many cases, one or more project

managers employed by each national sign company are responsible for selecting from their stable

of local installers in particular geographic areas. (Id.) While certain project managers are given

some level of discretion in choosing the local installer, a bid process is usually a key feature in the

selection. (Id. at ¶ 31.)

The Complaint asserts that the reason for the decline in national sign company receipts

became plain when Plaintiff discovered information that Descant has engaged in a years-long

bribery and kickback scheme with at least one project manager with at least one national sign

company. (Id. ¶ 32.) The employee of one of the national sign companies, referred to in the

Complaint as Company A, is a project manager in charge of procuring bids for commercial sign

installation in the state of Louisiana and throughout the Gulf South. (Id. ¶ 33.)

Plaintiff claims that Company A has been a staple of TTA’s business from TTA’s

inception; that Company A and the project manager both reside outside of Louisiana; and that

Company A is unaware of the scheme between Descant and the project manager. (Id. ¶¶ 34–36.)

Plaintiff claims that Descant pays a portion of the fees from awarded contracts back to the

project manager, typically in the amount of 10% of the invoiced amount of a particular project.

(Id. ¶ 37.) As additional inducement, Descant has provided other goods and services to the project

manager. (Id. ¶ 38.) Descant has encouraged and the project manager has agreed to send all of

Company A’s commercial sign installation projects in Louisiana and Mississippi to Deep South.

(Id. ¶ 39.) The project manager has also directed projects to Deep South for installations in

Alabama and Texas. (Id. ¶ 40.)

The project manager has shared competitor pricing with Descant in connection with his

preparation of bids. (Id. ¶ 41.) The project manager has also educated Descant in the best way to

maximize the amount of his bids to the detriment of the national sign company and its own

customers, including by inflating the amounts charged relative to permitting, which are elements

of an invoice that typically receive little scrutiny. (Id. ¶ 42.)

Plaintiff alleges that the scheme continues to this day and involves project managers with

up to eight national sign companies. (Id. ¶¶ 43–44.) While discovered less than a year ago, the

scheme has been ongoing for at least four years, and it is estimated that, for Company A alone, the

invoices for the installation services that are part of the bribery and kickback scheme total over

$500,000. (Id. ¶ 45.)

Moreover, Descant has disparaged Plaintiff and its principals to the project manager in an

effort to convince the project manager to stop using Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 46.) Plaintiff had previously

been awarded a consistent stream of projects from Company A that began to dwindle once the

scheme alleged above began to take root. (Id. ¶ 54.)

C. Relief

Plaintiff asserts that “[i]mmediate injunctive relief is necessary to prevent this fraudulent

conduct and level the competitive playing field. Thereafter, Defendants should be held accountable

to pay Plaintiff the damages it has sustained.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff brings claims under the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), specifically 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d), (id.

¶¶ 51–79); the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., (id. ¶¶ 80–91); the Louisiana Unfair Trade

Practices Act (“LUTPA”), La. R.S. § 15:1401 et seq., (id. ¶¶ 92–100); and Louisiana law for

tortious interference with business relationships, (id. ¶¶ 101–06), and “general Louisiana tort

liability,” (id. ¶¶ 107–11).

Plaintiff asserts that it can demonstrate that its receipts from Company A have steadily

declined such that, in 2025, receipts from Company A were $0. (Id. ¶ 55.) According to Plaintiff,

the precipitous decline tracks the scheme by Descant and the project manager of Company A. (Id.

¶ 56.) The scheme began in 2023, and Plaintiff’s sales to Company A dropped by 69% from 2022

to 2023. Plaintiff’s sales to Company A dropped 94% from 2022 to 2024. (Id. ¶ 58.) Plaintiff

suffered lost profits, loss of business opportunities, reputational harm, and other damages

exceeding $800,000. (Id. ¶ 63.)

II. RELEVANT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides:

The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written

or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific

facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that

immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the

movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and

(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to

give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).

The four requirements for a temporary restraining order are the same for a preliminary

injunction: “the plaintiff must show 1) that there is a substantial likelihood that it will succeed on

the merits, 2) that there is a substantial threat that it will suffer irreparable injury if the district court

does not grant the injunction, 3) that the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the threatened

injury to the defendant, and 4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public

interest.” W. Sur. Co. v. PASI of LA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 764, 789 (M.D. La. 2018) (deGravelles,

J.) (citing Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. F.D.I.C., 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also

June Med. Servs., LLC v. Caldwell, No. 14-525, 2014 WL 4296679, at *5 (M.D. La. Aug. 31,

2014) (deGravelles, J.) (describing four requirements for temporary restraining order (citations

omitted)), abrogated on other grounds Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215

(2022), as recognized by June Med. Servs. LLC v. Phillips, 640 F. Supp. 3d 523 (M.D. La. 2022)

(deGravelles, J.).

“Injunctive relief is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, not to be granted routinely, but

only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” PASI, 334 F. Supp.

3d at 789–90 n.201 (citing Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir.

1985)). “Otherwise stated, if a party fails to meet any of the four requirements, the court cannot

grant the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.” Gonannies, Inc. v. Goupair.Com,

Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 603, 607 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (emphasis in original) (quoted with approval by

PASI, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 790).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Arguments

The Court finds that this motion turns on one element—the alleged substantial threat of

irreparable injury—so that is where the Court will focus its attention. Plaintiff acknowledges that

“established law discourages granting an injunction where monetary damages can compensate for

the loss,” but TTA argues that this barrier is not “insurmountable.” (Doc. 4-1 at 14.) Plaintiff cites

authority for the proposition that it can establish irreparable injury through proof of the potential

loss of its business and clients. (Id. at 14–15.) Plaintiff also asserts that future RICO violations can

be enjoined. (Id. at 15.)

Defendants oppose the motion. (Doc. 9.) Defendants argue that: (1) Plaintiff’s alleged

harms are monetary and can be undone through monetary damages, (id. at 8–9); (2) Plaintiff has

not pled or declared in its motion that Plaintiff’s goodwill has been or will be harmed or that its

operations will cease, (id. at 9–10); and (3) Plaintiff’s delay in filing suit shows no immediate and

irreparable harm, (id. at 10–12).

B. Good Will and Lost Profits

“Perhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction

is a demonstration that if it is not granted the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before

a decision on the merits can be rendered.” 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary

Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1 (3d ed. 2026). “Irreparable injury is harm that

‘cannot be undone through monetary damages,’ that is, harm for which money damages are

inadequate or for which money damages are ‘especially difficult’ to compute.” Johnson Controls,

Inc. v. Guidry, 724 F. Supp. 2d 612, 619 (W.D. La. 2010) (quoting Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of

Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir. 1981); Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc.,

878 F.2d 806, 810 n.1 (5th Cir.1989)). “The ‘central inquiry in deciding whether there is a

substantial threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff is whether the plaintiff’s injury could be

compensated by money damages.’” Id. (quoting Allied Mktg. Grp., 878 F.2d at 810 n.1).

Accordingly, “there can be no irreparable injury where money damages would adequately

compensate a plaintiff.” Id. (citing DFW Metro Line Servs. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1267,

1269 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citations omitted)).

This is not, however, an absolute rule. “Where economic rights are involved, irreparable

harm exists ‘when the nature of those rights makes establishment of the dollar value of the loss . . .

especially difficult or speculative.” Id. at 626 (citing Allied Mktg. Grp., 878 F.2d at 810; Block

Corp. v. Nunez, No. 08-53, 2008 WL 1884012, *6 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 25, 2008)). But “[w]hile a loss

of a business’ customers and damage to its goodwill are widely recognized as injuries incapable

of ascertainment in monetary terms and may thus be irreparable,” id. (citation omitted), a plaintiff

fails to meet its burden when it “specifically allege[s] the exact amount of profits it lost as a result

of the” defendant’s misconduct, see id. (finding when plaintiff did so that “these damages [were]

not incalculable or speculative”). Thus, “simply arguing that a company is losing customers and

goodwill without showing that monetary damages are an inadequate remedy is insufficient to

establish irreparable harm.” Id. at 620 (citing Millennium Rests. Grp. v. City of Dallas, 181 F.

Supp. 2d 659, 666 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Sun Water Sys., Inc. v. Vitasalus, Inc., No. 05-574, 2007 WL

820280, *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2007)).

Plaintiff fails to meet its burden of showing irreparable harm. Plaintiff provides an unsworn

declaration of Euguene F. Bagot III, TTA’s President, who swears that, since he “became aware

of Descant’s scheme, TTA has monitored its revenue from the company that employs Descant’s

co-conspirator as well as its revenues from other national sign installation companies.” (Bagot

Decl. ¶¶ 1, 16, Doc. 4-2.) Bagot says that, “[s]ince [he] became aware of Descant’s scheme, TTA’s

revenues from national sign installation companies have drastically declined.” (Id. ¶ 17.) Dona

Bagot handles TTA’s accounting, and she avers that, “[i]n the three year span of the

communications, data show bids rigged for just Company A exceed $500,000.” (D. Bagot Decl.

¶¶ 2, 28, Doc. 4-3.) The verified Complaint likewise states that “the scheme has been ongoing for

at least 4 years and it is estimated that for Company A alone, the value of the invoices for the

installation services that are part of the bribery and kickback scheme total over $500,000.” (Compl.

¶ 45, Doc. 1.) The Complaint later states that “Plaintiff can demonstrate that its receipts from

Company A have steadily declined such that in 2025 receipts from Company A were $0” and that

“Plaintiff’s sales to Company A from 2022 to 2024 reflect a drop of 94%.” (Id. ¶¶ 55, 58.) Plaintiff

pleads that it “suffered lost profits, loss of business opportunities, reputational harm, and other

damages exceeding $800,000.” (Id. ¶ 63.)

Thus, the verified Complaint and other evidence reflect that TTA can demonstrate with

considerable precision the lost profits it suffered as a result of the fraudulent scheme. Such losses

are not speculative or difficult to calculate, so Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief. See

Johnson, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 626.

Similarly, with respect to the loss of goodwill, the Complaint alleges that Descant has

disparaged Plaintiff and its principals to the project manager in an effort to convince the project

manager stop using Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 46.) Plaintiff had previously been awarded a consistent stream

of projects from Company A that began to dwindle once the scheme alleged above began to take

root. (Id. ¶ 54.) But, again, “simply arguing that a company is losing customers and goodwill

without showing that monetary damages are inadequate is insufficient to establish irreparable harm

as required for injunctive relief.” Johnson, 724 F. Supp. at 626. Without more, Plaintiff cannot

meet its burden of proving irreparable harm.

Even if Plaintiff had shown that its damages could not be easily calculated, Plaintiff fails

to demonstrate irreparable harm for an additional reason: Such a showing must be supported with

sufficient proof. The above allegations lack any documentation to support their conclusions. See

The Boil & Roux Kitchen, LLC v. East Baton Rouge Off. of Alcohol Beverage Control, No. 23-

409, 2023 WL 4041894, at *1 (M.D. La. May 31, 2023) (Dick, C.J.) (“[T]he Court denies

Plaintiff's Motion for TRO because the pleadings are devoid of any factually supported allegations

of any immediate or irreparable injury, loss, or damage that may result before the parties may be

heard on a preliminary injunction. . . . Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation of irreparable

injury in the form of ‘loss of profits and reputational damage.’”). Plaintiff submits nearly 150 pages

of text messages which purportedly establish the kickback scheme, (see D. Bagot Decl. Exs. 2-A

& 2-B, Doc. 4-3 at 7–147), but Plaintiff fails to provide a single pinpoint citation to any of these

texts, referring instead to the exhibits in globo. This is insufficient to support Plaintiff’s position.

Cf. Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 56 does not impose upon the

district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition

to summary judgment.” (quoting Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.

1998)) (citing Nissho-Iwai Am. Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1307 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that it

is not necessary “that the entire record in the case . . . be searched and found bereft of a genuine

issue of material fact before summary judgment may be properly entered”); and then citing United

States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles

buried in briefs.”))).

Ultimately, without more, TTA’s “damage, if any, does not rise to the irreparable harm

level necessary for the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction.” Johnson, 724 F. Supp. 2d

at 627. Plaintiff must therefore satisfy this element a different way.

C. Injunctive Relief and RICO

Plaintiff also claims that it has demonstrated irreparable harm by virtue of its RICO claim.

According to Plaintiff, “§ 1964 allows for future RICO violations to be enjoined.” (Doc. 4-1 at

15.) But the issue is not as clearcut as Plaintiff would like. As the Fourth Circuit recently observed:

Our sister circuits are evenly divided on this question, which

presents an issue of first impression for our Court. See Chevron

Corp. v. Donziger, 833 F.3d 74, 138–139 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding

that equitable relief is available); Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v.

Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 697 (7th Cir. 2001), rev’d on other

grounds, 537 U.S. 393 [ ] (2003) (same); Dixie Carriers, Inc. v.

Channel Fueling Serv., Inc., 843 F.2d 821, 829–830 (5th Cir. 1988)

(holding that equitable relief is not available); Religious Tech. Ctr.

v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).

Hengle v. Treppa, 19 F.4th 324, 353 (4th Cir. 2021).

Indeed, the state of the law is even more ambiguous in the Fifth than Hengle indicates.

“The appellate courts of the United States have expressed considerable doubt over whether

injunctive relief is even available to private plaintiffs under RICO.” Hinojosa v. City of Kingsville,

266 F. Supp. 2d 562, 564–65 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (citing Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d

970, 977 n.42 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that “there is considerable doubt that injunctive relief is

available to private plaintiffs under RICO . . . . The only court of appeals case to address the issue

has held that RICO does not allow private injunctive relief . . . and we have agreed in dicta”) (citing

Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1296 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994); and then citing Wollersheim, 796 F.2d

at 1082–89; and then citing In re Fredeman Litig., 843 F.2d 821, 830 (5th Cir. 1988); and then

comparing Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that RICO civil remedies provision

authorizes injunctive relief at the behest of private plaintiffs))). In Richard v. Hoechst Celanese

Chem. Grp., Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2003), the Fifth Circuit expressed some

agreement with the Second Circuit but only after stating: “This Court has not decided whether

equitable relief is available to a private civil RICO plaintiff. The circumstances before us do not

necessitate that we reach this question today.” Id. at 354–55 (internal citation omitted); see also

Cunningham v. Offshore Specialty Fabrications, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 614, 640–41 (E.D. Tex.

2008), aff’d sub nom., Brown v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 663 F.3d 759 (5th Cir. 2011)

(citing Richard for the proposition that the “Fifth Circuit came close to recognizing some form of

equitable relief in accepting the Second Circuit’s view”). Thus, any such leaning in Richard was

dicta. See Richard, 355 F.3d at 354–55 (“Even if equitable relief were available to a private party,

disgorgement is not a proper remedy given the circumstances present in this case.”). Ultimately,

the issue remains unresolved. See Cunningham, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (“The cases cited by both

parties are in agreement that the Fifth Circuit has not decided whether equitable relief is available

for private civil RICO plaintiffs under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)–(c).”).

Left with no clear answer, this Court is inclined to adopt the position of the Fourth Circuit,

which held that “Section 1964 does not authorize private RICO plaintiffs to sue for prospective

injunctive relief” because “the text of Section 1964 is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is

coherent and consistent.” Hengle, 19 F.4th at 356 (cleaned up); see also id. at 353–56 (analyzing

the statute). This position is most in line with basic principles of statutory interpretation. See id. at

356 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 n.7 (2001) (“[T]he interpretive inquiry begins

with the text and structure of the statute and ends once it has become clear that Congress did not

provide a cause of action.” (internal citation omitted))).

Nevertheless, this Court need not make this determination. Again, “a preliminary

injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should not be granted unless the party seeking it has

clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four requirements.” PASI, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 789–

90 (cleaned up). Given the uncertainty in the law—both outside this circuit and within it—the

Court cannot say that Plaintiff has “clearly” demonstrated entitlement to injunctive relief. With no

other showing of irreparable harm, Plaintiff’s motion must be denied.

D. Delay in Filing Suit

As this Court explained in Walker v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 25-514, 2025

WL 1901907 (M.D. La. July 1, 2025) (deGravelles, J.):

Again, to obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must establish,

inter alia, “that there is a substantial threat that it will suffer

irreparable injury if the district court does not grant the

injunction[.]” PASI, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 789 (citation omitted). Under

this requirement, “[t]he law is well-established that:”

[D]elay in seeking a remedy is an important factor

bearing on the need for a preliminary injunction.

Absent a good explanation, a substantial period of

delay militates against the issuance of a preliminary

injunction by demonstrating that there is no apparent

urgency to the request for injunctive relief.

Id. at 799 (quoting Gonannies, 464 F.Supp.2d at 609). “Wright and

Miller similarly recognizes: ‘A long delay by plaintiff after learning

of the threatened harm also may be taken as an indication that the

harm would not be serious enough to justify a preliminary

injunction.’” Id. (quoting 11A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller,

et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2948.1 (3d ed. 2018)).

Unlike a defense based upon the statute of

limitations, mere delay is not sufficient to bar

injunctive relief on the ground of laches. . . . Delay

coupled with knowledge and acquiescence in the acts

complained of, as well as prejudice to defendant

generally will be a sufficient basis for denying

injunctive relief. . . . The defense of laches is

equitable in nature and the court must look at all the

factors or circumstances relevant to a given case

when deciding whether relief should be barred. Thus,

a lapse of time because of plaintiff's ignorance of his

rights or his disability or in some situations, even

neglect, when it is not attributable to a lack of

diligence, should not bar the issuance of an

injunction.

Id. (quoting Wright & Miller, supra, at § 2946).

Nevertheless, this Court has recognized that delays of only a few

months can warrant denying a motion for preliminary injunction.

See also Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No.

18-23, 2019 WL 491312, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 7, 2019) (Dick, C.J.)

(citing Gonannies, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 609) (citing Tough Traveler,

Ltd. v. Outbound Prod., 60 F.3d 964, 968 (2d Cir. 1995) (vacating

preliminary injunction where movant waited four (4) months to seek

a preliminary injunction after filing suit); Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust,

756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985) (ten (10) week delay in seeking

injunction for trademark infringement undercut claim of irreparable

harm); Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1193

(5th Cir. 1975) (affirming district court’s denial of temporary

injunctive relief where movant, among other things, delayed three

(3) months in making its request) (descriptions of authority quoted

from Gonannies))). Indeed, excessive delay can be found even

where a plaintiff is trying to resolve the situation amicably. See

Gonannies, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (noting that six-month delay in

filing motion from discovery of infringing conduct was not justified,

even when plaintiff filed the motion “only after settlement

negotiations had soured.”).

Id. at *5–6.

Here, the verified Complaint states that, “[i]n May of 2025, Plaintiff began to receive

information that Descant had embarked on a fraudulent scheme to unfairly compete in the

commercial sign installation market in the state of Louisiana and throughout the Gulf South.”

(Compl. ¶ 26, Doc. 1.) Despite this, Plaintiff did not file suit and seek injunctive relief until nearly

one year later, in April of 2026. Clearly, “such delay militates against a finding of irreparable harm

under the above authorities.” Walker, 2025 WL 1901907, at *7 (citing Atchafalaya Basinkeeper,

2019 WL 491312, at *2 (collecting cases)). “At the very least, Plaintiff has not ‘clearly carried’

his burden of showing irreparable harm.” Id. (quoting PASI, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 789–90 (citation

omitted)). And “though delays can be justified with ‘a good explanation,’ see PASI., 334 F. Supp.

3d at 799, here, Plaintiff has none.” Id.

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s “delay was excessively long and unjustified.” Id.

For that additional reason, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

[continued on next page]

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 4) filed by

Plaintiff TTA Services LLC d/b/a Thunderbolt Signs is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within seven (7) days of this ruling, the parties file

simultaneous briefs, not to exceed five (5) pages, addressing why the Motion for Preliminary

Injunction should not be denied for the same reasons given in this ruling.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Tuesday, April 28, 2026, status conference is

RESET to May 5, 2026, at 2:00 p.m. The conference shall take place by Zoom video conference.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on April 21, 2026.

S

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA