Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KAMIL T. BROWN,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-cv-00445

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

CAISON,

Defendant.

ORDER

Kamil T. Brown, formerly incarcerated at SCI-Camp Hill, proceeds

on retaliation and excessive force claims against Samuel Caison, a

correctional officer at the prison. Caison has moved for summary

judgment (Doc. 24), and Brown has not responded despite multiple

extensions of the deadline to do so. Because Brown has not properly

exhausted administrative remedies as to his claims for money damages,

and the record forecloses any reasonable inference that Caison violated

his constitutional rights, the Court grants summary judgment to Caison.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court received Brown’s verified complaint against four

defendants affiliated with SCI-Camp Hill on May 7, 2024. (Doc. 1). As

relevant here, the complaint alleges that Caison engaged in a campaign

of abuse and harassment against Brown in retaliation for Brown

submitting prison grievances and other complaints against Caison. The

complaint requests “pun[i]tive and compensatory damages to be

determined by a jury,” and no other relief. (Doc. 1 at 5). Following a

motion to dismiss, Brown was permitted to proceed on two claims against

Caison: an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim based on a June 14,

2022, incident in which Caison allegedly “grabb[ed Brown] around the

neck,” and a First Amendment retaliation claim based on Caison’s

purportedly illegitimate search of Brown’s cell on September 30, 2022.

(Doc. 12).

Caison moved for summary judgment on July 11, 2025, and his brief

in support was filed on September 23, 2025. Brown failed to respond to

the motion within the time allotted, and the Court issued two orders

extending the deadline and warning that the motion would be deemed

unopposed if Brown did not respond. (Docs. 33, 35). The Court then

granted a final, limited extension to February 19, 2026, after Brown filed

a motion claiming he was unable to meet the last deadline due to

unspecified “personal reasons.” (Docs. 36, 37). Brown has not

responded to the motion, and the time to do so has passed.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome

of the case. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”

, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all

inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the

movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.”

, 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking

summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence

of a genuine dispute of material fact. , 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant

must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that

“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to

the jury.” , 477 U.S. at 251-52.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first

determine if the moving party has made a showing that it is

entitled to summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S.

at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the

burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a

genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477

U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those

made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory

answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

Because Brown has not responded to the motion, Caison’s properly

supported statements of fact are deemed unopposed. M.D. Pa. L.R.

56-1. Regardless, the Court must review the record to establish “that the

facts specified in or in connection with the motion entitle the moving

party to judgment as a matter of law.”

, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990).

III. MATERIAL FACTS

The summary judgment record describes three incidents at SCI-

Camp Hill involving Brown and Caison, and documents the prison

grievances Brown pursued after each incident. The Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections (“DOC”) provides a three-part procedure for

grievances: initial review by a Grievance Officer, appeal to the Facility

Manager, and final appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances

and Appeals (“SOIGA”). To begin the grievance process, the prisoner

must provide a factual summary of the claim and state the relief

requested. DC-ADM 804 (“Inmate Grievance System”), § 1.A.1 As

relevant here, “[i]f the inmate desires compensation or other legal relief

normally available from a court, the inmate must request the specific

relief sought in his/her initial grievance.” ., § 1.A.11.d.

In the first incident, on June 14, 2022, Caison issued a misconduct

report against Brown for “Presence in [an] Unauthorized Area.” In brief,

the report alleged that Caison witnessed Brown on the “B side” of the

1 Although not included among the summary judgment papers, the

Court takes judicial notice of the current version of DC-ADM 804, a

publicly available policy that has been in effect since May 1, 2015. ,

, , No. 1:23-CV-1781, 2026 WL 286179, at *2 n.2

(M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2026).

prison, in an area where he was not permitted. Caison repeatedly ordered

Brown to return to the “A side” where he was housed. Brown “became

irate” before ultimately complying “at his leisure.” During this dispute,

Brown threatened to file a falsified grievance against Caison. The

misconduct report was referred to “informal resolution,” meaning that

Brown suffered no loss of privileges. (Doc. 31-1).

On the same date, Brown filed a grievance that told his own version

of this incident, in which he accused Caison of “grabb[ing Brown] by [the]

neck,” drafting a falsified report, and using “[intimidation] tactics to

silence [Brown] from writing this grievance.” The grievance did not

clearly state the relief requested, but Brown wrote that he “would like to

press charge[s]” against Caison. (Doc. 31-3 at 5).

Six days later, on June 20, Brown attended a sick call in which he

told a physician assistant that he “had an altercation on 6/14/22 and

desires something for neck stiffness and pain.” He did not otherwise

describe the injury and had no apparent limitation to his range of motion,

but “want[ed] it documented that he has neck pain.” The provider

initially recommended Motrin, but it is unclear if this was ever

prescribed, because he was already taking Naproxen for an unrelated

issue. (Doc. 31-4). On June 23, Brown had a “mental health contact”

in which he told a provider that he had “a verbal altercation with a Sgt.

and [was] worried about how that [would] play out.” (Doc. 31-5).

Ultimately, DOC investigators found that Brown’s allegations of physical

abuse were “unsubstantiated,” because there were no witnesses and no

video footage of the incident. (Docs. 31-2, 31-3).

On August 29, 2022, Brown was involved in another dispute with

Caison. In a grievance, Brown claimed that Caison had “refused to let

[him] out on time” for a scheduled telephone call at 6:10 p.m. Brown

claimed that Caison did not let him out until 6:20 p.m., which in turn

“cause[d Brown] to lose out on 6:30 p.m. yard time.” The grievance officer

reviewed camera footage and found that Brown had been released to use

the phone at 6:12 p.m., and used the phone from 6:13 p.m. to 6:36 p.m.,

in excess of his allotted 15 minutes, and thus Caison was not responsible

for Brown missing yard time. (Doc. 31-6).

Finally, Brown filed a grievance in which he alleged that Caison

conducted an improper search of his cell on September 30, 2022. Brown

alleged that Caison “took it upon himself to conduct a full[-]fledge[d]

security investigative search” without Brown present. Brown allegedly

returned to his cell and found it “ransack[ed]” and in “disarray,” with

various items strewn about the floor, and with “one brown t-shirt [and] a

car magazine” missing. As relief, he requested Caison’s “removal from

any [and] all further interaction with general population.” Upon review

of surveillance video, the grievance officer found that Caison had

removed “an extra mattress and a large amount of excessive linens,”

which did not require a confiscation slip because they were state property,

and that “[n]o evidence exists”2 to corroborate Brown’s allegations that

his cell was left in disarray. (Doc. 31-7 at 6-7).

IV. DISCUSSION

Caison is entitled to summary judgment because Brown did not

properly exhaust administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners3 complaining about the conditions of

their confinement must exhaust available administrative remedies

2 In appealing the denial of this grievance, Brown claimed to have

“witnesses that saw [Caison] leave the cell in disarray,” but did not

identify the witnesses. (Doc. 31-7 at 5).

3 Although Brown has now been released from custody, these rules

still apply to this case because he filed the operative complaint from

prison. , 938 F.3d 69, 88 (3d Cir. 2019).

before they may file suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA

requires proper exhaustion, meaning plaintiffs must administratively

grieve their claims in accordance with the procedural rules of the prison

in which they are incarcerated. , 968 F.3d

299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing , 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)).

Because the DOC’s rules require that “the inmate must request the

specific relief sought in his/her initial grievance,” a prisoner who has not

requested money damages during the grievance process cannot seek

money damages in federal court. , , , 729 F. App’x

225, 227 (3d Cir. 2018); , No. 1:20-CV-00266, 2024 WL

3034099, at *17-18 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 2024) (addressing claims for

compensatory and punitive damages); , No. 1:22-CV-

583, 2024 WL 1557377, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2024).

Here, the undisputed evidence shows that Brown did not request

monetary relief in his grievances about the June 14 altercation with

Caison or the September 30 cell search.4 Because he only seeks

4 Brown also did not make any such request in his grievance

appeals. (Docs. 31-3, 31-7); , No. 20-CV-01836, 2023

WL 7329526, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2023) (finding that plaintiff’s claim

for money damages was exhausted when he sought money damages in

his grievance appeal and the request was considered on its merits).

compensatory and punitive damages in this case, and he has not

exhausted those claims for money damages in accordance with the DOC’s

rules, the Court must grant summary judgment to Caison. ,

2024 WL 3034099, at *17-18.

Moreover, Brown has not presented evidence that could have

sustained his claims on their merits. Even assuming a genuine dispute

of fact as to whether Caison “grabbed” Brown’s neck or throat, this alone

would not defeat summary judgment on his excessive force claim; he

would have to show that the officer used more than force.

, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (not every “malevolent touch

by a prison guard” violates the Eighth Amendment); , 532

F. App’x 78, 82 (3d Cir. 2013) (summary judgment appropriate where

officer used force, despite plaintiff’s allegations of pain). The

record shows that Caison would have been justified in using some force,

given that Brown was in an unauthorized area of the prison and

disobeyed verbal orders to leave. , 293 F.3d 641,

649 (3d Cir. 2002) (force applied “in a good-faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline” does not violate the Eighth Amendment).

Brown’s retaliation claim would also fail on its merits. He alleges

that the September 30 cell search was “in retaliation for” his August 29

grievance about the denial of yard time. However, he has not disputed

the evidence that this was a frivolous grievance based on allegations he

knew to be false, which is not protected conduct that can sustain a

retaliation claim. , No. 4:23-CV-00015, 2024 WL

265867, at *3 n. 43 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2024) (citing

, 905 F.3d 165, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2018) (the First Amendment does

not protect “false statements of fact”)). Nor could a jury reasonably find

a “pattern of antagonism” by Caison supporting an inference of

retaliation for prior grievances. To the contrary, the record shows that

Brown’s repeated allegations of abuse by Caison were investigated and

consistently found to be unsupported or contradicted by video, written

records, and/or interviews with staff. (Doc. 1-1 (documenting

responses to seven grievances Brown filed against Caison)).

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 24) is

GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter JUDGMENT in favor of the

defendant and against the plaintiff.

2. The Clerk is directed to mark this case as CLOSED.

Dated: March 12, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge